Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Memorandum by General Marshall to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
Your Excellency: In compliance with your request of yesterday, I am submitting my views on the present status of negotiations between the Government and the Communist Party regarding the detailed reorganization and redistribution of troops under the agreement of February 25th last. As you know, during the past several days I have endeavored, with all the means at my disposal, to seek out possible points of compromise to lessen the present serious differences in the proposals or stands of the National Government and the Communist Party. Following my meeting with you yesterday morning, I discussed with General Chou the various issues from 1:30 to 4:00 yesterday afternoon and again at 6:30 in the evening.
At the present time I find the Government demands and the Communist position irreconcilable regarding the following aspects of the situation; the total evacuation of Kiangsu by the Communists, their evacuation of Chengte and the Communist insistence that the local governments in whatever areas might be vacated by the Communists should not be interfered with until the formal reorganization of the Government had been established. I am not yet clear as to the Communist position regarding Antung and that province, nor as to the importance they attach to the occupation of Mutanchiang in preference to Yenki.
Turning to the discussion of the various areas you will have noted the possibilities of a compromise regarding Kiangsu and Anwhei suggested by the discussion of this region I had with General Chou yesterday afternoon. Disregarding the matter of the Communist insistence that the local governments remain undisturbed, the solution suggested of withdrawal of all Communist troops south of Huai-an and west of the Grand Canal through Su-eh’ien and Huai-an presents, in my opinion, a possible compromise which relieves the Government of the threat to the capital, Shanghai and the Yangtze in general. It would appear that a Communist agreement might be secured for their evacuation of the areas indicated by the end of a month or 6 weeks. (The basis for the foregoing agreement incidentally had not been cleared by General Chou with Yenan, according to his statement.)
Turning to the Shantung Province, it would appear that an agreement [Page 1229] might be reached which would remove all Communist troops from the Tsinan–Tsingtao railroad line. In the recent Communist proposal a division was to be stationed at I-tu. Involved in this agreement would be a Communist insistence on the strength and dispositions of the National troops along the railroad. General Chou proposed a division at Tsinan, another at Wei-hsien and another at Tsingtao. The time in which these strengths would be reached was not discussed although it was stated that the Government insisted that the railroad line be freed of Communist interference within 10 days. The matter of local governments of the regions to be evacuated by the Communists remains an issue in this area.
Turning to the area through which the Peiping–Hankow railroad passes I believe the principal Communist insistence is directed to locating a division in the city of Hsing-T’ai. Since the original Government proposal admitted the Communist domination of this railroad line by accepting the presence of Communist divisions immediately to the east and west of the railroad the readjustment here should be acceptable to the Government without compromising its position. Two of the other divisions of the proposed Communist army in this general region are located at Ho-tse and Ch-ang-chih during the first phase of reorganization. This is not in accord with the Government desire, but I think it might be accepted as not unduly threatening to the Government’s position.
I have not discussed with General Chou the Communist desire to locate a division at Wen-hsi on the Tungpu railroad so I am unable to judge their determination in regard to this particular disposition. I will discuss this with General Chou today.
I find an unyielding determination on the part of the Communists regarding Chengte. Whether or not this same determination applies to Ku-pei-k’ou I do not know, but I feel that this can become a fatal point of disagreement. Examination of the map, and somewhat disregarding the importance of the Peiping–Chengte–Chao-yang railroad, shows the Government in possession of Yeh-Pai-Shou, Ling-yuan and Ping-chuan and at the western end of the line the towns of Huai-jou and Mi-yun, southwest of Ku-pei-kou. On the other hand, the Communists occupy a substantial portion of the remaining region to the north and northwest of the Tientsin–Chinchow railroad. Could you not consider the evacuation of Ku-pei-kou by the Communists and of the region to the south and east of the Peiping–Chengte–Chao-yang line as affording the Government reasonable security of this vital line of communications to Manchuria. The remaining southern boundary of the Communist occupation of Jehol could run through Fen-ning west to Ku-yuan in Chahar and then follow the Outer Wall of Chahar in accordance with your recent proposal.
[Page 1230]My discussion regarding Manchuria was of necessity very brief due to lack of time. However, two important points were covered. As previously stated I have not yet reached a conclusion as to whether or not the Communists can be persuaded to agree to the evacuation of Antung, and I did not discuss yesterday their proposal to locate a division south of Tsitsihar at Taoan (Peicheng). I asked General Chou the reason he preferred a division at Mutanchiang to the location proposed by the government at Yenki. He stated that Yenki and the surrounding country was over-run with Korean evacuees and for that reason he did not wish to locate a division there. From General Chou’s remarks yesterday it would appear to me that the Communists would accept a so-called symbolic force, as General Yu Ta-wei terms it, at Harbin in place of their present proposed location of one of their divisions and an army headquarters in that city. I am not prepared to report on the strength of the Communist resistance to a reduction from their proposal of 5 divisions in Manchuria to the 3 agreed upon by you.
I have not discussed with General Chou the possibilities of effecting compromises if certain provincial appointments were assured the Communists, but I am inclined to the belief that they are far more deeply interested in an early meeting of the PCC and the initiation of formal discussions regarding the drafting of the constitution. You stated the other day that you would not consider any political discussions for three or four months following the successful conclusion of the military agreements. It is my belief that such a delay would almost inevitably have disrupting consequences. While from your point of view the delay would be for the purpose of testing the good intentions of the Communists, it would actually result, in all probability, through rather normal reactions to the present tense political state of China, in a renewal of hostilities.
It seems apparent to me that a formal detailed amendment with the necessary annexes to the agreement of February 25th for the reorganization of the armies cannot be produced before noon of June 30th. In the meetings I have presided over in the Committee of Three it is frequently the case that the discussion of a single sentence will absorb an hour or more of time. I do not believe the unsettled differences now involved could be resolved in final form as to the exact wording in less than a week, possibly 10 days. At the same time I do not think a prolongation of the truce period beyond June 30th could be carried out without a complete breakdown in the situation. Therefore I propose that a special agreement be prepared which will cover a settlement for the critical areas in enough detail to protect the interests of the Government sufficiently to permit instructions to be issued for the cessation of hostilities on June 30th.