Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at House 28, Chungking, April 23, 1946, 10 a.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Caughey |
| Captain Soong | |
| Mr. Chang |
General Marshall opened the meeting by informing General Chou that he had had an opportunity to familiarize himself with General Chou’s four-point statement to the Government22 concerning political reform and that he also had now in his possession the Government’s [Page 791] reply23 to those four points. General Marshall stated that he had not had an opportunity to study the Government’s reply but would talk over the matter with General Chou En-lai at a later date.
General Marshall continued by informing General Chou that he now had exact data, from the U. S. side, of National forces movements into Manchuria. The 13th, 52nd, New First, New Sixth and 71st or a total of 145,000 troops have been transported. The Northeast Garrison Headquarters consisting of 6,500 troops and 12,000 service troops were also moved for establishment of a major supply base at Chinwangtao and/or Hulutao. The 60th Army (32,000 troops), the 93rd Army (30,000 troops), the First Army Group Headquarters (2,600 troops) remain to be moved under present commitments. If completed, this would make a total of 228,000 troops moved with U. S. resources by 1 June. General Marshall continued by stating information he had received indicated that elements of the 92nd and 94th Armies had been used in Manchuria but that at the present time the only element of these two armies in Manchuria is the Fifth Division and it is now being moved back into North China.
General Marshall informed General Chou that he had a discussion with the Generalissimo the previous evening with reference to his proposal for a peaceful solution in Manchuria. General Marshall stated that his major difficulty was eliminating the distrust between the Kuomintang high officials regarding Communist motives and vice versa. General Marshall informed General Chou that the National Government was fearful that a redisposition, redeployment and readjustment of Communist forces in Manchuria probably would further complicate the Manchurian situation as related to the coalition government. General Marshall stated, however, that he wished only to discuss the military phases of the problem which was much more in his line.
General Marshall stated that before he proceeded further he would appreciate receiving from General Chou the general nature of Communist proposals with respect to the military situation in Manchuria.
General Chou admitted that Communists’ accounts of National Army movements were not very accurate and that General Marshall’s information was much more reliable. He added that puppet troops, not recognized by the Government as its troops, may account for a substantial difference.
General Chou continued by stating that the situation in Manchuria is very complicated; that at the outset of negotiations he had not anticipated anything like the situation that exists today. General Chou explained himself by stating that prior to the 27 March agreement, Manchuria was occupied by Russians, National Government and [Page 792] Communists but that now, with the Russian withdrawal, it has become a race between the National and Communist troops to occupy the vacuum. Occupation of strategic areas makes it more difficult to discuss redispositions. General Chou reminded General Marshall that in November of last year the Communists had urged the National Government to move into Manchuria but instead they attacked Communist forces in Jehol; that after the 10 January agreement National forces were again asked not to attack Communists but to march to Mukden to negotiate with the Russians; that as late as 15 March the Communists urged the Government to take over Mukden and the Changchun railroad. General Chou added that the Communist Party had no intention of monopolizing Manchuria but instead wanted international cooperation. General Chou stated that due to difficulties with respect to the current situation his ability to negotiate was growing less and less. General Chou stated that the National Government is now insisting on taking Changchun by force and then negotiating whereas it is the Communists’ view that fighting should cease immediately to be followed with negotiations. In elaboration of his lessening ability to negotiate General Chou pointed out that his Manchurian leaders were now concerned as to how they will fit into the reorganization plan; that Yenan is now of the opinion that a ratio of 1 to 14 divisions in Manchuria is no longer appropriate.
General Marshall stated that he had just completed a draft for the immediate cessation of hostilities.24 (Handing a copy to Chou) General Marshall asked General Chou’s reaction and informed General Chou that he proposed to give a copy to General Hsu Yung-chang who is the new National member on the Committee of Three. General Chou indicated that he was not ready for comment and stated he would have to refer the matter to Yenan. He further stated that although the principle was very good and he wished to cooperate he would have to reserve comment due to the fact that Yenan wished to restudy the ratio of troops in Manchuria and was adamant with respect to further movement of any National forces into Manchuria.