851G.00/8–946
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent)
Recent developments indicate that the French are moving to regain a large measure of their control of Indochina in violation of the spirit of the March 6 convention. The evidence, as set forth below, suggests that the French are attempting to gain their objective by manoeuvres designed to confine and weaken Viet Nam. In the event that Viet Nam decides to resist these encroachments, which is by no means unlikely, widespread hostilities may result.
The chief opposition to the reestablishment of French rule in Indochina has all along come from the Annamese, who inhabit the three east coastal provinces of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina, which once comprised the Kingdom of Annam. The populations of the other two countries of Indochina—Cambodia and Laos—are not in a high state of political development or in any condition seriously to resist French control. A modus vivendi between the French and the Annamese was achieved in the preliminary convention of March 6, 1946, by which the Annamese “Republic of Viet Nam” was recognized as a free state within the Indochinese Federation and the Viet Nam Government declared its readiness to receive the French Army. The convention left for future settlement two crucial problems: the status of Viet Nam in its external relations, and the geographical extent of Viet Nam. On the former point, the provisional agreement stated that “each contracting party will take all necessary measures …55 to create the favorable atmosphere necessary for an immediate opening of amicable and free negotiations. These negotiations will bear particularly upon diplomatic relations between the Viet Nam and foreign states, the future status of Indochina, French economic and cultural interests in Viet Nam.” On the latter point the agreement stated that “with respect to the bringing together of the three (provinces), the French Government pledges itself to ratify the decisions taken by the populations consulted by referendum.” The crux of the present situation lies in the apparent intention of the French to settle both matters to their own advantage and without reference to Viet Nam.
The hostility of the Annamese toward the French began to mount to its present intensity when the French on June 1 announced the inauguration of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Cochinchina. Annamese leaders had long emphasized their view that [Page 53] the inclusion of Cochinchina in Viet Nam was a matter of life and death to their country. Cochinchina, it may be mentioned, contains the important mercantile cities of Saigon and Cholon, includes the mouths of the Mekong, and is the richest province in Indochina. Called the Southern Province by the Viet Namese, it is racially indistinct from Tonkin and Annam. Statements by the French that the referendum in Cochinchina (as pledged in the March 6 convention) would still be held failed to reassure Viet Nam leaders, who pointed out that such a referendum could not possibly be fair owing to the suppression by the French of pro-Viet Nam political parties and of all anti-French opinion. SEA’s information tends to substantiate this point of view.
Tension between the French and the Annamese reached its present pitch when the French on August 1 convened a conference at Dalat (in southern Annam) to which the Royal Governments of Cambodia and Laos, the Government of the autonomous Republic of Cochin-china, and the native peoples of southern Annam and high plateau of Indochina (but not Viet Nam, recognized by the French as part of the Indochina Federation and French Union) to send delegates to “study the framework of the French Union”. Subsequently published agenda of the conference indicated that the salient aspects of the Indochina Federation would also be deliberated. As an immediate result of this conference, the Viet Nam delegation which had been discussing the future relation between France and Viet Nam with the representatives of the French at Fountainebleau since July 6 announced that they were suspending negotiations until the French should have cleared up the “equivocal” situation which had been created. The head of the Viet Nam delegation, who had opened the conference with a violent blast against French policies, charged that the French were now trying to engineer their own statute for the Indochinese Federation and their own settlement of the status of Cochinchina and other areas claimed by Viet Nam. The view of Consul Saigon is not very different. He gave as his opinion that a front against Viet Nam was in the making, that the states participating in the Dalat Conference were at least tacitly recognized as free states by the French, and that France and these free states are now determining the status of the Indochinese federation without reference to Viet Nam. In his view it indicated double-dealing on the part of the French, and he reported that the French Commissioner for Cochinchina had forced the issue by threatening to resign unless his policy is carried out. Nothing has been said at the conference about a referendum. Finally, Consul Saigon added that he had learned that representatives of the southern regions of the Province of Annam (which has always been claimed by Viet Nam) will petition [Page 54] for inclusion of their territories in Cochinchina. In view of the completeness of the agenda of the Dalat Conference, which covers the essential framework of the Indochinese federation, and in view of the deliberate exclusion of Viet Nam from the conference, the conclusion is inescapable that the French are endeavoring to whittle down Viet Nam and to settle the future form of organization of Indochina with those who may be expected to be amenable to French influence.
Annamese reaction to French moves has been sharp, and following the suspension of the Fontainebleau negotiations, there were pro-Viet Nam manifestations in Saigon. The ambush of a French supply column near Hanoi by Annamese soldiers, during which the French suffered 52 casualties (one of the worst of many incidents during the past several months), may have been related to the opening of the Dalat Conference.
While it is to be doubted that the French will allow the Fontainebleau Conference to break down completely, Embassy Paris quotes Baudet as having stated that French officials are in no hurry to speed up negotiations until the pacification of Indochina, and particularly of Cochinchina, has been completed. In this connection, Consul Saigon reports that more troops are arriving in Indochina and that the French military position has grown much stronger. Meanwhile, the Saigon press has been carrying vitriolic attacks against Viet Nam. Since this press is completely controlled by the French, there would appear to be no official objection to this line.
In his latest report, Consul Hanoi states that there now exists an imminent danger of an open break between the French and Viet Nam. He adds that a rupture of relations would probably be followed by a period of anarchy and that, although the French could quickly overrun the country, they could not—as they themselves admit—pacify it except through a long and bitter military operation.
In conclusion, it is SEA’s view that the Annamese are faced with the choice of a costly submission to the French or of open resistance, and that the French may be preparing to resort to force in order to secure their position throughout Indochina. It may not be advisable for this Government to take official notice of this situation during the Peace Conference,56 but the Department should be prepared, SEA believes, to express to the French, in view of our interest in peace and orderly development of dependent peoples, our hope that they will abide by the spirit of the March 6 convention.
- Omission indicated in the original.↩
- For documentation on the Conference, held between July 29 and October 15, see volumes iii and iv.↩