Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Notes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, June 27, 1946, 9:30 a.m.
The previous afternoon, General Chou En-lai had discussed with General Marshall the Communist proposals for the settlement of the military redistribution of troops in Manchuria and North and Central China which had been delivered to General Marshall and to the National Government early that morning. The stenographic notes of the meeting with General Chou were completed in the late evening and furnished the Generalissimo. However, translation into Chinese was not completed until the early morning and therefore he had had only a limited opportunity to review General Chou’s statement prior to the meeting with General Marshall.
Having reference to General Chou’s statements the Generalissimo outlined what he considered the Communist procedure of delay and [Page 1216] obstruction which had obtained since the agreement for the reorganization of the armies signed February 25, 1946 and since the conclusion of the PCC conference last February in Chungking. He stated that the Communists had made it impossible for the Government to go ahead with the reorganization agreed upon by the PCC, by their refusal to nominate members to the National Council and also by their refusal to nominate representatives for the Constitutional Assembly which was to have been convened on May 5th, and therefore had to be postponed. The Generalissimo further stated that the military agreement of February 25th provided that certain lists of troops be submitted by the Communists within three weeks of the signing of the agreement and a further list at the end of the 6 weeks. Neither of these lists had ever been submitted, therefore, the Communists had prevented the carrying out of the demobilization and reorganization of the armies.
With reference to General Choirs statement that it was a fundamental consideration of the CCP that the local governments established by them in the regions controlled by them which had for their principal purpose the interests of the peasantry, should not be done away with by the turning over of the occupation of the region to the control of the National military forces citing instances of this process where the Communists had evacuated a region: To this comment the Generalissimo responded with a statement that he wished General Marshall to point out to General Chou that he knew of no instance where the inhabitants of a region occupied by the National Government had fled to a region under the control of the Communists; that on the contrary over 5 million people had fled from Communist controlled areas principally to the large cities under National control which was evidence of the fact that the system of local government instituted by the National Government was preferred by the inhabitants to that of the Communistic procedure.
Referring to General Chou’s discussion of the belief that the National Government would entertain no political settlements prior to the completion of the military agreements, the Generalissimo stated that his principal desire was that the military readjustments be so established that clashes would be avoided which otherwise would make the political adjustments extremely difficult if not impossible.
The Generalissimo mentioned the possibility of having the Communists agree to an American control of the movements by the CCP out of the areas and the similar control of the movements of the Government into the areas, which could be delayed for a stated period. He stated specifically that North Kiangsu, the Tsingtao–Tsinan railroad, Chengte, Kupeikou, Anwhei province, Harbin should be vacated by the Communists within 10 days and must be occupied by the Government [Page 1217] troops within one month. Other places which the Government proposed that the Communists withdraw from should usually be vacated within one month but the entry of the Government troops might be delayed for two or three months longer. The Generalissimo mentioned the possibility that General Marshall might, as apparently his own suggestion, propose as a compromise measure that the Communist officials in the province of Hei Lung Chiang, Shing An, Nun Chiang and Chahar might be accepted by the Government as a temporary arrangement which would receive consideration when the time finally came for the political reorganization.
The Generalissimo stated his agreement to General Chou’s contention that the troops should not be located in areas, but rather in definite spots, meaning cities, though the Generalissimo desired that this be stated in terms of hsiens.
In the discussion which followed General Marshall stated to the Generalissimo that while the facts appeared on the surface as the Generalissimo had described regarding the PCC conference and the military agreement of February 25th, there were other factors which had exercised a profound influence on the course of events at that time. The discussions and action of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang has conveyed to the public a grave doubt as to the intentions of the Government in carrying out the agreements of the PCC. Also at this time, and actually during the later part of the negotiations culminating in the agreement of February 25th for the reorganization of the army, there were staged violent demonstrations in Chungking against the Communists and at Peiping ostensibly anti-Soviet in their nature but actually resulting in violence to Communist individuals and offices. These so-called anti-Soviet demonstrations were undoubtedly a serious irritation to the Soviet Government and I have been led to believe that as a result the Soviets practically released all of Northern Manchuria to Communist occupation and that Japanese captured arms became available to the Communist troops in that region. Therefore, whatever failures there were on the part of the Communists in this matter, there were very definite Government actions, or permitted actions, which militated against the implementation of the agreements.
General Marshall stated that in the present discussions the Government had laid down very severe terms for the Communists in North China which it was highly improbable that they would, or could, accept without feeling that the continued life of their party would be seriously jeopardized. General Marshall also stated that the demonstrations now starting, and which were threatening, were in pattern an exact repetition of what had occurred in Chungking. There could be no acceptable explanation from his point of view except that of a [Page 1218] deliberate effort to interrupt the negotiations and that the effort was not on the part of the Communists. General Marshall further stated that he could not conduct negotiations under such circumstances. The Generalissimo assured him that there would be no further outbreaks. General Marshall stated that he was not so much interested in the suppression of outbreaks as he was the prevention of the outbreaks.
General Marshall stated that regarding the most critical points under discussion that it would be necessary to find some basis of compromise regarding Kiangsu, Jehol and Harbin in particular, as the present terms would not be accepted by the Communists.