740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–946: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 16—11:02 a.m.]
Tfurc 63 [to Tokyo]. [From Bunce:] Following is a report of my visit to Pyongyang accompanied by Mr. Prostov59 at the invitation of Mr. Balasanov, who is the Political Adviser in north Korea (see [Page 744] cable Tfurc 6260). We left Seoul Thursday 3rd October and returned the night of the 7th. During this period I met with the following important persons and discussed Korean problems with them: Chancellor Balasanov, General Shanin, Kim Il Sawng, Chief Executive of the Provisional People’s Committee for north Korea, and Cho Man Sik, Democratic leader who has been in protective custody for the last 8 months. During our visit we had complete freedom of movement without any surveillance of any kind and were treated with great hospitality and courtesy.
My feeling is that the Russians are not at all certain that they have the support of the people of north Korea for their occupation and there was emphatic and universal sentiment in favor of resuming negotiations by the Joint Commission.
In my long discussions with Mr. Balasanov he emphasized and gave us complete details of Generalissimo Stalin’s reply to the questions asked him by Alexander Werth of the London Sunday Times.60a This emphasis indicated to me that he felt cooperative attitude. In our discussion I criticized strongly the whole of Russian postwar foreign policy and attitude of non-cooperation with the other great powers in the solution of the many world problems we face. I emphasized that this policy had hardened public opinion in the United States against Communism and Russia and stated that a continuation of this policy would inevitably lead to war between the two great powers. I stated that the United States was willing to cooperate with Russia on a constructive policy for establishing world peace on a permanent basis. In regard to the problems of Korea, I informed Mr. Balasanov that the United States would under no condition consent to the establishment of a provisional government dominated by the Communists so that it became a puppet state to Soviet Russia. Mr. Balasanov stated that Russia had no such objective and defended USSR policies. He stated that he felt that the United States had supported Rightist reactionary elements in south Korea and that the Soviet Government would not accept a provisional government dominated in any way by Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo. I assured Mr. Balasanov that the United States had no intention of trying to establish a provisional government under the control of Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo and that we desired from the beginning to work with all the Leftist elements in south Korea but that up to recently these groups had not only refused to work with us but had attacked our policies by underground means and a propaganda of lies. We agreed that in the case of Korea there was an opportunity to demonstrate that the Soviet [Page 745] Government [and] the US Govt could cooperate for a constructive solution of the Korean question which would have beneficial repercussions upon Soviet-American relationships in the rest of the world.
Following this general clearing of the decks, Mr. Balasanov stated that they were very anxious to have a withdrawal of both Soviet and American Forces from Korea. I agreed that this was a desirable objective that could be obtained only after a provisional government satisfactory to both powers had been established. He then suggested that we discuss the basis of reconvening the Joint Commission to establish the provisional government and asked me to draft a proposal which I thought would be acceptable to General Hodge and to General Chistiakov. In spite of the straightforward talking on both sides, the negotiations were carried on in a very friendly spirit.
The next day Mr. Balasanov and I discussed in detail the basic cause of the adjournment of the Joint Commission and the reason for Minister Tsarapkin’s uncompromising attitude regarding consultation. Mr. Balasanov stated that the basic problem was in regard to the position taken by the United States on trusteeship and felt that trusteeship in the form of help and assistance was essential for a period up to 5 years. He felt that the basic problem lay in the United States interpretation of Communiqué number 5 which contains the declaration to be signed by political parties and social organizations with which the Joint Commission would consult. He interpreted the statement by General Hodge which said that “signing the declaration for consultation with the Joint Commission does not indicate that the political party or social organization favors trusteeship, or that the organization commits itself to support trusteeship” to mean that the Rightist leaders and political parties could give antagonism to trusteeship as a means of whipping up opposition to the Joint Commission, the Provisional Government and the Moscow Decision. He stated that the speech by Kim Kiu Sic, expressing the same point of view, meant that the Rightist would be given a political advantage over all groups, particularly those in the north which had been informed as to the real meaning of trusteeship and approved of it fully because they understood it. I agreed with Mr. Balasanov that the issue of trusteeship should not be used as a means of making political capital or sabotaging the work of the Joint Commission and the Moscow Decision. I also stated that it was impossible for the United States to exclude from consultation all those who might oppose trusteeship or have various opinions as to the form it should take. I argued that from those who opposed trusteeship status we might gather valuable information as to the form of trusteeship which would be most desirable to the Korean people and which the Joint Commission could approve. I also pointed out that in discussing the question of trusteeship [Page 746] with these individuals and emphasizing that it was method of aid and assistance, that the Joint Commission could persuade them that it was desirable for the national welfare of the Korean people find the development of strong democratic government. At first Mr. Balasanov violently disagreed with my position, but later accepted it as reasonable and on the basis of this discussion I later drafted the following statement:
“The delegation of the United States will agree to interpret the word ‘cooperation’ in paragraph 3 of the statement to be signed by parties and organizations before consultation and which had been published in Communiqué number 5, to mean that such individuals, parties and social organizations would not sabotage the work of the Joint Commission and the fulfillment [of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social]61 organizations which do sabotage the work of the Commission and the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from consultation with the Joint Commission.
“In consideration of this interpretation of the Joint Communiqué number 5, the Soviet Delegation agrees that it will not exclude from consultation any individual, political party or social organization which has subscribed to the declaration in accordance with the Joint Communiqué number 5 and which loyally fulfills this statement.”
Since this was a completely unofficial meeting, I further suggested that a possible procedure for arriving at a practical solution would be to ask General Hodge to write a letter to General Chistiakov suggesting that a Joint Committee of two delegates from each delegation meet together to work out an agreement for the reconvening of the Joint Commission. Since returning here Mr. Prostov and I met with Generals Hodge, Lerch, Brown and Weckerling and discussed this statement which both Mr. Balasanov and I felt provided a reasonable basis for the resumption of negotiations. It was felt that the statement as drawn was subject to misinterpretation and the American Delegation is revising it to fully protect the American position regarding freedom of speech. After this is done, it was agreed we should ask Mr. Balasanov to visit informally in Seoul and see if the modification might be acceptable to the Soviet Delegation.
My impression is that Mr. Balasanov interprets this statement to mean that individuals, parties and organizations with which the Joint Commission would consult and express their opposition to trusteeship before the Joint Commission if they so wish, but they could not use their opposition to trusteeship to build up political power or stir up opposition to the Joint Commission, the Provisional Government and the Moscow Decision.
The Department will be kept fully informed regarding further developments.
[Page 747]A detailed account of our trip and impressions will be forwarded as a dispatch.62 [Bunce.]
- Eugene V. Prostov, senior economic analyst at Seoul.↩
- October 8, not printed.↩
- On the questions asked by Werth, and the replies made by Stalin, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vi, pp. 784–787.↩
- Insertion based on text transmitted in despatch 51, October 16; received October 24.↩
- Despatch 51, October 16, from Seoul, not printed.↩