Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 28, 1946, 3:30 p.m.

Nanking, June 28, 1946, 3:30 p.m.

Also present:	Mr. Chang
	Colonel Caughey
	Captain Soong

General Marshall: I had two hours with the Generalissimo this morning and I made the point that it would be, in my opinion, impossible to arrive by 30 June at the exact wording for a formal modification of the Agreement of February 25. I therefore proposed that we endeavor to meet the situation, especially the Government’s insistence on an understanding regarding the redistribution of troops, by drawing up a special (it might be called a temporary) document which sets forth the agreements regarding critical factors now under discussion. That document would be the accepted basis for the more formal or detailed amendment of the Agreement of February 25 to be prepared in negotiations after June 30th.

I also stated that, in my opinion, a further extension of the truce would not be a workable arrangement because I thought, in the present confused and highly dangerous state of affairs among the troops, and particularly in the civil population, there would be fatal ruptures involving the general spread of hostilities which would certainly not facilitate the progress of negotiations.

Before I go any further with the results of my discussion with the Generalissimo I would like to get General Chou’s views on what I have just said.

General Chou: General Chou said that in principle he agrees with what you said because the main point is that we want peace and not war. Anything that can prevent the hostilities and forestall any new rise of conflicts would be acceptable. As to the detailed arrangements of army reorganization we will continue talking. The present situation is certainly very serious. I just received a telegram from Yenan this morning saying the Generalissimo had, in the middle of this month, issued an order to General Liu Chieh in Honan and General Cheng Chien in Hankow, that as soon as hostilities arise the Government troops surrounding the Communist forces in the area north of Hankow should launch an all-out attack to completely annihilate the Communist forces. The attack was commenced on June 26 and the Communist forces are compelled to take up self-defense. In view of this situation I think the matter is getting very serious. We have pledged before to the Kuomintang forces that we would not attack the cities of Tsingtao, Tsinan and Tatung, we still adhere to this pledge. On the other hand we also hope that the Government troops would not attack the 60,000 Communist forces to the north of Hankow. The situation now seems to be very serious. Some emergency measures are imperative. If the Generalissimo intends to straighten out the matter peacefully then he should order the Government troops in Honan and Hopeh to stop the attack and on our part we will inform our own forces to stop fighting back. As far as this arrangement is concerned the Communist forces are placed in an inferior position. In the event of hostilities they are bound to suffer heavy losses, in which case it would have repercussions on other areas, such as Tsinan and Tatung. We have now only two days left until the deadline of the truce (General Chou added that up to now the Communists have adhered to their pledge not to attack those two cities) the situation is getting serious and more serious every day. So any action that would stop the resumption of hostilities, as General Marshall has suggested, I am willing to consent.

General Marshall: I probably feel more strongly than General Chou regarding the perils of the present situation and any attempt to continue it without a formal cessation of hostilities, because I receive reports from both sides. The National Government is fearful of the heavy Communist concentrations near Tatung which, apparently from their reports, are a direct threat to Tatung. I am also thinking about the public demonstrations which are apt to increase rather than diminish and undoubtedly will represent the interest of both sides, as well as the people in the middle who so urgently desire peace.

I would further like to talk to General Chou regarding certain dispositions which we partially discussed yesterday and which relate to my discussion with the Generalissimo this morning. He insisted that T’eng-hsien, north of Hsuchow, on the railroad, should be evacuated. He took exception to the proposed Communist disposition in Ho-tse and Ta-ming. He accepted Hsing-t’ai and I think accepted Chang Chih. He took decided exception to the Communist occupation of Wen-shi. I am still not clear on his reaction to the proposal that I suggested in the northern part of North Kiangsu, that is, the Communist troops north of Huai-an and the evacuation of Kiangsu and Anwhei to the west of the Grand Canal and to the south and east of the trace of the old Yellow River bed between Huai Yin and Tung-hai, it being understood that Communist divisions were to be stationed at Huai Yin and Su-chien. I am proceeding on the basis that this would be accepted. I realize that General Chou merely discussed it with me yesterday and did not commit himself.

Now, we come to the apparently much more difficult issue to settle. I presented the proposal that I would endeavor to persuade the Communists to evacuate the region to the south of the railroad from Ping Chun to Chengte and along the line through Fenning and Kuyuan, thence south of the outer wall through Kalgan to the border of Sui-yuan Province.

When I finished my conversation with the Generalissimo he was still adamant regarding Chengte; and that is the situation at the present time.

Turning to Manchuria, I discussed with him the Yen-ki and Mutan Shing [Mutankiang] dispositions. He remained firm on Yen-ki. I told him of General Chou’s statement regarding that area in relation to the Koreans. I discussed the two possibilities mentioned by General Chou yesterday, one the evacuation of Harbin by all troops and the organization of a coalition government with a neutral mayor and also the possibility of locating there a symbolic force, say a regiment. He would not consider the total evacuation of Harbin, but insisted on a sizeable force there. We had a further discussion of that without arriving at any conclusion. I am proposing a maximum of 6,000 troops. I did not discuss the question of a Communist division to be located at Pei Cheng. Nor did he express himself further regarding Antung, though he had stated very emphatically that he would insist in [on] the Communist withdrawal from that region. I did not have time to discuss with him further the question of comparative strength in Manchuria and the matter was therefore left with his previously emphatic stand that he would not alter his concession to a revision of the ration of five to one, it being understood that did not approve of an increase in the total number of divisions during the first 12 months from 18 to 20. As I have said I did not get to that phase of the discussion this morning, but I don’t think there would be any profit in my pushing the matter further because I think it is a determined position on the part of the Government. As to the locality of Peicheng, I do not know. The Generalissimo had been very much opposed to the Communist occupation of Nunchiang Province. It was in connection with his concession to me regarding the Yen-ki disposition that he brought up the stipulations regarding Chengte and Chahar. These are, as nearly as I can recall, the various details of my discussion with the Generalissimo.

General Chou: From the Generalissimo’s statement that you have just mentioned, it can be seen clearly that so far as the fundamental issues are concerned the Generalissimo objects to the idea that I have expressed which stipulates that the Government troops should not enter the areas vacated by the Communists during the time of army reorganization.

General Marshall: I did not state that. Did I give General Chou that impression? I only made one statement about one place, possibly two, Harbin, and maybe Antung.

General Chou: The Generalissimo’s reply did not indicate that he accepts the principles I have proposed—that the areas vacated by Communists troops during army reorganization will not be occupied by the Government troops—and, therefore, the Generalissimo’s idea is still that military matters will overrule political matters, to which we are adamantly opposed. The only proposal that we can consider would be along the line, or in accordance with the principles, that I have proposed. In my proposal I am trying to concentrate Communist troops to those places which would not constitute a menace to the Government, so as to give reassurance to the Government. But, it being understood that the places if vacated by the Communists will not be entered by the Government troops.

General Marshall: Don’t you mean that the Government troops will not be garrisoned in places vacated by the Communist troops?

General Chou: Yes. Nor do we see any necessity for the Government troops to enter those areas unless the Government is attempting to control the local civil administration.

General Marshall: Do you mean by military means?

General Chou: Yes. I have made these compromises very boldly, accepting a very heavy responsibility, and it is entirely a unilateral concession. I did not raise any claim that any particular place under Government control should be left ungarrisoned. In fact my proposal stipulated that the Government troops are permitted to garrison all the strategical key points in their hands. Not to mention that I did not raise any claim to station our troops in areas under Government control at the present time. This procedure proves it is entirely a unilateral concession.

The Generalissimo still insists in the principles that he has continuously advocated, which implies a complete revision of the PCC resolutions that the military affairs should be subordinated to political affairs, and which is also incompatible with the arrangements of the army reorganization agreement in which it is stipulated the army will have no other concern than the training of troops in time of peace.

From what the Generalissimo has said, we can see that he wants to have various places in Shantung, in Hopei and in Shansi left ungarrisoned by the Communist troops along the railway lines and that the Communists should give up the southern part of Jehol and Chahar to the Government troops. He further demands Chengte, but he did not indicate whether the Government troops would enter the places evacuated by the Communist troops. Nor did he indicate that the local civil administration will be permitted to continue its function until such time as the political matters are straightened out after the reorganization of the Central Government. In the reorganization of the government, actually two aspects are involved. The first one is the civil administration in the Communist area, the second is the party rule in the Kuomintang controlled areas. All political issues pertaining to those two areas will have to he straightened out. In view of these circumstances, the disposition of the two parties are widely apart and we may even say that they are adamantly opposed to each other, that is, irreconcilably opposed. This makes it very difficult to approach each other in the detailed matters.

In principal matters, in basic issues, the Generalissimo does not alter his fundamental disposition. For example, that the railway lines should be evacuated by the Communist troops, except perhaps a small section at Kalgan. Even there it is not yet known whether or not the Generalissimo will accept it. According to the Generalissimo, the Communist troops will have to vacate the Tungpu railroad, Peiping–Hankow railroad, Cheng-Tai railroad, Tientsin–Pukow railroad, Tsinan–Tsingtao railroad, Lunghai railroad, Peiping–Liaoning railroad, and the Peiping–Chinchow railroad. Also the large cities will have to be evacuated by the Communist troops, such as Ho-tse. It can be gathered from the Generalissimo’s attitude that during the past few days he has not made any change to his fundamental policy. That is, he wants the Communist area to be cut into five isolated areas. (Pointing out the areas on the map.) Except for two minor revisions, the Generalissimo has not made many changes from his original proposal. The two revisions were made in North Kiangsu and the concession on Hsing-Tai. Hsing-Tai is the only place he accepts on the railway lines. Regarding his fundamental attitude toward Manchuria, it is almost the same as in China Proper. The Generalissimo has finally agreed to let the Communist troops garrison two large cities, Tsitsihar and Kalgan but, considered as a whole, the disposition of the two parties are still in direct opposition and the gap on specific matters is still very wide. Therefore, I share General Marshall’s view that it would be difficult to reach complete settlement during the next two days and, therefore, I think it is a good idea that we should work out in principle certain stipulations regarding the army reorganization provisions and I am willing to work along the procedure as General Marshall has suggested.

General Marshall: The paper that I have hurriedly drafted,⁹⁶ as I said before, does not cover all of the points in dispute but it does include more of the Government’s stipulations regarding the Communist than it does of definite statements regarding Government dispositions. I intended to conclude it with a statement regarding the occupation of evacuated regions and the matter of civil government, but I have not been able to find a satisfactory method of expressing the idea because of the many complicated factors. This paper includes propositions that neither side would probably agree to. I am interested more in the form, at this moment, than in the detailed stipulations. I would like General Chou’s advice as he hears this, both as to the form and as to the specifications. I will turn over the draft to him to work on this evening himself. Finally, I repeat again the purpose of this is to find a basis for the immediate issue of an order for the cessation of hostilities and I do not expect final commitment on General Chou’s part at this time.

(Draft given to General Chou to read for comment.)

General Chou: In principle paragraph 1 is okey. Regarding paragraph 2 General Chou still reserves it for his consideration. Paragraph 3 can be considered. General Chou would like to have it expressly stated that paragraph 4 covers China Proper and paragraph 5 covers Manchuria only.

(The following comments by General Chou refer to paragraphs 6–11 of the draft of the special memorandum of “conditions to be agreed to by the Committee of Three”, proposed by General Marshall.)

So far as the form is concerned, it seems to be too much in detail in the last six paragraphs. Right now we are discussing disposition of troops within the scope of army reorganization provisions. It should indicate which places will be garrisoned by Government troops and which places will be garrisoned by Communist troops. In the form presented here it merely gives the impression that commitments will be made here and there and I am afraid both the Communist Party as well as the people themselves will have the impression that the Government is insisting on certain localities and the Communists cannot help but evacuate to localities designated by the Government. Also, this way of proceeding is not in accordance with army reorganization plan or PCC resolutions.

General Marshall: General Chou will recall that I stated that this draft is not a complete directive and contains much more concerning Communist troops than Government troops. General Chou will probably wish to insert certain stipulations regarding Government troops. However, it was to avoid the difficulty of attempting to get all these stipulations into the formal arrangement of the agreement of February 25th that I selected this brief way of covering the highly disputed points. There are many details which must be stated in a formal amendment of the agreement of February 25 but most of those do not involve disputes. Though, unless the disputed points are settled, these other factors are of necessity related to the difficulties. I know of no other way to handle this matter than in some such manner as this, unless we attempt a careful re-draft of amendments to the agreement of February 25th. That would be a precise job which will require considerable time and will inevitably involve lengthy discussions though the points themselves will probably not be of sufficient importance to produce a stalemate.

The issues I have brought forward in this paper, so far as I could see, will determine whether or not the Communist Party and the Government can get together. And, as I have just said, I know of no other means of approaching the matter within the short time available, really less than 24 hours. General Chou, when he takes this draft document, can include the parts he thinks should of necessity be covered regarding the Government troops. However, the principal considerations regarding the Government troops, as I see it from the Communist point of view, relate to two things: their assignment to specific places instead of areas, and the prohibition the Communists propose against the movement of Government troops into areas evacuated by the Communists, along with the insistence on the continuation of the present established civil government.

If this draft document has to be changed on the basis of the impression it would make on the public, it might be that that could be handled in a prepared release which would not mention specifically the details of this document in their present form but refer to the agreements in a general manner, postponing the announcement of details until the formal amendment of the agreement of February 25th had been decided upon. General Chou will remember that last January we did not release to the press the long detailed instructions regarding Executive Headquarters. We only made a general announcement on that question. I do not know but possibly we could handle this the same way except that we would have to include more facts, and then at a later date, say within two weeks, produce in full the formal amended February 25th agreement. These are merely suggestions.

General Chou: In addition to the other two principles that the Government troops will not enter the Communist evacuated places and that the established civil government in the areas will be continued, General Chou would like to introduce another principle. That principle would be that the Communists would not station troops which are authorized by the army reorganization plan in certain places within the Communist area nor use those places as a point of concentration of Communist troops. He would use such a provision to substitute for the word “evacuation” used in the draft because using the word “evacuation” can cause lots of disputes; such as, the Government will argue that since evacuation of that place they could send railroad police to that particular section of the railroad and the Government may also claim that the Communist militia should also go away, or other similar issues. Therefore General Chou suggests using wording he proposed rather than the word “evacuation”.

General Chou suggests first, a general provision be made regarding those places under issue and then, following that general provision, the details will follow. The general idea is, instead of having 6 paragraphs here he suggests we have one provision in the nature of a general statement, then in the footnote cover the details. The footnote would not be published at this time, and General Chou’s statement, which would come in at paragraph 6, would read:

“The Chinese Communist Party agrees that for the purpose of implementing the army reorganization agreement of February 25, 1946, as amended, it will, within the period stipulated above, concentrate its troops now stationed in certain areas into specified localities, it being understood that the Government troops will not move into the areas thus vacated and that the present established civil government and the peace preservation corps, which serves for the maintenance of local security, shall be preserved.”

The footnote would read: “The Chinese Communist Party promises that the following places will not be used as troop concentration places for the purpose of army reorganization.” Then follows the various provisions regarding initial areas. The footnote would not be published but would be a commitment on the part of the Communist Party when we come to discuss the formal amendment.

I would like to continue about the various places in which I think I can commit myself.

The first part is:

(a) Anhwei Province

(b) Kiangsu Province, to the south of Huai-an, Huai-an itself being garrisoned.

(c) Shantung

1. Tsaochuang.

2. Tsingtao-Tsinan RR

Regarding Teng Hsien, Ho-tse and Te-hsien, I cannot commit myself.

The present situation is that the Nationalists only occupy 5 cities—all the rest are under Communist control. It is not adequate if no large city is left for the Communist troops to be garrisoned.

What the Communists are afraid of is that[,] if Communists evacuate all railway lines and highways, all communication lines are abandoned and Communist areas are cut into pieces which can be easily surrounded.

Regarding paragraph d. Shansi: The original Communist proposal specifies there will be two Communist divisions in Shansi and one more to the north. The Government insists that Communists cannot be stationed at Wen-hsi. I do not believe I can accept that although I will consider moving this division somewhere else.

General Marshall: Right now it cuts the railway. As a matter of fact I guess that is why it is stationed there.

General Chou: Three-fourths of Shansi is under Communist control. Therefore we should have the right to control that section of the railway.

General Marshall: Is that the only section cutting the railway?

General Chou: There are also other places to the North.

Regarding e. Hopei: The Communists propose only one division. There will be no opposition, I believe, from the Government side.

Regarding f. Jehol: It is agreed that the Communists troops will be withdrawn within one month from the region of Chahar south of the Outer Wall as far as Ku-yuan and also from the region in Chahar and Jehol south of the line, Fenning–Chengte, and south of the railway to the east of Chengte through Chaoyang.

With regard to Manchuria, paragraph 12: Today I am in a position to discuss Harbin city alone and since the Generalissimo expects us to agree to his first suggestion as to completely evacuating that city, I can only accept your original proposal on the Government’s having a symbolic force of one regiment. I will try to induce Communists in Manchuria to agree to this, but 6,000 men is too strong a force for me to accept.

My suggestions are then that the first five paragraphs will stand, the sixth will be revised and the rest will go out except the 12th, which will then be the seventh paragraph. With regard to the contents, I will make a further study.

General Marshall: I am anxious to see if we could reach some basis for agreement by noon tomorrow because if there is to be a cessation of hostilities, orders must be issued 24 hours in advance or they will not be observed. A tragic situation may develop in spite of the fact that we have practically reached an agreement. I am concerned over the present situation as to the amendments to this draft for the reason that I think we are becoming involved in a very complicated manner of presentation which not only will not be acceptable to the Government but will be a source of confusion as to interpretation later on. This would mean a probability of a stalemate in endeavoring to reach a formal agreement on the amendment to the February 25 paper. That in turn would mean another resumption of retaliations, gradually developing into open civil war. Now I understand, I think, General Chou’s objection to the phraseology “The Communist Party agrees to the evacuation”, etc., but I am afraid the method he is taking to obviate that, without intending perhaps to change the conditions, will completely destroy the possibility for both governmental understanding of interpretations and, therefore, agreement. The trouble as I see it is that General Chou has left no apparent uncomplicated method of presenting various conditions that are included in this paper. I believe an accurate presentation of the conditions is quite necessary to acceptance of the document. And, at the moment, I am at a loss as to how to phrase the conditions so that they can be readily understood. I have also these comments to make: General Chou has made a general statement “that the present established civil government and the peace preservation corps will be continued”. I feel rather certain that I cannot secure an acceptance by the Government of the continuation of the local administration unless there are some detailed understandings or conditions mentioned. I am at a loss as to what these conditions might be but I do know that the basis for opposition on the part of certain governmental officers will be directed to the condition that the local governments would be continued in force. I have endeavored to draft a statement to meet the objections. The matter is so complicated that I have not been able to prepare a draft that even appealed to me as practicable. Two others have tried their hands on the same proposition and with the same lack of success.

General Chou: I am afraid that if the Communists evacuate areas and no force is left to maintain order, the Government will use that as an excuse to send its peace preservation corps in to restore that order. The militia is still very much feared and is in strength within the peace preservation corps.

General Marshall: I suggest we adjourn the meeting. General Chou can give me his recommendations on my proposal tomorrow morning.

96. Infra.