Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270: Telegram

General Marshall to the Acting Secretary of State ¹⁹

[Nanking,] 14 December 1946.

1874. I am transmitting herewith redraft of the Presidential statement proposed in your 87476. This was prepared in conference with Dr. Stuart and Mr. Butterworth. We are all in agreement as to the changes proposed. Referring to the statement regarding my stay in China, it is important to amend that somewhat as indicated in the redraft because it appears now very likely that I should return to Washington in the near future, though this possibility should not leak out.

There is no reason why this statement by the President should be delayed. I am agreeable to its immediate issuance.

The redraft of the statement follows:²⁰

• [2.] The policies of this Government were also made clear in my statement of last December. We recognized the National Government of the Republic of China as a [the] legal government. We undertook to assist the Chinese Government in reoccupation of liberated areas and in disarming and repatriating the Japanese invaders. And finally, as China moved toward peace and unity along the lines mentioned, we were prepared to assist the Chinese economically and in other ways.
• [3.] I asked General Marshall to go to China as my representative. We had agreed upon my statement of the United States Government’s views and policies regarding China as his directive. He knew full well in undertaking the mission that halting civil strife, broadening the view of the Chinese Government and bringing about a united, democratic China were tasks for the Chinese themselves. He went as a great American to make his outstanding abilities and the appropriate assistance of this Government available to the Chinese.
• [4.] During the war, the United States entered into an agreement with the Chinese Government regarding the training and equipment of a special force of 39 divisions. That training ended [on] V–J Day and the transfer of the equipment had been largely completed when General Marshall arrived.
• [5.] The United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics all committed themselves to the liberation of China, including the return of Manchuria to Chinese control. Our Government had agreed to assist the Chinese Government in the reoccupation of areas liberated from the Japanese, including Manchuria, because of China’s lack of shipping and transport planes. Four armies were moved by air and eleven by sea, to Central China, Formosa, North China and Manchuria. Most of these moves had been made or started when General Marshall arrived.
• [6.] The disarming and evacuation of Japanese progressed slowly—too slowly. We regarded our commitment to assist the Chinese in this program as of overwhelming importance to the future peace of China and the whole Far East. Surrendered but undefeated Japanese armies and hordes of administrators, technicians, and Japanese merchants, totalling about 3,000,000 persons, had to be removed under the most difficult conditions. At the request of the Chinese Government we had retained a considerable number of American troops in China, and immediately after V–J Day we landed a corps of Marines in North China. The principal task of these forces was to assist in the evacuation of Japanese. Only some 200,000 had been returned to Japan by the time General Marshall arrived.
• [9.] Events moved rapidly upon General Marshall’s arrival. With all parties availing themselves of his impartial advice, agreement for a country-wide truce was reached and announced on January 10th. A feature of this agreement was the establishment of a unique organization, the Executive Headquarters in Peiping. It was realized that due to poor communications and the bitter feelings on local fronts, generalized orders to cease fire and withdraw might have little chance of being carried out unless some authoritative executive agency, trusted by both sides, could function in any local situation.
• [10.] The Headquarters functioned under the leaders [leadership] of three commissioners—one American who served as chairman, one Chinese Government representative, and one representative of the ‘Chinese Communist Party. Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Chargé d’Affaires of the American Embassy in China, served as chairman until his return to this country in the fall. In order to carry out its function in the field, Executive Headquarters formed a large number of truce teams, each headed by one American officer, one Chinese Government officer, and one Chinese Communist officer. They proceeded to all danger spots where fighting was going on or seemed impending and saw to the implementation of the truce terms, often under conditions imposing exceptional hardships and requiring courageous action. The degree of cooperation attained between Government and Communist officers in the Headquarters and on the truce teams was a welcome proof that despite two decades of fighting, these two Chinese groups could work together.
• [11.] Events moved forward with equal promise on the political front. On January 10th, the Political Consultative Conference began its sessions with representatives of the Kuomintang or Government Party, the Communist Party and several minor political parties participating. Within 3 weeks of direct discussion these groups had come to a series of statesman-like agreements on outstanding political and military problems. The agreements provided for an interim government of a coalition type with representation of all parties, for revision of the draft constitution along democratic lines prior to its discussion and adoption by a National Assembly, and for reduction of the Government and Communist armies and their eventual amalgamation into a small modernized truly national army responsible to a civilian government.
• [13.] While comprehensive large scale aid has been delayed, this Government has completed its wartime lend-lease commitments to China. Lend-lease assistance was extended to China to assist her in fighting the Japanese, and later to fulfill our promise to assist in reoccupying the country from the Japanese. Assistance took the form of goods and equipment and of services. Almost half the total made available to China consisted of services, such as those involved in air and water transportation of troops. According to the latest figures reported, lend-lease assistance to China up to V–J Day totalled approximately $870,000,000. From V–J Day to the end of February, shortly after General Marshall’s arrival, the total was approximately $602,000,000—mostly in transportation costs. Thereafter, the program was reduced [to] the fulfillment of outstanding commitments, much of which was later suspended.
• [15.] China agreed to buy all surplus property owned by the United States in China and on 17 Pacific Islands and bases with certain exceptions. Six months of negotiations preceded the agreement finally signed in August. It was imperative that this matter be concluded in the Pacific as had already been done in Europe, especially in view of the rapid deterioration of the material in open storage under tropical conditions and the urgent need for the partial alleviation of the acute economic distress of the Chinese people which it was hoped this transaction would permit. Aircraft, all non-demilitarized material, and fixed installations outside of China were excluded. Thus, no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement.
• [16.] The Chinese Government cancelled all but 30,000,000 United States dollars of our indebtedness for the Chinese currency, and promised [to] make available the equivalent of 35,000,000 United States dollars for use in paying United States governmental expenses in China and acquiring and improving buildings and properties for our diplomatic and consular establishments. An additional sum of 20,000,000 United States dollars is also designated for the fulfillment of a cultural and educational program.
• [17.] Before General Marshall arrived in China for the second time, in April, there was evidence that the truce agreement was being disregarded. The sincere and unflagging efforts of Executive Headquarters and its truce teams have succeeded in many instances in preventing or ending local engagements and thus saved thousands of lives. But fresh outbreaks of civil strife continued to occur, reaching a crisis of violence in Manchuria with the capture of Changchun by the Communists and where the presence of truce teams had not been fully agreed to by the National Government.
• [19.] There has been encouraging progress in other fields, particularly the elimination of Japanese from China. The Chinese Government was responsible under an Allied agreement for the disarmament of all Japanese military personnel and for the repatriation of all Japanese civilians and military personnel from China, Formosa and French Indo-China north of the sixteenth degree of latitude.²¹
• [21.] At the end of last year, approximately 200,000 Japanese had been repatriated. They were leaving Chinese ports at a rate of about 2,500 a day. By March of this year, rapidly increased efforts on the part of the American forces and the Chinese authorities involved had increased this rate to more than 20,000 a day. By the last of October, 2,980,361 Japanese had been evacuated and the program was considered completed. Except for indeterminate numbers in certain parts of Manchuria, only war criminals and technicians retained on an emergency basis by the Chinese Government remain. That [this] tremendous undertaking has been accomplished despite conflict, disrupted communications and other difficulties will remain an outstanding example of successful American-Chinese cooperation toward a common goal.
• [22.]²²
• [23.]²³ Another duty our forces undertook immediately upon the Japanese surrender was to provide the necessary protection so that coal from the great mines northeast of Tientsin could reach the sea for shipment to supply the cities and railroads of Central China. This coal was essential to prevent the collapse of this industrial area. Our Marines were withdrawn from this duty last September.²¹
• [24.] At peak strength a year ago we had some 113,000 soldiers, sailors and Marines in China. Today this number is being reduced to less than 12,000, including some 2,000 directly concerned with the operations of Executive Headquarters and will be further reduced to the number required to supply and secure the American personnel of Executive Headquarters and the air field and stores at Tsingtao.
• [25.] Thus, during the past year we have successfully assisted in the repatriation of the Japanese and have subsequently been able to bring most of our own troops home.²¹
• [26.] It is a matter of deep regret that China has not yet been able to achieve unity by peaceful methods. Because he knows how tedious [serious] the problem is, and how important it is to reach a solution, General Marshall has remained at his post even though active negotiations have been broken off by the Communist Party. We are ready to help China as she moves toward peace and genuine democratic government.
• [27.] The views expressed a year ago by this Government are valid today. The plan for political unification agreed to last February is sound. The plan for military unification of last February has been made difficult of implementation by the progress of the fighting since last April, but the general principles involved are fundamentally sound. But China is a sovereign nation. We recognize that fact and we recognize the National Government of China. We continue to hope that the Government will find a peaceful solution.
• [28.] We are pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China. Our position is clear. While avoiding involvement in their civil strife, we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country.
• [29.] As ways and means are presented for constructive aid to China, we will give them careful and sympathetic consideration. An example of such aid is the recent agricultural mission to China under Dean Hutchison of the University of California sent at the request of the Chinese Government.²⁴
• [30.] In short, we believe that our hopes for China are identical with what the Chinese people themselves most earnestly desire. We shall therefore continue our positive and realistic policy toward China which is based on full respect for her national sovereignty and on our traditional friendship for the Chinese people and is intended to promote international peace.²⁵

19. Copy transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State by the War Department on December 15.
20. Bracketed numbering corresponds to that in telegram No. 87476, December 11, p. 610; paragraphs omitted are the same as corresponding paragraphs in telegram No. 87476, or have only unimportant verbal changes. Bracketed corrections are based on the telegram as sent to the War Department by General Marshall.
21. Remainder of paragraph unchanged.
22. Unchanged except that last sentence was deleted by General Marshall’s redraft.
23. First five sentences unchanged.
21. Remainder of paragraph unchanged.
21. Remainder of paragraph unchanged.
24. Remainder of paragraph unchanged.
25. For text of statement by President Truman on December 18, see United States Relations With China, p. 689. This text is the same as General Marshall’s redraft except for slight revisions, most of them of a verbal nature. In paragraph [1], the first four words were replaced by “Last December”. In paragraph [3], third sentence, the word “view” was changed to “base”; fourth sentence, the phrase “and the appropriate assistance of this Government” was deleted. In paragraph [5], third sentence, “Four armies” was changed to “Three armies”. In paragraph [10], first sentence, the word “functioned” was changed to “operated”. In paragraph [12], third sentence, the word “assurance” was changed to “substance”. In paragraph [13], sixth sentence, the figure “$602,000,000” was changed to “$600,000,000”. In paragraph [19], fifth sentence, last three words changed to “to be evacuated”. In paragraph [21], fourth sentence, first words changed to “By November, 2,986,438 Japanese”. In paragraph [29], last sentence, the clause “When conditions in China improve,” was inserted preceding the original wording. In paragraph [30], the first two words were deleted and, in final sentence, the word “intended” was changed to “designed”.