Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, June 10, 1946, 10:10 a.m.

Also present: Colonel Caughey
Mr. Chang

Gen. Chou opened the meeting by expressing his thanks for the airplane Gen. Marshall had provided for him. He stated the flying in Gen. Marshall’s airplane was very smooth. Gen. Chou and Chairman Mao33 both expressed thanks for the present given them.

Gen. Marshall said Gen. Chou should have his black notebook back, he imagined, about 11:00 or 12:00 o’clock, and that it would be delivered to him direct. Gen. Marshall would see that he got them, probably while he was here.

Gen. Chou thanked Gen. Marshall and stated Madame Mao also thanked him for the candy. Gen. Chou said that while in Yenan, he had a lengthy discussion with his associates, covering nearly all subjects, as far as they could, brought up by Gen. Marshall. He would first bring up a few points to be talked over and then come to the details to be covered in negotiations.

Gen. Marshall asked to interrupt a minute. Probably the greatest difficulty during negotiations would be the hesitation on both sides to commit themselves to definite proposals, one in advance of the other. It is easy to understand why that reluctance, but in view of the time factor, it is unfortunate. That was one reason he had talked at length to Gen. Chou about one phase—Communications. The other reason was, of course, the building up of some little feeling, at least, of good faith and intention.

Gen. Marshall said that he had done exactly the same thing with the Central Government people, especially regarding communications, and he hoped they would follow his advice on the matter of not holding back on proposals until they hear all of the other man’s proposals. That was going to be the great difficulty, particularly where political factors relate to military decisions.

[Page 1009]

Gen. Chou endorsed the point Gen. Marshall had just brought up. He hoped that during the 15 days, they could solve the major questions so that hostilities could be stopped. At least, in his capacity of a negotiator, he would think this way. Therefore, Gen. Chou said, that while in Yenan, he had discussed many points. In fact there were so many subjects to discuss, and so short a period (only 15 days) that it would be best if the scope of discussion were restricted to three points agreed upon. That which could be solved more easily, they would try to solve first. In doing so, they would increase confidence and facilitate the intermediary action of General Marshall. This would also help toward strengthening the cooperation of the parties concerned. If done this way, even if certain points could not be agreed, they would still have some formulas for others. This would diminish the danger of failure in negotiation and would help to bring success. Any other basis of discussion might involve other political matters which would make it impractical to complete our talks during the 15 days. This, of course, did not imply that political matters would or could not be brought up. Even after the 15 days are over, our discussions on political matters can continue. My suggestion [he said] was subscribed to in Yenan. While there, I received your telegram and I paid much attention to your views.

Gen. Marshall was much gratified to hear that, and by that he was referring to his entire statement.

Gen. Chou said that now he would come to the crucial point that ought to be discussed. It was admitted that at present, there was no mutual confidence between the two parties and that actually, mutual confidence had been destroyed. In order to restore this mutual confidence, 15 days would certainly not be enough time. The one thing that we could depend upon was the following two factors: first, trying to approach detailed problems one by one and then go on to another; and second, the efforts of Gen. Marshall as a mediator toward increasing the possibility of cooperation between the two parties.

Gen. Chou said that this raises a new problem. It would be recalled that in the lengthy six-hour discussion,34 Gen. Chou had indicated that during the month of May, his analysis brought up certain suspicions of American policy in China. Communists now feel that the United States rather favored the Kuomintang. This helped to a certain extent to encourage the tendency of the Kuomintang to wage civil war, at least in the Northeast.

It seemed to the Communists that there exist several contradictions in the American policy. Communists saw this on the one hand, but on the other hand, they find that Gen. Marshall is working toward [Page 1010] establishing peace. There seems to be a self-contradiction of what American policy really is. Through his explanation of the situation to Yenan, Yenan leaders came to believe Gen. Marshall’s effort is really working toward peace. There might be drawn this conclusion: America has a two-track policy toward China. This was the conclusion Yenan arrived at. It was also one which he had frankly told to Gen. Marshall at the last meeting.

Gen. Chou also presented certain facts on American policy in the past few months as related by Gen. Marshall. After long discussion and study, Yenan came to the conclusion that Gen. Marshall’s efforts are really working toward establishing peace in China, and that only his effort can help improve the present situation and the present relationship of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, who now distrust each other completely.

Gen. Chou said despite the fact that China’s people aspire for peace, the Chinese people have no power to express themselves because they are suppressed. Gen. Marshall’s effort does reflect the aspiration of the Chinese people. Therefore, after lengthy contemplation, he found it necessary to tell Gen. Marshall very frankly what the Communist view is. It may be that Gen. Marshall would not agree to what he was going to present but at least he would know what the subcommittee of the Chinese Communist Party is thinking. This would help to provide a solid basis for his efforts as a reference.

Gen. Chou said Yenan thought that since the outbreak of the Manchurian conflicts and the hostilities in China proper, Yenan was led to believe that regardless of the concessions Gen. Marshall would make for the sake of peace, the Kuomintang would never feel satisfied. Yenan felt that under the pretext of taking over sovereignty in the Northeast, the Kuomintang would want to control all the large cities and the main communication lines. Then they would drive the Communist forces to a corner in Manchuria. As to China proper, they would, under the name of reopening communications, take control of the eight railroad lines in North China, thereby forcing the Communists to the rural areas. Then the Kuomintang can demonstrate that they have accomplished unification and they would advocate peace. In case the Communist Party would object to such terms, the Kuomintang would claim that the Communist Party is actually demanding civil war. By that time, because of talk about reorganizing Government to include other parties, they can even call a National Assembly. This could be done regardless of whether the Communists would attend it or not. This National Assembly would then adopt a constitution to display to the world that China has become a democracy and thereby obtain assistance abroad. The next effort would be to suppress Communists in the rural areas. This is the picture that [Page 1011] the Kuomintang would like to depict when they are working toward civil war.

Gen. Marshall asked, “Do you mean that is the picture the Kuomintang had in mind?” Gen. Chou replied: Yes.

Gen. Chou said that another possibility is that the Kuomintang would dictate such harsh terms for restoring peace, terms which if accepted by the Communist Party would cause it to be eliminated by peaceful means. For example, in Manchuria if the Kuomintang can control all large cities and key communications lines, then they can wipe out Communists in rural areas as bandits. In China proper, they would employ secret police and railroad troops to hold railroad lines and highways, thus dividing Communist areas into pieces. In this way, the Kuomintang want to carry on and rule all Chinese people.

Gen. Marshall asked, “Do you mean perpetually rule?”

Gen. Chou said, “Yes.” Right now the Kuomintang Government, as well as the National Assembly, are overwhelmingly dominated by Kuomintang members. They can pass any kind of transactions or regulations they desire. Even if the Communist Party should then be permitted to participate in the Government and in the National Assembly, they would have no chance to reach a compromise with the Kuomintang. The reason for this is that the Kuomintang actually reports to the Central Government. They can utilize all kinds of regulations and demand their unqualified enforcement in the different areas. By peaceful means, they can reduce the strength of the Communist Party and eventually wipe it out. This can be demonstrated by the contentions of the Kuomintang in the P. C. C., the steering committee, and the various party committees in the P. C. C., as well as the party committee or the Kuomintang itself. It is also demonstrated by actions of the Kuomintang.

Under such evaluation of the present situation, Yenan feels that the Communist Party is placed in a difficult position. What Communists wish for is peace and democracy. However, the prevailing situation is that the danger of civil war is aggravated every day. This compels us to restraint. It seems that under the present rule of the Kuomintang, it is impossible to obtain a true peace and democracy. The Communist Party feels that the only way out is to resist any attack from the Kuomintang. China’s Communist Party has sustained itself during the past twenty years through armed fighting in China. It has grown up under such a situation so that if the Kuomintang attack us, Communists would again resist. If they make advances, Communists will make advances at some other point. If the Kuomintang would promise to give up ground, then Communists would do the same. If the Kuomintang gave up fighting, Communists [Page 1012] would also give up fighting. Only in this way can we prevent the Kuomintang from obtaining their goal of implementing a civil war policy. They must comprehend the difficulty in obtaining that goal and then direct their efforts toward peace. This is the situation that has been prevailing during the past two months—that is in April and May.

Gen. Chou said that of course he could very clearly see those incidents in Nanking. He had also duly reported to Yenan whatever he saw. It appeared that all the actions of the Kuomintang were in preparation for war. For example, during the 15 days of Cease Fire, the Kuomintang were going to call a military conference, a financial conference and a food conference which are being convened. The propaganda conference was just finished. A communication conference will be called soon. Particularly, the military and food conferences show clearly the Kuomintang intention that as soon as the 15 days had expired, they would be ready for large scale fighting.

That could also be seen in the statement of Gen. Tu Li Ming in the Northeast which was published in the field [the] day after this agreement became effective. In that statement, he repeated one which had also been circulated in Chungking saying that the Communists have made a four-point decision. Gen. Chou said Gen. Tu claimed practically all the large cities in the Northeast, demanding that the Communists withdraw from those cities. He had mentioned the names of many cities in that statement. This showed that they were still intending to put the Communist Party in a corner, or else the Communists would have to accept the harsh terms they proposed. That attitude is an intention for carrying out the war. Therefore, they came to the belief that if past circumstances should be continued, then instead of the situation improving, it would only deteriorate.

When they were discussing this in Yenan, they felt that it was, just as General Marshall had stated, time for commencement of mutual confidence. They would make a start for the settlement of outstanding problems one by one. They would give a new trial to cooperation between the two parties. Such a situation would require a trustworthy individual who could mediate between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang. Yenan felt that Gen. Marshall’s efforts would still be needed in that work. Therefore, Yenan had conceived two means for coping with the situation: First, in order to eventually secure cooperation in certain things between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, it would be desirable to first secure cooperation between the Chinese Communist Party and the United States as a bridge. For example in the railways and the coal mines they would first secure American cooperation in the Communist area so as to determine if Communists were willing to restore communications and to restore [Page 1013] production and to testify as to their ability to run such enterprises. Then as a next step they would connect the railways of the Communist area with the Government areas.

Second, as the present situation could not be altered within one or two months, or even 15 days, and as the army reorganization plan would require 18 months for completion of which 4 months had expired, there were still four months of required work on that problem. Such a long transitional period would require a long stay of Gen. Marshall in China so that the relation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party could be improved and a basis for cooperation established.

If instead of adopting those two measures, they should try to solve all problems by direct contact between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Gen. Chou was afraid that there were no means to restore mutual confidence. If one or two problems were solved, new complications would arise. For example, if they did not get provoked by the action of the opposite party, it would be all right. If the provocation on the one side would continue, restraint on the other party could not last long and some day counter-action would be taken. Therefore, they had to find some intermediary measures to stop the war. He said that was what he wanted to say as an introduction to detailed problems.

Gen. Marshall said that naturally he was very much interested in what Gen. Chou had just stated. As to the actions or statements of certain generals, he thought that was to be expected. He recognized, and he thought Gen. Chou should recognize, that there were some military leaders who look to a settlement only by military means. When they give public expression to that, it was most unfortunate. The same thing applied to certain phases of propaganda. Nobody had clean hands on that. Gen. Marshall had endeavored to quiet the outbreaks and he had acted just as vigorously on the Government side as he had on the Communist Party side—possibly more so. The question of suppression of newspapers had been gone into at great length. He would talk to Gen. Chou about that in detail at some later date.

In relation to Gen. Chou’s comments on the general intentions of the Kuomintang Party, he might say that he talked to, with frequency recently, several of the leaders. Gen. Marshall found them very seriously considering the most practical approach to a final solution politically. The trouble was that while the bitter fighting was going on, they could not put forward with any hope of success, a policy of moderation and adjustment.

Regarding the United States and Gen. Marshall personally, Gen. Chou should understand that there was just as deep a feeling against [Page 1014] Gen. Marshall on the part of a considerable portion of the Kuomintang as there was against him on the part of the Communists, and maybe more bitter. He accepted it as inevitable and was proceeding to do the best he could under the circumstances. It might interest Gen. Chou to know informally that he had never explained those two phases of the situation to the United States Government. He did not want to bother them with such details. Although, they were plagued by questions from the American press in the United States—searching questions. It was entirely a two-sided affair. The hope in his mind was that there were a sufficient number of individuals on each side to take a long view of the situation and to suppress their own personal feelings of resentment.

Gen. Chou said that Gen. Marshall’s comments were very good. Despite the fact that there were misunderstandings by both parties as to the role of Gen. Marshall, he thought that there was an even larger share on the Kuomintang side. It seemed natural to Gen. Chou that some misunderstanding would exist, but he wanted Gen. Marshall to know that the Communist Party had full confidence that Gen. Marshall was really working for restoring peace in China. As to their point that one should have a long range policy, that subject was also under discussion at Yenan. Yenan came to the view that it was not an easy task to realize peace and democracy in China and therefore it needed the greatest tolerance and incessant efforts. It could not be secured by the P. C. C. decisions alone, but would have to be carried out step by step in order that they may eventually achieve peace and democracy. It was with that in mind that he had just referred to the necessity of securing cooperation from American individuals who were for a peace in China. They hoped that Gen. Marshall would stay in China for a long time. They came to that conclusion by taking a long view of the situation.

As to other views, there are sufficient number of individuals there, he agreed on that point. Though there were many individuals in the Government, they may not always be thinking in the same way. Powers varied with the different persons. Some of Government representatives were empowered with authority and some were not. Regardless of who the Government representative was, Communists would try to approach the problems one by one and through Gen. Marshall would try to agree to some measures. A great deal would depend on implementation of those measures. Gen. Chou therefore asked that since he concurs with the idea of attacking the problems one by one, was it Gen. Marshall’s view that they would first deal with the communications problem, then go to detailed arrangements for the cessation of hostilities and follow that by going to the army reorganization.

[Page 1015]

Gen. Marshall said that was his view. He had talked at great length with Gen. Yu Ta Wei regarding communications and Col. Hill had given him several papers. He thought the thing to do was to immediately start conferences on that and see how far they could get towards agreement on matters of particular disagreement, and Gen. Marshall could come into that phase of the discussion. In other words, find out how much it is they agree to and then specify what is disagreed to. Do that directly. Then he said he would do his best on the disagreements. Whether or not it was best for Col. Hill to talk to Gen. Chou first before Gen. Chou saw Gen. Yu Ta Wei he did not know. He asked Gen. Chou what he thought.

Gen. Chou said he thought it would be best if he saw Col. Hill in the afternoon and then he would see Gen. Yu Ta Wei in the evening.

Gen. Marshall said he would notify Col. Hill accordingly. He asked Gen. Chou if he had come to any conclusions regarding the problems for the restoration of communications.

Gen. Chou said that regarding the repair work of the railways, he was debating whether or not they should consult the American technical personnel as an initial step in the Communist areas. As to the operation and administration, he tends to be in favor of regarding all the railroads as concerning both Chinese parties. Those railroads would be put under the Transportation Section of Executive Headquarters so that that section would not only be supervisory but would actually run those railroads from the point of starting the repair work until the traffic was established—during the transitional period.

Gen. Marshall thought that so far as Executive Headquarters was concerned, those functions of control should be restricted to controls to whatever extent was necessary in order to reassure the Communists. For example, that the restored railway would not be utilized to the disadvantage of the Communists. That was an example of the type of control he thought Executive Headquarters should have. The actual performance of the work—the direction of its personnel problems and all—he thought would be entirely too heavy a burden on Executive Headquarters but that it could effectively exercise a protective role through supervision.

Gen. Marshall said the problem of highways, it seemed to him, was important for early solution. He examined that quite carefully the past four days. He found several conflicting situations. He thought that in some places, certain Government generals would be opposed to an immediate opening up of highways; meaning all types of roads—trails, cart tracks, broad highways—because they feared the Communist method of infiltration of small groups to bring up a force in one particular area by the process of a few individuals at a time. On the other hand, he thought in some cases you would encounter Communist [Page 1016] resistance because by closing the highways they prevented the movement of, say, rice to other districts, or to the relief of cities. It appeared to Gen. Marshall very important to open up highways at as early a date as possible. He could not find just what objection there was to reopening of the postal service and the censorship. He might be wrong, but he thought the difficulties in these matters had been more of misunderstanding than they had been of a deliberate policy. His impression was that there should be no great difficulties in rather quickly reaching an agreement on contentious points. Gen. Marshall said he would endeavor to get in touch with Col. Hill that morning and have him communicate to Mr. Chang regarding an appointment for the afternoon.

Now as to the other phases of the agreement to be reached—a and c. He did not think that the agreement for the immediate cessation of hostilities should be so very difficult to arrive at, but only if the real difficulties are in effect transferred to a special portion of the detailed agreement under paragraph c, which related to the reorganization and redistribution of the military forces. What he had in mind for the most expeditious procedure for conferences during the 15-day period was as follows: That they make detailed terms for immediate cessation of hostilities in Manchuria as simple as possible, leaving the execution largely to the Executive Headquarters established in Changchun. He said he sent word to Gen. Byroade two days ago that he would like him to do the following if he could secure local agreements for the procedure. First, to survey the situation so that he might know himself what the difficulties would probably be, where the critical spots would be, and then to establish immediately but not operate detached posts at various focal points.

Gen. Marshall mentioned in his message to Gen. Byroade, “for example, Harbin, Kirin, Anshan, Yingkow, etc., etc.,” there to establish a team at each of those places. If there was objection to a National officer going to Harbin or to a Communist officer going to Kirin, at the present time, then to secure permission to establish an American in each of those places, have his communications all set up, and his local contacts all made in advance. Then the teams could be deployed from those points into action quickly to carry out details of a general agreement. In that way, Gen. Marshall thought there would be a set-up well prepared for action, in complete contrast to the situation on January 11th in Peiping, when they started to establish a headquarters with no communications, radio or road or airplane, no teams and trouble everywhere.

Gen. Marshall said that for the new situation, he wanted to see the complete network established which would permit a very quick adjustment of the troop situation without delays of waiting to go here or [Page 1017] waiting to go there. They would already be on the ground in the immediate vicinity of those places and their transportation already in there. Such a network would permit a rather simple basis of agreement. If the agreement could be written in such a form that both sides would be agreeable to the decisions determined locally.

An instance parallel to that is a general detailed agreement regarding the readjustments of armed forces in Manchuria during the next six months. That should be a special annex to the general agreement of February 25th for the Reorganization of the Armed Forces. That detailed agreement, as General Marshall visualized it, should cover monthly periods for the first three months. Thereafter quarterly periods of three months each. Gen. Marshall regarded it as very important during the first three months to have it for periods of one month to avoid situations that might lead to further fighting. That part of the agreements to be reached, Gen. Marshall thought, was the most difficult of all, far more difficult than that pertaining to communications and very much more difficult than that pertaining to the bare cessation of hostilities. Yet, to Gen. Marshall’s mind, it is a most essential part of the whole consideration. In the reconsideration of the total strength in Manchuria, Gen. Marshall saw no great difficulties. They could reach agreements on that, but the periods month by month for the first three months was most delicate.

Gen. Marshall’s thought that they should proceed immediately with the communications problem, try to conclude a general agreement on that as quickly as possible, and try to clear certain of its phases without further delay. Gen. Marshall regarded that as important in the way of restoring confidence. The Communists must concede some things and the Government must concede certain things quickly in order to develop confidence toward the more difficult matters to be settled later. He had already talked about that and he would not repeat himself.

As to the cessation of hostilities, Gen. Marshall did not think it should be very difficult if machinery were already established for carrying it out. As they proceed from one thing to another, they should also talk about final reorganization and redistribution matters and try to reach as many agreements as possible. When they reach a dispute, they should turn to something that they could work on such as the cessation of hostilities draft. That would be following the procedure they had in Chungking.

At that point, Gen. Marshall handed Gen. Chou a copy of the message sent to Gen. Byroade.35

Gen. Chou said that the procedure outlined by Gen. Marshall was [Page 1018] agreeable to him. Regarding the restoration of communications, Gen. Chou would contact Col. Hill that afternoon. Gen. Chou wanted to call Gen. Marshall’s attention to administration which Gen. Chou was rather afraid he would not be able to reach agreement on with the Ministry of Communications directly. Therefore, he came to the conclusion of putting it under the Executive Headquarters.

With regard to cessation of hostilities, Gen. Chou concurred with the message Gen. Marshall sent Gen. Byroade. He would convey the same idea to the Communist representative in Manchuria. Gen. Chou suggested letting the people now in Manchuria collect reports from both parties as to where forces are or were on June 7th. The Nationalists would report on where their troops were and the Communists would report on places they garrisoned. Of course, there would be some conflicts between reports of the two parties, but reports would at least give some basis for later investigation in case of dispute.

Regarding the army reorganization problem, Gen. Chou agreed that they should talk about the matters one by one. As to the strength of Communist forces in Manchuria, Gen. Chou had gotten some data on his recent trip to Yenan but it was prepared on April 16. Since that date, more fighting had taken place so that the data again was out of date. It was hard for Communists to conduct investigations about the real strengths because of poor communications. That would necessitate somebody being sent up to study on the spot the Communist forces. Therefore, while Gen. Chou was working on the procedure arrangement of the army reorganization, he would have need to send somebody to the Communist areas in Manchuria to collect data. In case the field team went to Harbin, of course the data can be secured by the Communist member there.

Gen. Marshall queried Gen. Chou as to whether or not he had any objection to putting a field team into Harbin. Gen. Chou said in principle he had always favored the dispatch of field teams to Harbin as soon as fighting had stopped. He would again report the idea to Yenan and at the same time he would inquire about the condition of the air field. He did not think there was any way to go to Harbin except by air.

Gen. Marshall said he had another question regarding Gen. Byroade’s set-up in Changchun. In order to get the Generalissimo’s agreement to the immediate dispatch of the Advance Section to Changchun, he stipulated that if [it] not begin to function until they had determined the terms for the cessation of hostilities. Gen. Marshall accepted that rather than have any delays. He now found himself in this embarrassment. There are four teams in Manchuria who were supposed to operate under the terms of the agreement of March 27th which stipulated the mission would pertain solely to the readjustment [Page 1019] of military matters and that the teams would proceed to points of conflict or close contact between the Government and the Communist troops to bring about cessation of fighting and to make necessary and fair readjustments. Those two provisions are sufficient for the time being for the operation of the teams in Manchuria. The trouble was that under the present agreement of the Generalissimo, Gen. Byroade’s headquarters could not function so teams were being directed from clear back in Peiping.

He received a message this morning from Gen, Byroade which was dispatched to Team 27 in Mukden, to the Commissioners in Peiping and also to him.36

“Gen. Liao,37 6th Army, called tonight (the 9th) to report for a second time that large scale attacks are being launched by the Communist troops in the Lafa area 40 miles east of Kirin. Reports attack was launched at 15 hours on the 7th by one regiment, but is now grown to two infantry regiments and one artillery regiment. This location (Lafa) has already been recommended to the three commissioners as the initial station of a team now being sent to Manchuria. In view of the foregoing report, I am sending Col. Tabscott38 as an American observer immediately to that area (Lafa). It is planned to replace him as quickly as one of the other teams arrives. I request this situation be made the subject of a special meeting by Team 27 in Mukden and that Gen. Liao39 be requested to have this action investigated immediately.”

Gen. Marshall said he would like to get from the Generalissimo that afternoon his agreement to Gen. Byroade’s handling these teams under the terms of the March 27 agreement rather than have them handled from Peiping. He asked if that was agreeable to Gen. Chou? Gen. Marshall said that previously they were defeated by the political factors, but that at the present time the teams could really operate effectively under the March 27 agreement.

Gen. Chou said that he thought that as soon as the Generalissimo would agree to Gen. Marshall’s proposal, the teams could immediately go ahead to implement the March 27th directive. Regarding the Lafa incident, Gen. Chou had wired Yenan immediately. While in Yenan he had received the memorandum40 Gen. Marshall sent him. On the other hand, Gen. Chou was not sure who had occupied Lafa—whether the Government troops took it from the Communists or whether the Government troops had ever occupied Lafa. It might [Page 1020] be that the Government occupied Lafa after noon on June 7th which caused the Communists to counter-attack or, possibly, the place had never been abandoned by the Communists. However, the best way to settle such a situation was to get a field team dispatched there.

Gen. Marshall said he would contact Col. Hill to have him see Gen. Chou.

  1. Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
  2. June 3, p. 950.
  3. See telegram No. 843, June 7, p. 992.
  4. Not printed.
  5. Lt. Gen. Liao Yao-hsiang, Commander of the Chinese Government’s New 6th Army.
  6. Reference is to Col. Raymond R. Tourtillott, who was senior American officer at Changchun, after Brigadier General Byroade.
  7. Gen. Yao Shu-shih was the senior officer of the Chinese Communist branch of the Advance Section of Executive Headquarters at Changchun.
  8. OSE 139, June 9, p. 1006.