Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting of Military Sub-Committee, February 27, 1946, 10 a.m.

February 27, 1946, 10 a.m.

Present:	General Chang
	General Chou
	Gen. Marshall
Also present:	General Lee
	General Kuo
	General Lien
	Colonel Pee
	General Tung
	Mr. Chang
	General Gillem
	General Caraway
	Colonel Caughey
	Capt. Eng

General Marshall: We would like to hear General Kuo’s suggestion regarding this paragraph 9.³² In paragraph 7 of the English revision, the second line, the word “first” should be “last”. Have you any comments?

General Chang: General Kuo is representing the Ministry of War in making a tentative section 10. Executive Headquarters will prepare the detailed and logistic plan for the submission to the government.

a. Statistical study of the demobilized personnel classifying them into retired, individual employment and collective employment classes.

(When retired they go back to the land; individual employment is in the Government or in the police or other vocation; and collective employment is the building of dikes, railroad construction, etc.)

b. The supply and care of demobilized personnel together with the collection of their equipment.

c. The handling of demobilized personnel including the issue of traveling allowance and other procedures.

d. The organization and the processing of those demobilized personnel which will be classified into individual employment and collective employment. To organize them in the process. The concentration, organization and processing of those demobilized personnel into the individual employment and collective employment categories.

e. The training and employment of the personnel under the individual employment category. The transportation and redeployment of the collective employment personnel.

f. Attend to the supply and other administrative details that are necessary in the accomplishment of its mission.

General Marshall: Are any of those stipulations that might not be appropriate for Executive Headquarters to be concerned with?

General Chang: General Chang and General Kuo understand that Executive Headquarters will prepare a detailed plan covering those points. They will not actually be responsible for execution. General Kuo suggests that we have an organization for handling the demobilized personnel. The responsible officer may be included in the combined staff to study the detailed plan so that he can coordinate the plan worked out by the Executive Headquarters to that worked out by the Ministry of War.

General Marshall: In paragraph e of the original paper it states “procedures for turn over of demobilized personnel to the Demobilized Manpower Commission”. Now it seemed to me that some of the matters that General Kuo had in his list pertained to things that Executive Headquarters should not do or should not plan for. It seemed to me there were matters included there that pertain to a higher level of governmental planning. I think we have to keep Executive Headquarters very clear of things that pertain directly to the Ministry of National Defense or other governmental agencies. With us it would not be the Ministry of National Defense that would attend to those matters that we visualize under Demobilized Manpower Commission. That would be another agency of the government because it is not war making. We should be very careful to give Executive Headquarters only the things that are necessary to carry out this general program of demobilization, reorganization and integration, but at the same time we ought to be very careful not to give them authority that does not pertain to their direct business. I would like to have General Caraway have an opportunity to study General Kuo’s suggestion and in the meantime I would suggest that we take what was paragraph 10 and which is now paragraph 9 and terminate it with a period after the word “demobilized” in the first sentence. Then we can get into the details. You strike out the words “to cover” at the end of the first sentence and all that comes after that. Then that leaves these details to be worked out. I presume General Kuo will have to deal with the details as will General Caraway. Is such a procedure acceptable to General Chou?

General Chou: Yes.

General Marshall: Have you any comments to make about this matter we are striking out, General Chou? I asked you yesterday for some.

General Chou: General Chou has first intended to say a few remarks on the Demobilized Manpower Commission, but since this is to go out now he has no comments.

General Marshall: We would be very glad to have his comments when we take that single paper. Is this directive as now modified acceptable?

General Chang and General Chou agreed.³³

General Marshall: I would like, if agreeable to you gentlemen, to discuss next a proposed letter to the President of China regarding the organization of the service areas.³⁴ Is that agreeable? Are you agreeable to sending a letter on this subject to the President? I am not discussing about the contents, just the letter.

General Chang: After the signing of the basic plan, General Chang submitted it with a report from himself to the Generalissimo requesting the Generalissimo to issue instructions to the different responsible agencies—Ministries to carry the terms out.

General Marshall: That is agreeable to General Chou?

General Chou: Yes.

General Marshall: Any suggestions regarding the first paragraph?

General Chang: There is a change of Chinese translation. (After a brief discussion in Chinese General Chang agreed with paragraph 1). Does this service areas “will be organized” mean that 8 service areas [are?] to be organized and set up simultaneously?

General Marshall: Paragraph 3 states that. The service areas will be prepared to function on duties specified by Executive Headquarters. They have to start to do it now. We are making a distinction between the procedure of setting them up and the time they start to operate. The longer they are in a position of being set up and not having to operate, the more efficient they will be when they start.

General Chou: General Chou suggested to change the first sentence. “The preparation for organization of the service areas shall be started immediately”, because as it is with Chinese translation [it] will imply that all those service areas will be organized and will be in the field.”

General Chang: General Kuo just pointed out that we have in existence 10 service areas, so it implies only a process of reorganization.

General Marshall: The first sentence will then read, “The preparation for the organization of the service areas will be started immediately.” I want to strike out four words in the second sentence so that it will read “they will have functions” and the words “be established and will”—the next is unnecessary. Is that all right now as modified? “The preparation for the organization of the service areas will be started immediately under the Ministry of National Defense (or National Military Council). They will have functions as specified in Basis for etc.” Is that acceptable?

General Chang and General Chou agreed.

General Marshall: Paragraph 2—is that all right?

General Chang and General Chou agreed.

General Marshall: This paper then is adopted. I suggest that we next consider the proposal to the President regarding the Peace Preservation Corps.³⁵ Paragraph 1. I suppose you want to strike out the words, “the basic agreement.”

General Chang: General Chang and General Chou both share the feeling that they have to collect some data first before considering that paper so they both like to ask you to postpone on this paper.

General Marshall: I would like to make this one comment, for your later consideration of the paper. It has been suggested to me that the limitation in strength be set to a basis of one battalion for each two million people which might not be satisfactory for some extensive areas with small population. It would be my suggestion to meet that if there is such a necessity by adding a sentence to paragraph 2 stating in effect that “exceptions to this provision would be made on the specific direction of whatever agency you think is proper”. This is the general rule then. The exception would have to be specifically authorized. Then my understanding is that we put this aside for later consideration.

Would you care to discuss the proposed memorandum to the President regarding Demobilized Manpower?³⁶

General Chang: Both General Chang and General Chou agree that they would like to study the Demobilized Manpower further. They will collect some data. The government side—the Ministry of War—has worked a long time on that and we re-request that we discuss the paper when we return from the inspection trip.

General Marshall: Then if it is agreeable we will set that paper aside for later discussion. Now at this time I would like to outline what appears to me to be the best procedure in going ahead with the measures we have now approved. There is a slight difference of opinion as to what is the best way to manage this and I am stating my views and I would like to have very frank statements from you gentlemen and also from General Gillem who will be concerned with it and General Caraway who has been working on the details without any hesitation with disagreeing with me.

I think that at the present time, the Government should designate some officer, I should imagine, General Kuo, and General Chou designate some officer or more than one if they are available to start work with this small group of American officers that have been struggling with this problem. They have not the data at this time for specific schedules, but they can begin to draft regulations. I think it is very important that the regulations and general instructions be very carefully considered here where their proper integration with the method and procedures of the Chinese military headquarters, the National Military Council and the administrative headquarters of the Communist party in military matters, so that the language is understandable both in Chinese and English as to its exact meaning and so that the matters directed are in keeping with the existing methods of the Chinese in so far as possible. These conclusions will be the actual operating basis for a tremendous conversion in the Chinese Army. I am concerned to see that as far as it is possible to carry into effect some of the American ideas we have put forward that it should be done in accordance with the Chinese methods and procedure. All of our American officers have been very carefully and extensively educated—all of them in a system of operating procedure and in a system of military education and instruction. Their methods and general procedure are so well established that they are almost habits of life. I wish to be certain that in the generous manner with which you meet our various proposals we do not become involved in directives or procedures that would be very awkward according to the Chinese habits and systems. The entire procedure and task before us is a monumental one. You are accepting the proposition of westernizing your armies according to our democratic system and at the same time undertaking a vast demobilization, so I think it is very important to give the most careful consideration to an effort to solve this problem with as little variance to Chinese methods and traditions as possible. Now for these reasons I would like to see this group gradually integrated here with the American officers and the representatives of the National Government and of the Communist Party and the problem very carefully considered on a combined basis before transfer to Peking. I think the time for such transfer should be in a very few days after the receipt of the first schedules. I think the representative of the Government with this group and the representative of the Communist Party with this group should endeavor to obtain advance information regarding the units that are to be demobilized in the first month. We have a time limit on the data for the first two months or [of?] three weeks but any advance information that would help us with the first month would greatly expedite the entire procedure. It should be very easy to establish a liaison basis with the Executive Headquarters during this interim period whereby we could call on them for field information when it is desired. General Chang, I would be interested to have your comments.

General Chang: General Chang thinks those remarks made by General Marshall are very sound and we should carry it out according to the spirit he has just described. It is very clearly stipulated in Article 4 in the basic plan³⁷ that within a certain period of time special lists or reports should be sent to the Military Sub-Committee so that now it is a question that both sides have to carry the terms out without any reservation and within the time stipulated. It is further stipulated that within the stipulated period, that is 3 weeks and 6 weeks, we have to submit to the Military Sub-Committee data (lists and reports) and then the Military Sub-Committee on receipt of that data has to work out a detailed plan and after approval by both sides then it should be submitted to the National Military Council (or Ministry of National Defense) for execution. So now it boils down that what we should do is to stick to the provisions in that article and carry that out without reservation. General Chang thinks it would be a very good idea to have some sort of detailed plan by the combined staff. He feels that there are bound to be some difficulties that will certainly arise, but if every party concerned will stick to the spirit in reaching that basic plan, he doesn’t think there is much difficulty in complete accordance and working out some plan. General Marshall just explained that all the American staff officers have undergone strict training and careful study in the process of handling things and General Chang quite appreciates that fact, but he says that in the future relations among the family of nations, it will be more closely a matter of military cooperation between many countries and we should admit that Chinese staff officers may not have reached such a high standard as American officers. General Marshall is very considerate to state that American staff officers should take notice of existing practice of handling things by the Chinese staff officers, but in the other respect the Chinese staff officers, being not so well trained, have much to learn from American staff officers. We should not stick to our standards without making any progress. General Chang reiterates that General Marshall is so kind to state that the American staff officers should respect or take notice of the existing Chinese practice. Referring to that, General Chang wishes to express his thanks on behalf of the Chinese Army to the American staff officers for they are working hard for us—not for themselves, but for us. General Chang appreciates their hard work very much and General Chang further states that all the staff officers of the Ministry of War or the Department of Military Operations will have the greatest extent of cooperation to arranging things with the Communist officers and at the same time they will also show greatest respect for the opinions and views of the American staff officers that a very amicable result will be reached. Now the Government officers, and General Chang thinks also the Communist officers, will make a careful study based on the data and make a study for the preparation of a detailed plan. General Chang likes to assure you that we will never cherish prejudice in this direction and we will work for the Chinese Army. We hope that the plan worked out will be in complete accordance and we will not be prejudiced and we will make things easy.

General Marshall: I appreciate very much what General Chang said. I am going to impose on him to give him my own education of this sort of business. In the First World War, I was Chief of Operations in an Army of about a million men. They were fighting in the Meuse Argonne battle. Tremendous artillery requirements were part of such a battle. We were almost completely blocked by a destroyed zone 6 kilometers wide and 40 kilometers long. I don’t think there was a space the size of this table that hadn’t been struck by a very heavy shell. Roads had vanished and villages were completely levelled and could hardly be located, so the most urgent requirement of the battle was a railway line across the 6 kilometers. I had one of our greatest railway engineers carrying out the construction. The French objected very strenuously to what he was doing. He thought they were insisting on a type construction that would give them a good railway after the war. There was a complete failure to understand each other. It resulted in the delay of the battle by five days. The Frenchman was never able to make him understand what the real trouble was that he foresaw. Just as I am afraid that some of your officers in their politeness may fail to make clear as to what the trouble is. We opened up the railroad and started forward with the ammunition and every train went off the tracks. The French coupling is about that long (holding his hand up to denote the length) and is held about 2½ feet and an American train could have gone right over that track. So the rough places in the track threw the cars right off the track. So we had to reconstruct the entire line. It took five days. Our advance was completely stopped as we had limited ammunition for the guns. The American was outraged that the Frenchman hadn’t told him what the trouble really was. The Frenchman said he thought anybody would understand that, but they stopped the battle for five days. I am not trying to encourage argument here, but I do think you have to be very careful that you see that you have made clear the picture on what the situation and methods are and the American officer will have to be very careful to make clear what he is trying to get at, what is the purpose for this particular thing. I do not want Chinese methods unnecessarily disrupted. On the other hand I think some of the systems should be probably completely changed. General Chou?

General Chou: I agree with General Marshall’s comment that in many things we want to have smooth cooperation, but we must first make everything clear so that the work can go on smoothly. On our side Ave have many weaknesses and therefore we must make it very plain that in order to change the Chinese military system and to adopt the westernized democratic system this change is tremendous for the Chinese Army and I share General Chang’s view that the Chinese officers have much to learn and I also feel confident that they will get to learn all this, but while we make a study of this, there will be many matters which will not be understandable to them and that must be very clearly explained. Now China is economically backward country and accordingly their habit of living is also low and the efficiency is also low and many things they do are not accurate and all this should be overcome. As to the Chinese Communists they have been staying a long time in the rural areas and therefore it can be expected that they will do things rather slowly and sometimes it is also difficult to collect all the data and their accuracy is rather low. Therefore, we must make all efforts to overcome this. I hope the American friends will understand this point and will help them to overcome it. We will try to select those best officers who are eager to learn and have determination to overcome the difficulties and are hard working fellows. They will then cooperate with the government and the U. S. officers and I am confident that they will have the spirit of study and at the same time our people will be frank and so as to promote mutual understanding and have all the problems settled. They will not be purely polite. During the time when we will be on the inspection trip General Tung will be here and tomorrow as soon as I arrive at Peiping, I will send the Vice Chief of Staff of the 18th Group Army from Peiping to Chungking so that they will stay here to work with the Government officers as well as with General Gillem and General Caraway so that the work will not be stopped during this week so that they can go on to the details.

General Marshall: Have you any comments, General Gillem?

General Gillem: I am very grateful to General Marshall for letting me attend these meetings. My being present at the time the policies are formulated gives me a better impression of my mission later. I give assurance that I will give every consideration in those problems which concern our mutual interest and I hope that when you know me better you will understand that we can approach the problems without regard to each other’s personal feelings. I have seen the problems with regard to demobilization of the American Army and therefore have some idea of what we could do in our country—in America. We have some procedures that might be useful here, but every endeavor will be made to adjust to meet the conditions which exist in China.

General Marshall: It might be well for me to state that General Gillem at one time was the commander of all armored forces in the United States and the head of the mechanical and armored schools. Later he commanded an army corps of 150,000 to 200,000 men that cross[ed] the Rhine and advanced to the Elbe River to the Northwest of Berlin. He met the Russians there and extended his left to the Baltic Sea cutting off the Germans from retiring into Denmark. So he has a very good understanding the school system and the working out of the system on the ground in combat. General Caraway, have you any comments?

General Caraway: No comments, sir.

[Here follows discussion regarding trip to North China by the Committee of Three.]

General Chou: Now when we go out on this trip we may expect correspondents and other people to ask us about the status of the Manchurian situation.³⁸ With respect to this and since this basis actually covers Manchuria, I suggest that we give them a uniform answer saying that Manchuria is included in this basis, but as to the settlement of the detailed problems pertaining to the reorganization and demobilization and to the cease fire problem, we will take it up as soon as we get back to Chungking.

General Chang: Regarding that point, General Chang has no comments to make. He would like to listen to General Marshall’s opinion.

General Marshall: I agree with General Chou’s idea, but I would prefer that any question regarding the application of the cease fire order in Manchuria, we merely state that we are considering the matter rather than that we are delaying decision until we return to Chungking. I think General Chou’s statement is accurate because we must consider it then, but I do not see any advantage in informing the people the specific moment when we are going to do it.

General Chou: Would you say that this is applicable to Manchuria but as to the detailed settlement, we are just considering it.

General Marshall: Here is the way I think we should say it. This basic agreement applies to the Northeast province[s]. Now as to answering any questions regarding the cease fire order as relates to the Northeast province[s] we merely state that we are considering that matter. The question as to when we are going to do certain things in the Northeast province[s] should be answered as exactly as I think it should regarding any other portion of China. That is a detail. The basic agreement is the general terms. The problem is a tremendous one and it will take a great amount of staff work to develop the detailed procedure.

General Chou: General Chou has been inquiring about his proposal with regard to the publication about the cessation of publicity fighting.

General Marshall: You mean the battle in the press.

General Chou: Last time General Chou has made a proposal and another problem has to be looked forward to.

General Marshall: I thought that was an agreement that had been completed and he was showing me.

General Chang: General Chang says the reply is ready and will be forwarded and in principle it agrees with General Chou’s proposal.

General Marshall: I have nothing to say except that I hope you agree and that you don’t come out the same hole you went in. It seems to me that there has been some improvement except in isolated spots. I am hopeful that the American correspondents that slipped into Manchuria will be able to slide down a railway where the National Army is. I don’t know where they are going. They are footloose. I think they have gone to Changchun. I notice they are coming out in releases to the United States with very full details on the situation. Are there any other details?

General Chang and General Chou: No.

General Marshall: Then if agreeable to you gentlemen we will adjourn until we meet at the plane.

32. Of the draft of directive to Executive Headquarters for the implementation of the agreement of February 25 on military reorganization, not printed.
33. For text of directive to Executive Headquarters, signed March 17 but dated March 16, see United States Relations With China, p. 626.
34. Draft paper entitled “Organization of Service Areas” of February 27, not printed.
35. Draft paper entitled “The Peace Preservation Corps” of February 27, not printed.
36. Draft paper entitled “Formation of Demobilized Manpower Commission” of February 27, not printed.
37. Agreement of February 25, p. 295.
38. For correspondence regarding Manchuria, see pp. 712 ff.