Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall, General Hsu Yung-chang and General Yu Ta-wei at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 18, 1946, 4:40 p.m.

Nanking, June 18, 1946, 4:40 p.m.

Also present:	General Pee
	Colonel Caughey

General Yu said he wished to discuss the plan on the areas to assign, which was an integral part of the readjustment in the Military Reorganization agreement dated 25 February 1946. There are two plans regarding the Communist troops in Manchuria.¹⁸ We favor the first plan which contemplates one division in Lung Kiang Province, one at Sung Kiang Province, and then the one in the Sung Kiang Province would integrate in one Army with the Government divisions stationed in the southern part of Lung Hai Province, while the northern part over in Tsitsihar would be garrisoned by Communist troops, with the third Communist division on the border near Korea.

General Marshall said he wanted to discuss the Manchuria Annex,¹⁹ the plan the Generalissimo indicated he accepted, which was one of two integrated armies with one Communist division in a small area of eastern Kirin.

General Marshall then read from the Manchuria Annex, which stated the location of armies shall be as follows:

“1. One army composed of 1 National and 2 Communist divisions to be located within the three provinces of Hsin Hei Lung Kiang, Hsing-An, and Nun Kiang with one Communist division in Hsin Hei Lung Kung Kiang and North and Central Nun Kiang, one Communist division in Hsing-An and North-Central Nun Kiang, and one National division in southern Nun Kiang. The division headquarters of the above 3 divisions shall be located at Tsitsihar, Hailar and Pai-cheng respectively. The army headquarters shall be located at Tsitsihar.”

General Marshall remarked that the Government gains by this compromise outweighed the possibility of disadvantages by the arrangement proposed.

General Yu asked what his suggestion was of where the demarcation line should be in Nun Kiang Province.

General Marshall indicated on the map (46° parallel in the province).

General Yu said in this plan the province of Liao Peh was without any troops and added that this commitment did not prevent the Government from sending troops into this province.

General Marshall asked General Yu how many Communist armies were in Jehol and Chahar.

General Yu said that part of the troops under the Communist commander in Jehol and Chahar had been sent to Manchuria and the main troops under his command were estimated at 50,000 or more.

General Marshall asked if that included both Jehol and Chahar.

General Yu said yes, that was about it. It was their estimation that there were 50,000 in Jehol and 50,000 in Chahar, which could possibly be reorganized into two armies.

General Marshall asked how many of these 100,000 would be considered fairly good troops.

General Yu said about half.

General Marshall asked how many of those normally lived in Jehol and Chahar. How many of the men in the 50,000 did not belong in those two provinces.

General Yu said they did not know the particular details of the question placed by General Marshall, but could give a reasonable idea. The Communist troops at Jehol and Chahar were composed of three categories. It is composed about one-third of militia. The third category is of just armed farmers and armed natives of the region of Jehol and Chahar—at least one-third to one-half of the natives.

General Marshall explained that he asked that question because it occurred to him in his discussion with the Generalissimo last night that he was creating an explosive situation by the enforced evacuation of Jehol and Chahar. The proposed movement of the Communist troops north from Central China, (pointing to map) would create a concentration in North China (again pointing to map), particularly of Communists, which, by its density, would present a considerable hazard. In other words, there would be too much steam pressure and an explosion would be likely.

General Yu told General Marshall they would then present the map of the areas to be assigned to the Communist Troops. He then asked if General Chou En-lai would go back to Yenan.

General Marshall said he didn’t know—that he had wanted Chou to go at 2:00 o’clock today. He said General Chou had not proposed going back to Yenan, but he (General Marshall) had thought he ought to start back at 2:00 o’clock today. He said General Chou had such a mass of papers and that it took a long time to communicate back and forth with Yenan by radio. He thought more time would be lost unless Chou could talk directly to his people. He could get back to Nanking about 2:30 tomorrow afternoon.

General Yu asked whether General Marshall would be at the meeting between General Hsu and General Chou.

General Marshall said no, he did not want to participate in the first meeting. He did not see any useful purpose in having a formal meeting of the Committee of Three at this moment.

General Yu said he talked to the Generalissimo and he told him he had been discussing all the requirements in the past paper. He said we will go through that document and you tell us what to do.

General Marshall asked what document.

General Yu said the one on integration.

General Marshall said he had seen it in typewritten form, but not on the map. Unless some ground was broken and something gotten out of the way, no progress could be made. It was not now necessary to go into the details at all.

General Yu said this was a map showing the areas which the Generalissimo told you of yesterday. (General Pee then explained the map.)

General Yu said they²⁰ may enter those concentrated areas in four months’ time—July, August, September, October.

General Marshall asked where they were now in these regions.

They then showed General Marshall where they were on the map, explaining they were very much scattered.

General Marshall asked if they crossed the railroad anywhere.

General Yu said yes. (Tientsin-Pukou)

General Marshall then asked where they crossed for this first time.

General Yu said they crossed in many places—that the railway had been disrupted at many points.

General Marshall said, of course, if you get them into those areas they are completely under your control, particularly in Shantung.

He said his comment was that there would be no probability of the Communist accepting the proposition. How many divisions were to be put into those places?

1. Southwest Shantung, Lin-i

2. South Hopeh, Taimen

3. East Shansi, Chin Cheng

4. Shensi, Yenan

5. Chahar, Kalgan

General Yu answered five armies in five areas. He said we may give them one more area. (North Shantung west of the peninsula.) That is a basis for discussion. The Generalissimo discussed this yesterday. He hinted on the possibility of giving them this area.

General Marshall asked that where they were to go into those areas, they must be established there by the end of 12 months.

General Yu said before that. He said they must get the troops in by four months. From four to six months. He said, according to the suggestion made by General Marshall, six months. They go into the regions assigned them. Of course, no provision had been made for the demarcation of these regions.

General Marshall told General Yu he would have to remember that they were dealing with a much larger force and could not cut it down suddenly to that size by terms of a general agreement. So that while they were moving into those areas there would be a great many more people at the end of six months than there would be at the end of 12 months.

General Yu said they were anxious to get them.

General Marshall continued by saying at the end of 12 months they are supposed to have 18 divisions, and at the end of 18 months 10 divisions. Demobilization is not instantaneous—it has to be progressive and must begin moving in two or three months.

General Yu said that is a question of how to physically do the job.

General Marshall said it is not so much physical but rather how to expedite the process. For instance you are going to produce concentrations out of proportion to the area, and therefore demobilization procedures should be speeded up. You must have more area while concentrating at the end of six months and then at the end of 12 months (Pointing out on the map). That is the thought I have in mind.

General Marshall said the Government would be putting people along the railroad. Take Shantung alone—the Communist would be unwilling to evacuate all lines at the end of six months. I am thinking of this as a staff problem and I’m not so sure you can crowd them in at that time.

General Yu said General Hsu had said that in all these areas there were 69 hsien and plenty of room, and that four months was a reasonable time for them to get into the areas if they propose to do so. General Yu said his idea was to get them into certain areas.

General Pee said the Government’s proposed amendments to the draft documents were—firstly, from Northwest China and one from South China into North China in the first phase; secondly, they would like to add to Article 5 of the Reorganization Demobilization Plan the assigned areas for the Communist to enter before a certain date—say the six months—so as to avoid being scattered around. This would end hostilities.

General Marshall said he thought the only way to do this was to have a North China Annex to the draft document. He added that the Government insisted that the agreement of February 25 should be the bible, and how [now?] were tearing so many pages from it as to leave only the cover. We should avoid that. The best [of] solutions is an annex.

General Pee continued with the 3rd amendment. He said they would like to insure that all plans could be implemented without delay and implemented effectively. He said they hoped the Americans would be vested with the deciding vote so that any argument in the field team or Executive Headquarters could be settled by a majority vote. Regarding this amendment however General Hsu would approach General Chou and talk directly.

General Yu said the Generalissimo had told him that in talking with General Chou to stress the fact that the Generalissimo insisted the American member be given the deciding vote. He said he thought they had presented the most important things. He then stated the Generalissimo had instructed him to ask General Marshall’s ideas, but this is an integral plan, not one of bargaining. If presented to General Chou it is not intended to be an instrument of bargaining. The Generalissimo asked me what technique to pursue in dealing with General Chou. Would the proper procedure be to present the plan as written?

General Marshall said he rather thought not because at the present moment, in his opinion, they would find so much disagreement that they would merely add to the complications. General Marshall said one modification was given General Chou last night, that is with respect to area No. 5. That is a modification—

General Yu interrupted to say that he meant the Generalissimo had told him last night if the Communists rejected the idea then what would be considered—

General Marshall asked to let him complete his thought first—that is modification only in the terms up to the present instance. In the first place, General Chou has no authority to accept those stipulations in North China. He must consult Yenan. In the second place, the areas [assignment] depicted on the map adds to the depressing outlook for the Communists. General Marshall suggested that at this meeting this afternoon, General Yu should tell General Chou he had read his comments of this morning to General Marshall. General Hsu himself has not become familiar with them. General Marshall suggested that the Manchurian question be discussed first. General Chou has already agreed. General Marshall suggested that since the stipulations regarding North China present the great problem so far as General Chou is concerned, and necessitated his going back to his people, therefore, an understanding about the Manchurian question should be easy.

General Marshall continued: I would discuss with him the Manchurian question first, and then specifically his views regarding Shantung, Jehol, and Chahar. I don’t think there is any profit in discussion of the reorganization of those towns that have been taken in Shantung since June 7. I am rather inclined to think he will agree to that. He said that was the only thing he had to negotiate on right now. So he must have known something. If there is anything you can give him in a general way—in regard to communications—tonight is the time to talk about it. So that he can go to Yenan tomorrow at 9:00 o’clock and have a little more than he has so far to tell them beyond the mere reading of papers. I would like you to keep in mind that I think, personally, that General Chou has a proper complaint regarding communications. I want you to be conscientious.

General Yu said he would come to the question of communications later. He asked if General Marshall thought it premature to mention the North China question. General Marshall said if he (General Chou) brought it up, then do it, but if you discuss that, you immediately become involved in the Jehol-Chahar propositions.

General Yu asked if General Marshall thought it time to tell General Chou about the area assignment. He asked if General Marshall thought they could tell General Chou the ideas in general.

General Marshall said that would appear appropriate but not to show him the map. He said if you show him the restricted areas you will have war in China.

General Yu said he would forget the map. He would confine the discussion to the Manchurian question and just talk of area readjustment in a general way.

General Marshall said when it comes to the question of authority of Americans, he was told yesterday by the Democratic League, that they had discussed with General Chou that afternoon that very proposition and they insisted the Communists must make some compromise and found out that General Chou probably would agree to the American team captain having the deciding vote. That still left the question of communications confronted with the possibility of delay. General Marshall had told those two gentlemen in talking to General Chou that they might make a suggestion that may not give the American team captain quite so complete a vote but to at least leave him power to decide where to go, when, and who to see. Then when the situation is reported to Executive Headquarters the American Commissioner has the deciding vote on the settlement of the disagreement. Another thing, the American Commissioner also should have authority to decide where and when the teams should go. The team captain would decide exactly where the team should go—to this town or that town, or this region.

Also, I told the representatives of the Democratic League to try prevailing on General Chou to extend this same authority to communications matters. I don’t think there is any chance of their accepting general authority, but there may be a chance if you define it and permit the teams to go and see. Also permit Americans to prevent delays on communications—that would be an immense gain. The representative suggested it should be a majority vote which wouldn’t put Americans in such a conspicuous position. I told them the majority vote was not so good since Americans quite frequently would feel that either the Government or the Communists were entirely wrong.

General Yu said the authority was qualified in the first place in case of dispute among members of the team since it would be referred to the Executive Headquarters.

General Marshall said only regarding the situation, not where to go or when.

General Yu said how about disagreement—there we get the most difficulty. Sometimes there are disputes on account of different interpretations—then, who decides?

General Marshall said the senior American representative at Executive Headquarters has the deciding vote on disagreements on communications, interpretation of facts, etc.

General Yu then said he wanted to get clear these proposal qualifications in case of disagreement:

1. In case of disagreement the commissioner has the deciding vote where and when to send the teams.

2. In the field the team captain decides in case of disagreement as to where and when they go.

General Marshall suggested, “and who they see”. Disagreements regarding conclusions as to the situation would go back to the commissioner. An American has the decision in the case of any disagreement regarding communications. That is as far as I think Americans can go.

General Yu said, how about getting an American member to decide in case of general disagreement?

General Marshall said he didn’t think the Communists would agree.

General Marshall explained further that these are not “his” proposals—they “must” be the Government’s and not “his”. You can state it in specific terms.

General Pee said a week ago General Hsu talked to General Chou regarding arbitration and then three days ago General Hsu sent a memorandum to General Chou and General Chou sent back a reply, answering, “No”.

General Yu said (coming back to negotiations regarding communications) a general memorandum was drafted and two plans worked out—one called the administration of railways during the interim; the other one a plan of execution for restoration. General Yu told Colonel Hill one consideration of this plan was for some kind of joint administration. He was prepared, however, to take Communists into and to be employed by the Government. He told Colonel Hill he was prepared on all of these to have qualifications and examinations conducted by Americans, so that we would have absolute fairness to adjust the affair. Then he sent these two documents, one drafted by General Marshall and one by Colonel Hill, modified in principle. General Yu told Colonel Hill that he wanted communications restored. It would be good for the Chinese people, though not much military advantage would accrue until all the area is restored. A lot of the area is now under Communist control, where National troops can not move. We have not asked General Chou to evacuate the railroad. He has put through the following demands on communications, but we discussed your formula that we agree to demolish all fortifications, except such tunnels, railroad stations, etc., as are necessary. He also raised the question of joint administration. We will take the Communists into the Government, but we cannot go beyond that; we cannot recognize party bureaus. General Yu said the question of railroad police may be raised by Chou again. These police have existed in China ever since there were railways—General Chou objected to military police during the restoration period—and General Yu agreed to that. But there must be a time when we have to send in police in the interest of the Chinese railway system. I don’t see why the Communists should object. He suggested that in the interim period, according to Colonel Hill, no police would be used. Today, Colonel Hill proposed that the troop movement clause be deleted because that does not (matter that I proposed myself) fall within the scope of communications. Colonel Hill proposed that the clause be deleted. We may have an argument at a later date—maybe three months, maybe later.

Another question General Chou raised was that fortifications be destroyed between Hsuchow and Kaifeng on the Lunghai railway. I don’t see why the Government should commit themselves to destroy all fortifications for that small sector.

I want to incorporate into the communications document the same “arbitration” clause. In case of disagreement as to interpretation of this directive the majority vote of three members will be decisive. We don’t like the clause “majority vote”—how about saying the American member would have the deciding vote.

General Yu asked if, since General Chou would be going back tomorrow, would he be back again by the 20th?

The first plan was to leave at 2:00 o’clock this afternoon and be back here at 2:30 tomorrow, so he could have a conference here this morning and another one tomorrow. If he goes back tomorrow, I hope he will be leaving there the day after.

General Yu asked if that would be on the 20th. General Yu said they would talk to General Chou as suggested by General Marshall and he said that General Marshall knew the Generalissimo was very sincere in making an effort at peace.

General Marshall told General Yu they must have the fact in mind that the terms were pretty stiff.

General Yu said that was a staff question.

18. Neither printed.
19. Ante, p. 1076.
20. The Communists.