Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Informal Meeting of Military Sub-Committee, at House 28, Chungking, February 11, 1946, 12:30 p.m.

Present: General Marshall
General Chang Chih Chung
General Chou En-lai
Also present: Colonel Caughey
Mr. Shepley
Colonel Pee
Captain Soong
Mr. Chang

General Marshall stated that he would like to hear the results of discussions which had been held thus far between Generals Chang and Chou.

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1. Scope of Military Sub-Committee

General Chou stated that the directive from Committee of Three89 said the Military Sub-Committee would study reorganization of all Armies, whereas PCC had previously directed that only the reorganization of Communist Armies would be considered. General Chou believed, however, the total reorganization of the Armies would be the better plan. General Chang agreed.

2. Size of the Army

General Chou said the 90 National and 20 Communist division figures were arrived at without relationship with one another; now, due to reorganization there is a relationship and the figures are set; in the second stage, however, within the 50 to 60 division Army, some new ratio less favorable to the Communists might be acceptable. General Chang stated that reduction from 250 odd divisions to 90 by Nationalist and reduction to only 20 by Communists would have bad effect on National morale and he hoped Communists would reduce below 20.

3. Time Factor

General Chou agreed to a 12 month period for the 1st stage in which National will reduce to 90 divisions and Communists reduce to 20. General Chang also agreed.

4. Integration

General Chou agreed that integration in 1st stage is desirable but he stated he had referred this question to Yenan for decision. General Chang agreed to the principle of integration in the first stage.

5. Conscription

General Chou said the PCC has set the principles. General Chang said the National Council would have to work out these details.

6. Organization

General Chou agreed with General Marshall’s concept of 3 divisions per Army, no intermediate command, and to separate service areas from command. General Chang also agreed.

7. Deployment

General Chou informed that Communists do not want Communist units in South China. General Chang agreed.

8. Equipment Disposal and Distribution

General Chou believed this question must be taken up by Military Sub-Committee. General Chang agreed.

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9. Demobilization Officers and Enlisted Men

General Chou said that training and employment programs for this personnel must be worked out; first separately, then combined. General Chang agreed.

10. Education, Military and Political

General Chou stated that the Military Sub-Committee should establish broad policy. General Chang agreed.

11. Disarmament

General Chou believed that Military Sub-Committee should agree to the principle that Communists should keep arms of the Japanese surrendered to Communists and that Communists would store and guard the arms until settlement was made. General Chang agreed.

12. Puppet Troops

General Chou believed that the Military Sub-Committee should prohibit attempts to win over from one side to another puppet troops and that puppet troops should be demobilized first. General Chang agreed.

13. Banditry

General Chou said that Army commanders should be responsible for respective areas. General Chang agreed.

14. Local and Irregular Forces

General Chou said these forces should not be considered as part of the Army. General Chang agreed.

15. Executive Headquarters

General Chou believed that the Executive Headquarters and team organizations was a satisfactory agency to implement decisions regarding reorganization and that the planning and control committee set up by PCC could take over later. General Chang agreed.

16. Personnel System

General Chang said that an adequate personnel system must be established to properly administer the reorganized Army. General Chou agreed.

General Marshall said that he would have a paper prepared and submitted to Generals Chang and Chou tomorrow for consideration. As to the subsequent procedure General Marshall indicated that it is very important to arrive at certain broad principles such as:

a.
Number of divisions.
b.
Order of procedure in reorganization.
c.
General disposition of troops.
d.
Type of command to be maintained.
e.
Organization of supply districts.

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Once an agreement has been reached on these broad principles, it then immediately becomes possible to work out the details. The details would be the working basis for the Executive Headquarters and would include:

a.
Number of divisions to be demobilized during the first, second, third, etc., month.
b.
Divisions to be integrated into Armies.
c.
When and where integration is to take place.
d.
Establishment of service areas.
e.
Exact schedule for discontinuance of high field headquarters.
f.
Exact procedure of demobilization.
g.
Disposition of weapons.
h.
Completion of the equipping of divisions remaining in existence, when and how.
i.
Regulations, stipulations as to pay and allowance from the Central Government.

General Marshall stated that he had made arrangements with General Wedemeyer for several officers with General Caraway90 as the head to work out the details in consultation with high Chinese officials in Chungking.

General Marshall then stated that it is very important to reach agreement as soon as possible as to numbers of divisions and that Generals Chang and Chou should decide this before Wednesday. General Marshall then said that he was inclined to agree with General Chou’s comment to the effect that to start integration at the same time as demobilization would be difficult and confusing. He added that integration should probably begin during the third month; that two combined armies would be created at beginning of third month; three combined armies in fourth and so on. He stated that the procedure to create service areas requires a great deal of thought and that these areas probably could not be all created at once or simultaneously. General Marshall further stated that these areas would help in handling demobilized personnel and help in the collecting and cleaning up of equipment. After the planners had done their work, they would be transferred to the Executive Headquarters as a new section.

General Chou informed that he would approach General Chang tomorrow evening about number of divisions and that, regarding integration in first stage[,] he would consult Yenan. He added that he felt integration would be difficult even by the third or fourth month.

General Marshall concluded by saying that demobilization should start first and integration should follow later, say integrate 2 Armies the 3rd month, 3 armies the 4th month, etc.; the staffs of these integrated [Page 215]armies to be integrated also. General Marshall added that service areas probably would also have to be delayed initially.

  1. January 14, p. 188.
  2. Brig. Gen. Paul W. Caraway.