Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall, General Chou En-lai, Mr. Robertson, and General Yeh at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 15, 1946, 10:45 a.m.

Nanking, August 15, 1946, 10:45 a.m.

Also present:	Colonel Caughey
	Mr. Chang

General Marshall: I am leaving at 1:30 for Kuling. I wanted to find out if there was anything you had to say to me before I saw the Generalissimo.

General Chou: I read the Generalissimo’s statement in the evening of day before yesterday as well as yesterday and it appears that in this statement the Generalissimo has said everything he wanted to say. The terms put up do not differ from what he had brought forward the last time to you and Doctor Stuart in Kuling. This is my initial impression.

Furthermore, the Generalissimo threw all the blame on the Communists as if the Government has entered into all the agreements for the past six months and the responsibility for obstructing those agreements rests entirely with the Communist Party. In addition to that, he threw all the blame on the Communist Party for the economic crisis, for the suffering of the people’s livelihood and the degradation of Chinese international status since the Japanese surrender. Everybody who knows history well can find out that his charges do not correspond to fact. As to the concrete terms he put up, he said that in principle the Government still adheres to the cease fire agreement, the PCC resolutions, the restoration of communication and army reorganization agreements. Actually these agreements have not only been violated by the Government during the past six months but also even during the negotiation that was conducted in June; despite the fact the Communist Party made many offers with a view to completing the agreements. The Communist Party made many concessions but the Government refused to sign the new proposals. Since the end of June the Government raised new demands which are entirely contradictory with the past agreements.

Take the case of the local administration. It was expressly specified by the PCC resolutions that dispute over the local administration should be settled by consultation after reorganization of the Government. Certain clauses were decided upon by the PCC as a guide for the settlement of those disputes and the Government, apart from refusing to sign the four papers the Committee of Three prepared in June, raised new demands. Therefore we can see that the main spirit of the Generalissimo’s statement points toward civil war and dictatorship. The way he threw it in front of us is simple: Either we give up the places he demanded; or he would refuse to continue negotiation. That is a policy of civil war and it is expressed in such a tone that if we do not accept his terms he would resort to fighting.

As to the political aspect, he announced outwardly that he would call the National Assembly at a definite date, that he would reorganize the government and carry out the joint platform of the PCC. But, seeing that the civil war is still going on, the Government would not negotiate with the Communist Party. So, they want to go ahead unilaterally with their own measures. In this way they would announce the congregation of the National Assembly. The Generalissimo further suggested that all kinds of suggestions regarding the Constitution could be put before the National Assembly. This is not in keeping with the PCC resolution which prescribed the way of revising the Constitution. So, in the political aspect, the Government is also taking unilateral action. Just as before—the basic policy of the Government has been decided and the policy is fully expressed in this statement.

As to the Communist attitude, it is still this: We are for a truce and we would not put new terms forward to bring about a truce. We are at any time willing to accept a truce. At the same time we are willing to sign the four papers prepared in June as soon as the Government is willing to cease fire.

As to political matters, we still hold to the opinion that the Government should be reorganized in accordance with the PCC resolutions. Of course we might hold a pre-discussion on Government reorganization first between the two parties with the participation of Doctor Stuart and when a basis of agreement has been found the other parties could be consulted and then the whole platform would be passed by the Steering Committee of the PCC as a matter of formality and the Government may be reorganized. During the discussion we could also talk about the local administration problem, and after the government reorganization we may call a unified national assembly in the spirit of unity. This is our attitude and we adhere to that attitude.

It is true that, apart from the question of local administration, there are still one or two points not settled in connection with the four papers we have prepared in June but, if the Government is willing to announce a cease fire immediately, then we may immediately iron out those small differences. It is high time now to solve this dispute. No delay should be permitted because the fighting is growing larger and larger. Soon it will be completely out of control and leave no room for mediation.

The Government is prepared to launch a general offensive in the coming three months; August, September, October and if it is to be stopped, it should be stopped now. Otherwise the fighting will become of intensified nature.

As to the mediation and since the publication of the statement by you and Doctor Stuart, we feel somewhat worried because if the matter is stalled then we can expect no results. I have talked lengthily with Doctor Stuart on this point. I don’t want to go into detail on that discussion. I merely want to emphasize that under the present situation, while on the one hand there is the fighting and on the other hand there are the negotiations, it appears exceedingly hard to accomplish anything. It is my opinion that while we may, under all conditions, make our best efforts for negotiation, it is indispensable to have a general cease fire order issued. If the idea of the Generalissimo should be put into effect, that unless those places are occupied by the Government troops by force he would not feel safe, then the negotiation can certainly be dispensed with because, under such conditions, we do not have peace but only war.

Many neutral papers, such as the Ta Kung Pao and others, subscribed to the idea that an unconditional truce should be effected right now. As to all the other disputes they can be settled by negotiations. Even the case of local administration will have to be settled by popular election. As to the procedure of popular election, that can be discussed and we may set a limit to bring the discussion to an end. At present it is true that the American position as a mediator is being placed in an exceedingly difficult position. This does not imply that nothing can be done, if they believe that we can reach a truce by negotiation. That is also the tendency of public opinion in China.

There is one fundamental conception that I wish the American side will have cleared in their mind. It is not our purpose that, after the cease fire, we would retain all those areas now being controlled by the Communists for ourselves permanently. We want true democracy to be initiated in those areas. The principle of the Generalissimo appears to be to keep those areas in his control for himself and he would not feel secure unless he could get control of those areas by force. This is a fundamental conception in connection with the negotiations.

We are of the opinion that should the fighting and negotiation take place at the same time, the negotiation is bound to be fruitless. Therefore, we hope that the American side, and particularly you and Doctor Stuart would take active measures to bring the negotiations to some positive result. This is the best course we can pursue. I have also conveyed this idea to Doctor Stuart.

General Marshall: I will take a draft of your statement to Kuling and go over it with the Generalissimo unless you have objection.

General Chou: No objection.

General Marshall: The portion of your statement which referred to the fundamental conception of the Communist Party as to those areas which they now occupy is rather obscure in my mind. I am confused as to the status of those areas from which the Communist Army troops were to withdraw. Will you please clarify that point?

General Chou: Our fundamental conception and the Generalissimo’s on this question is different. According to the Generalissimo’s conception, the Communist forces should withdraw from those areas and consequently the local administration should also be taken over by the Kuomintang authorities. This is the way of monopolizing the new area as an area of its own. Our conception is different. We approach this question from two angles.

First, regarding the military which we discussed in June in connection with the troop disposition. You will recall that it is impossible that after army reorganization, the troops will still garrison so many places as it does now. It is not possible because the army strengths will be reduced. With a view to giving assurance to the Generalissimo that China will be brought to order politically and that the military threat will be eliminated, we subscribe to the idea that troops should be concentrated to certain localities for training during the period of reorganization and integration. Therefore, we also agreed to vacate certain areas by the Communist troops as well as by the Nationalist troops. This is our conception. You are also aware that the Generalissimo at the very beginning disputed the idea that the disposition of the Nationalist troops should also be determined. When discussing the supplementary agreement to the army reorganization plan we were ready to discuss the disposition of the Communist troops. This was a concession on our part by which we hoped for assurance from the Generalissimo that discussion on the disposition of the Nationalist troops would be held later on. This was a decisive concession on our part. At that time, for example, we gave this concession that instead of three and two divisions in North Kiangsu, in the two phases respectively, we agreed to reduce it to two and one divisions. We also agreed to vacate our troops from the Tsinan–Tsingtao railroad; to vacate Jehol south of but excluding Chengte; and to retain only three divisions to be concentrated at three points. This is our conception of troop disposition.

Second, we approach this question from the question of local administration. In our areas, popular election has been held regardless how wide that basis is. We could not adhere to the principle adopted by the Kuomintang merely to make appointment by the higher authority. If it is challenged that the popular election was not conducted on a wide enough basis, then reelections could be held. Also it was previously agreed that the election laws would be determined after the government reorganization. Now we are ready to discuss that phase before the government reorganization so that some definite measures can be worked out. Since the Generalissimo announced that he is willing to carry out the joint platform, we think that this would certainly be agreeable to him. Therefore, under the direction of the reorganized government, reelection can be held in those areas garrisoned by the Communists where popular election had been held previously. These areas would therefore be made even more democratic in nature. We cannot reconcile ourselves to the idea that the popularly elected governments in those areas should be abolished and that the areas be taken over by the one party authority. This would constitute a breach of one of the PCC principles. Once that principle is broken every other principle of the PCC will be broken. There will be no proper foundation of execution of the other resolutions.

The conception of the Generalissimo is different than ours. He views every place as “his” only when they are put strictly under his own control. He does not believe in the popular election after government reorganization. He does not accept the idea that the local administration should be determined by the people themselves and that it should be free from military interference. He only believes in controlling an area by force and only when he knows that that area is in his hands. Therefore, unless we yield to his demands, he will resort to force. This is an idea of “armed unification” as the Chinese say, and not a unification by peaceful means. This is dictatorship rather than democracy. Therefore we cannot make concession on this point. This is an issue of the basic policy, that is, dictatorship versus democracy. I wish to repeat that we welcome any discussion under the principle of democracy as to how election should be held and how the local self-government can be initiated. On that basis we are willing to discuss.

General Marshall: Your comments regarding the necessity for continuing negotiations and also regarding the present difficult position of the Americans in such a negotiation leads me to a discussion of the An-ping incident, its consequences and its probable later consequences. I have had an opportunity since I last saw you to go over the various reports that I received from Mr. Robertson with Mr. Robertson personally, and to hear at length his personal statements of what occurred as he understood it. He has shown me the agreement that was reached, I believe, in the last hour before his departure from Peiping. I wish to go ahead with an endeavor to carry out that investigation on the basis of that agreement. I repeat that I certainly wish to have the team go ahead on that basis of agreement to see if a satisfactory report cannot be arrived at. But I feel called upon to make a very frank statement at the present time, and particularly since General Yeh is here.

I might say, incidentally, that my regard for General Chou in our long contacts since last December, and the similar respect and lengthy contact Mr. Robertson has had with General Yeh, places you two gentlemen in our regard in a rather unique position because we both have faith in you. Much that we have done and have endeavored to do has been based almost exclusively on that faith.

Now, with regard to your statement of your strong belief that the negotiations should go forward, I wish to say that, in my opinion, the actions of General Huang; his public statements; the statements in the English sheet prepared in Executive Headquarters, of which I have a copy here that I will refer to later; and the statements from Yenan, are calculated to destroy any possibility of my, or Doctor Stuart’s, being able to serve any useful purpose in contributing to a successful negotiation. The purpose of the procedure followed is incomprehensible to me, unless it is a deliberate effort to provoke a situation which will result in a civil war, with the possible thought in the minds of those directing the procedure that by this means the civil war will be carried out in the absence of the Americans. I can find no other logical explanation of the procedure which has been followed during the past two weeks in August. While I have expressed the hope that the present agreement just arrived at will lead to a decently conducted procedure of this investigation, I must state now that I have little expectation of that proving to be the case. The procedure, as I gathered, and it is entirely credible to me as indicated by General Huang’s actions, would certainly not encourage the belief that there is any possibility of this being conducted as a genuine investigation. There is every probability that it will be pursued as a basis for propaganda.

I have here an issue of 10 August of news excerpts published by the Communist Branch at Executive Headquarters “For the information of the Communist Branch, Executive Headquarters” and yet published in English and not in Chinese. There in the building of an organization which is supposed to promote a possibility of the peaceful settlement I find statements so extravagant, so evidently on their surface erroneous, and so insulting that it is past my belief as to what purpose could lay behind it except as I have already described. In the last paragraph of a considerable tirade, General Huang says, “Responsibility for the sudden forced adjournment of the meeting and the interrupting of my interpreter’s speech should entirely fall on the shoulders of the American chairman. Before he had finished his words, Colonel Davis interrupted again. Thus he used his power as chairman when there was no more meeting or when the meeting was over. Such unfairness and outrageousness is not to be found anywhere in diplomatic history except in past Sino-Japanese diplomatic dealings.” That is the end of the quotation. There is much more in here of the same general nature. It is insulting, it is provocative and it is deliberate.

Now I say to you, if you expect me to go along with you in the effort on which I have been engaged since last December there will have to be a complete change of procedure. But the procedure is growing so outrageous that I can no longer continue in silence if it is continued in this investigation. Mr. Robertson told me that he proposed to General Yeh that both Colonel Davis and General Huang be replaced and that was opposed.

Both Mr. Robertson and I were opposed to establishing an investigating team because we feared it could lead to no good and would possibly lead to great harm. We did not vaguely realize how correct was our judgment.

Now what I am endeavoring to make very plain is that, if this same delaying procedure is resumed, I will instantly withdraw the Americans from the investigation. Now just what profit you think the Communist Party will gather from that I do not know. The thing has been heart-breaking to me because it is literally defeating any possibility I have of influencing the National Government to make the very changes that you are so desirous of securing. I have never seen so much “dirt” thrown into such a procedure.

I have not discussed this matter at all with any member of the National Government, and for very evident reasons, because it really amounts to a triumph for them in relieving themselves from any embarrassment in opposing my efforts to secure a basis for peaceful negotiation. Of course they are well aware of what has been happening and it has probably been repeated to them in more unfavorable colors than I have referred to here. The only hope that I can see is that from now on there is no more misrepresentations, delaying tactics, and efforts to make the procedure practically a farce.

I stand almost alone among Americans concerned in my reluctance to make a public statement of the matter. Dr. Stuart, as you already know, felt that it was demanded. The same has been the case with the Commander of the Fleet, the Commander of the Marines, and almost every other American concerned in an official capacity. The reason I find myself standing alone is purely the intense desire I have had to exerting sufficient influence to bring about an agreement on the part of the Government to a cessation of hostilities. But, as I commented to you the other day, I am being deprived of almost every argument and the Government is being furnished, in its opinion, the justification of all its contentions.

Mister Robertson: May I say just one word. General Marshall said he stood almost alone among Americans in not advocating a statement at this time. I want to say for General Chou, and particularly for General Yeh, that I also feel that a statement should not be made until it is obvious that it is perfectly hopeless to continue an investigation on a fair basis.

General Chou: Regarding the An-ping incident, I have said at the very beginning that it occurred under very complicated circumstances. We have read the report of the American side, the newspaper dispatches and a few other reports I received from our sources. I have come to know that in certain points concurrence can be reached, but on one or two main points there is still a direct diametrical opposition of the reports between the American side and the Communist side. Those two reports refer to first the cause, and second whether the Nationalist troops participated. The Kuomintang has capitalized on this diametrical opposition toward the incident and widely propagandized the matter. Even General Cheng Kai Ming and General Tsai made statements publicly and they furnished materials for the press. Therefore, before any release will be made by General Marshall and Mr. Robertson, the Kuomintang already fully capitalized on this incident.

The more they made provocations on this matter the more complicated the problem become[s], the more suspicion is aroused. Our side said that the Nationalists participated in the conflict but the American side believed definitely that no Nationalists participated. We have a strong suspicion as to whether the whole incident was well planned by the Nationalists. The Communist side gets the impression that they were attacked by the Nationalists, while on the other side the Marines get the impression they are being ambushed by the Communist troops. General Yeh, on his own accord, also came to this suspicion and when I talked with him last night we both had the same feeling. General Yeh also told me that he does not feel that Mr. Robertson has assumed any hostile attitude to the Communists. At the beginning when I read the message turned over to me by General Marshall, I was somewhat afraid that Mr. Robertson might have some misunderstanding with us. General Yeh told me that it is not the case. Therefore, we have basically the impression that the whole incident was provoked, until now of course it has become a very grave problem.

Next, I would like to say that up to now both General Yeh and myself have received no report on the incident from the local commander except two messages, nor have we any possibility to make contact with the local commanders. This presses us in a very dangerous position. We have asked that we may have the opportunity to meet the local commanders, or that we might bring back their representative to submit a report. Though the American side promised to furnish transportation, the Nationalist branch refused to give safe conduct. Furthermore, that area is just being subjected to new offensive by the Nationalists, and An-ping itself was occupied by them for over 10 days—since July 29th. They may now cover the true facts and have the area in their control.

The Nationalists are probably delaying their own investigation. During the past fortnight they have used every conceivable means to make propaganda to gain the impression that the whole incident was fabricated by the Communists. Thus they may incite the Communists’ sentiment and give the wrong impression to the public that we were opposed to the investigation. As a matter of fact, both General Yeh and myself, as soon as we learned about the incident, asked for an investigation. This evidence shows that we in no way would like to see the matter aggravated. On the contrary we would like to see that true light is thrown on the truce. As to the incident itself, its occurrence was very unfortunate.

The factor that the U. S. Marines are in close contact with the Nationalists stimulates great feeling on the part of the Communists. I have referred to that previously and I don’t want to repeat it here. In the whole matter the Kuomintang has played its part to make it more complicated.

The relation among the team members is not good. It seems to me that there is some question as to the attitude of Colonel Davis. General Yeh told me that Mr. Robertson gave some evidence that the discussion of the procedure was delayed for four meetings and still without results. Regardless whether the procedure we proposed was adequate or not, it is a fact that that proposal was not brought forward for discussion. Colonel Davis is opposed also to have his own procedure, nor would he put a proposal forward for discussion. He also refused to let General Huang to speak in the meetings. Originally I was thinking that because General Huang has been cooperating fairly well in the Communications Division, there should be no question of his cooperation in this team. Unexpectedly the situation was bad and Colonel Davis also could not refrain himself from being outspoken sometimes, and could not deal with the matter with an entirely cool head. It seems that he places too much emphasis on the report of the American side. On our part, of course, we have our own report and we of course have to believe our own report, but on the other hand we are still willing to recall the testimony of the American side. This shows that we did not form a conclusion beforehand. Because Colonel Davis has formed a conclusion beforehand for himself, General Huang also felt excited and some arguments started and the atmosphere in the meetings was not very amiable.

Of course some correspondents also helped to deteriorate the situation by misrepresenting reports. The responsibility for this will rest with the correspondents alone. That can be easily corrected. Apart from that I am also aware that the meetings in Executive Headquarters and in the field teams are not conducted in such an orderly manner as in the Committee of Three in Nanking or Chungking. Sometimes they use quite extravagant statements as Mr. Robertson is certainly aware. Not unfrequently the Nationalist representatives use quite unusual statements which made the atmosphere in Executive Headquarters and field teams rather bad. Of course that is a bad example. The Nationalists have also helped in the past six months to sow some bad feeling between the Communists and the Americans. This is possible.

(General Marshall turned the meeting over to Mr. Robertson).

General Chou: With regard to the investigation, I share your view that we may encounter greater difficulties if the following two conditions are not recognized: (1) That the Kuomintang is now trying to monopolize the scene of the conflict. They have taken An-ping. They are now planting their witnesses in that part so that the whole act will look like a farce and that may make the matter worse.

(2) We still have no way to contact our own people and to get our own report. So it would be impossible for us to make a judgment only on the basis of testimony made by the other parts. We have no confidence in the testimonies placed by the Nationalist side. We cannot judge what is true or not unless we can have a report from our own side.

The Kuomintang is now preventing us from contacting our own people. We are the only branch which has no facility for transportation. Last night I had a discussion with General Yeh and we all are of the opinion that the matter should not proceed along such a course, so that at the end we will have separate investigations by each party. That makes it very bad.

With regard to your statement that the United States is being placed in a difficult position which was augmented by the An-ping incident, I wish to say that the main cause for this should be attributed to the Kuomintang side because they are making every effort to make the position of the Americans impossible. They are raising their demands every day and of course I also admit that we also place some difficulties before the Americans. However the main difficulties are not placed before them by us.

Americans are now mediating in the present negotiations. On the one hand by recognizing the National Government as the legal government, it provides every kind of assistance to that government. Such a position is of course welcomed by the Nationalists, but because of it the Communists feel very uneasy. From what you just said, that we are aiming to force the Americans to give up their mediation, that is not our purpose. What we are asking for is that the U. S. should stop for the time being to render such unilateral assistance and that it assume an even fairer attitude in the mediation by stopping such assistance. That would increase the prestige of the Americans and make their role of mediation easier.

For example, at the time when General Marshall first came to China, we forgot about the dispute on the right of acceptance of surrender because we wanted to start on a new and fair basis, but now because of the assistance given to the Nationalists, we have to take those factors into consideration again. Just to cite one example. During the time of the Japanese surrender the Nationalists sent 40% of its strength to fight against the Communists, now it sends 85% of its strength for that purpose. This shows the difference.

As regards the An-ping incident, I hope sincerely that Mr. Robertson and General Yeh on coming here would fully grasp the gravity of the situation and they will therefore redouble their efforts to secure cooperation among the Executive Headquarters members to bring the investigation to a successful end. I admit that the present relation is not a normal one because fundamentally we seek cooperation with the U. S. and we do not want to be pushed into such a position that we are in the position of opposition to the U. S. That is the purpose of the Nationalists and we cannot expect the Nationalists would change their attitude. I hope that the Americans in the position of mediator will conceive every possible means to improve that relation.

Now, lastly, I wish to express my thanks to Mr. Robertson for providing the facilities for General Yeh to come down and that I have been able to see Mr. Robertson so that he could hear my statements. Also I wish to thank you for your efforts during the past seven months. I realize that the position in Peiping is even more difficult than ours here because you are confronted with much more trouble and headaches, but I have firm belief that you will make every effort to restore China to a peaceful position.

Mister Robertson: General Chou has raised several points which of course can only be answered by General Marshall, but I would like to make a short statement with regard to the An-ping incident.

For seven months General Yeh and I have worked in harmony in Executive Headquarters. However controversial the questions which have come up between us, I have always found him to be reasonable, objective, practical and cooperative. I value his friendship and I value our official relationship. Now this situation has been a very distressing one to the American Branch. We are in a position we have never been in before. Heretofore our role has been that of an objective mediator trying to implement decisions which the two Chinese parties have made between themselves. There has been no question of partiality. Now we find ourselves, whether we are willing or not, being put in a position of opposition to the Communists and it was for this reason that I was very much opposed to Executive Headquarters getting involved in this incident between the Marines and the Communists. Neither General Yeh nor I have attended any of the team meetings. It is natural that he should believe the reports of his representatives. I believe the reports of our representatives.

Colonel Davis, among our 36 team captains had one of the most cooperative records, according to all reports. He was particularly fond of his Communist representative and if he leaned in partiality it was to the Communist side because of his personal admiration for this representative. Now the information which General Chou has given with reference to the proceedings does not conform to the information which we have in the American branch. I could well understand that differences would arise, but whatever the differences involved, I could not understand the propaganda and criticisms—very unjust criticisms—being made against the Americans at the time the conversations were taking place. For instance General Huang has intimated that the Americans would not discuss procedure. That is absolutely contrary to the facts from our standpoint.

The directive for the team was issued on August second. The Captain of the team ordered to make the investigation could not serve on [it?] because of illness. We appointed Colonel Davis in his place. He tried to have a team meeting on the afternoon of the third, the first day the team had been organized, but couldn’t get the members together. A meeting was called for August 4th at 11 o’clock. The Communist senior representative did not appear. He sent a subordinate. When questioned, the subordinate had no credentials and said that he could not act for General Huang. Colonel Davis said this was a very important meeting. It was the first meeting of the team. It was an organizational meeting to decide upon procedures and no action could be taken without an authorized Communist representative. The subordinate was sent back to find General Huang and convey that message to him. He did not reappear and after waiting for over an hour that meeting adjourned.

I see in this official Communist article from which General Marshall read the statement that the Communist representative, General Huang, was not invited to attend the meeting until two days after the team had been formed. On August 4th, the date of the meeting which the Communist member would not attend the Communist Official News Agency carried the statement that the Communists were pressing for the investigation of the incident and it was being delayed by the American and the National Government branches. As to the discussion of the procedures, when the team convened on Tuesday morning, August 5th, (That was the first day that the Communist representative had attended) General Huang took the floor and made a very long statement. He said that this was an international incident, and that they would have to proceed on that basis. Interviews would first have to be made with General Rockey of the Marine Corps, then of General Sun, Commander of the 11th War Zone, and then of the senior Communist commander, unnamed and unidentified. Fourth, which has been the real crux of the disagreement, that no witnesses could be called to testify unless it was unanimously agreed beforehand by all three sides that such witnesses could be heard.

When he elaborated on this point it produced a deadlock as far as the American Branch was concerned. I am talking of the American branch only, not of the National side.

General Huang said that no American could testify because he would be prejudiced. He said that no civilian could testify because it was a military matter. He said that no Marines could testify who participated in the conflict for the same reason (they would be prejudiced).

Colonel Davis would not accept that. The American branch could not accept it. On August 2nd when the directive was issued to organize the team, I gave General Yeh a memorandum asking safe conduct for the team to go into Communist territory to interview the Communist commander. I asked him to name the date, the hour, the place and the commanders whom the team was to see and to do that not later than noon, August 5th. Thus the statement that has been reiterated in the past and which you repeated here this morning, to the effect that there was intent to exclude the testimony of Communist witnesses is without foundation of any kind. To the contrary I stated to General Yeh when he first expressed the fear that the National Government would stop the investigation before the Communists could be heard, “General Yeh, no American worthy of the name could participate in such an outrageous procedure. We would not only permit your witnesses to testify, we would fight with you to see that they did testify.” We, of course, have never even considered a position which did not provide for all three sides being heard. I cannot emphasize that too strongly.

The safe conduct pledge was not received from the Communists until August 6th. We could not go into the field without a safe conduct pledge. We were waiting for a reply as to the name of the commander whom the team should interview. During that interval, Colonel Davis proposed, while we were awaiting for the safe conduct guarantee, that the team hear the testimony (1) of the three members of the Executive Headquarters who were passengers in an Executive Headquarters car in the convoy and (2) the Marines who participated in the conflict. They were then present in Peiping and immediately available. If they should be transferred or become ill their testimony might be lost to the team. General Huang insisted that his procedure must be adopted and that no witness could be examined except by unanimous consent of the three sides. After this had been going on for many hours it was reported the team was in deadlock and the question was referred to the Commissioners.

At Commissioners’ meeting, passing over the argument about procedure, it was decided to send the team to the scene of the incident and then take testimony. It was agreed the team should leave the next morning at 9 o’clock, each branch to so inform its own members. At 9 o’clock the National Government member appeared with his three representatives, the American member appeared with three, but the Communist member insisted upon taking 9. Colonel Davis had previously advised that transportation could be furnished for 3 members each. General Huang took the position that the teams are usually made up of 12 and 9 was therefore a reasonable number. That was a detail, however, which offered no problem.

In addition, General Huang said he would not go until it was decided what the team was to do when it got there. Colonel Davis then reported the Communists’ refusal to leave as ordered. I immediately consulted General Yeh. After long conversation lasting until 1:30, he finally agreed to instruct his members to leave with the team that afternoon. (General Huang and Colonel Davis attended our meeting and there was considerable discussion of the difficulties existing between the American and Communist members and of their different viewpoints.) The team finally left for the scene of conflict at 2:30.

The three members of Executive Headquarters who were passengers in the convoy were taken along to identify the exact terrain where the conflict took place. However upon arrival General Huang would not hear them. He also refused to hear the testimony of the local witnesses who were presented. He proposed instead that the team go over in Communist territory and interview the Communist commander and personnel. The National Government member refused to do this but stated that he would send for those witnesses and record their testimony if General Huang would allow these witnesses then present on the ground to testify at the same time. General Huang again refused and the team returned to Peiping without having heard a single witness. The team deadlock continued in Peiping, with the same arguments back and forth. I sought a private interview with General Yeh and suggested that he put a stop to General Huang’s tactics so the team could get down to business.

I reiterated that every suggested procedure guaranteed that any witnesses brought forward by the Communists or any other side would be heard. We should therefore hear these eye-witnesses, get them out of the way, and proceed with the investigation.

We had a 2½ hour discussion and finally reached, I thought, a complete agreement on the procedure to be followed. As soon as it could be typewritten it was sent to him and the National Government Commissioner for their signatures. General Yeh and General Chen Shih-chu came to my house for dinner that night. We had a gay time. Certainly I enjoyed them very much. The next morning I was very much surprised to find that General Yeh had failed to sign and return the agreement sent him the preceding evening. The National Government Commissioner, who had not been consulted by us in drawing it up, signed and returned it immediately. The agreement specified the witnesses to be examined and contained a provision making it imperative to examine any witnesses which each side considered necessary to establish the facts directly related to the incident. It seemed to be all inclusive. Not hearing from General Yeh, we telephoned him and were told that he could not be reached until 12 o’clock. At noon we were informed that he had the matter under reconsideration. About 4 o’clock in the afternoon he came to see me bringing an entirely new proposal. It incorporated the things which we had agreed upon the previous afternoon but it contained new proposals which had not been discussed and which seemed to me to be entirely unreasonable. I insisted to General Yeh that unless the document sent him for his signature failed to incorporate all of our agreements or omitted any, he should stand behind it because it had already been signed by the National Government Commissioner. His reply was that he wanted to make it more specific. It was for this reason that he had added the additional proposals: (a) to interrogate and record the testimony of the commander of the National Government unit which took part in the conflict; (b) to interrogate and record the testimony of the National Government enlisted witnesses, who participated in the conflict; and (c) to interrogate and record the testimony of Major Freese and Mr. Duke, American Headquarters personnel who had participated in the activities of the Marine armed patrol. I pointed out that while the Communists alleged that National Government troops had participated in the conflict, both the National Government and the Marines emphatically denied that they had done so. To determine the truth or falsity of this allegation was one of the things to be determined by the investigation.

He was proposing that we write the procedure agreement in such a way that it would state as facts the principal things which were in dispute. I proposed as a substitute (which has now been agreed upon) that: “Interrogate and record the testimony of the commander of the Government troops and personnel whom the Communists alleged to have participated in the conflict.” We talked for two hours, during which General Yeh insisted the Communists considered the point very important and suggested that we further consider each other’s viewpoints and have another meeting.

The point I want to make clear, without any possibility of misunderstanding, is that the Americans are Just as anxious and just as insistent that the Communist witnesses be heard as the Communists are. No fair minded man could wish to conclude an investigation of a disputed incident after hearing only the testimony of one side. From every standpoint of equity and justice such a procedure would be unthinkable. I cannot imagine anyone but a moron participating in such an obvious fraud. I would fight just as hard as General Yeh to see that anyone the Communist side wished to present would be heard.

I am distressed at this situation. In seven months I have never had a heated argument with that gentleman over there (General Yeh). Until now I have never had occasion to criticise his actions. I have often expressed praise and admiration for him.

I am disturbed by what has happened and worried about the unfortunate outcome of the investigation to date. I, of course, believe our men and you believe yours. We now have an agreed procedure but unless we can get the job done without further bickerings over trivialities, the investigation might well do infinitely more harm than good. I therefore suggested to General Yeh that both your representative, General Huang, and our representative, Colonel Davis, be replaced in the interest of harmony.

General Yeh: You have just made a statement explaining the whole course of incidents as you saw it. Of course there are some points which differ with my understanding but I would not go into details here.

But, with regard to the last of your statement, I wish to say that since Team 25 has reached an agreement on the procedure, it would be advisable to let them continue to work for the time being, hoping that the representatives will correct their attitude and make replacements unnecessary. In case the facts prove that they cannot continue their work, we will then consider their replacements. I understand your hope and will take pains to impress the representatives in the spirit of cooperation.

General Chou: I was informed of the matter through reading the message you sent to General Marshall and which he read to me about the course of the incidents. I thank you for the statement you have just made and I also decline to go into the trivialities of the matter. I think the main issue we now have before us is first with the problem of procedure. In the past there was difference of opinion on that point and now after understanding each other and reaching an agreement these have been straightened out. Of course during discussion there were some hurt feelings but, since the problem has been fixed, I hope the program will be adhered to and we can go ahead with that procedure of recording testimony of the witnesses.

I want to state that so far the Communist side has not established contact with Communist local commanders. Therefore it is difficult to designate the time and place that the commanders may meet. Only after establishing such a contact can they determine the time and place of the rendezvous. As the matter now stands the Nationalists are continuing to attack the Communist forces in that area. While it is easy for the Nationalists to meet their appointments between Peiping and Tientsin, it is hard for the Communists. If they make a point too far away it would be inconvenient. Therefore I hope that the Communists may first have a liaison man to arrange and make the appointment and thus expedite the appointment.

Regarding the situation in An-ping. I hope that you will recognize the fact that after the occupation of An-ping the situation has changed with regard to the scene of conflict and it would therefore be fair only if the Communist personnel who were evacuated from An-ping can be allowed to present their case. Only by comparing the two different testimonies could we reach a fair and objective conclusion.

With regard to the replacement of the team representatives. General Yeh has just voiced his opinion in disfavor to the suggestion, and of course I fully realize why you brought up this question with the good intention of improving the relationship among the team members. I will consider it again and I will have another discussion with General Yeh before making a reply.

Mister Robertson: As to transportation for the Communist liaison officer to contact the Communist Commissioner, General Yeh asked me would we furnish it and I said certainly. We kept a jeep waiting two days for him.

We, of course, must arrange to hear the Communist commanders and whatever witnesses they wish to produce before we can consider our program is completed. We will join with General Yeh in insisting that these liaison contacts be made.

You raised another question about hearing the testimony of the Communist personnel who evacuated Anping. The provision in the agreement—one that was proposed in the beginning on the American side—that each Branch may call whatever witnesses they consider necessary in order to establish the truth, would provide for this. There can be no misunderstanding—anyone whom the Communists think would contribute to establishing the facts would have to be called. We couldn’t establish the facts to anyone’s satisfaction by hearing only one side.

General Chou: I wish to call to your attention the case of Tsining. You will remember that at that time we wished to determine whether Tsining was in the hands of the Communists or Nationalists on the day of January 13. The American member raised the question that they could not make the investigation unless the city itself was evacuated by the troops. Now we have an opposite example in Anping. Therefore the Communist claim is not without precedent. I merely called your attention to that.

Mister Robertson: Much water has gone over the dam since January 13th.

Meeting adjourned at 1430.