Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270: Telegram
Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall
142. Reference your 121. Our initial difficulty in Chihfeng was due to unwillingness of Communist representative to assume any authority. Apparently he had been given but little. Our next difficulty was attitude of commander of so-called pacification troops wha took position that Executive Headquarters had no authority to give him orders, and that he recognized only those orders which came from Governor of Jehol. Our information now indicates that both difficulties have been overcome. Following personal report from Colonel Tourtillott was received this morning over our own radio station:
“Situation now satisfactory. No immediate danger of conflict now seen. Pacification troops have now withdrawn from outlying small cities around Chihfeng occupied after midnight January 13 as directed. National troops now 20 miles southeast of city and 8th route army troops 10 miles southwest of city. Situation at the moment is most favorable.”
In answer to specific questions Tourtillott replied in further message this morning
“Russians left city of Chihfeng on January 23. Pacification troops first entered city on August 17 and thru several reorganizations have remained since that date. Subsequent to midnight January 13 pacification troops occupied five small cities outside of Chihfeng. Team directed withdrawal from these positions on January 23 and withdrawal was completed on January 26. These troops until January 28 were under control of Governor of Jehol. On January 28 control passed to Communist General Shao Ke commander of Forces in Hopeh-Jehol-Liaoning Military region.”
In view of this information it is the unanimous opinion of us here that it would probably be a mistake to send Byroade or another team to Chihfeng at this juncture. Of course we do not know what position the Generalissimo is taking in his conversations with you and there may be other elements in the situation of which we are not aware. We therefore await further advice as to whether or not you still think it advisable to send Byroade for personal investigation and report. From standpoint of present Executive Headquarters directive it appears to us that military problems in Chihfeng area are well under control. We realize, however, a problem may still exist in Chungking as Governor Chang Chun indicated in opening remarks of meeting number 5, Committee of Three, that question Jehol and Chahar occupation might again come up for future discussion. Our position as outlined in 9516 will be maintained unless present directive is modified.
Due to unwillingness of Chinese representatives to make statements which might indicate truce violations on their sides personal reports from American team members are almost essential to realistic appraisal of situations. It was for this reason that I supplemented commissioners’ report Dove 95 with personal report to you (9617), summarizing information contained in the personal reports of Colonel Tourtillott to Executive Headquarters, which, according to your 11518 signed by Caughey, seemed to you “somewhat hysterical”. Due the fact that I was engaged in long sessions with commissioners upon receipt of your 115, it was answered by operations (10919) without reference to me. Reply was inadequate in that it did not give full story concerning plane carrying radio supplies which had to return without making delivery. While team was not advised by radio that plane was enroute (our own radio set at Chihfeng was not yet on air and communications over Nationalist radio were too slow) and no [Page 391] official interpreter was aboard two accompanying Chinese newspaper men who spoke English made clear the purpose of mission. As later reported difficulty was with so-called pacification troops who did not recognize authority of Executive Headquarters and would not allow passengers to leave plane. The next day two more planes were dispatched, one picking up Communist commander of pacification troops in Jehol at Chengte who arranged delivery of supplies without difficulty.
New subject. In accordance with your instructions, all informational reporting to State Department from Executive Headquarters is discontinued. Following telegrams to department, repeated to Embassy, have been sent to date: No. 1 January 17, Summary of Headquarters and team activities; No. 2 January 18,20 concerning translation of General Yeh’s speech; No. 3 January 25, sent in two par[t]s, a. Summary of activities, b. Summary of Communist and Nationalist attitudes shown in meetings.21 The following dispatches, with copies to Embassy, have also been sent: No. 1 January 18,20 Subject: Executive Headquarters established at Peiping in connection with cease fire order issued at Chungking, with enclosures: No. 2 January 24,22 Subject: Remarks critical of the U. S. incorrectly attributed by the “Shihchiehjih Pao” to General Yeh Chien-Ying, Communist commissioner, enclosing separate memo on this subject.
All of this material was prepared by Sprouse and approved by me as routine informational reporting to the Department. I now understand your position but the Department will no doubt make inquiry as to why such reporting has ceased, in which event inquiry will be referred to you for reply. In this connection, Byroade is sending copies of daily Trusums to C. G. China Theater and also to W. D. Washington. Do you also wish latter discontinued for same reason?
- Telegram of January 26, p. 381.↩
- Telegram of January 26, p. 382.↩
- Telegram of January 27, p. 383.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Mr. Robertson also sent telegram No. 4, January 25, describing the principles and procedures established by Executive Headquarters for the implementation of the cease-fire order, p. 378.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not found in Department files.↩