Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chow En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 26, 1946, 2 p.m.

Nanking, June 26, 1946, 2 p.m.

Also present:	Mr. Chang
	Colonel Caughey
	Captain Soong

General Marshall: Thank General Chou for sending me the papers⁹⁰ this morning. I want to ask several questions about them.

The first question related to these long firm lines which are shown here as Communist garrison areas and Nationalist garrison areas. They seem to be the same on this map and also on the next. The lines are the same and yet the disposition of the troops is changed somewhat—I did not understand that.

Colonel Caughey: The lines are the same because it shows the end of the first period in both cases.

General Marshall: This is all the first period? That is what confused me. So they are the same and this is the disposition of the Government troops?

Now, regarding the first paragraph of General Chou’s letter to me in which he states there is no intention to alter those basic policies which are embodied in that agreement, such as “Subordination of Army to Politics,” “Divorce of Army from Civil Administrator” and “Separation of Military Operation, Military Administration and Military Training”; that so far as I know is not the subject of disagreement on part of the Government, and I agree with General Chou.

In the next paragraph appears the question of the five divisions in Manchuria which would result in an increase from 18 to 20 divisions in the first 12 months. I have not discussed the increase from 18 to 20 divisions with the Central Government. As far as I have gotten with the Central Government in the matter was the question of the reconsideration of comparative strengths in Manchuria, in which the Government had indicated they would agree to a 5 to 1 ratio, which meant an increase of 2 Communist divisions. In the final period there would be three instead of one. General Chou is familiar with that except he has used the expression once or twice that General Marshall proposed the two-division increase. The fact of the matter is that when General Chou told me of the Communist proposal of five Communist divisions in Manchuria, I stated, as he will recall, my own view. My view was that it inevitably meant an increase in Government troops if accepted by the Government at all. I did not think either side gained and that both would lose because of increased burden of armies in Manchuria. However, the point is that I succeeded in persuading the Government to agree to a 5 to 1 ratio as a basis for proceeding with negotiations. My own estimate is that there is no possibility that the Government will agree to a five division ratio in Manchuria, with the total increasing from 18 to 20 divisions. The best I can do this afternoon in the limited time available, is to indicate to General Chou where I think a state of complete disagreement exists. I have not seen anybody from the Government since receipt of this plan, and I am therefore basing my remarks on past conversations regarding various points which I have discussed with the Government before.

I think that regarding this area (pointing to north Kiangsu), the Government will never agree to its continued occupation until we reach the point in the progress of reorganizing and unifying the armies that indicates a peaceful basis of negotiations without prospect of renewed hostilities. I am quite certain the Government will be unwilling to accept the disposition indicated here, in close proximity to the capital at Nanking. The added factor of the movement of this army from here (pointing to Hopei) to increase the garrison and also I assume will greatly increase the Government’s unwillingness to rescind from its position regarding this area or retreat from this position regarding that area. So, referring to these troops in the area I am now outlining, I have been turning over in my mind, and I ask General Chou to consider, any other compromise disposition for these people to the north of Hankow in Hopei.

To go on to another area, the continued occupation of Chengtu is I know to be a point of great importance in the position of the Government. The location of these divisions on that particular railroad line is another point I would assume to which they will take decided exception. Those are the most critical factors I see at the moment which might prevent an agreement. I am not discussing the Manchurian dispositions at the present moment. I would rather wait until General Chou talks to me about whatever he has to present, including my comments thus far.

General Chou: I would like to exchange views with you freely on various points so that each may get clarified. First, we are talking at a time when political affairs are not touched upon at all because it is understood that political matters will be taken up later. We do this reluctantly because we find it necessary to raise the political problems at the same time. Since we are being forced to postpone talking on political matters, one critical issue arises; that is while the disposition of troops is settled, we are entirely unaware what is the Government stand with regard to political affairs. These present great difficulty to us. But, with a view to settling the outstanding issues, we cannot leave political matters aside and talk merely on military affairs, in particular disposition of troops. This is rather incompatible with the principle of having military problems subordinate to political affairs, as stipulated by the P. C. C., and also, as you have told me, according to the American way of subordinating the army to the Government.

The second principle is the divorce of civil administration from the army, which is also a principle laid down by the P. C. C. We have in mind to solve the problem of disposition of troops by this principle. You just asked me about the significance of the boundary lines. Now, it is our view that the political and military matters should be separated. According to our plan, the army units will only be stationed in those spots as shown on the map, and it will have no connection with the civil administration at all. Then after the reorganization of the Government, local self-government—the Communist army units will be concentrated and assembled within areas under Communist control, as shown here (referring to the map) and Government troops will also be concentrated and assembled in areas under the Government control. Then after reorganization of the army and the initiation of a coalition Government, the local self-government will be effected. When we have adopted a constitution, a provincial election, that is popular election, will be held. By that time, this boundary will automatically go out of the picture. This is the way we are thinking to achieve political democratic unity of China. This is also the idea expressed by the P. C. C. regarding divorce of army from civil administration, and which I believe is also the line you explained to me as that in the United States.

The third principle is the division of military operations into military training and military operations. The President will be empowered through the Ministry of National Defense and the State Council, to effect any movement of troops. This power is vested in the coalition Government. As to military training, army units will carry out their military training in accordance with the plan worked out by the general Chief of Staff. As to military administration, such as demobilization and recruiting, it will be taken care of by the civil administration and the local civil authorities.

These three matters are entirely separated from each other. This is the line of our proposal, as well as the basic plan of the army reorganization.

Now, the idea of the Government as embodied in its proposal is different. The Government’s idea is that wherever troops go, political matters will be adjusted according to the troops which are there. This is entirely against the principle of subordination of army to the politicos. For example, the Tingyuan area was recently occupied by Government troops. The local authorities were wiped out and they sent new personnel to take over the civil administration. I predict that as soon as the Communists north of Hankow have evacuated. Government forces will completely wipe out the existing local civil administration and replace it by theirs. So the whole idea is wherever troops go, civil administration will be entirely altered. This is the way in which the Government wants to solve the disposition of troops.

Therefore, from the way in which the Government proposed the disposition of Government and Communist troops, they asked that Government troops be stationed in Jehol, in the Kalgan area, Shantung peninsula, around the Tientsin–Pukou railway, and the Peiping–Hankow railway, and that the Communists evacuate a large part of north Kiangsu, north Shansi and North Anhwei, so that Communist areas will be drastically reduced to such areas as the area around Yenan, the northern poor area of Chahar which is almost without population, southeast Shansi, the middle of Hopeh around Tungming, and to the area around Lini in Shantung. In this way, instead of concentrating their troops, they are moving nearly to the Communist area, with the result that civil administration will inevitably also be changed. All the railway lines and large cities will be occupied by Nationalist troops and democratic institutions which now exist will be eradicated.

The Government’s proposal is incompatible. In the first place, it subordinates politics to the army. Second, it fails to divorce military affairs from civil affairs, so that civil administration will have to adapt itself to the change of troop positions. Third, as you told me last time, the reason they put such circles on the Government areas is for the purpose of demobilizing. This however, does not seem reasonable to me because while Communist troops are concentrated, Government troops are moving toward Communist areas, or coming into Communist areas, I do not see any reason why they should carry out demobilization in Communist areas since their soldiers come from the southwest or southern part of China. Instead of demobilizing, they will recruit more people from our area. That is against the principle of separation of military and civil affairs.

As to our proposal, there is not one instance in which we have expressed a desire to go to a Government area. We only want our troops to be concentrated within our own areas, and we ask the Government to do the same. In this way we try to divorce the army from civil administration so that civil administration will step by step go toward democratic unification. However, the Government proposal is that prior to a democratic unification of civil administration, they should occupy the large part of the Communist areas. This amounts to an occupation of Communist areas through negotiation as a substitute for a forced occupation. This is incompatible to the general tendencies for agreement and to the resolution of the P. C. C. as it appear to me. This seems to be the point of issue now.

With regard to the disposition of troops in accordance with the Army Reorganization Plan, the Government side believes that Communist troops should be withdrawn to certain specific places. Their intention is quite clear that wherever Government troops go, they would attempt to change the civil administration. Communists are only allowed to maintain civil administration in those few places they are still permitted to garrison. This way subordinates politics to the army.

However, our view is different. We think that as soon as the fighting is stopped, all troops will maintain their present position. Then in the Army Reorganization period, army units will be assembled at specific points within their own areas for training, while the rest of the troops are demobilized. As to local administration, it will be solved by means of the establishment of a coalition government and the initiation of local self government. At that time, the boundary line between the Government and the Communist troops will gradually fade out of significance.

On this basis, we will go over to the third step. That is the integration of the armies. The conception that formed in my talks with General Marshall in January and February was that the boundary line would later fade into insignificance. Therefore, the Government should not demand that Communist troops be withdrawn from certain places and that Government troops be sent in as replacements. Such a claim is entirely unreasonable. What the Government can do is to discuss where and what particular places Communist troops should be stationed. They may want to negotiate for certain places where Communists should evacuate. We think those places evacuated should be left ungarrisoned. In my present proposal, I properly leave out Chefoo for garrisoning. I plan to leave Chefoo ungarrisoned. You can also see from my overlay, I am properly trying to locate Communist troops away from the positions of Government troops so as to diminish their fear in the initial period.

On the other hand, I permit Government troops to station in practically all major cities near other Communist areas, such as Tsinan, Tsingtao, Paoting, etc. Despite the fact that those places are close to Communist areas, we concede that the Government can station troops there so that the Government may feel assured. But it appears to me that the Government should not think that Communist troops can be driven out of certain places and then replaced by Nationalist troops. If they think that way, they are thinking war instead of peace.

Now I will go over the detail matter. My first point is the movement of those troops north of Hankow. As I previously stated, they may go to Hopeh Province along the Peiping–Hankow railway line.

The second point concerns north Shansi and north Anhwei. The Government may raise the question that during the first period, Nationalist forces should be stationed in this area, but it seems absurd that they should ask the Communists to withdraw entirely, particularly at a time when we are starting the army reorganization plan. The Government representative may now oppose one Communist army during the first period and two divisions in the second period in Central China area. However, why did they not raise that question at former meetings? I repeat that they may negotiate if Communist forces are to be stationed there but it is out of the question if the Communist troops must be withdrawn completely.

I wish further to point out that during the period of reorganization, many Government armies will be stationed around different Communist armies. It is this way in the north areas, like in Peiping and Paoting, where large Government forces are stationed but there are only light Communist forces in the neighborhood. If Communists do not feel worried by the presence of so large a Government force, how can the Government force be menaced by a small Communist force in an adjacent area.

Thirdly, Shantung province itself is almost completely under Communist control. Despite this situation, we only ask that one Communist army be stationed here while the Government will also station one army there. Furthermore, we are prepared to leave the Shantung Province ungarrisoned. This would be a great concession on our part. Further, regarding Jehol, it is entirely unreasonable for the Government to want the Communists to evacuate that Province. Actually the larger part of Jehol is in Communist hands and we see no reason why we should withdraw. No doubt if we asked the Government to evacuate, they would feel indignant. But, because they occupy a part of the Jehol area, they feel we should evacuate. If we should demand they evacuate the capital of Shantung, leaving it entirely under our control, the Government would certainly feel indignant.

General Marshall: The Government has stated from time to time their reason for asking for Communist evacuation has no relation to Chengte being the capital.

General Chou: As soon as hostilities are stopped, the destruction of railways will cease as a matter of course. Particularly during army reorganization, no hostilities will take place and troops will be separated farther and farther away from each other.

We may demand Tsinan since the puppet troops are under direction of the Government. We might be entirely correct to demand the capital of Shantung but we will not do that as we believe the army reorganization will remove that need and no hostilities will occur. Therefore, at the time of army reorganization, we would assume it to be unreasonable to raise any new demand for Tsinan or for the Government to demand Chengte. But the Government’s plan is to operate north up to and including Jehol. Therefore, their plan of military operation is based on the following procedure: They would take north Kiangsu and from Suchow to Tsinan and from Tsingtao to Tsinan with only one army. But they are using more. The 54th Army will be shipped in and they will fly two armies instead of one to Tsinan, Suchow will also be reenforced. They will fly troops to the Peiping–Pukow railway and then they will have completed occupation of north Kiangsu area. Their troops will go from Peiping to Jehol to Chaoyang and they will completely control the Peiping–Chaoyang line, Tsingtao–Tsinan line and the Lunghai railway. If we do not concede the Government these points they would force it upon us by arms. This I know quite definitely.

On our part, we have no military plan whatsoever of that nature and should the negotiations end without success, we have no other way but to find new ways to approach a peaceful settlement. If we have to withdraw from Hopeh and Anhwei and to drop back from the Peiping–Hankow railway line, we should have made a scheme to take Tsinan by force or Wei-hsien or Suchow so that the whole area would be under Communist control. Any claim of that nature would be unreasonable and any military plan of that nature would be wrong. Therefore, I never think about it, just as we have never thought of taking the Peiping–Chaoyang line. We would not consider such a scheme because we believe that as soon as the army reorganization plan takes effect, the boundary line between the Communist and Nationalist armies will fade away and lose its significance. That is the point on which Ave differ from the Kuomintang.

This is the crux of all issues. We advocate that the disposition of troops should be solved along the way of democracy. What the Kuomintang, or particularly the Generalissimo, is thinking is that he would rather have the army disposition problem solved before everything else so that he will occupy a larger area and would not fear any other party or anything else. Therefore, all other problems so far discussed, we have made the utmost concessions with regard to the contents of the three papers tentatively agreed upon. In the detailed matters pertaining to the army reorganization plan, I am willing to give every consideration and to make whatever concession I am empowered to do. But, on those fundamental questions or principles laid down by the army reorganization plan and PCC arrangements, I cannot see why we should make a greater or any concession. I want to emphasize that any concession would deprive China of its prospect of democracy because under such conditions there would be no democracy in China. Meanwhile, areas which are for the time being left to Communist troops will be wiped out at a later time.

Should the Government still entertain that fear of concentration of the Communist troops, then I wish to point out that as soon as the hostilities stop and the army reorganization plan is put into effect, we would welcome American officers to help us in army reorganization. I do not see that under such conditions, there could still be anything that gives rise to fear to the Government.

As to the Manchurian problem, you just asked me about the figure of three divisions or five. I think that is open for discussion. I am willing to hear General Marshall’s view on this point since that is a detailed problem. So long as the basic policies of the reorganization are not violated, I am ready to consider all concrete issues.

General Marshall: I am a little confused as to what General Chou means exactly when he speaks of the fundamental basis which should govern the redistribution of troops under the agreement of February 25th and which he ties in with the agreements of the PCC. He gave a rather detailed and lengthy discussion, but I have lost track of the precise factors he has in mind. I am familiar with those in the agreement of February 25th, having written most of them myself, but I am trying to relate his statement of principle to his objection to the Government procedure. For example, to refer to the comments he has just made about Manchuria, and to my comments regarding General Chou’s discussion of the Manchurian problem some time back. The expression was used that the situation had greatly changed, therefore a reconsideration of the strengths was called for. I may have missed the point, but the situation in effect in North China has somewhat changed, particularly in the last month.

I recognize that there are two sides to most situations regarding offensive action, but so far as I have been able to determine from reports of American officers, there was a very aggressive offensive action after June 8th conducted by Communist troops in Shantung Province and there were other very threatening movements more recently reported in the general region of Tatung. I am, of course, familiar with the Government movement to reinforce troops in Tsinan and at Tsingtao, but those followed a continued aggressive Communist offensive action after June 8th. I had that in mind when General Chou said the situation had changed somewhat in North China during the past month, because those movements constituted a very decided threat against the Government’s position and a reaction on the Government’s part was inevitable. I am confused in my own mind at the present time as to the approach to this particular phase of the negotiations. I think the more clear cut the issues are made, the more hope there will be to find a mutually acceptable solution.

It appears to me at the moment that the Communist Party has very much in mind that it must not allow itself to be put in a position militarily which would weaken its defensive power to such an extent that it would adversely affect the efforts of the Communist Party, whatever they might be, in the political discussions which we all hope will follow. It also appears to me that on the other side is the fear of the Government against a reaction by military force on the part of the Communists to influence the cause of political discussions. There is also to be considered the freely expressed desire of certain Government officials to settle matters by force, which is exactly what we are trying so hard to avoid and which in my opinion would inevitably lead to utter chaos in China. I am trying to clarify in my own mind what the real motives are, what the real fears are on both sides. Therefore I ask General Chou to clarify the fundamentals that he has been referring to.

General Chou: Now stating briefly, the fundamental questions are the following:

Firstly, the present position of the Government is that it would leave political matters for later discussion and merely solve military questions at this moment. This procedure itself presents a difficulty because whenever discussing military matters, it is we who will be pressed by the Government to make concessions. The Government would not make any concessions as far as military matters are concerned. On our part we are prepared to make military concessions in order to get the Government to concede political matters so that the goal of democratization of politics and nationalization of armies will be achieved. As the situation now stands, only military questions are subject to discussion. This itself creates the fear on our part as to what will be the eventual outcome of the political settlement. Your statement on this part is correct on the Communist fear that by weakening its military strength, it might lose its bargaining power in political matters.

Secondly, when discussing military matters, the Government is demanding Communist withdrawal from certain places which will then be occupied by Government troops. By Government entry into those places, the freedom of the people as well as the local authorities will be wiped out. I have cited enough examples so I will not repeat here. This second fear is due to lack of democracy and to the Government’s intention against the agreement of the PCC and the army reorganization plan. Therefore, with regard to the North China problem, our concessions can only go so far as to leave certain places now under Communist control, ungarrisoned. Government troops should not enter into those places or areas during the time of army reorganization and prior to the establishment of democracy in China. That is the crux of the situation.

General Marshall: This proposed dispositions in Manchuria would be effected by whatever the final decision is as to the strength of Communist forces to remain in Manchuria. I assume that the most critical factors, from the viewpoint of the Government, would relate to Antung and Harbin. Is it the intention of General Chou in this diagram to indicate that outside of the area defined by a solid red line, the Government troops are not to go?

General Chou: According to the cease fire agreement, this will be the position held by the troops at the time of commencement of the cease fire.

Secondly, as soon as the army reorganization plan is put into effect, I favor dividing reorganization into two stages:

a. For reorganization only.

b. Integration.

With regard to Manchuria, I am willing to shorten the period of the first stage to 6 months as expressed in my letter.

Thirdly, during the time of army reorganization, Government troops should not go beyond the red lines, but under concrete circumstances we may make special arrangements with each particular instance. For instance, you raised earlier, the question of Harbin. I transmitted that subject to the Communist leaders in Manchuria. I am not talking here about its garrison by troops but some other arrangement.

General Marshall: There are several special conditions which I am quite certain the Government will bring forward. One relates to the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway line. They desire to have that line cleared of Communist troops at a very early date. Another would relate to the time element for readjustments in Manchuria, particularly because of the early arrival of the winter season. I am quite certain that the Government will insist that the preliminary readjustment should be accomplished by October. As further regards the time element, there will be Government insistence in regard to the situation in Kiangsu and the [in?] Anhwei in Central China which they feel constitutes a Communist threat against the capital. The same would apply to certain readjustments in Jehol. I mention these various critical points so that General Chou will have them in mind.

I am somewhat at a loss at this stage of the negotiations as to the best course of procedure. When it became evident yesterday that I would not have an opportunity in the late afternoon to talk to General Chou regarding these matters, and then to talk later either to the Generalissimo or General Yu Ta Wei, I thought it wise to postpone the meeting of the Committee of Three because we would reach the table without either the Government representatives or myself being prepared for a discussion of the Communist proposals. Now, I am in a new dilemma, not knowing how best to proceed to resolve the present great differences between the position of the Government and that of the Communist Party. Both have strong beliefs and intensity of purpose. At the same time I assume, I hope at least, that they both have in mind certain differences regarding which they might make concessions but they do not put them forward at this time. The trouble is there is so little time for maneuvering. It is quite evident that further delays or extensions of negotiations are not practicable because of the growing unrest and the constant threat of disturbances and vicious propaganda. I repeat, at this moment I am rather at a loss. I have a very great responsibility and the urgent necessity of taking some action to facilitate an agreement, yet I find the two sides so far apart and so firm in their purpose, that I do not know what to say or do.

General Chou: According to our original plan there are three items coming under discussion during the armistice. We have solved two of the three subjects and also an extra one with regard to procedure of the field teams and Executive Headquarters. Now, the most difficult problem for settlement is the reorganization of the army, and particularly the disposition of troops. This is the key problem as to whether China can be brought under the power of democracy or not. In battling over this issue, the Chinese Communist Party is not merely protecting itself on areas, but it is trying to fulfill its responsibility toward facilitating China to go on to the path of democracy. In that respect we are not in a position to make concessions. However, the unprepared concessions on fundamental problems does not apply. We would not make concessions on detailed matters. In principle, we cannot concede that the Government may send large forces into a vast part of the Communist areas.

The actual situation is that the Communists are protecting the rights and the social gains of the peasants in particular. As soon as Government troops enter those areas, those benefits will be withdrawn and the peasants put under immense exploitation and suffering. For example, in the Tingyuan area, all social benefits set up for the benefit of peasants have been destroyed by Government troops. The Chinese Communist Party at this stage has no other purpose than to protect the rights and interest of Chinese peasants so as to increase the purchasing power of peasants, and to help develop Chinese productive power. As far as that is concerned, we cannot make any concession. Any concession would constitute a failure of the Communist Party.

As to the question of how large or where a force will be stationed, that can be negotiated. I hope General Marshall will make an analysis as to what are our fundamental questions and what are detailed matters. I state on fundamental questions, we cannot make any concession because it would mean complete failure on our part. The Kuomintang’s tactics now is to present fundamental questions in the form of concrete (specific) matters. They ask concretely about this place or that place which added together implies occupation of a very large area by Nationalist troops and that the rise of the people will be abolished.

As to what procedure we should adopt from now on, I am now thinking there are two ways to pursue. The first alternative might be that we should first implement those agreements which have points which can be agreed upon. If say, hostilities in Manchuria can be completely terminated and if railroads in China proper can be under repair and traffic resumed, it would certainly be effective to prevent a further intensification of civil war. We would then have more time to deal with the remaining subject by peaceful means such as the army reorganization plan.

The second alternative would be that if the Kuomintang insists on solving all these issues simultaneously, then we can first lay down a few principles with regard to the army reorganization. For example, we may specify that during the period of army reorganization, the armies of both sides will be concentrated in certain individual spots, that the administrative affairs will be left entirely to the reorganized government without interference by the army. The second principle is that the troops of both parties will be stationed at those places which would not constitute a menace or arouse fear of the opposing party. The third principle regarding certain places in both Government and Communist areas, negotiations can be made to leave those places ungarrisoned during the time of army reorganizations so as to effect a compromise. The fourth principle concerns arrangements to be worked out initially with respect to Manchuria. If we could reach an agreement on those foregoing points, then I feel rather confident that we may also reach an agreement at this time. I think this second alternative in that way only solves the fundamental questions without touching the others. That is what I can think about at this moment.

General Marshall: I am very glad to have General Chou’s suggestions and I will see what I can do with them. As to his first alternative proceeding to implement the agreements we have already reached, and then going ahead with the negotiations we are now involved in, I am quite certain I could not get agreement of the Government to that procedure. I therefore turn to the second alternative which I will examine carefully.

Would it be convenient for General Chou to see me possibly at 11:00 tomorrow morning? That would give me some time to discuss matters with Government officials and see if I can develop any definite propositions to make.

General Chou: 11:00 will be all right.

General Marshall: I will telephone or have Colonel Caughey telephone when I see how my time is working out.

90. See memorandum MM 055, June 25, p. 1195.