856E.00/4–2046
The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Bloom)
My Dear Mr. Bloom: This is in response to your letter of April 20, 1946,75 receipt of which I have previously acknowledged, in which you transmitted for the comment of the Department of State copies of H. Res. 603, “Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to call upon the State Department to take steps regarding the presence of Japanese troops in Indonesia, and other action in support of the Indonesian Republic”.
I am glad to have an opportunity to make a number of observations on questions of fact raised by the proposed resolution. Furthermore, since the policies of this Government with respect to the situation in the Netherlands East Indies have frequently been misunderstood, if not actually misinterpreted, I welcome an opportunity to set the record straight.
The proposed resolution would call upon the Department of State to make the necessary representation to the British and Netherlands Governments for the complete and immediate withdrawal of their troops from Indonesia; it would also have this Department call upon the United Nations to investigate the matter of disarming and removing Japanese troops now in Indonesia.
Regarding the withdrawal of Dutch forces, it is clearly inappropriate for this Government to make such a representation to the Netherlands Government since the United States recognizes the sovereignty of the Netherlands, which is an Allied and friendly power, over the Netherlands East Indies.
The withdrawal of British forces from the Netherlands East Indies is primarily a matter between the British and Netherlands Governments and, consistent with the responsibilities of the Southeast Asia Command, is to a great extent contingent, the Department understands, upon the removal of Japanese troops from that area. The return to Japan of Japanese forces in the entire Southeast Asia Theater, including the Netherlands East Indies, is a British military responsibility assigned on behalf of the Allies to the Southeast Asia Command [Page 823] under Admiral Mountbatten, although the arrival of such troops in Japan is subject to the orders of General MacArthur. Thus the Southeast Asia Command, apart from its other responsibilities towards Allied prisoners of war and civilians, has been confronted with the tremendous task of rounding up, disarming, interning and removing some 650,000 Japanese troops in this area. Such troops are being removed, however, as rapidly as shipping and other facilities permit. The order of priority of their repatriation from the various regions of Southeast Asia is, of course, a military matter for decision by Admiral Mountbatten in conjunction with General MacArthur. The Department is informed that steps are now being taken which it is hoped will in the very near future provide shipping for the evacuation of very large numbers of Japanese from the Netherlands East Indies. At present, the task of preparing the Japanese for removal is being carried forward by British and Netherlands troops in cooperation with forces of the so-called “Indonesian Republic”.
The resolution would also call upon this Department to take all steps appropriate to withhold any further shipments of war material to Britain and the Netherlands for use in Indonesia under any terms or agreement.
Since the capitulation of Japan in August, 1945, no military lend-lease material has been furnished the Netherlands by the United States. No arms or equipment have been sold to the Netherlands for military use in the Netherlands East Indies except, pursuant to a previous commitment, such as were necessary for the equipment of a small unit of Netherlands Marines who were in training in this country before V–J Day. Relative to the Netherlands Marine contingent, may I call your attention to a letter from the Secretary of the Navy dated January 4, 1946 and reproduced in the Congressional Record of January 14, 1946, page A–21. Licenses for the export of arms and munitions from the United States to the Netherlands East Indies are not being issued. Furthermore, it is contrary to the policy of this Government to permit American flag vessels or aircraft to transport troops of any nationality to or from the Netherlands East Indies except for the evacuation of Japanese. It is also contrary to American policy to permit the use of American flag vessels or aircraft to carry arms, ammunition, or military equipment to this area.
Finally, the resolution calls upon the Department of State to express through the American delegates to the United Nations Security Council United States disapproval of the manner in which present negotiations are being conducted between the Netherlands and Indonesia. In this connection it is apparently felt that the negotiations are prejudiced by the presence in the Netherlands East Indies of three so-called “inter-ventionary armies”—British, Dutch and Japanese. The reasons for [Page 824] the continued presence of these forces in the Netherlands East Indies are explained above. Meanwhile, the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations, begun in February, have been carried forward both in the Netherlands East Indies and in the Netherlands proper under conditions of which the representatives of the Indonesian Republic themselves have made no complaint, so far as the Department is aware.
The proposed resolution claims that prior to the Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies the Dutch administration refused to arm the Indonesians in defense of their homeland. Actually, compulsory military service for both Europeans and Indonesians was instituted in the Netherlands East Indies before the war. Army and Navy forces designed wholly for the defense of the Indies were made up of a majority of natives, particularly Amboinese and Menadoese, many of them officered by Indonesians who even led some European units.
The resolution also includes the statement that British troops in Indonesia have used armed Japanese forces to destroy the Indonesian Republic and restore Dutch imperial control in Indonesia. The Department is informed that in certain areas of N.E.I, where no or insufficient British and Dutch forces were available, Japanese forces have been used under Allied direction to keep open lines of communication essential to effect the liberation of Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees and to supply food and medical aid to such persons pending their evacuation. The number of Japanese troops so employed is being reduced as rapidly as conditions permit. In view of the fact that negotiations are going on, it is clear that the Indonesian Republican administration is still in being and that the conditions under which any Dutch sovereignty shall be exercised in the N.E.I, are still being worked out between Republican leaders and the Netherlands authorities.
As early as October 18, 1945,76 an officer of the Department stated that, while this Government does not question Netherlands sovereignty in the East Indies, it is not our intention to assist or participate in forceful measures for the imposition of control by the territorial sovereign. Again, in a public statement of December 19, 1945, the Department called upon both the Indonesian leaders and the Netherlands authorities to seek through negotiation a peaceful settlement which would recognize alike the natural aspirations of the Indonesian peoples and the legitimate rights and interests of the Netherlands, and which would be in harmony with the principles and ideals of the Charter of the United Nations organization.
[Page 825]On February 11, 1946, the United States delegate stated before the United Nations Security Council in reference to the situation in the Netherlands East Indies that the best hope for the settlement of this unhappy situation and for the elimination of any possibility of a renewal of armed strife in that troubled area lies in the successful and prompt completion of the negotiations between the Netherlands Government and the Indonesian leaders. He added that he felt it would be a serious responsibility for the Council to take any action which might prejudice or retard the outcome of these negotiations and thereby increase the chance of future bloodshed. It is the Department’s opinion that this reasoning is still valid and is applicable to the possible passage at this time of such a resolution as the one proposed.
The Department has been informed by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this report.
Sincerely yours,
- Not printed.↩
- See memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, October 22, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi, p. 1167.↩