740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–346: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received August 3—5:25 a.m.]
Tfurc 61 [60] [to Tokyo]. The following brings up to date developments since our Tfurc 56 of July 22 [26]. The unity talks which were making such satisfactory progress entered a serious crisis last week. While this crisis is holding up and may even break up the unity movement, conflicts in Korean society [apparent garble] to a head and making us more aware of sinister aspects of our Korean problem. On the 22nd Pak Heun Yong returned from Pyongyang, immediately reasserted his authority over Communist elements in the People’s Front and proceeded to take measures designed to wreck the unity opposition movement. He cautioned Lyuh Woon Hyung not to “play the American game”, predicted the unity committee would be another fiasco, and claimed all rightist opposition in Korea would be eliminated in short order if leftists in the south stood firmly by leftists in the north. As Pak’s attitude toward unity before going to Pyongyang was not unfriendly although non-committal, it is clear that his resolute and positive opposition to it after his return is the result of instructions received at Pyongyang. Lyuh professes he told Pak in reply that he was too far committed to Dr. Kim to slacken or discontinue his efforts to reach unity and that he would stay with the project until some conclusion was reached. Some deep fear or mortal enmity of Pak must have come to the surface in this encounter as Lyuh hinted to us it was essential to the success of the American program that Pak be dealt with drastically at this juncture, perhaps jailed by some juggling of the counterfeit trial due July 29. We asked why Hu [he?] himself did not expose Communist intention to sabotage unity. His answer was that large labor, farmer and youth elements in southern Korea divide their allegiance between him and Pak, that if an open break between him and Pak came now it would harm the unity movement. He suggested that if Pak could be made to lose face at this moment [Page 723] Lyuh might be able to win a considerable portion of these elements over to his, and, therefore, our, side. Our view is that Lyuh either lacks moral courage or is too far secretly committed to Communists to have a show-down with Pak and is looking to us to extricate him from his position. We made it plain to Lyuh that we have no intention of abusing the counterfeit trial for political persecution and that he must fight his own battles, but that we would continue to give the unity movement and its leading spirits all support possible.
Regardless of Pak’s threat, the 10-man unity committee held its first and second meetings on the 20th and 26th in a harmonious atmosphere, agreement being reached at the latter meeting that each side would present its terms for unity at the next meeting and not publish such terms in the meantime. Thereupon the 5-man presidium of the People’s Front met to determine the Front’s terms for unity and by a vote of 3 to 2, the two being Lyuh and Kim Wong Bong, passed five conditions for collaboration with the Right. These conditions, published on the 27th in violation of the agreement, are as follows:
- a.
- Full acceptance of Moscow decision, joint action to hasten reconvening of joint commissions.
- b.
- Land reform (including confiscation and distribution of land without compensation), nationalization of important industries, enactment of democratic labor laws, political freedom;
- c.
- Elimination of pro-Japanese, pro-Fascists, and traitors of the people, suppression of terrorism and release of all political prisoners;
- d.
- Transfer to People’s committees of administration of southern Korea.
- e.
- Opposition to establishment of legislative body in military government.
The unity committee’s meeting scheduled for the 29th was postponed at Lyuh’s request on the ground of illness. Actually the meeting is doubtless being postponed so that Lyuh may continue his efforts to modify the above terms, b, d, and e, which are complete surprise to the negotiators and irrelevant to the committee’s terms of reference. In the meantime, Dr. Kim and his associates in the Right are behaving with extraordinary patience, dignity, and tact.
The present crisis confirms our knowledge that Communist leaders in our zone are not independent political figures, but subject to orders and influences in north Korea. It is also clear to us that, whatever may be the source of these orders or influences, it is unfriendly to our administration and working to confuse and frustrate it.
General Hodge intends to wait a reasonable time longer for the leftists to determine their attitude toward the unity movement and, in the light of developments in such interval, to shape his own course of action in relation to the legislative body.
Hodge concurs.