Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270: Telegram
General Marshall to President Truman21
[934] Dear Mr. President: Negotiations have proceeded very slowly due to reluctance of either side to commit themselves one in advance of the other regarding reorganization and particularly redistribution of troops.
Fighting in Shantung Province proved to be a very disturbing factor, causing increased bitterness and unwillingness to make concessions. Finally Saturday22 noon last the Generalissimo indicated definitely to me the nature of his demands and had me put them into formal shape for presentation to General Chou En Lai. The latter had made no definite propositions and had only given me a few general statements.
After the formal papers had been drawn up it required the better part of Sunday to translate them into Chinese for detailed consideration by the Generalissimo. It was not until 7:00 o’clock Monday evening that he gave me his formal approval. I immediately sent [Page 1100] the papers to General Chou En Lai that evening.23 Again a delay of translating was involved. Chou saw me at 11:00 o’clock this, Tuesday, morning.24 He had had but little time after translation to consider the proposals but sufficient to find them, in his opinion, entirely too demanding to admit of acceptance by the Communists. I prevailed upon him to meet late this afternoon the two principal officials representing the Government in the negotiations. Meanwhile, I saw the Generalissimo at 6:00 o’clock this evening and told him that there was no chance, in my opinion, of the Communists accepting his terms without considerable moderation.
I had suggested to Chou En Lai that he take my plane and fly to Yenan this afternoon or early tomorrow morning to consult with his principals. He accepted for tomorrow morning but late tonight sent me word that nothing had occurred in the conference this evening with National officials to justify a visit to Yenan, therefore he would not go tomorrow. One of the two Government officials called on me later and said that the [no?] meeting of views had been obtained and that General Chou had resented bitterly the Government insistence that Americans on field teams and the American Commissioner at Executive Headquarters be given the deciding vote in a number of matters in case of disagreements.
The principal stumbling block presented by the Government proposals does not appear to be in regard to readjustments in Manchuria but more resentment was aroused by certain Government stipulations concerning North China, wherein it is demanding the immediate evacuation by the Communists of the provinces of Chahar northwest of Peiping and Jehol north and northeast of that city; also the Government demand that National troops immediately take over Chefoo and Weiheiwei on the northern coast of Shantung Province. Incidentally the Government had announced this morning that it was in the process of sending an army of three divisions to Tsingtao and another to Tsinanfu, both in Shantung Province, because of the recent Communist offensive operations in that Province.
At the present moment we have reached an impasse. Whether or not I can prevail upon the Generalissimo to make concessions sufficient to find Communist acceptance of the general proposition remains to be seen, and whether or not I can get from the Communists a commitment to definite proposals on their part is also uncertain. The situation is extremely critical and has not been helped throughout by the belief, freely expressed, by some of the Government military officials and some politicians that only a policy of force will satisfy the situation, [Page 1101] and that the Communists can be quickly crushed. I consider the last view a gross underestimate of the possibilities, as a long and terrible conflict would be unavoidable, I am sure. Also, the Soviet Government would probably intervene openly or under cover. All of my views have been stated to the Generalissimo. I rather think today’s evidence of the reception of his demands may induce him to moderate them considerably, though I will probably find my efforts opposed by certain military officials. There remain but three and one-half days of the truce period. If I develop the possibility of significant Government moderations of the original proposals and a Communist favorable reaction I think I can have the truce period extended a few days without the hazard of fatal disruptions in the field. You will be kept advised.