Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall, Br. Wang, Mr. Shao, and General Chen at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 9, 1946, 3 p.m.
| Also present: | Capt. Soong |
Mr. Shao clarified the Government’s stand concerning its insistence that Communist troops withdraw from four areas—south of Chengte, Antung, along Tsingtao–Tsinan Railroad, and Northern Kiangsu. The reasons given were to eliminate a threat to the government and [Page 1332] to obtain better security. He stated that the Government did not demand that the Communist Party give up local administrative control as well as military control in all the areas to be vacated by Communist troops. Local administration problems in all such areas vacated by Communists other than the four specific areas mentioned above, will be discussed and solved by either PCC or by the Steering Committee of the PCC.
Dr. Wang supplemented Mr. Shao’s remarks by adding that the overall problem of local administration will be settled by either the Steering Committee of PCC or by PCC itself; but the local administration problem in these four particular areas must be solved for the interim period before the permanent Cessation of Hostilities Order can be issued.
Mr. Shao then stated that the Communist threat to the Government in these four particular areas might be not only in the form of actual troop concentrations but also in the form of disguised troops which would continue to remain under the existing local administration. The reason why the Government was particularly insistent on the total evacuation of Northern Kiangsu by the Communists was that this area is close to Nanking and Shanghai. Through Communist activities in this area, two or three millions of refugees have been made homeless. This has a serious repercussion on the political affairs in this capital.
Mr. Shao further stated that General Chou considered the Government’s demand to be excessive. However on the Government side, it is felt that the larger concession was made in favor of the Communist Party. It is true that the Government was authorized to take over sovereignty in Manchuria, both politically and militarily, but now that the Communists interfered, the Government had conceded a large area to them which is far greater than the four areas the Government had demanded from the Communists.
Mr. Shao gave another reason as to why the Government had to be insistent on Communist evacuation of Northern Kiangsu. That was at the beginning of the negotiations last year, the Communist Party promised to withdraw from eight areas in the first stage and two areas in the second stage. The two areas in the second stage were Northern Anhwei and Northern Kiangsu. In exchange for this, the Communist Party demanded certain governorships, vice governorships, mayoralties and vice mayoralties in different areas. Consequently, the Government felt that the Communist Party was ready to withdraw from Northern Kiangsu.
Mr. Shao further stated that General Chou clarified the Communist Party’s stand reference the areas south of Chengte, Antung, and [Page 1333] along Tsingtao–Tsinan Railroad by his statement that they would not be too difficult to solve but the Communist Party cannot give up Northern Kiangsu entirely because they had been there for too long. Mr. Shao then said that regarding Northern Kiangsu, the Government made a similar proposal to that of General Chou’s when he suggested the organization of a committee to supervise and protect refugees who wished to return home. This proposal was made on the assumption that the existing local administration in this area would be maintained. The Government proposal assumed total withdrawal by the Communists. The Government would assure the safe conduct of Communist personnel to carry out the three People’s Principles,98 and to continue the present land system. However, after three conferences, no agreement was reached.
On 6 July, the conference was adjourned without setting a date for further negotiation, but it was agreed that the Government Representatives would report the results to the Generalissimo while General Chou would make his report to Yenan. Mr. Shao and Dr. Wang saw the Generalissimo that night but no further instructions were given to them. The Generalissimo merely stated that he would want a little time to consider the situation.
Mr. Shao said that he had learned from the minutes of yesterday’s conference between General Chou and General Marshall that General Chou hinted the lack of sincere intention on the part of the Generalissimo to conduct further negotiations through the medium of this committee. This was not true. Government representatives had just received instructions from the Generalissimo to carry on further negotiations with the Communist Party. However, it was not yet decided as to how these future negotiations would be conducted.
Dr. Wang supplemented that they had seen the Generalissimo this noon and suggested to him that the effort in securing peace by negotiations should be continued. To this, the Generalissimo agreed. Dr. Wang further stated that if the Communist Party could make further concessions, then they would also urge the Generalissimo to concede further. Dr. Wang then asked for General Marshall’s comment.
General Marshall stated that he was very glad to hear that the Generalissimo would allow the Five man Conference to continue but that he was in no position to mediate these political problems inasmuch as he knew so little about conditions. However, in this particular situation, it was most important to find a solution, to settle the problem of local administration which was the only serious problem [Page 1334] now standing in the way of final issuance of the Cessation of Hostilities Order. General Marshall feared that the fighting might spread rapidly. He was intensely interested in obtaining a temporary arrangement which would settle the local administration issue in order that fights and conflicts could be stopped by the issuance of the Cessation of Hostilities Order.
General Marshall then commented that the original proposals to be made by the Government to the Communist Party in Manchuria were not in his opinion a workable basis for negotiation. The Generalissimo had therefore made some alterations in his proposals for that area with the proviso that the Communist Party would vacate in North China Jehol, Chahar, Weihaiwei and Chefoo. All this before the matter was taken up with the Communists.
General Marshall also pointed out that under the Agreement of February 25, at the end of 12 months, one Communist Army would have been in Central China; and at the end of 18 months, 2 divisions would remain there, although no specific locations were designated. But now the situation had totally changed. All the changes tended to indicate that neither side, as a rule, took into consideration the fear of the other side. Contrary to the Government’s belief, General Marshall thought that the Communist Party was intensely anxious to obtain a temporary arrangement which would permit the Order of Cessation of Hostilities to be issued immediately.
General Marshall had learned through Dr. Lo99 that General Chou may not have entered into the recent conferences whole-heartedly because he was embarrassed once trying to find a temporary arrangement which would settle the local administration problem because of the party fear that the Government’s intention was to abandon the PCC entirely. In view of this situation, General Marshall thought one approach to the problem might be to assure the meeting of PCC or the Steering Committee of the PCC at a specified time in the near future to discuss the problem of local government. This would provide some assurance for General Chou which should enable him to go ahead with the four specific areas on a temporary basis.
General Marshall then reiterated that the fears, suspicions and mutual distrust on both sides caused a continued repetition of acts of retaliation. These wrongful acts had made negotiations here extremely difficult and had carried China to the verge of total civil war. General Marshall summed up by saying that we had reached agreements on Cessation of Hostilities, the Restoration of Communications, and authority of American members to settle disagreements among team members. The only question which remained unsolved was the Local Administration issue. He expressed regret that he [Page 1335] could not propose a compromise measure, but the problem must be solved very soon or else China would have a chaotic situation.
Dr. Wang gave three points on the reopening of PCC. First, the Communist Party wanted to solve the present problem its way and its insistence on the PCC was merely intended to please the Democratic League. Secondly, the Democratic League and minority groups hoped for reopening of PCC for their own advantage. Thirdly, if no agreement could be reached on the present situation, then the reopening of PCC would only further complicate the matter. Dr. Wang asked if the Government representatives could be made responsible for additional concessions on the Northern Kiangsu issue, and if the Communist Party would make further concessions in the areas south of Chengte, Antung, and along the Tsingtao–Tsinan railroad. He had not decided as to what proposals they would make to General Chou.
General Marshall then outlined to them a suggestion he had previously made to General Chou concerning the evacuations of Communist troops from Northern Kiangsu and Chengte areas.
General Chen Cheng pointed out to General Marshall that it was absolutely necessary to have the Communist troops moved to the area north of the Lunghai railroad and he asked General Marshall to pay specific attention to this point.