Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Notes on Meeting Between General Marshall and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, June 29, 1946, 11:30 a.m.
The discussion related to the efforts to reach a compromise solution on a special document9 which had been prepared to make possible an agreement before the termination of the so-called truce at noon of the following day.
The Generalissimo declined to modify the conditions demanded of the Communists for the redistribution of troops. Specifically, he insisted upon the evacuation of Cheng-te, of all of Kiangsu Province [Page 1249] (rather than all of the section south of Huai-an), and the removal of existing local governments in the regions to be evacuated by the Communists. There were many other points at issue which were discussed. The foregoing were the most important, except possibly his requirement for the complete evacuation of Antung Province in Manchuria.
It was pointed out by me that I was left with no basis for further negotiations because throughout the Government had confined itself to demands in North China and had made no compromise other than some small modifications of those demands. The Generalissimo took the line that he could not accept any basis for the conclusion of negotiations that did not guarantee in his opinion the future avoidance of difficulty with the Communists. Temporary measures were not acceptable and his past experience had made it evident that the demands he had insisted upon were necessary.
I pointed out that the same logic could be carried to the extreme of justifying the complete elimination of the Communist Party and army as being the only measures satisfactory for the maintenance of future peace in China. Further, I stated that my negotiations had been made particularly difficult and trying, by reason of the freely expressed opinions of high Government officials, particularly those in commanding positions in Manchuria, that even if an agreement was reached it would have no importance and they were determined to pursue a policy of force. Political leaders of position in the Kuomintang Party had been similarly free in their expression of opposition to negotiations and determination to see the matter through by fighting. I expressed the opinion that whatever might be thought to be the evidence of the past, that the Government of China would be judged by the world, and certainly by American public opinion, as having unnecessarily plunged the country into chaos by implacable demands and the evident desire to pursue a policy of military settlement.
The Generalissimo, after expressing his regrets that the negotiations had resulted in failure and with assurances of appreciation of my efforts, then produced a draft of a statement referring to me which evidently was to be released to the press. It expressed regrets over the failure of the negotiations. It said that, even so, the Government hoped I would continue my efforts at mediation. I expressed thanks for the complimentary references but stated that I much preferred no such reference to me be made and that I would decline to be an umpire on a battlefield.
The conference terminated with my statement that I would see General Chou En-lai immediately, but there seemed to be no probability of reaching any satisfactory agreement.
- Supra.↩