895.00/10–946
Memorandum of Conversation With Major General A. V. Arnold56
General Arnold, who left Korea Sept. 23, stated that he was at the disposal of interested officers of the Department to discuss conditions in Korea. His comments follow:
The present strikes and disturbances in south Korea are regarded as moves to counter U.S. efforts at political unification and a semblance of economic order. Evidence has been plentiful showing that the disturbances are well planned and organized by a small, but extremely active group of Koreans who receive their direction from north Korea. Should the obstructionist program continue for the next two months, the U.S. program will receive a serious set-back and the salient points of our present policy, particularly the formation of a legislative assembly, will not be achieved.
In north Korea, the Soviets appears to be having little difficulty in maintaining control through a Government composed of Peoples Committees. Behind the scenes, the able hand of Balasanov (Soviet member, Joint US–USSR Commission) is clearly evident. There is some indication that the Soviets are preparing to “fatten up” Koreans in their area by importing food.
The need for imports of rice into south Korea was stressed. Bad weather at a critical time reduced local production, and the grain collection program is not expected to fill requirements. Corn or wheat are not effective substitutes for rice in the Korean diet. Soft coal is another badly needed commodity in order to keep trains running and to operate factories.
[Page 742]Reference was made to the President’s letter to Ambassador Pauley,57 and General Hilldring said that the War Department should expend allocated funds now, if that is necessary, to provide urgently needed supplies. Future operations could then be financed by deficiency appropriations. These should be forthcoming with backing of the sort contained in the letter referred to, and the support the Department is prepared to give the War Department. Mr. Heneman said he thought funds for Korea might also be available in War Department allocations for other activities. General Arnold said he expected to confer with CAD personnel on this subject and press for action on the supply program.
Returning to Soviet-inspired activities to create resistance to the U. S. program for south Korea, General Arnold said that the command had been hesitant to take strong measures against agitators, Aside from providing martyrs to a cause, such tactics were too reminiscent of Japanese methods, which were not too successful in suppressing the Koreans. The Korean police and judiciary had actually been restrained in their tendency to prosecute leftists, or Communists, over-zealously. Counter propaganda activities have not been developed fully, and General Arnold indicated that he hoped Colonel Roberts, who is now in Washington from Korea, would be successful in obtaining badly needed personnel and materials for a strong information program in south Korea.
General Arnold expressed the opinion that if the Joint Commission could be reconvened with some hope of accomplishing its purpose Korean morale would be raised considerably. He felt, however, that there is no hope of its reconvening on the basis of the situation in Korea alone, without the Commission again being plunged immediately into the impasse that brought about its adjournment.
The discussion was adjourned to Mr. Vincent’s office where the political and economic advantages to the USSR of continuing the present dual occupation of Korea were examined. General Arnold expressed the opinion that the Soviets had made it perfectly clear that they expected to gain and hold a dominant position in Korea.
Mr. Vincent suggested that if the Secretary agreed to discuss Korean problems with the Soviets, he might make it abundantly clear that the U. S. would maintain its present position in Korea until a government was established satisfactory to both countries. Such a determined position on our part might persuade the Soviets to come to an agreement on the question of a future government for all of Korea. General Arnold felt that the USSR’s final answer to such a stand would [Page 743] be helpful, since the air in Korea would be cleared of the indecision that is now prevalent.
It was decided that a memorandum would be prepared for the Secretary suggesting the need for an approach on the governmental level and that an attempt would be made to arrange for a discussion of basic Korean questions with the Secretary, Mr. Cohen58 and General Arnold.
In Mr. Borton’s office, in the afternoon, General Arnold said that he had been impressed with the real ability and talent the Koreans had developed in managing their own affairs. He feels that the body of self-seeking Korean politicians that has developed is not helpful since they are quite irresponsible. There are only a limited number of Korean leaders who have an unselfish interest in Korea at heart and the General places Kim Kiu Sik high on the list. Lyuh Woon Heung he regards as brilliant and personable, but irresolute. Kim Koo has lost out completely. Syngman Rhee, while powerful, is completely self-seeking.
The trusteeship issue is quiet at the moment. Should this principle be pursued, the General recommends strongly that when the terms are known, care be taken in raising the issue again in Korea. He believes a reasonable number of Koreans would readily accept advisers in the administration of their affairs providing definite terms for independence were assured, and the Koreans were given a large share of control over their own affairs.
No Koreans have appeared who could be relied upon to manage adequately their finances and industrial planning, (and other practical aspects of high level government administration) without falling prey to corrupt practices. General Arnold believes, however, that fifteen advisers, operating with Koreans now staffing the Military Government administration, would be sufficient to ensure reasonably efficient operations.
- Drafted by John Z. Williams, of the Division of Japanese Affairs, and initialed by the Acting Chief of the Division (Borton). Other participants in the conversation were the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring), Harlow J. Heneman and Hiram M. Stout of his office staff, the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent), and the Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs (Martin).↩
- July 16, p. 713.↩
- Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department.↩