Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Messrs. Tung Pi-wu and Wang Ping-nan, Communist Party Delegation, at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, October 4, 1946, 10:30 a.m.
| Also present: | Lt. Col. Hutchin |
| Captain Soong | |
| Mister Wu |
Mister Tung: After our last conversation, I transmitted pertinent details to General Chou En Lai. When I received the memorandum from the Generalissimo transmitted through you,61 I also transmitted its contents to General Chou. He has received that memorandum as of yesterday morning, but we haven’t yet received a reply from him.
Inasmuch as the Generalissimo’s memorandum mentioned that it was in reply to General Chou’s memorandum handed to you through me, it seems that the Generalissimo’s memorandum is in reply to General Chou’s memorandum transmitted to the Generalissimo through you. However, in the Generalissimo’s memorandum, no word has been mentioned on the cessation of the advance by Government troops against Kalgan. When we received the memorandum from the Generalissimo, Mr. Wang Ping Nan went to visit Dr. Stuart and asked him about the issue of Kalgan. Dr. Stuart replied that the memorandum did not deal with that special issue. Dr. Stuart [Page 282] did not discuss that issue and said that he would have to discuss this matter with you first before he could make a reply.
Yesterday morning, Dr. Stuart told Mr. Wang that before a cessation of the attack on Kalgan, the Communist Party could make an expression of doing certain things before the Government actually ceased its attack on Kalgan. After this conversation, Mr. Wang reported to me and I simultaneously reported to Yenan and to General Chou in Shanghai.
The attack on Kalgan has been a most serious problem of the present situation. It is still so today. Since the Government has made no reply on the Kalgan issue, it shows that the Government has no intention to stop its fighting or advances toward Kalgan. It is General Chou’s wish, and also the wish of the Communist Party, that the Government make a definite reply concerning the Kalgan issue, I hope that you will pay most serious attention to this problem.
Regarding the meeting of the Committee of Three and the Five Man Group, the public seems to be very confused. The Central News has reported that the Government has agreed to this proposal but the Communist Party has not expressed their attitude. Mr. Connors of the American Embassy has announced that the Government did not make the expression to agree to a simultaneous meeting of the Committee of Three and the Five Man Group.
General Marshall: The Government did “not” make that?
Mister Tung: That is right. The Government has not made the expression of agreement for the Committee of Three and the Five Man Group.
General Marshall: That is not correct, there is something wrong there.
Mister Tung: It is reported in one of the local newspapers in Nanking. Mr. Connors also announced that a meeting of the Committee of Three was not a proposal of General Marshall. A second point of my coming here today is to express the Communist attitude on that point.
General Marshall: Wait a minute. Mr. Connors did not say that. (To Captain Soong: Translate this statement of Mr. Connors.)
“The statement released by the Central News Agency in Nanking dated September 30 to the effect that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had agreed to accept the proposal of General Marshall for a simultaneous [meeting] of the Committee of Three and the Five Man Committee is incorrect in attributing the proposal to General Marshall.”
Mister Tung: The Ta Tao Pao issued that statement I mentioned and it is not an official Government paper. They must have made an error in printing the news. The Central News Agency and Central Daily News has not carried this statement made by Mr. Connors.
[Page 283]There is still confusion in the public’s mind because the Chinese Government official newspapers did not carry Connors’ statement. The impression left with the public is that the Government has agreed to all the proposals, but the Communist Party hasn’t. I want to make clear today that the conversation I had with you before was not related to anyone other than my immediate staff and office, and that no statement has been made to the public. We have made clear to Dr. Stuart and to you repeatedly that the Communists have not rejected the proposal of the simultaneous meeting of the Committee of Three and the Five Man Group. During our previous meeting you had stated that you would let us know as soon as you received the official reaction of the Government to the simultaneous meeting of the Committee of Three and the Five Man Group. I am still waiting for that reaction.
General Marshall: The only official reaction I have is that communication I sent you. I transmitted your statement and the Government gave me back that memorandum.
Mister Tung: Do you have any comments to make, or opinions, regarding this memorandum from the Generalissimo?
General Marshall: Nothing other than to say what I think Dr. Stuart has probably already said, that we had done our best to find a basis for the termination of hostilities without delay and the reply of the Generalissimo is the result to date.
Mister Tung: According to this memorandum of the Generalissimo, it seems to set forth the conditions precedent to a cessation of hostilities.
General Marshall: That was my assumption.
Mister Tung: These conditions include the State Council issue, the Five Man Group, plus a new condition which requires the names of the delegates to participate in the National Assembly. Is this a new demand?
General Marshall: I transmitted that statement from the Generalissimo about three weeks ago, I believe, in writing in a memorandum to General Chou.62
Mister Tung: I have seen that.
Regarding the delegates to the National Assembly, there was a question remaining whether they should increase the number of seats or not. Also, the number of delegates of the Communist Party is not fixed. This is a complicated issue because it was a resolution of the PCC that the nomination of the delegates from Shantung, Hopeh, Jehol and the nine provinces in the North East must be by consultation with the Communist Party, which the Government has not done.
I would like to amplify that statement. For instance, it was agreed [Page 284] that there would be 725 delegates in the National Assembly. Later on it was decided that the number should be increased. As to numbers involved in this increase, it was not fixed. A certain number of Communist delegates was agreed upon but later on it was decided that that should also be revised. However, that part has never been taken up again.
The delegates to the National Assembly from Shantung, Hopeh, Chahar, Jehol, the nine provinces of the Northeast, the Yenan district of Shensi and Kansu and Ningsia was not officially discussed in the PCC. However, it was privately discussed between General Chou En Lai, Mr. Tung Pi Wu, Mr. Wang Ju Fei63 and Mr. Shao Li Tse, General Chang Chun and Dr. Wang Shih Chieh.64 This issue was discussed among these few people since it only concerned the Kuomintang and the Communist Parties and it was not brought up to the PCC.
Regarding the National Assembly, the most important issue was the draft constitution. If there is no draft constitution agreed upon by all, there can be no reason for calling this National Assembly. This draft constitution is a major issue in the National Assembly. Therefore, during this serious stage of the situation in China, to bring up this National Assembly issue as a condition precedent shows the lack of intention of the Government to secure settlement.
This is only my personal feeling and expression. I have to wait for the official expression from Yenan and General Chou En Lai.
The second point in the Generalissimo’s memorandum brought up the issue of Communist troops disposition. I am asking whether the agreements reached on the supplementary paper to army reorganization on 24 June65 is still effective. That stated that in Manchuria, regardless of how many places the Government and Communist troops occupied, they must return to the lines of 7 June. In China Proper, regardless of how many places the Government or Communist troops occupied, they must return to the lines of 13 January. Is that agreement as reached on 24 June still effective?
General Marshall: I cannot answer that directly. As I reported to General Chou three weeks ago, I believe, it was my impression that it was the Generalissimo’s purpose to continue in military occupation of the places in North China that his troops had recently occupied. I have received no definite statement on that. But that is the stand I anticipate. Regarding Manchuria, I have no definite statement, but the implication I have gotten from general conversations was that the tentative agreement reached regarding troop dispositions in Manchuria, both for the cessation of hostilities and for the reorganization [Page 285] and redistribution of the armies, would be as it was tentatively agreed last June.
Mister Tung: It is my hope that if any agreements tentatively reached are still effective, then all agreements tentatively reached should be effective. If just part are effective, then the Government could break any part of an agreement which does not suit them. Before Mr. Shao Li-tze went to Lushan,66 I had a conversation with him at which I expressed my personal opinion that agreements made by the Communists in the past are agreements to which they still agree today. Some of these agreements were more advantageous to one side and others were more advantageous to the other side. However these conditions always exist. Agreements we have reached should be adhered to.
General Marshall: We have a saying at home “Chickens come home to roost.” I do not know any more than I have already told you of the Government’s probable stand, but they might readily use General Chou’s language after the Communist capture of Changchun when he was requiring an alteration of the agreement of February 2566a regarding the military setup in Manchuria, which he justified by the statement, “The situation has greatly changed.” My comment then was, that if the Communists insisted on that alteration, it was inevitable that the Government insist on corresponding changes, which they did regarding Communist troops scheduled for location in Anhwei and Kiangsu.
These comments do not help in the solution of the problem but they at least give point to some of my difficulties. When the Government continued its advances after occupying Changchun, I told them that inevitably the Communists would react in North China, which they did commencing 7 June. And when the Communists continued their operations after 8 June in Shantung, I told General Chou that inevitably the Government would react with reinforcements and attacks, which they did. This procedure has gone on almost indefinitely—whichever side has had the advantage has pressed that advantage and justified it by explanations. In my opinion that has been both a serious Communist mistake and a serious Government mistake, a very human reaction though a very short-sighted one. I have to be very realistic and it is seldom therefore that I can be agreeable in these conferences.
Mister Tung: Another point regarding the troop disposition issue; that is, the Government is now concentrating 85% of its total troops in North China and Manchuria. Even though we seek a peaceful settlement, if this situation is not corrected, any agreement would be [Page 286] just for the time being and not permanent. I want you to consider that point. This is my personal expression.
Since the discontinuance of the Committee of Three meetings on the 29th of June, Yenan has told General Chou that if an agreement is to be reached, the Government must withdraw half of its forces from Manchuria and North China. However, since the discontinuance of the Committee of Three meetings, other issues entered discussion. I do not know whether General Chou has reported to you on this issue.
General Marshall: He has not.
Mister Tung: That is partly because after the 29th of June, the issue of cessation of hostilities was not brought into discussion.
General Marshall: I had the Government troop situation checked about four weeks ago, I think. I found that over 100 divisions had been demobilized. But that virtually none of the troops in North China and Manchuria had been demobilized. The Government procedure of demobilization is to reduce a three division army to one division. The first step is a reduction to a division of four infantry regiments instead of the three that is the standard organization. The second step is the elimination of the fourth regiment and of one of the two brigades. In view of the fact that there has been no demobilization in North China and Manchurian units, the principal reduction in strength would result from reduction of armies into divisions.
One minor reason why I secured this data was to permit my officers to calculate for me, the permissible or possible movement of troops within a certain period of time that could be made in Manchuria and in North China so that I would be properly informed in connection with my intervention in the matters of negotiations and would not commit myself to an agreement which was impossible logistically of execution. Mr. Tung has just indicated to me a Yenan requirement in relation to troop strength in North China and Manchuria and yet I have never been given any data by the Communist Party since that would enable me to make any calculation of any kind, though it was due three weeks following the agreement of February 25th.
There followed some off-the-record remarks.
Mister Tung: The Communist candidate has delegated the Chief of Staff, General Teng to participate in this procedure. However, later on a civil war flared up and no progress was made.
General Marshall: The three weeks elapsed before the civil war flared up. Three weeks had almost elapsed before I left for Washington. But that is beside the point. I have been just trying to explain to you the situation in North China regarding Government troops.
[Page 287]This is something that has just been handed to me. (General Marshall handed Captain Soong a newspaper item issued by Central News Agency to translate to Mr. Tung). It answers one of Mr. Tung’s questions.
Mister Tung: This statement is not true because the letter from the Government representative to General Chou is really acknowledging receipt of the memorandum. I still wish to obtain a reply. I hope you will exercise your efforts to receive a reply from the Government toward the Kalgan issue.
(General Marshall suggested that Mister Tung submit his proposal in waiting after some discussion.)
Meeting adjourned.