Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Dr. Stuart at the American Embassy, December 13, 1946, 10:30 a.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Underwood |
Dr. Stuart stated that the Generalissimo wants a conference with General Marshall and Dr. Stuart, The Generalissimo has been wondering why he hasn’t seen more of General Marshall. Dr. Stuart said he had explained the matter by stating that General Marshall desired to avoid any misunderstanding which might come from his associations with one side while the other side had withdrawn from negotiations.
Dr. Stuart referred to a conference with the Generalissimo on the preceding day in which the Generalissimo showed deeper feeling and embarrassment over the situation in China than ever before. The Generalissimo had studied a memorandum from Dr. Stuart15 which covered the rendering of technical advice and assistance by the United States. The Generalissimo honestly desires United States help in making China strong, modern, and efficient. He regards the primary problem as one of governmental organization. He desires advice in this field much more than loans and material aid.
Dr. Stuart mentioned to the Generalissimo the report of the Agricultural Mission.16 He said that this report needed thorough backing within the Government in order to be implemented. This program, if carried out properly, would give positive evidence of the Government’s sincerity for the welfare of the people of China, since it goes to the very heart of the problem; namely, the rural areas. The Generalissimo seemed ready to carry out such a program. Dr. Stuart felt that if fighting were stopped, the railroads protected, the Government advised on organization and technical matters, the door kept open for Communist participation in the Government but no actual pressure placed on them, the Communists might possibly come to terms.
Dr. Stuart said that if General Marshall’s mission were to bring stability to China and the Far East, his job has just begun, his mission only started. He said the Generalissimo honestly desired General Marshall to stay in China as his advisor. The Generalissimo was worried by rumors that General Marshall would become a Presidential candidate and he figured that General Marshall could do more good for humanity by staying in China than by becoming President of the United States. The Generalissimo believes that General Marshall is the one man who can lead China out of her ancient inefficiencies and [Page 622] give her honest government and an efficient army. Dr. Stuart said the task bristled with difficulties, but was nevertheless an immense opportunity.
General Marshall stated that the basic question was where the most important service to China could be rendered. General Marshall described himself as struggling with two problems: the power of the reactionaries in the Government, and the difficulty of dealing with the Communist Party in its immense distrust of the National Government. He considered that the best way to defend against Communism was for the existing government of China to accomplish such reforms that it would gain the support of the people. General Marshall commented on the destructive influence of the reactionaries in the Government and stated that the Generalissimo’s own feelings were so deep and so colored that it was most difficult to divorce him from the reactionaries. General Marshall stated that the solution seemed to call for building up the liberals under the Generalissimo at the same time that he tore down the reactionaries. Blasting the reactionaries by a statement in China would only provide tremendous encouragement to the Communists. A statement made in the U. S., however, would get heavy news coverage, and would be reflected with less distortion all over China. Any statement, however, must be very forceful. It must explain the situation to the people of America, must make reactionaries in China plainly see the handwriting on the wall and must strengthen the liberals.
General Marshall read Dr. Soong’s memorandum (on file in Embassy)17 on Communist intentions. He called attention to the uncertainty as to the sources of the information and commented that analysis was difficult since the truth of the statements could not be determined. Dr. Stuart said that the incoherence of the memorandum caused him to regard it as probably genuine. He said that any Chinese spy sitting in on Communist meetings would probably be confused, somewhat unnerved by pressure and incapable of understanding many of the issues. He stated that he would ask Dr. Soong how the information was obtained (later in the day, Dr. Stuart reported that Dr. Soong would not reveal his source but stated unequivocally that the memorandum was genuine).
General Marshall expressed his belief that no statement should be made until the Constitution is adopted and the Government has taken steps to enforce the Constitution and reorganize the Government. He referred to a proposed statement which he would shortly receive from the State Department, and which the State Department was most anxious to issue at once.
[Page 623]General Marshall referred to the Generalissimo’s desire for American advice. He said that machinery already existed for providing military and naval advice. The big question, however, concerned means of making practical use of this machinery which, presently, was being neutralized by the civil war. He stated that one of the prime needs of the Government was to place its financial procedure on a sound basis. Other ripe fields include the establishment of a firm budget and the general overhauling of taxation programs. American advisors could be quite helpful on these matters provided they were given sufficient authority and direct access to Government figures on a decision level. He emphasized, however, that corruption within the Government could not be eliminated through advice. Corruption could only be eliminated by the existence of an effective opposition party.
General Marshall asked Dr. Stuart for the Generalissimo’s reaction to Dr. Stuart’s scheme for reopening the two north and south railroad lines in North China. Dr. Stuart said that the Generalissimo accepted the idea and expressed a willingness to approach the Communists. General Marshall doubted that the Communists would agree to the railroad proposal. The Communists were so distrustful of the Government that they would probably regard the proposal as a guise for moving troops into the Communist areas. However, General Marshall regarded the railroad issue as extremely vital. He thought it might be more realistic to start on the Tientsin-Pukow line, since it did not traverse the heart of the Communist area. If the experiment proved successful in this area, sufficient mutual faith might be developed to permit application of the procedure in other areas. General Marshall recognized that the successful carrying out of such a program required faithful keeping of the peace which would be supremely difficult because of the mass of misrepresentation to be encountered on both sides.
Dr. Stuart stated that there was no one else in China with the Generalissimo’s ability, prestige, character, and sincerity. He said that the Generalissimo had been struggling with himself and that he was now ready and anxious to go down in history as the man who brought unity and liberal government to China.
General Marshall asked Dr. Stuart for his opinion of Dr. C. P. Lee. He mentioned that Dr. Mills,18 who had first brought Dr. Stuart to General Marshall’s attention, also sponsored Dr. Lee. Dr. Stuart said that Dr. Lee was probably a well-meaning individual who wants to be helpful, but that he actually did not believe that Dr. Lee could be of any great practical help. General Marshall then asked for Dr. [Page 624] Stuart’s opinion of Mr. Mo Te-hui. Dr. Stuart described him as able, patriotic, and selfless.
Dr. Stuart said that the Generalissimo wished to know General Marshall’s reaction to General Chang Chun’s trip to Yenan, now that the Communists had taken a truculent attitude on the matter. General Marshall reminded Dr. Stuart that it had always been his idea that the trip to Yenan should await adoption of the Constitution and positive manifestations of Government intentions to reorganize and to enforce the Constitution. Also, the trip to Yenan must not be shackled with stipulations.
Dr. Stuart stated that the Generalissimo was vastly worried over the leaking out of the plans for the trip to Yenan. It was believed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was responsible for disseminating the general theory behind the trip.
Dr. Stuart said that the Generalissimo wanted a conference with both himself and General Marshall to discuss American advice and supervision of the modernization of China’s government system to permit establishment of a progressive, democratic organ. General Marshall suggested that the Generalissimo might be making this recommendation as a means of bidding for the support of himself and Dr. Stuart to the Government cause. Dr. Stuart agreed that this motive entered into the Generalissimo’s thinking, but that the overriding factor was the Generalissimo’s overwhelming desire to bring democracy and good government to the people of China.