761.93/10–3146

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

No. 245

Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegram no. 1755 of October 28, 1946, 4 p.m.,32 concerning Sino-Soviet relations in Manchuria and to amplify further the comments on that subject made to me by the Foreign Minister.

On the basis of a suggestion made by T. V. Soong that a proposal had been received recently from the Russians concerning concessions desired by the Soviet Government in Manchuria I asked the Foreign Minister what he could tell me about this proposal. He said that he had never heard of it but that since he had only just returned from Paris, it was possible but most unlikely that something had been received in his absence of which he was unaware. He agreed however to investigate and let me know. Subsequently he informed me, through the Division of West Asia Affairs, that no such proposal had been received and that presumably Mr. Soong was confused about the Chinese counter-proposal made last March of which the Department is aware33 and which came to nothing. In a subsequent conversation with Dr. Pu34 and the Director of the Treaty Department,35 they expressed concern over the indeterminate situation in Manchuria and possibilities of what the future might hold. They appeared to be worried over the Soviet decision to withdraw the delegation of railway officials which has been in Manchuria and who have been on very unsatisfactory working terms with Chinese employees of the railway. Chinese actions in territory controlled by the National Government have resulted in a situation in which the Russian employees not only find themselves under threat of terrorism but are largely without anything [Page 461] to do. The action of the Foreign Minister was reported in Embassy’s telegram no. 1704, October 20, 1946, 9 a.m.36

In connection with this general situation in Manchuria the Department may be interested in remarks made by Dr. Carson Chang, Head of the Democratic Socialist Party and a brother of Dr. Chang Chiangao, Chairman of the Economic Council for Manchuria. It can be assumed that Dr. Chang has merely passed on the views and observations of his brother. He first observed to me that in his opinion the turning point in the negotiations between the Government and the Communists for a general political settlement came when Soviet troops withdrew from Manchuria and the vacuum created was immediately filled by the Communists. He said that following the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 15 [14], 194537 and the occupation of Manchuria by Soviet troops during hostilities just prior to the termination of the war against Japan, the Soviets desired to obtain certain economic concessions from China; but definitely preferred to obtain them in agreement with the National Government. Consequently there was no desire to allow Communist troops to enter the northeast and when the first group did appear in Changchun it was summarily deported by Soviet military authorities. When the Soviet authorities finally came to the conclusion after several months of negotiations that substance of concessions beyond those accorded in the Treaty of August 15, 1945 were not going to be obtained from the National Government, they suddenly concentrated the arms and equipment seized from the Japanese in convenient locations and evacuated the entire Northeast, leaving it up to the Communists to move in quickly and seize the military stores. Following this, as the Department is of course aware, National Government troops succeeded in occupying a considerable portion of the area and of driving the Communists back. Dr. Chang said he did not believe this Soviet action in any sense represented any definitive abandonment by the Russians of their Manchurian objective but said it probably meant that the Soviets did not at that time feel themselves in any position to take any further action and that they believed they could afford to allow the internal situation in China to ferment and later determine what action, if any, might be indicated. Dr. Chang expressed great pessimism over the ability of the Government to accomplish in any predictable period the enormous job of reconstruction and development which is necessary.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
W. Walton Butterworth

Minister-Counselor of Embassy
  1. Post, p. 1129.
  2. See telegram No. 572, March 26, 5 p.m., from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 1121.
  3. Pu Tao-ming, Director of the Western Asiatic Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
  4. Wang Hua-chen.
  5. Post, p. 1212.
  6. Signed at Moscow; United States Relations With China, pp. 585–596.