Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
General Marshall’s Notes of Meeting With Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Nanking, October 4, 1946, 7:15 p.m.
The Generalissimo made the following comments on my memorandum of October 1st (OSE 476), stating that unless certain action was immediately taken I would recommend to the President that I be recalled and that the American efforts at mediation be terminated. He stated that he had searched his mind for any action that might have been construed as lack of integrity in action on his part without result. Such an action by him was unthinkable—that, aside from his position as head of the Government of China, his own conscience as a Christian would forbid. He regretted exceedingly if anything had occurred to give rise to such a belief and he could only assure me that I was mistaken. He did not feel that it was a matter that could be discussed.
The Generalissimo stated that my departure from China was unthinkable. I could not possibly cease my efforts of mediation, that the crisis in China was the most important in the world at the present time and my efforts were of great historic significance. He could not consider such action on my part; that nothing that he could recall had affected, surprised or had disturbed him so much mentally. He also said that a satisfactory basis could be found for the continuation of my mission.
I replied that I was not implying any question of the integrity of the Generalissimo, but rather to my actions and position and to that of the United States as represented by my actions; that I was convinced that a campaign of force was in progress and the negotiations could be charged as a cover for the campaign and as such I could no longer participate. I cited that in June he had acceded to my proposal [Page 288] that Kalgan be left to the Communists and at that time the Government was in a very much weaker position than at the present time, (Chengteh had been captured, most of Hopeh and Jehol had been taken over and his troops had advanced well beyond Peiping in the direction of Kalgan, and also were about to capture Chihfeng and Tolum—all critical strategic points). To say at this time that Kalgan was of such strategic importance that the Government could not consider any arrangement whereby it would not occupy that place was not consistent with the action in June in view of the much weaker position of the Government at that earlier date. The present procedure therefore clearly meant to me a campaign of force and not a settlement by negotiation.
I reminded him that at the end of June I had opposed the whole procedure indicated for July and August where he declined to accept the agreements openly reached, and stated that there would be only local fighting in China Proper and no fighting in Manchuria; that I disagreed not only with that conception, but I thought it inevitably meant the development of a full-fledged civil war entirely beyond his, or the Communists’, control for a long time to come and also that it would provoke a situation which would be an invitation to the Soviet Government to intervene in Manchuria.
The Generalissimo replied that his reference to Kalgan in June was not an agreement—that the Communists had not accepted the proposal. I replied that it wasn’t a question of agreement, what I referred to was a statement of a condition that existed then when he was willing to submit himself to such agreement in contrast to the strong position of the Government at the present time when he was unwilling to call a halt to the operations against Kalgan unless the Communists agreed to its occupation by Government Forces.
The Generalissimo made a lengthy statement—more or less reiterating the matters referred to above and also going into the various aspects of negotiations with the Communists—but he gave no indication of stopping the operations against Kalgan.
In conclusion I stated that I regretted to inform him that nothing had transpired in our discussion that caused me to alter my point of view—in fact, I was the more convinced that the U. S. Government was being placed in a position where the integrity of its action could be successfully questioned and therefore I must recommend to the President my recall.
Note: That evening General Pee, the Generalissimo’s aide, called on Dr. Stuart to make some inquiry regarding a meeting Dr. Stuart had had with Communist officials. Dr. Stuart remarked to General Pee that General Marshall was sending a message to the President recommending his recall. About a half-hour later General Pee called [Page 289] up Dr. Stuart and stated that the Generalissimo would like to see him immediately, that was 8 p.m. Dr. Stuart reported to me about 9:30 the substance of the conversation which involved a discussion of the declaration of a truce for a short period halting the advance of Kalgan. I had already dispatched my message to the President (1000 [1600]67) and thereupon sent a message in the clear (1605)68 directing that its delivery to the President be delayed until further instructions from me.