Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Memorandum by General Chou
En-lai to General Marshall
MM 041
Nanking, June 16, 1946.
My Dear General Marshall: On June 10, 1946,
General Hsu Yung-chang forwarded a copy of his memorandum to you with
regard to the power of final decision. As I had explained in person to
you and General Hsu in considerable length as to why such a proposal is
not acceptable to the Chinese Communist Party, I then thought that a
written reply could be dispensed with. On June 14, 1946, I received a
second letter from General Hsu in which he again pressed for a solution
of this matter. In view of this I am sending the enclosed memorandum to
him to clarify my attitude. A copy of this memorandum is hereby
forwarded to you for your reference.
[Signature in Chinese]
Chou
En-lai
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by General Chou
En-lai to General Hsu
Yung-chang
MM 040
Nanking, June 16, 1946.
Dear General Hsu: Reference is made to your
note under date of June 14, 1946.
As was fully explained to you at our last conference, the Chinese
Communist Party declines to accept the proposal of empowering the
American members with final decision in connection with the field
teams, the Executive Headquarters or the Committee of Three. Seeing
that you have sent a second letter to press for a reply, I beg to
forward the following as my personal comment on this matter based on
the experience of the past few months.
- 1.
- Ever since the Committee of Three, the Military Sub-Committee,
and the lower organizations were established, we had in
compliance with General Marshall’s desire adopted the unanimous
agreement principle as the method of procedure in our
discussion. On this basis we passed many important decisions,
and took actions on innumerable operational matters pertaining
to military readjustment. By doing so we have backed out for
many a time of a situation which verges on disaster, and
achieved recently the agreement governing a 15-day cessation of
aggressive actions. Had both parties been lacking in the spirit
to abide by the “unanimous agreement” principle, how could so
many agreements be brought into being, and the truce preserved
for such a long time?
- 2.
- In your letter you further mentioned that both sides are
lacking in any sort of guarantee. This I don’t think is in
keeping with the fact. Since the establishment of the Committee
of Three, the American officers under the leadership of General
Marshall have attended all
[Page 1063]
meetings, and participated in the
formulation of all agreements, and all phases of its activities.
By virtue of their position as being placed in the middle, they
assumed in outward form as well as in practice the role of
guarantee. Apart from that, the American representatives are not
only representing the American Government by working along the
line of President Truman’s statement on 15 December last,99 out are also morally
bearing the responsibility to implement the Moscow Communiqué of
the Big Three.1 In other
words, the American representatives are at the same time serving
as an international guarantee. But for this guarantee, how could
the two parties have placed such a high confidence and respect
in them? Thus to place confidence and respect in the American
representatives does not necessarily imply that they be
empowered with the final decision. This is best illustrated by
the fact that the previous decisions of the Committee of Three
were in the largest measure initiated by General Marshall. As
the matter then stood, General Marshall enjoyed the highest
confidence and respect of the two parties, despite the lack of a
final decision power. This evidenced that such a power is not a
deciding factor to the settlement of the various issues.
- 3.
- It might be argued that empowering the American
representatives with final decision would expedite the
settlement of disputes between the two parties. To me, at least,
this argument seems not to have been backed up by the train of
events. Glancing back at the past five months, we find that
while during the initial three months very little difficulty was
confronted in reaching decision by unanimity, in the following
two months, under the influence of the Manchurian issue and a
mounting dispute over the PCC decisions, a deadlock was formed
which blocked the unanimous agreement. What should be deduced
therefrom is: whether an issue can be settled easily or
difficultly lies essentially not in the power of final decision,
but rather in the earnest intention of both parties to reach a
compromise. Were the two parties lacking the good intention to
cooperate and compromise, to empower the American
representatives with final decision would merely complicate,
instead of solving the issues.
- 4.
- As far as the American representatives are concerned, the
final decision power would instead of being helpful, rather tend
to place them into an even more difficult position. We fully
respect the American representatives, and trust in their
participation in the work of military readjustment, as well as
in assuming a leading role in the negotiation. This is one
matter. But to grant them the power of final decision, which
would place them high above the representatives of the other two
parties, to pass verdict, is another matter. Should the two
things be confused, it would not only be hardly comprehensible
to the Chinese people and the nations abroad, but would set them
into surprise.
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While presenting the foregoing to you in writing, I request earnestly
that you will kindly withdraw this proposal of yours, and direct all
your efforts toward the solution of matters which were scheduled to
be solved within these 15 days.
