The Consul General at Mukden (Clubb) to General Marshall72
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegrams Nos. 80, June 8 and 83, June 10,73 incorporating elements of the press statement made by Commander-in-Chief Tu Yu-ming in interpretation of the “truce order” issued by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on June 6, and to enclose for the information of the Embassy a copy (in English translation) of the full text of the statement74 as published in the Ho P’ing Jih Pao (Peace Daily [Army organ], Mukden) on June 8, 1946.
It will be observed that the spirit of General Tu Yu-ming’s statement where it treats of alleged past misdemeanors of the Communist side, as well as the implications of his schedule of proposed accomplishments for the fifteen-day period and of his forecast of movement of Government forces during the same period “for the recovery of territory and sovereignty”, is not such as would give sound basis for belief that the Communists would accept the “truce” as thus arbitrarily offered them, unless it can be assumed that they already feel themselves defeated in Manchuria. It is my estimate that they do not feel that their position in Manchuria has become untenable. It is possible that the National Government feels that their military position in Manchuria is now sufficiently strong to force the issue; it may be contrariwise, that the Nationalist military leaders feel that their present military position is over-extended, and they are trying to pin the Communist forces down to inaction while they bring up additional forces for the purpose of strengthening weak points. It is fairly obvious, in any event, that the National Government by the present move anticipate that they will get from it the greater gain, if only by maneuvering into a position where the Communists can be forced to shoulder the blame for breach of the “truce”. In the circumstances, it would appear that it would have been sounder political tactics if General Tu had said a little less than he did.