Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall, General Chang Chih-chung, and General Chow En-lai, at the Office of the Aide to Generalissimo Chiang, Chungking, February 26, 1946, 4 p.m.
| Also present: | General Kuo |
| General Lien | |
| General Lee | |
| Colonel Pee | |
| General Tung | |
| Mr. Chang | |
| General Gillem29 | |
| General Caraway | |
| Colonel Caughey | |
| Captain Eng |
[Here follows discussion of plans for trip to North China by the Committee of Three.]
[General Marshall:] Do you care to discuss these papers. First one is the directive to the Executive Headquarters.30
General Chang: General Chang remarks that they haven’t been completely translated. Will we discuss item by item?
General Marshall: I thought there might be some general remarks that you might like to make then we can go down item by item.
General Chang: No comments.
General Chou: No comments.
General Marshall: Is it agreeable if we start in paragraph by paragraph?
General Chang and General Chou agreed.
General Marshall: Paragraph 1.
General Chang: We have a little doubt on the interpretation of the word “redeployment” into Chinese.
General Marshall: How about “distribution”?
General Chang and General Chou agreed on “redeployment”.
[Page 303]General Marshall: That is all right then. That paragraph is all right.
General Chang and General Chou agreed.
General Marshall: Second paragraph.
General Chou: General Chou is inquiring about the Control Group. On what level would it be. Would it be on the level of the Operations Division of the Executive Headquarters or on the level of the Combined Staff?
General Marshall: It will be under the Operations Section. What would you say[,] General Gillem?
General Gillem: I would say this would be under the Operations Section.
General Marshall: Of course, we have to keep in mind that that entire staff is charged with this responsibility and we are adding to it. This work in part which has no independence of action, but is an integral part of this main staff. It may be when they begin to operate that they would find it more convenient to make some other adjustment and that should be easily authorized accordingly up here. What we are trying to do here is actually do a great deal of their work for them before the responsibility is passed to them. So where this sentence says “The Headquarters will perform [form?] immediately a Control Group for Planning”, actually as I see it that Control Group is going to be performed up here and turned over to them complete. I think, in view of the fact that the major organization of the group will occur here that the word “immediately” should be struck out. The immediately applies more to us than it does to them and they will be told when they receive this that the organization of that Control Group will occur up here. Are there any other comments on that paragraph?
General Chang: With regard to English would it be better to make it uniform and have it read “for planning and for supervising”. These two are the first functions of the Control Group.
General Marshall: “for planning and supervision [supervising?] the execution”, that reads better.
General Chang: General Chang suggests to have a slight change on the third sentence, “this group will be composed of Government, Communist and U. S. Military personnel”, without specifying that they are of equal number. That is his idea. It is understood that they are of equal numbers.
General Marshall: That is agreeable to me. There won’t be equal number of U. S. personnel probably. Take out the words “in equal numbers, etc.” It reads, “Government, Communist and U. S. military personnel.”
General Chou: Of course it is understood that the Government [Page 304] and Communist personnel will be composed of equal numbers as it is in the other party of the Executive Headquarters.
General Marshall: That is recorded in the minutes. I should explain here for the minutes, our U. S. conception of the work here in relation to the field teams. This Control Group will have certain reports that will be furnished them, you will have the government report of divisions and units, locations, etc. and we will have the Communist list of units, locations, etc. Judging from our experience in such matters, you never can leave any of these things to the report and they will have to check and see if everything is according to the reports. Is the division in this particular location and is all the data confirmed in the report. If they begin issuing orders they must know where it will be. We do that in all our procedure. This paragraph indicates the means of going about that business. In the ordinary routine, the minute they get the list they will start making the plan. While they are making the plan, they will have an inspection confirming the exactness of the data and that will then confirm the plan and the plan will be issued. Then we would finally come to the execution of the plan as issued and again the field teams go out to perform execution. Any other comments on this paragraph?
General Chang and General Chou had no further comments.
General Marshall: Third paragraph.
General Chou: In this connection, General Chou likes to point out the significance of going to Hankow and Canton in this trip because when he goes to the field then he will contact the field commanders and explain to them the importance of submitting the necessary reports and he, of course, will collect some of the data at his presence, but the others will be prepared and sent up to him and also they will send staff members to Peiping Headquarters submitting their reports and unless he has some of these people it might be difficult for him to get the necessary reports.
General Marshall: I understand. Third paragraph?
General Chang and General Chou agreed.
General Marshall: Fourth?
General Chang: “The demobilization will require the gradual elimination of Provincial, Pacification, or other high Military Headquarters.” What does that mean?
General Marshall: As we understand it, in some of the Provincial Governments, they have large military headquarters. Under this system they would not be authorized to have large headquarters.
General Chang: General Chang and General Chou both agreed to have Section 4 read, “The demobilization will require the gradual elimination of those headquarters higher than Army Group headquarters.”
[Page 305]General Marshall: It will eventually lead to getting rid of higher than army headquarters itself. Army headquarters is the base.
General Chang: “The gradual elimination of military commands higher than army headquarters.”
General Marshall: The way this reads now is “The demobilization will require the gradual elimination of military commands on a higher level than Army Headquarters.” That translates all right?
General Chang: Yes.
General Chang and General Chou: That is acceptable.
General Marshall: Fifth paragraph. The basic agreement stated the termination for the rapidity of elimination of puppet units. This puts an actual time limit on it. The expression used was “as soon as possible”. Now we give them a limit.
(General Chang and General Chou discussed in Chinese on the three month period)
General Chang: General Chang and General Chou agree on the three month period.
General Chou: General Chou is suggesting whether before the establishment of service areas all the equipment taken from the puppet units should be sealed up—frozen. Whether the equipment should be inventoried and put in the store houses, before the establishment of the service areas.
General Marshall: I don’t know what has been taking place here, but I have this comment to make. It seems to me there are two issues here. One is the case of Japanese equipment and one is the case of the other equipment. Now certainly in the latter case of other equipment it should be possible to utilize that to complete the deficiencies of the divisions. Now as to the Japanese equipment you can take that as it is right now and settle on a policy and then try to straighten out the paragraph. We might put an exception in here in the case of Japanese equipment it will be sealed until a formal decision is made as to its disposal. That is concerned in the next paragraph where a provision is made for at least its temporary use. Now all of that is in direct disagreement with the terms of the allied agreement in which I do not think the Chinese Government was consulted. We have destroyed all German equipment and the American troops and the British troops are destroying all Japanese equipment. So we are not perpetuating in any way the production of that equipment on Japanese standards. However, of course, your situation here is quite different from elsewhere because of the dearth of equipment—the shortage. One way to solve this fifth paragraph, at least temporarily, is to place the decision in the hands of the Executive Headquarters, which is a combined group then we can cease our arguments for the time being and let them fight. Is that all right.
[Page 306]General Chang agrees.
General Chou agrees.
General Marshall: “or as directed by Executive Headquarters.” That will then read, we will scratch out the words regarding the Ministry of National Defense (or National Military Council) and substitute therefor, Executive Headquarters.
Paragraph 6. I would propose to insert these words after the word “issued”, “if necessary as a temporary measure”. The paragraph then would read “Captured Japanese equipment may be issued if necessary as a temporary measure to units to be retained, etc.”
Discussion in Chinese between General Chang and General Chou.
General Marshall: Would it help matters if we inserted after the word units the four words, “of the 60 divisions to be retained in the National Army”. Is that acceptable in that form, “Captured Japanese equipment may be issued, if necessary as a temporary measure, to units of the 60 divisions to be retained in the National Army.”
General Chang: General Chang raised the point that the problem of how to issue captured Japanese equipment to units seems nonexistent now so he doubts whether we should have such an article in this directive. He favors to just scratch the whole paragraph out.
General Marshall: It is rather bad, I think, to just leave that up in the air, and everybody begins disputing whether it is in use. If there is none out it does no harm. If there is some issued, this tells them what to do with it.
General Chang: General Chang does not find any such reference in the basis.
General Marshall: These are the detailed plans. We did not put all the details in the basis. The basis says we will reduce the army and equip it. This is a part of the machinery. We are trying to give the Executive Headquarters a basis to solve the problem. Theirs is a concrete proposition.
General Kuo just explained how we had handled the Japanese equipment. The artillery pieces have been issued to units but the Ministry of War is of the opinion that we should not use the Japanese rifles at all because there is a different bore. It is not very advisable for us to use the Japanese rifles because of the difference of the barrel so we may use the Japanese artillery pieces but we will not use the rifles nor the automatics.
General Marshall: How would this change of the paragraph be considered, “the use or employment of Japanese equipment may be directed by the Executive Headquarters, if found necessary as a temporary measure, etc.” Now General Chang, as I understand, states that they are using some artillery and they do not wish to use rifles or automatic rifles. Now if we do not have a paragraph in there, [Page 307] they do not know whether they can use the artillery or whether or not they use the rifles. Now if some such paragraph as I have just suggested is included then so far as the Government is concerned they all have to notify their one commander that they do not support any use of the rifle and automatic rifle. Otherwise, we have got to say here, you can use certain artillery and you can use this equipment and you cannot use other equipment and that becomes a highly involved matter. Perhaps we do not know the total stores of ammunition. There has to be a stock taking of all this equipment. We can strike out this paragraph, but we will have to do it later if we don’t do it now, because Executive Headquarters is going to be faced with this problem. On the other hand, they should have some basis for their decisions and on the other hand we are not prepared with the data for detailed decisions and I do not think we should make detailed decisions anyway. The Government has a means of notifying its commanders in elaborate detail of its policy about this and he just stands by that statement. Unless the decision is taken here that no Japanese of any kind anywhere is to be used and then we just make the flat statement. If we do not decide to do that then we have to do something like this or we have just left a vacuum. Now my last proposal was that we have been very definite where the division comes from and we make it dependent on the necessity and under the wording I proposed it would be perfectly possible to restrict the use of rifles or automatic rifles. I don’t know what the situation is in regard to trench mortars. I will read again the wording I proposed. [“]The issue of employment of Japanese equipment may be directed by the Executive Headquarters, if found necessary as a temporary measure to units of the 60 divisions to be retained, etc.”
General Chou: Directed or issued.
General Marshall: [“]The issues of employment of Japanese equipment may be directed by the Executive Headquarters if—”
General Chang: General Chang had two remarks to be made here regarding that section. First, it did not appear in the basic plan any provision about captured Japanese equipment, Secondly, if some provision would be provided here it would be extremely difficult to carry it out. As a matter of fact it is a very delicate point because the Communist troops may have some Japanese equipment, but the Government troops also accepted a part of the Japanese equipment. They issued those to the respective units and we have to collect them and re-issue those equipment to the different units that will constitute a very complicated task. General Chang laid emphasis that is a very difficult and complicated thing to do. General Chang suggests to omit that whole section with a view that the Executive Headquarters may come across extreme difficulties in handling that point of issue [Page 308] because being very delicate it is now very difficult to find out where the equipment is now, to which units they were issued. It would take ages for the Executive Headquarters to do that work alone. General Chang suggest that we omit putting some sort of provision in the minutes that if that point of issue will arise then we will refer to the minutes then as to the issue and until that time we will just drop the subject.
General Marshall: In the first place, this referred to the 60 divisions to be retained in the service. The divisions to be demobilized present no problem. Their equipment is collected when they are demobilized by the terms of the agreement. This paragraph doesn’t refer to change the equipment around among those divisions who are now in the service who are of the 60. It is perfectly agreeable to me to put a statement in the minutes.
What is General Chang’s definite proposal for the minutes.
[General Chang:] General Chang adopted your last proposal to be added in the minutes.
General Marshall: In other words all that is said here will go into the minutes and not put in the instructions to the Executive Headquarters. Is that acceptable to General Chou?
General Chou: Of course, the minutes will be transmitted to the Executive Headquarters.
General Marshall: It is understood and agreed that in the case of Japanese equipment, the issue or employment of this equipment may be directed by the Executive Headquarters, if found necessary as a temporary measure to be retained to units of the 60 divisions to be retained in the National Army, but when this is done complete battalions will be so equipped.
General Marshall: Seventh paragraph. After the word “Government” in the first sentence substitute “or” for “and”.
General Chang: General Chang and General Chou they are both facing the same sort of difficulties and General Chang likes to explain the common difficulties to you. The students are out of control. General Chang and General Chou both understand that it is in your mind that in the second state of the deactivation they have to pick out 50 divisions out of 90 divisions on the government side and 10 divisions out of 18 Communist divisions to be retained, then deactivate the rest. From there will arise some sentimental difficulties—national difficulties, but out of the sentimental because of the peculiar Chinese temperament. We should carry out according to the method raised by you that is pick out 60 divisions out of 108 divisions, but as the sentiments of the officers and men and the personal relations is concerned there will be some difficulties. Take for instance on the reduction of the 18 Communist divisions into 10 divisions as an example. The disposition [Page 309] of the Communist troops in the coming 12 months will be 3 divisions in the northeast region and 3 divisions in the Central China, 12 divisions in North China and then in the next 6 months then the Communists have to pick out 10 divisions out of those 12 divisions in North China to be retained and deactivate the remaining 8 divisions. Then in the next 6 months a disposition will be one division for northeast region and 2 divisions in Central China and 7 divisions in North China. That means those 3 divisions in Northeast and those 3 divisions in Central China should all be deactivated and then from North China send 1 division to the Northeast and 2 divisions to the North.
General Marshall: Why one division to the Northeast?
General Chang: Because in the next 6 months it is stipulated that one division will be sent. You have 3 Communist divisions.
General Marshall: Why?
General Chang: Because it is stipulated that [of?] 6 army group those 12 divisions will be the ones picked out.
General Marshall: In other words the 6 army group has you involved. I understand now.
General Chang: In that case those 3 divisions can be deactivated [and?] the officers of the 3 divisions will be very resentful and will cause much friction and difficulties. If we try the other way around if the Communist 3 divisions in Northeast China instead of divide them all we reduce it and into one division and apply the same to Central China for those three reduce to 2 and then for those 12 divisions reduce and integrate into 7 divisions then that will be more amicable solution. The same is true to National troops. We cannot just separate the 90 divisions into 50 divisions to be retained and 40 divisions to be deactivated because it would be much better to just reduce the 90 divisions and integrate them into the 50 divisions and that will be a much better solution.
General Marshall: Well I see no objection to doing it like that according to the plan. What I am thinking about is the issue that have been raised specifically as to the Manchurian army of 3 Communist divisions as the best example. In the discussion of the organization of the Army groups I did not think through the matter to the adjustment of reduction from 18 to 10 and from 90 to 50. Before getting going on General Chang’s proposal I would like to discuss with you the restrictions which we have imposed that make it impossible to do the easiest thing, for example, in the case of the Manchurian Communist army. I am very hesitant about proposing any modifications so soon after the adoption of the formal agreement, but I don’t like to see the Communist forces and the National forces greatly embarrassed by a term of agreement its effect we did not consider in regard to this particular procedure. Now Section 3 of [Page 310] Article 5 of the basic agreement provides that during the following 6 months, the 4 army group shall be formed and lists the divisions. Now the purpose of this paragraph, of course was to produce army integration that particular time. Do you think it very unwise to consider a modification of the terms of that in the light of this discussion which we would agree to and that would be understood then by both the Government and Communist Party and by the Executive Headquarters which would permit an exception to be made of the basic plan. We would not have to make a public change of these instructions, but it would be a detail of execution. Is it unwise to consider such a matter.
General Chang: General Chang agrees. He thinks it is a wise step to be taken not to change the basic plan, put it into the minutes today and in the detailed plan that is with the understanding of the three sides that such a step will be taken. That is in the northeast those 3 divisions will be reduced to 1 and in Central China those 3 divisions will be reduced to 2. Put it into the minutes and embody in the detailed plan instead of changing the basic plan as it is in conflict to the spirit.
General Marshall: It does not change the spirit at all, it is just the execution.
General Chou: General Chou has this to comment. Firstly, when he accepted this proposal of forming 4 army groups he was already aware of this difficulty. However, at that time he was thinking that it can be overcome because as General Marshall has explained to him that all the 10 divisions to be retained should undergo a short course of training within the next 6 months and he has thought that we have to call in the divisions in Manchuria and the 2 divisions in Central China to somewhere near the training camp so they can be trained and then sent back at the end of the 18 months so he thought there is no difficulty in accepting this proposition. He thought that this difficulty can be overcome in some way though it is not so easy because at the time when he accepted your proposition he was trying to coordinate it with your training program so he thought that by moving the troops and then sending them back this can be settled. Actually as to the government side he can make the statement that he agrees that the government will not be restricted by this clause because lie is fully aware of the difficulty on the part of the government in demobilizing the other 40 divisions and so they would not be restricted by this. Thirdly, he wants to state that at the present time as he has expressed his idea of how the armies should be sent in and others dissolved he still likes to reserve for the time being until after he has talked to the field commanders and he would be much more sure.
General Marshall: Then my understanding is that we will reserve [Page 311] decisions as to whether we would formally in our detailed plan modify the terms of this section 3, Article 5. In the meantime we have to consider paragraph 7. I do not believe the way it is written that it proves any difficulty with regard to section 3 of Article 5. It would force us to delay in the general terms of that paragraph. The provision here is very general. I think it is applicable to whatever changes we direct. Unless we strike out the words, “the general area”. I would suggest that the expression “by one month from time of notification of retention” be struck out.
General Chang: General Chang still has this doubt in his mind. We cannot just list the designation of those 50 divisions to be retained because those 50 divisions will have to be amalgamated, and form the 50 divisions. We may amalgamate number one and number two into one division.
General Marshall: All you have to give us is the number of the divisions and then you go about your own formation. You designate that you are going to keep the 35th division. The Government tells us, and the Communists tell us the number of the divisions and their designation. Now they themselves are going to decide what divisions are going to flow into that. The Executive Headquarters does not tell them you will amalgamate this division and you will amalgamate that. We want them to know the number of that division and then have an agreement with you as to where it is to be located. We can arrive at that by saying where it is eventually to be stationed and where the troops are that are going to compose that division. Executive Headquarters hasn’t anything to do with how to put them together.
General Chang: Does this number refer to one of the 60 divisions.
General Marshall: Both stages. You have two different phases. You are going to have 90 from 250 and you are going to have 50 from 90. It is the same thing repeated although the Executive Headquarters is at present primarily interested in the 50. That is, it is interested only in the 50 as to organization and is also interested in the fact that you are only to have 90 at the end of 12 months. The organization of the 50, the limit of 90 in 12 months. On the Communist side they are interested in the 10 for retention and they are interested to see that you only have 18 at the end of 12 months, and we say here that those that are to be retained would take a certain type organization, and will start with a certain type of training. Now when they start would depend on when you get them together.
General Chang and General Chou agreed.
General Marshall: Paragraph 8 and I will also say, “shi shi”.31
General Chang: After all, the professor is in full control of his students.
[Page 312]General Kuo brought up another point. It is stipulated in section 7, organized as an Alpha division and the strength of that sort of division will not have the strength of 14,000. Believes in the first stage we can reduce to Alpha division.
General Marshall: The strength is more than that of the Alpha division. 14,000 is more than the number of the Alpha division, I understand.
General Chang: The strength of the Alpha plan is only 10,993.
General Marshall: In other words it is 11,000 so you will have 3,000 there to be accounted for.
General Chang: The proposal is that we shall adopt a division comprising 2 brigades, each brigade with 2 regiments. That means 1 division will be 4 regiments. According to the Alpha plan infantry regiment consists of 2,650 officers and men so adding 2,650 to the 11,000 you will come to just less than 14,000.
General Marshall: Before you decide on that I would like to make a comment. I do not know what the eventual type of division for China will be. If you have already made up your mind about that that throws this light on the matter. We have not yet done that about our divisions. We are still trying to figure out what is the correct division and we are going to make quite a few changes. Now if you have already determined your future type division, has that been determined?
General Chang: No.
General Marshall: Then if you have not determined that, then all you have to permit is overstrength.
General Chang: General Kuo just said that the National forces now organized into 90 armies so we have to have some means to bridge over the difficulties from organizing those 90 armies into 60 divisions, so we adopted an interim organization of two brigades of four regiments. That doesn’t mean that that would be the ideal division.
General Marshall: It is all right to change this from Alpha plan to new divisions. I wish also to add this comment to the future of Chinese armies. We have a war strength and a peace strength. We cannot afford to maintain units at their war strength. If your division had a total strength of 14,000 I should imagine that a few would be reduced to, we will say 10,000. Ours will probably run between 8 and 9,000 because we won’t be able to get enough money to support a larger unit. However, as I understand this it is an interim arrangement. We could scratch out that whole thing. Reorganize as an Alpha Plan division. We would scratch out the words “reorganize as an Alpha Plan division” and it remains a limitation of 14,000. Then you have the type division you want. Now unless there is objection [Page 313] by General Chou it will greatly add to convenience of arrangements if the Communist divisions were of the same type, so as soon as the National Government gives us a formal statement of the type division they wish during the interim period, we could turn that over to the Communists and they could produce the same kind of division.
Then in this paragraph after the words, “general area” all is struck out down to the word “and”. “To assemble in its general area and initiate.” Is that acceptable as amended. Is that correct?
General Chang and General Chou agreed.
General Marshall: Paragraph 8. The expression is used in the first sentence, “in the second six months period”. It should read, “in the final six months”.
General Chang: Do you mean by school, a school for officers or for enlisted men?
General Marshall: It will be both.
General Chou: It is not the whole division.
General Marshall: No.
General Chou: General Chou asks if the 3 months is for each course.
General Marshall: Yes, that is just the length of the course.
General Chou: General Chou has no further comments.
General Chang agreed.
General Marshall: Paragraph 9. In the first sentence the expression is used will be directed by Executive Headquarters. It should be changed to read “ordered”.
General Lee: In the last line the word logistics should be logistic, shouldn’t it.
General Marshall: Yes. Any comment?
General Chang had no comment.
General Marshall: Paragraph 10.
General Chang: Shouldn’t that be 9 instead of 10.
General Marshall: I am using this reference on the paper. We will have to renumber them all afterwards. I haven’t the numbers yet. In paragraph c, it refers to a Demobilized Manpower Commission. Now we have another paper separate from this to be considered which is the request for the reorganization of such a commission. So this paragraph, of course, not only depends on that paper but it depends on the approval of the proposition by the government. That would have to be the understanding in considering this paragraph. Have you any comment to make.
General Chou: Can you just briefly explain the nature and the functions of the Demobilized Manpower Commission.
General Marshall: In order to provide adequate work for large number of demobilized army personnel, it is recommended that a [Page 314] Demobilized Manpower Commission be established immediately. This commission should coordinate its activities with the government, the Communist Party, the civilian and the relief agencies and with Executive Headquarters. It should be prepared to operate in all parts of China. It should classify demobilized personnel as employable or unemployable. A special effort should be made to place demobilized personnel in private industry. The unemployed should be given adequate care. Now the government has a plan for governmental work such as dike construction, restoration of communications, road construction and a great many things of that character. However, that is largely engineering that pertains to job of working. It seemed to us there should be some group that deals with the personnel with relation to the work. This is in the form of a suggestion for action by the government and it only deals with the general character of the commission. We advise the government the commission should be prepared to operate in all parts of China. We give three very general directions or suggestions as to functions. To classify the personnel as employable or unemployable. To make a special effort to place individuals in private industry. That takes a burden off the government work which possibly cannot care for them all and then another provision is suggested that the unemployable should be given adequate care. All those three suggested provisions refer to decisions which will have to be taken on a higher governmental level, and I would assume it is not for us even to suggest. We do say that we think this commission should be ready to operate within a certain time because we are going to release a flood from the demobilization, by our action a flood of individuals begins to flood out of the army into China for general employment somewhere. We do know the rate of the flow of that flood. Therefore we advise that the commission should be prepared to operate within 2 months. Does that answer your question, General Chou?
General Chou: Yes.
General Marshall: That expresses in comparatively few words what we are writing a book about in the United States and fighting on every page. We call it the Veterans Bureau.
General Chang: General Chang asks about the paragraph a. Whether by movements prior to separate you mean the assembling of troops.
General Marshall: That is right. That is the assembling of troops who are to be demobilized getting them into collection points where they will then be demobilized. That is before he will be demobilized.
General Caraway accepts this modification of a. “Movements of units prior to demobilization.”
[Page 315]General Chou: The second point, b, is still separation.
General Chang: General Chang likes to raise the question whether the Executive Headquarters will handle the demobilized personnel or they just draw up a plan and leave the supply districts to handle them.
General Marshall: It will be handled by the army commander or the division and then as the personnel leave the division, and becomes merely an individual then he would pass into the area command. Part of the procedure is a divisional procedure. Part of a is divisional. Most of b is divisional. All of d is divisional. Part of e may be divisional. Now after these schedules and regulations have been approved the Executive Headquarters then issues to the units concerned through whatever command channels still remain in existence. In other words, there are certain higher commanders that are in existence now and they do not all cease at the same time so Executive Headquarters issues its instructions through the proper channels. The division commander carries out a certain portion of those until the man has separated himself from the division and is moving on his way to wherever he is to go and in whatever manner he is being handled, that is all within the divisional staff. The last phase of the divisional part would be the division commander and his staff remaining—nothing else left. Suppose the men of his division come from several parts of the country. Does that exist?
General Chang: Yes.
General Marshall: He would be directed to group them according to the part of the country they come from and see that they had commanders who came from that part of the country. Now he starts them on with orders which have to be in liaison with the area director. To the men there to go on engineering work of some kind. He groups the[m] accordingly. He starts them off in accordance with the directives and they are picked up by area commanders so they will get to the proper place without confusion. He has taken in the weapons and those are turned over to the area director or some such procedure as that. It might be that one division commander was directed to turn over all his equipment to an adjacent division which might be retained in service. Part of it is divisional and then it is in accordance with where they are to go and what the method is to handle them. This is merely a rough outline. Now when the Chinese members join this group they have to interpret this into the manner that is acceptable to your practices. This merely outlines a responsibility of the Executive Headquarters. For example, in the last sentence it directs the Executive Headquarters to coordinate all they do with the directors of the Service areas and also with the Demobilized Manpower Commission if there is such a commission. This is merely a very [Page 316] general statement which has to be translated into Chinese practice and Chinese custom.
General Chang: Regarding the employment of demobilized personnel they will certainly constitute a very important question. The government has worked out a plan to employ the deactivated personnel. General Kuo will give a description of that plan.
General Kuo: In this country the deployment of enlisted men will not constitute a very serious question because they come from the land and they just go back to the land. But the officers are professional soldiers, they come from all over the country. So we have to take care of the officers more than the enlisted men. National forces have undergone deactivation in the past here. We have deactivated 111 divisions and 29 brigades. We had no difficulties in handling the enlisted men but all the officers we organized them into Officers Corps and more than 20 of those establishments have been set up accommodating 100,000 officers. Then out of those 100,000 deactivated officers, we have to resort to individual employment. That is, find some places in the civil police, as officers, or in the Ministry of Communications, to be officers of communications police. What you have mentioned just a minute ago about finding employment at private industry is more or less out of the question because in this country very little private industry is in operation. The remainder which cannot find any place to go have undergone some sort of vocational training so they are fitted to do some other business. They have to get a training and find employment in some other respect. In the past we can well state that after the deactivation is carried out according to this plan there will be over 100,000 officers which we have to find positions for. Putting together the 100,000 mentioned in the deactivated officers in the past and those in the future there will be over 200,000 officers. We can only have 10,000 of them to have more military training in order to [make?] them into officers in the retained army. The balance have to find positions either in the Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Interior—a certain number will find employment in those Ministries. Then the remainder will have to have some vocational training. That is as far as the deactivated officers are concerned and the individual redeployment is concerned. We will handle it in that way. Then in the deactivation to be carried out in the 18 months, we will again have the officers, there will be some deactivated enlisted men—however those in the whole are ready to go back to the land, but there will be some left, so the government is now preparing a collective redeployment plan for those enlisted men. The collective redeployment for enlisted men will be organized into some form of units to be led by the deactivated officers to a specific area to do some construction work or engineering, such as repairing [Page 317] roads, railroads, etc. As to the number of those enlisted men which we will include in that collective redeployment plan we cannot figure that out until we can find out who is going to get a civilian job and who are to go back, then we can calculate the exact number.
General Marshall: Thank you.
General Chang: General Chang thinks that it is sound for us to give the Executive Headquarters some policies regarding the deactivated personnel, but regarding the implementation, perhaps we have to leave that to the combined staff to work out a detailed plan and by doing that the Ministry of War can provide some very able data, judging from our past experience.
General Marshall: I suggest that it is so late we reserve any further discussion on this paragraph until tomorrow and I would be interested in having the General make a draft of how he thinks it ought to read and if General Chou has any conception he wishes to make I would appreciate his having a draft. Will you meet tomorrow.
General Chang: How about 10 o’clock?
General Chou agrees.
General Marshall: Fine.