Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270: Telegram
Colonel Marshall S. Carter to General Marshall
97428. This message is dispatched solely to make sure that you are kept up to date as to current thought here on United States-Russian relations. Its only purpose is to give information and background which may be useful.
[Here follows a War Department summary of a State Department estimate of world-wide Soviet aims and intentions.]
(4) War Department OPD46 summary: As to current OPD planning estimate in which [you] have expressed interest in the past, it is in summary as follows:
The obvious Soviet aim in China is to exclude U. S. influence and replace it with that of Moscow. The major concern is that, should the U. S. for any reason or reasons withdraw from China, the result would be a triumph for Soviet strategy in an area of global importance. Soviet intent, obvious from their current propaganda campaign, is to discredit U. S. activities in China with the hope of creating public clamor in the U. S. for withdrawal of all troops and cessation of U. S. efforts in China, such clamor incidentally establishing a base for diplomatic leverage on the U. S., particularly just now in Paris on Mr. Byrnes.47 There has been press comment in the U. S., increasing since the recent statement of difficulties issued jointly by General Marshall and Ambassador Stuart, that if General Marshall’s [Page 28] mission fails, the U. S. must revert to the status of an interested bystander rather than that of an active participant in Chinese affairs. Our exclusion from China would probably result, within the next generation, in an expansion of Soviet influence over the manpower, raw materials and industrial potential of Manchuria and China. The U. S. and the world might then be faced in the China Sea and southward with a Soviet power analogous to that of the Japanese in 1941, but with the difference that the Soviets could be perhaps overwhelming[ly] strong in Europe and the Middle East as well.
The great difficulties in attaining our objectives in China are well recognized. However, we should preserve a position which will enable us effectively to continue to oppose Soviet influence in China even though internal strife continues. It is felt that failure to maintain this position would have the gravest effect on our long-range security [interests]. End of OPD estimate.
I will continue to follow the development of official thinking vis-à-vis Russia and report same to you periodically.