893.00B/10–3146
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 15.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 28 of August 5, 1946 entitled “Return to China of Li Li-san”27 and to enclose a copy of a report27 supplied by the Intelligence Section of the Ministry of National Defense which purports to show that Li Li-san returned to China “at the behest of Soviet Russia” and that he is the leader of a schismatic movement against the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. It has come to my attention [Page 454] that the same and similar reports have been handed to a number of American newspapermen for “their confidential information” by officials of the Central Government or have been published in one form or another in pro-Kuomintang vernacular newspapers in north China.
The possibility of a split in the Chinese Communist Party can not he ignored, but available information tends to show that at the present time such a split is most improbable. Current reports with regard to the development of a line of cleavage between a “nationalist” group and a “pro-Russian” group within the Chinese Communist Party are likely to come from wishful thinking supporters of the Central Government or are inspired to dissuade foreign observers from belief in the essential solidarity of the Chinese Communists.
In this same general connection, reference is made to my despatch no. 96 of September 4, 194628 commenting on the reported contemplated disaffection of General Ch’en Yi, Commander of the Communist New Fourth Army, and to my despatch no. 208 of October 23, 194628 reporting that the original report had withered under examination and that the possibility of a bargain between Ch’en Yi and the Central Government, as described in the enclosure to my despatch no. 96, appeared extremely remote.
As reported previously to the Department, it is freely admitted by the Chinese Communists that Li Li-san returned to China with Soviet troops when they entered Manchuria in 1945 and therefore his return was with the knowledge and consent, if not the actual sponsorship, of Soviet authorities. It is most unlikely that he would have been allowed to leave Russia, least of all for return to China, had he not been deemed trustworthy by the Kremlin. It does not necessarily follow, however, that Li Li-san, after nearly fifteen years’ absence from China, is in position seriously to challenge the authority of Mao Tse-tung at this early date, even assuming that such was his purpose in returning to China. Newspapermen who have interviewed Li in Manchuria and others who have discussed his return with Communists at various places in China, including Yenan, have received the standard reply that Li has recognized the fallacy of his former beliefs and has been welcomed back into the Party fold as a faithful follower and disciple of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Officers of the Embassy who have expressed interest in Li’s return to members of the Communist delegation at Nanking have been offered the same recanting-sinner-returning-to-the-faith explanation.
Wherein the enclosed report states that Li Li-san has proposed that the Northeast be made the principal Chinese Communist base, it strikes a reasonable note. If Kuomintang military successes continue as they have in recent months, the Chinese Communist position in north China [Page 455] will shortly be no better, or may be even worse, than under the Japanese occupation—namely hemmed into marginal subsistence areas. On the other hand, in northern and western Manchuria the Communists from an economic point of view would have the advantage of richer areas and from a military point of view would enjoy far greater maneuver room. In addition, they would be within more easy reach of their ideological brethren and potential supporters.
It is on questions such as this that there may be broad differences of opinion within the Chinese Communist hierarchy. It is also likely that differences of opinion exist with regard to whether it is advantageous to continue the present inter-party negotiations or to terminate them. Another controversial question may well arise with regard to the tempo of agrarian reform (Embassy despatch no. 45 of August 12, 194629). Other seeming differences result from time to time through faulty communications. Among Communist units and between Communist-controlled areas “the voice of command” often fails through faulty communication equipment, poor technical maintenance, and the exigencies of a guerilla existence. All such differences, however, are not apparent outside of the Party, and once a policy decision is reached and a course set there is universality of expressed opinion to the point of nerve wracking monotony.
This universality of expressed opinion on basic doctrine is the most prominent manifestation of Chinese Communist solidarity. It reaches its highest development at Yenan, but it is also evident in other Communist-controlled areas, regardless of how widely separated and in the face of differing physical environment. Therefore, the question of whether or not Li Li-san is an emissary of Moscow is somewhat academic. There has always been a predilection in Chinese Communist Party public statements and the Party press towards following closely the Soviet Communist Party line. Formerly the similarity was confined to broad ideological generalizations. Since early 1946, however, following a Yenan statement of policy with regard to Manchuria (Embassy despatch no. 1166 of February 2830) the Chinese Communists’ general tendency to follow a Soviet line has become more clearly a matter of firm policy. This is manifested most obviously in Yenan statements which follow automatically Soviet releases and statements concerning specific problems in the Far East and events in other areas of the world. Concomitantly, current Chinese Communist anti-American fulminations apparently receive similar prominence in the Soviet press. Incidentally, foreign correspondents and other observers are still searching—but thus far without success—for a Chinese Communist who is in any state but one of complete agreement with all Soviet actions.
[Page 456]There has never been substantive proof put forth, even by the Central Government which stands to gain the most thereby, that the Chinese Communist Party has been actively supported by the Soviet Union. Such proof, however, is not important. What is important is that the affinity should not be misunderstood and underestimated. Revulsion at the manifest corruption and ineptitude of the Kuomintang leads foreign observers and many Chinese liberals and intellectuals to view sympathetically that which is non-Kuomintang. The result is they tend to regard the Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers and to lose sight of the fact that they are not agrarian reformers per se, but play the role because it is required by the environment in which they find themselves and is merely a tactical phase in the overall strategy of the eventual realization of a Communistic state. Liberal apologists of the “agrarian reform” school of thought too often fail to point out that top Chinese Communist leaders themselves are the first frankly to admit that in ideology and aim they are Marxist Communists, but that existing social and economic conditions in China make the early achievement of their end impossible and therefore it is necessary to adopt such interim measures, even of democratic and capitalistic coloration, which may be necessary for the achievement of the end, however long the period.
In retrospect it may be considered that the period between the arrival of the United States Army Observer Section at Yenan in July 1944 and the recall of General Joseph W. Stilwell from command of the China, Burma and India Theater in October 1944 constituted the era of good feeling in Chinese Communist-American relations. During that period, in the face of external Japanese pressure and the non-participation of the Soviet Union in the Far Eastern war, the theory that the Chinese Communists could be weaned from basic ideology, and thus potential satellites of the Soviet Union, was tested. The test was inconclusive because the attitude of the Central Government prevented the granting of material American aid for use against the Japanese and the unfolding strategy of war in the Pacific required no combat landing on the coast of north China. It was always apparent at Yenan and in Communist forward areas, however, that top Communist leaders were firmly Marxist Communists and however unpalatable the term “communist” might be to Americans, no ideological deviations could be expected other than those which were tactically necessary to meet the immediate requirements of a given situation. There is no reason to believe that there has been any change in this attitude.
As pointed out above, there has undoubtedly been considerable divergence of opinion within the inner circles of the Chinese Communist Party with regard to policy. Such differences, largely on tactical [Page 457] procedures, may be expected to continue, but it is characteristic of Communist Party discipline, not alone in China, that once policy decisions are reached there is presented to non-believers a solid party front. In China perhaps no other group is more keenly aware of the need for unity of action than the Communists, particularly at the present time when failure to maintain a solid front would inevitably ensure their destruction. Furthermore, it may be anticipated that the Central Government will foster for foreign consumption the belief that the Communist Party is disintegrating into numerous factions without unity as a political party and therefore the systematic elimination by force of disassociated and heterogeneous factions may be expected to be more palatable abroad than would be an all-out offensive to eliminate an organized party in opposition to the Government. The period of “civil war” may well be drawing to a close to be replaced by a new era of “bandit suppression” campaigns.
Respectfully yours,
Minister-Counselor of Embassy