Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 29, 1946, 3:30 p.m.
| Also present: | Mr. Chang |
| Mr. Durden10 | |
| Colonel Caughey | |
| Captain Soong |
General Marshall: I have just returned from a long conference with the Generalissimo, starting at 11:45 and lasting until 3:00 p.m., regarding this document (Preliminary Agreement to Govern the Amendment and Execution of the Army Reorganization Plan of February 25, 194611) that I prepared after General Chou had proposed the changes in its form yesterday and by his draft this morning. I found the Generalissimo unwilling to agree to the confinement of paragraph 5 to Manchuria only.
Paragraph 6, so far as refers to the coalition government, I am afraid he did not agree to that, but he did agree to appoint the civil mayor and try to find a man, acceptable to the Communist Party, through his own initiative.
Paragraph 7. He first expressed complete disapproval and I am not certain now as to just what his attitude was at the last. He is now, as I understand his point of view, having only seen the translation of this document as I arrived (and, during the early part of my visit), agreed to the contents of the Communist local government until the reorganization of the National Government has been effected. But he later qualified that by stating he could not accept that arrangement in Kiangsu as there are hundreds of thousands of refugees desirous of returning and who, he felt, would probably be mistreated by the present local government.
Regarding the Peace Preservation Corps, he accepts the idea of a Peace Preservation Corps on the same basis as local Security troops strengths in National hsiens.
He did not discuss the last two sentences, the one regarding imports and exports, and the one regarding currency.
Regarding the annex, to which I understood General Chou proposed the amendment that the moves would be completed within one to three months, the Generalissimo insisted that a specific period should be mentioned as was done in this draft document.
Regarding Kiangsu: The Generalissimo would not accept the partial occupation of north Kiangsu. He insisted evacuation should be [Page 1251] carried as far north as Huai-an within six weeks and at a later period, whether three or six months I am not certain, to the north of the Lunghai railroad. He stipulated that the second proviso under Shantung should include the evacuation of the coal mines along the railroad, particularly Po-chan.
He made no reference to the statement here in the draft regarding Chahar but he was unrelenting regarding Cheng-te. His last statement I recall was that the Communists should evacuate the area south of the latitude of Cheng-te within one month and Cheng-te itself within three months. He stipulated that the evacuation of Antung Province should be completed within one month. He stated that a paragraph should be added to this document to the effect that the completion of the amendments to the agreement of 25 February must be completed within ten days.
Those, I think are the points that the Generalissimo made proposing amendments or additions to this draft we are discussing.
General Chou: The Generalissimo referred only to Antung and Harbin so far as Manchuria was concerned?
General Marshall: Yes.
General Chou: Did the Generalissimo mean Antung Province?
General Marshall: Yes. He did not say “the province”, but he mentioned it the other day and I am quite sure that is what he was discussing.
General Chou: I am somewhat uncertain about the meaning of paragraph 3. At first I thought that the period would be altered from 12 months to 3. Then it was later changed to 6 months. I understand that that concerns only the concentration of troops but does not alter the reorganization and demobilization of troops, which will still be completed within 12 months. Maybe you mean the demobilization and the reorganization, which should be carried out within 12 months, be changed now to six months?
General Marshall: Answering General Chou’s question as to whether or not the six months referred to in paragraph 3 refers to demobilization as well as to distribution of forces, it would be my impression that this shortening of the period did not refer to the demobilization procedure at all. I recall that the Generalissimo had stated very specifically in earlier discussions of the Manchurian situation that the reduction of strength as well as the redistribution of troops should be effected before the severe cold weather, and I believe October 15 was the date mentioned.
General Chou: The revised draft is not clear. My understanding has been that regarding China Proper or Manchuria the period refers to only the concentration of troops. The period for the demobilization will still be as originally scheduled. With this understanding [Page 1252] then, I agree to the change from 3 to 6 months. The six months refers only to the concentration of troops but not the demobilization of troops.
General Marshall: As I have said, my understanding was that we were discussing the redistribution of troops but I recall the Generalissimo’s statement about Manchuria and he would have to clarify my understanding of that phase of the matter.
The Manchurian annex, which the Generalissimo approved, states that the entire demobilization and integration program of the Manchurian program should be completed before November 1. We had originally written the date January 1, but the Government changed it to November 1.
General Chou: My comments on paragraph 2 have already been given to Colonel Caughey. I am still consulting Yenan.
Regarding paragraphs 4 and 5. I do not see the reason in the Generalissimo’s insistence to apply paragraph 5 to China Proper since paragraph 4 applies to China Proper. I believe my original proposal should be maintained whereby paragraph 5 relates only to Manchuria.
General Marshall: I do not know just what was in the Generalissimo’s mind regarding this point. I think it possible that he felt that the determination of the facts under the agreement of January 10 would be a very long process, particularly as unanimous agreement is required. For example, in the case of Chinning,12 they have never, according to your statement yesterday, reached an agreement. The Government feels that Chinning should be theirs, and the Communists feel that Chinning should be theirs. The issue involves the period January 13–14 and it is now nearly the first of July and still no decision has been reached and probably there will never be a unanimous agreement. That means whoever occupies the place will continue to hold it by blocking an agreement. So it is possible that he had in mind that the events since June 7 were more clearly defined therefore they could be readily settled without being set behind the decision regarding incidents of the preceding months. Also, he may have been influenced by the feeling that these offensive actions from the Government point of view after June 7, the date of the so-called truce, were of such a nature and in such localities that he wished an immediate settlement, defining ten days as such a period.
General Chou: I wish to point out that the two paragraphs, 4 and 5, are vaguely worded. There are two points: First, regarding paragraph 4 which refers only to China Proper as it is now amended. There is little difference between the two paragraphs as now worded and the question might be raised whether the statement of January 13 should also refer to Manchuria. To raise such a question would [Page 1253] merely complicate the matter and therefore I still suggest that paragraph 4 refer only to China Proper and paragraph 5 to Manchuria. Secondly, regarding ten or 20 days’ period. It is practicable in Manchuria to complete evacuation in ten days but not in China Proper because it takes some time to reach the troops and investigation must be made there. Most of the Communists are in an unfavorable position with regard to lines of communication. Also, villages or townlets captured by the Nationalists after June 7 may not be determined. If the period in paragraph 5 is prolonged to 20 days then it would be the same as in paragraph 4.
With regard to the June 7 situation, some points have not yet been clarified. The Government would not admit the occupation of places in Shansi or in the Hopeh area, or along the Lunghai railroad, so it is impossible to settle the issue within ten days. Coming to Manchuria, the matter might be simpler because there are fewer hostilities since June 7 and communications are better than in China Proper. Even so, I feel I am running a risk to accept the ten days proposed for Manchuria. So far as the larger places are concerned, determinations within ten days could be made easily. Set examinations regarding the villages and towns would be harder to determine.
General Marshall: It might be possible to eliminate paragraph 5 if we could have an understanding or stipulation in the formal minutes that the occupation of places since June 7 would be determined with a minimum of delay and so far as possible in advance of settlements regarding the occupation of places prior to that date and since January 13, 1946.
General Chou: But Manchuria cannot be put into paragraph 4.
General Marshall: Let us state then, “It might be possible to arrange matters if we could have an understanding.”
General Chou: Paragraph 5 with the word “Manchuria” is acceptable.
As to paragraph 4, I suggest that we add a footnote to paragraph 4. We could state that the occupied places during the months of April, May and June be determined first because hostilities took place only since the beginning of April and because that is all very clearly defined and affects only big places. For example, Tingyuan, in Anhwei Province, to which the Communist Party attaches great importance.
General Marshall: What is the purpose of that? Tingyuan is to be evacuated within 6 weeks. Are the Communist troops in there now?
General Chou: They are scattered around there.
General Marshall: Isn’t Tingyuan now occupied by Government troops?
General Chou: Yes. The point of issue is that if the status quo [Page 1254] is maintained the troops of both parties have to evacuate that place. If that is not straightened out the Government troops will otherwise occupy that place.
General Marshall: General Chou will recall his discussion of arrangements in Kiangsu in which he said he thought the Government troops could retake Lai-an, Liu-ho and another place, I think Chengte. Is he altering his stand regarding those places?
General Chou: I did not mention Lai-an. Instead it was Puchen (north of Pukou), Liu-ho and Chengte which were garrisoned by the Nationalist troops.
General Marshall: That is right outside of Nanking—across the river.
General Chou: I proposed Government troops merely stay in places which are under their garrison.
General Marshall: That had something to do with movements since January 13th?
General Chou: Puchen, Liuho and Chengte were occupied before January 13th.
General Marshall: They were?
General Chou: Yes.
General Marshall: Then they occupied Laian and Tingyuan on June 7th—those were occupied recently.
General Chou: The point of issue is, according to the stipulations in this draft, that the places thus evacuated will be left ungarrisoned. This is a matter which affects the livelihood of the people—also the oppression of the people. The Communists would not raise the question of refugees. If we raised it we could raise the same Hell as the Government, which is now raising the question of refugees.
Regarding paragraph 6, I can try to reach a compromise on that basis; that the mayor will be appointed by the Government who is acceptable to the Communists. The appointment is made on the initiative of the Government. I cannot declare myself definitely on that but will take up the matter.
General Marshall: That will have to be an understanding outside of this paper. In paragraph 7, did he have the insertion after “vacated”, “in China Proper”. Of course in discussing that I ask General Chou to keep in mind that the Generalissimo has disagreed as to the Kiangsu part where General Chou discussed the possible compromise in a statement regarding the local government. The Generalissimo stated that he couldn’t accept that arrangement in Kiangsu.
General Chou: I wish to raise two points.
First, it is acceptable to me that this arrangement will only refer [Page 1255] to China Proper and as to Manchuria a separate arrangement will be worked out.
The second point is regarding the strength of the Peace Preservation Corps. It is acceptable to me that the strength will be the same as in the Government hsien.
General Marshall: Are the hsien in two or three classes?
General Chou: There is a small variance, but not much as far as the strength is concerned.
General Marshall: The reluctance of the Government in that matter comes from their feeling that Communist ordinary troops can easily masquerade as Peace Preservation Corps units and Peace Preservation Corps units are frequently capable of very aggressive action. That reluctance therefore applies to areas such as that immediately north and west of the Tientsin–Hulutao railroad which could be continuously open to sabotage attacks by so-called Peace Preservation units.
General Chou: General Chou’s reply to that is that such an argument is not aimed to establish peace. On the Government side they also have railroad troops which can be used to arrest and harass people. These railroad troops are recruited from the secret police and they have also other special units. This argument is merely raised due to the Government’s intention to still prepare for war. In case it is really sincere in ceasing fighting and to establish peace, then all such considerations can be taken up step by step. An argument would not facilitate the settlement of our questions. Right now, the Government will also maintain railroad troops along the railways, for instance on this railroad from Peiping to Hulutao and they also have Peace Preservation Corps and a large size police force in the large cities. Most of them are recruited from troops of the secret police. They can do a lot of harm to the civilians. They can go to the country to ransack the people and loot the food. Anything of that can happen on the Government side too. Should we argue along that line, then the Communists are also entitled to raise the question of disbanding railroad troops and Peace Preservation Corps, etc. The only practical steps we should adopt is one on the basis of mutual trust to commit ourselves to a certain scope of discussion so as to straighten out the points at issue. Regarding the second sentence in paragraph 7, I accept that.
As regards the third sentence, the currency problem, I believe that it should be settled in principle but not at this time, as I told Colonel Caughey this morning.
Now on the remaining problem concerning North Kiangsu; to have that as an exception is impossible because I cannot see my way clear [Page 1256] to turn over the 20 million people in that area to the Kuomintang Government which is not a coalition government, but rather a most undemocratic one. Now the Government raised the question of refugees. I, myself, am a citizen of Huai-an and the Communists are successful in the settlement of the problem of peasants. I admit that some of the landlords do not feel satisfied with Communists, but the settlement is to the advantage of the peasants. If the Government should intend to take Kiangsu by force that is a different matter, but I cannot agree to turn it over to the Government through negotiations. I am willing to commit myself to station only minimum forces in that area which will be limited to 2 divisions during the first phase and during the second phase it can further be reduced to one division. This division will be integrated with a Government unit, with a Government member as an army commander. So, from the military point of view the Government would not seem to be menaced. As to the political aspect, this will be solved by democratic ways because the local government will also be reorganized on the basis of public election and then it will depend on the ballot cast by the people as to which party will gain control in that area. By comparison I cite the Communist area north of Hankow which has a population of several millions. As the situation now is, the Communists have already been forced out of many places in that area and many refugees are thereby created. As the Communists move to some other place more refugees are formed. I feel sure of that, but the Communists did not use that pretext to claim the civil administration in those areas evacuated. In fact the Communist Party has abandoned its claim of civil administration in many places such as Kwangtung, Anhwei and south Kiangsu. I feel pretty sure that the people are badly oppressed, but the Communist Party did not make it a point to claim the civil administration nor to organize those regions in the way that the Government is now demanding in Kiangsu and elsewhere. This would not help toward the straightening out of the matter. I am only willing to commit myself to a reduction of the Communist forces in North Kiangsu, Anwhei and Hupeh and also in Central China. This not only goes beyond my authority, but it still affects the rights of the people. Merely as a citizen I, myself, would not be willing to turn the whole area over to the Government.
General Marshall: Apropos of that last remark of General Chou regarding Kiangsu. The Generalissimo stated the reason why he would not accept the local Communist Government was that there were a very large number of refugees which fled from that area and whose peace and security would be in jeopardy if they returned while the region was under Communist control. The Generalissimo said he felt a responsibility to those people for their security.
[Page 1257]General Chou: In the first place, the number of refugees is far from being as large as has been alleged. It is true that some refugees have come out of the Communist area, but the number is not large. On the other hand, oppression of the people in those places where Government troops have moved is much more serious than the refugee problem in the Nanking–Shanghai area. Secondly, the secret police are deliberately organized in those regions to cause trouble. The beating up of the Shanghai delegates is an illustrative example.
Thirdly, perhaps a part of those refugees have come out on account of the fear of the Communist Party which may have been the case at the time of agricultural reform. But if the Kuomintang would send their troops into Communist evacuated areas, or their administrative personnel, then those people who support the Communist local authority now would be badly suppressed in amounts far larger than the refugees scattered in the Nanking–Shanghai area. There are at least many millions of people who now support the Communist rule while the number of refugees is only a matter of tens of thousands. Though I do agree that tens of thousands have left the Communist area we cannot turn over the million people to the suppression of the Kuomintang. This is entirely unacceptable to us. Maybe some of the landlords would hail the arrangement, but the overwhelming majority of the population would be against it. In order to reach some solution on this question I think that some political arrangement might be worked out so that North Kiangsu will have a true democratic government. I am thinking that elections should be held and the Kuomintang, and also other parties, should send representatives to supervise the election to see to whom the population really give their support. The election might be held at an earlier date, say within this year, or as soon as the National Government is reorganized. The election in North Kiangsu would be held so that a peaceful and democratic settlement would be reached. This is a fair settlement as I see it.
Coming to the Annex of the draft. Regarding the time element, I find that I am not in a position to accept the specific time elements desired by the Generalissimo because I am only here alone. I am not informed about the actual conditions as to how much time it will take in particular places to effect the concentration. It is rather difficult for the Communist troops who are accustomed to the rural way of life to do it promptly. I could not accept that offhand, so the only arrangement I can accept is to fix it for one to three months. Maybe in certain places it would take three weeks or six weeks or two months. In such places as the Hupeh area, they can start the concentration now because they are prepared.
[Page 1258]Coming to the different provinces in China proper, and taking away the time element, the Anwhei arrangement is all right.
In Shantung, Lin-cheng is not in the hands of the Communists.
The next item I think should be Tenghsien instead of Tehsien. Now regarding those places, I do not have so much in mind about the places but rather the principle of having Communist troops garrison the Tientsin–Pukou railroad. Seeing that the Communists have now agreed not to station troops on the Tsinan–Tsingtao railroad, there must be some place on the Tientsin–Pukou railroad so they can use communications in reorganization of troops. Particularly in Shantung where it is almost entirely in the hands of the Communists, it is not right that the Communists should vacate both from the Tsinan–Tsingtao railroad as well as the Tientsin–Pukou railroad. Such an arrangement would be too unfair for acceptance.
The Government may station troops at Tsingtao, Wei-hsien and Tsinan. In turn the Communists should also have some important cities for the garrisoning of troops on the Tientsin–Pukou railroad. As to the particular places for the concentration of Communist troops that must be still subject to discussion later on, when we came to the detailed discussion on the distribution of troops.
Now regarding Wensi in Shansi Province, I take exception that the Communists will not be permitted to garrison that place, but I am willing to make further study on it and give some reconsideration. That is my comment on China Proper.
Regarding coal mines along the railroad lines, I have no intention of stationing any Communist troops there, but I think it is most unfortunate to make such elaborate arrangements by specifying that the Communists should also evacuate the coal mines. Though I had no intention of stationing troops in those places I think such an arrangement is not acceptable in principle. It means that the Generalissimo is merely trying to strangle the Communists—I mean Chiang Kai-shek. No further concessions can be made on Cheng-te. I am doing my best to make concessions toward the Government, but the Government is making additional claims on every concession he makes. The Communists did not make any claim toward the Government. The only claim the Communists have raised is an increase on the strength ratio, and even on that one point I have wired to Yenan considering withdrawal.
Coming to Manchuria, apart from Harbin, the Antung problem was also raised. As you have just told me the Generalissimo has in mind the Antung Province. I have to have time to take into consideration Antung Province as a whole. I am talking merely about Antung city in the following. I have never been prepared before to consider it. I need serious contemplation particularly with my associates in Manchuria [Page 1259] before I can give any commitment. Right now I feel very uncertain regarding that. I can give no indication as to what the reply will me without consulting my associates in Manchuria. I am not in a position to reply.
I am deeply moved and also feel grateful to all the efforts you have made, but the arrangement that the Generalissimo prescribes leaves me not even a moment for breathing because it keeps me so hard pressed. Also the stipulation that the detailed plan has to be worked out within 10 days. That would be very hard for the Communists to do and the time is too pressing. That is not to the good of China because we cannot solve every matter with care. Now, much depends on General Marshall’s efforts to find a way out for the present situation. Maybe the Communist proposition would not be acceptable to the Government, but evidence shows that I have made all the concessions that I can and I have stated that regarding certain matters I still have to get an approval of Yenan and Manchuria before I can definitely commit myself. I don’t know what the Government idea is as to what should be done as a next step; whether a few days’ margin can be granted for further negotiations or, if nothing is accepted by noon tomorrow, a complete breakdown with the Government resuming aggressive action and at the same time attempting to negotiate.
Regarding those concessions that I have made, I wish to state that I still have to get confirmation from Yenan. I made these concessions on my own accord purely because I have full trust in General Marshall to establish peace in China. I place confidence in his efforts despite the fact that we have perhaps thought differently. It is for this reason that I have the courage to make my commitments even without consulting my associates. But I have to state clearly that those things I cannot comment on and which are beyond my power, I must leave as they are.
I have a strong desire for peace and all my efforts are for establishing peace in China. I feel particularly moved by your strong desire to establish peace in China. However, under the circumstances, we cannot accept the terms as the Generalissimo has prescribed them. The Generalissimo has actually made all the preparations for an attack in Hopeh. The attack is being launched and the Government has openly declared that they will take over north Kiangsu by force and they have organized, or are organizing, an army of so-called refugees to launch the fighting. The stage is set for an attack at Tsingtao and Tsinan and Cheng-te. The Generalissimo has actually completed his preparations.
General Marshall: Is that all, General Chou?
General Chou: Yes.
[Page 1260]General Marshall: I have done my best to endeavor to produce an acceptable compromise regarding the many issues involved in this matter of the redistribution of troops and the related political factors. Incidentally, I took such action as was possible last night regarding the fighting in Hopeh and again this morning, following General Chou’s note13 on this matter. I am inclined to think the most serious trouble to me has not been so much the prevailing suspicion and distrust and animosity as it has been the effect of the aggressive Communist actions in Shantung and in Shansi Province in the region of Tatung. This morning I was greeted on the commencement of my interview with the Generalissimo with the information just received that four additional bridges were destroyed, two of them quite large—the largest near Chin-chou. These very recent actions have made it very difficult for me to persuade the Government to alter its position. I am aware, I think, rather fully of the various actions General Chou has brought to my attention—which he states threatens Communist positions. Altogether the period of this particular negotiation has been one of extraordinarily difficult influence brought to bear during the periods of our talks.
Having spent some hours this morning discussing the Government’s position and determination and now having listened to General Chou’s statements, I have come to the conclusion that the negotiations are not going to be successfully completed. Just exactly what the Government procedure will be I do not know. My own impression has been that the situation is so tense that it would probably get entirely out of control if the present loose, so-called truce basis were continued. It has therefore been my hope that in some way I could find a basis for completing agreement on the present paper in time to insure the issuance of the documents for formal termination of hostilities in Manchuria and the additional orders which would stop the fighting in China Proper. But, tragic and regrettable as it would appear, I can find no basis for optimism in the present tragic dilemma.
If General Chou has any suggestions to make, aside from a specific discussion of the various points of this paper, I would be very glad to hear them.
General Chou: With regard to North Kiangsu, I already suggested a reduction in the Communist forces. As to Civil administration I suggested that an Inspection Mission be formed comprising members of the general Partisans and non-partisans who will work out the stipulations for holding a popular election after the reorganization of the National Government. I am also ready to consider the proposition [Page 1261] of forming a coalition government in North Kiangsu after the re-organization of the National Government. The details of the provisions will be subject to further study. My feeling is that I am ready to consider any formula, except the formula for civil administration involving the withdrawal of the Communists from North Kiangsu while the Kuomintang takes it over.
General Marshall: Do you have any further suggestions?
General Chou: You have just asked me what suggestions I could make now regarding the parts of this draft. The main text of the draft is almost entirely acceptable to me except for one or two minor points.
In principle I hold no particular concern over the terms of the Annex. I would disagree on certain points, but I am trying my best to reach a compromise. While the main text is not acceptable to the Generalissimo, and he has more exceptions on the Annex, I am trying on that basis to reach a solution and I am thinking of the following procedures that you may adopt:
First, how about our trying to reach an agreement on the main text of this paper before noon tomorrow. As to the Annex, I can commit myself to those points to which I have already given my approval and as to those points for which additional time is required we can continue to discuss those which may not be completed tomorrow.
Secondly, in order that the main text itself will be accepted by the Government, I suggest that you may have Dr. Wang Shih Chieh, General Chen Cheng and Mr. Shao Li-tse on the Government side have a talk with you. If necessary I can also have a separate talk with those three gentlemen so that the main text will be acceptable to the Government before noon tomorrow.
Third—The neutral persons should also be asked to use their efforts so that the main text will be acceptable to the Government. That is, the Chinese neutral parties, such as the China Youth Party, Democratic Party, and Non-partisans.
Fourth, in case the negotiations prove a failure at this moment would it be possible to work out some arrangement for immediate cessation of hostilities, and that a time limit be fixed for the settlement of the outstanding issues with reference to the text and some further discussion be held. In case the Government feels that no settlement could be reached on that point, then of course after the time limit that has been fixed, the Government is still free to take action. My suggestion is that while those outstanding issues are under discussion the P. C. C. will be convened which will also be beneficial. (Initially the Steering Committee)
That is all of the suggestions that I have now, when these papers [Page 1262] were handed to me I read them and noticed several things I thought both sides should consider as to what procedures we may adopt.
Meeting adjourned at 0615 [6:15 p.m.]