740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1346: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon)
122. Dept has given very careful consideration to the statements of fact, views and recommendations contained in Tfgbi 392,49 Tfpol 23 PolAd 86,50 Tfurc 61,51 and Tfgcg 471 PolAd 54.52. We are fully [Page 736] aware of the difficulties that face you and of the impediments that interfere with your following a line of action satisfactory to the Koreans or, for that matter, to you and us. However, we feel as we are sure you do, that the long-term objective of our policies is sound and that there should be no substantial deviation therefrom. We believe that a constant and patient application of the measures proposed in Wartel 90716, Jun 7,53 will bring us nearer the achievement of our objective than any other presently feasible course of action.
We concur in the views expressed in numbered paragraph 1 of Tfgcg 471 and welcome the report in numbered paragraph 2 of concrete measures that are being taken. Bunce’s recommendation (a) has been carried out, as you know. We are prepared to give all possible assistance in seeing that military government policies listed in the Acting Secretary’s public statement materializes. Furthermore, we are taking practicable steps to see that the four other recommendations made by Bunce are acted upon.
Tfurc 61 and Tfgbi 392 seem to contain an element of hope that the Korean political parties may in time work out some solution of their differences helpful to you in solving your problems, particularly with regard to holding elections and creating a legislative assembly. The inability of extremists to reach agreements should not, we feel, deter you from taking such measures as you deem appropriate and feasible to carry out your program.
Dept is anxious that Joint Commission reconvene as soon as possible. However, it does not consider the present or near future as opportune for approaching the Russians on a governmental level and therefore, while fully appreciating soundness of suggestion regarding British and Chinese approaches, feels that such a move should not be made until we are prepared “to go down the line” in getting Russian agreement to reconvention of the Commission.
The discussion in Tfpol of our present line of action is valuable to us and is considered very much to the point from the angle of Korean popular feeling. It is unfortunate that we cannot now pursue a course which would be more popular with the Koreans. However, we are convinced that progress along the lines of our present policy will in time build up popular support in spite of policies followed by the Russians in northern Korea. In Korea it may be expected that Russian policies will meet with more immediate popular favor than those pursued by us. We must therefore have confidence in the ultimate soundness and popularity of our own policies.
Granting the fact that Koreans feel that the “basic job of the US in Korea has been done”, it seems to us that all evidence of the past year clearly indicates that the Koreans are not psychologically or [Page 737] technically now prepared to undertake self-government. Therefore, although further deliberations of the Joint Commission would be formally directed toward creation of a provisional government, the immediate and practicable achievement might be to break down the 38th latitude barrier and bring about joint Soviet-American administration because it seems to us that a provisional government would at best have to function for some time under the very close supervision and guidance of the Joint Commission. In this connection, while we can see that stressing the trusteeship objective of the Moscow Agreement should be avoided, we feel that no encouragement should be given the Koreans to think that abandonment of trusteeship is or may be feasible. Their own actions will be the best criteria in determining this matter.
We wish again to assure you of our support and confidence.