893.00/10–3146
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 27.]
Sir: I have the honor to continue the report of attempted peace negotiations by the minority parties and a few nonparty leaders. These were begun in Shanghai where General Chou En-lai had been keeping himself for some weeks, thus dramatizing his withdrawal from the mediation efforts of General Marshall and myself. Dr. Sun Fo joined in the Shanghai conferences as did a few other representatives of the Government. Finally General Chou was prevailed upon to return to the capital with the members of the so-called Third Group. It has since been disclosed that before doing so he cleverly secured the signatures of the two minority party leaders to an agreement by which they bound themselves to act with the Communists either in attending or boycotting the program for a coalition government and the National Assembly.
The conferences continued in Nanking, General Marshall and I keeping in touch with them but trying scrupulously to avoid any appearance even of interfering with this purely Chinese attempt at a solution. As had happened more than once before, it seemed that a solution had been almost reached when the Government-captured city [Page 458] of Antung on the Korean border produced a violent emotional reaction among the Communists, who withdrew from further discussions.
General Chou En-lai called on me one afternoon looking rather distraught and haggard. He had lost his characteristic vivacity and spoke without enthusiasm. In the course of the discussion he reviewed the eight points in President Chiang’s open letter of October 17 finding fault with almost every one, although at least three were definite concessions to the Communists extracted from President Chiang by General Marshall. The total impression made upon me by that interview was that he was in a state of mind which prevented him from seeing any good in the Government attitude and very little in that of the American mediators, so warped had all facts become when seen through the fog of deep suspicion and mistrust which had become even thicker.
A day or so later he called on General Marshall, who graciously kept him for lunch. The conversation, while dealing more with military questions, seemed to me to be equally hopeless as far as any basis in any common outlook was concerned.
Meanwhile, the Third Group prepared their proposals which, after several revisions, were presented to Government and Communist delegates on October 28. A few hours later they were withdrawn upon General Chou’s objection to several points. On October 29 President Chiang received the delegates cordially but pointed out that as mediators they should have confined themselves to the eight points of his communication or have brought counterproposals from the other side rather than themselves to propose a solution.
The Government has been taking advantage of this delay to carry on offensive military operations with a view to destroying Communist bases and in general to weaken their military position. This is, of course, contrary to the spirit of mediation and aggravates the American embarrassment. They doubtless justify themselves by the expectation that this will make the Communists more reasonable and probably lead them to come into the coalition government. Underlying this action is the same distrust of Communist promises and the determination to avoid another cease-firing order as futile as the one of January 13 has proven to be. There is no indication as yet, however, that the Communists, who are enured to defeats, retreats and hardships, will come to terms. Their armed forces are still in the main intact and by withdrawing to inaccessible mountain fastnesses, they can still carry on harassing guerilla warfare.
The Government apparently intends to hold the National Assembly with or without the participation of the other recognized parties. All this would seem to indicate that the period of mediatorial efforts for a negotiated peace has passed. If so, the hope would seem to lie [Page 459] in an acceptance by President Chiang and his associates of the responsibility of ending the period of one-party tutelage and establishing real democracy with the internal reforms that are so urgently required. This might emphasize the following features:
- 1.
- Reorganization of the Government troops so as to effect drastic reductions in numbers, improvement of the quality and the employment of those retained in defense against future Communist aggression, the suppression of local violence from whatever sources, and in general the maintenance of peace and order.
- 2.
- The real improvement of local administration, especially in areas recovered from Communists and those contiguous to territory held at present by them. In so far as this can be achieved and interest in local affairs be encouraged will Communism be most effectively overcome while at the same time beginning the practice of democracy.
- 3.
- Progress in the two above undertakings would be the surest method of economic recovery. The Chinese people, given a fair measure of stability, will not need much else from the Government in their economic activities. The Central Government could in the meantime be carrying out measures that could be extremely beneficial, such as land tenure reforms, more efficient taxation, communications, technological developments, et cetera.
It is not impossible that some such procedure as is suggested above would ultimately bring the Communists in as a political party, perhaps with the incorporation of their armed forces into those of the nation together with assistance in demobilization in part. If the policy set forth in President Truman’s statement of December 1531 and consistently advocated by General Marshall seems to have failed, there is at least the satisfaction of reminding ourselves that it has been given the most complete opportunity. I can testify as to the patience, tact, understanding sympathy, the frank but always constructive criticism, and in general the skill with which General Marshall has conducted these seemingly interminable negotiations. My own more recent and minor association in these has convinced me further that every approach has been explored and every effort exhausted to induce the Communists to cooperate and that they seem to be either unable or unwilling to do so under any practicable arrangement. That they themselves have honestly tried and sincerely feel that they have been thwarted despite their own repeated concessions and that Government leaders must take a large share of the blame for the failure can all be freely admitted, but the complex of twenty years of intense hatred, suspicion and fear, aggravated by the difficulty of large-scale, voluntary, cooperative effort inherent in the Chinese tradition and by the techniques of Communist discipline has had its natural fruition.
[Page 460]The above paragraphs have been written largely with a view to American policy as it must be reconsidered in the light of these developments. After further consultation with General Marshall and Embassy colleagues, suggestions on this important aspect of the matter may be forwarded in the near future.
Respectfully yours,
- United States Relations With China, p. 607.↩