740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2546

Memorandum by the State Department Member (Hilldring) of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of the Committee (Moseley)

secret

Subject: Proposed Negotiations with the USSR over Korea on a Governmental Level.

There is attached as Annex “A” a copy of War Department telegram C–63158 of July 17, 194632 in which General Hodge states that there is little chance of further local negotiations with the Russians on the Moscow decision and requests that the Korean problem be discussed on the governmental level.

The State Department position on General Hodge’s suggestion is that it would be a serious mistake for the United States to initiate discussions of the Korean impasse on a governmental level at this time. Such a move would be interpreted by the Soviets as a clear [Page 719] sign of our impatience and as an indication that, because of this impatience, the United States position in Korea is fundamentally weak.

It would appear that we have much more to gain by pursuing a vigorous implementation of the new policy for Korea now being prepared in directive form by SWNCC than by demonstrating to the Soviets our anxiety to dispose of the Korean problem quickly through an approach to them on a governmental level. In War Department message 90716 of June 7, 194633 the new political policies for Korea were dispatched to General MacArthur and General Hodge. The economic, financial, and cultural sections are now up for final consideration by the State, War and Navy Departments and should be available at an early date for transmission to the field.34 It is impossible to estimate how long it will take for our new policies to produce appreciable results. But when our position in Korea has been strengthened by these new policies, there will for the first time be reason to hope that the Soviets will be ready to make concessions and may even desire to initiate negotiations for an agreement acceptable to the United States.

The President on July 16 in a letter to Ambassador Pauley outlined the policy embodied in the SWNCC paper on Korea now under consideration. The President stated that “our commitment for the establishment of an independent Korea requires that we stay in Korea long enough to see the job through and that we have adequate personnel and funds to do the job.”

For these reasons, the State Department recommends that the draft message in Annex “B”35 be sent to CINCAFPAC as a reply to the message in Annex “A” (War C–65318 [63158], July 17). It is requested that SWNCC consider this problem as a matter of priority and take early action on the proposed message.

J. H. Hilldring
  1. Not printed.
  2. See footnote 14, p. 692.
  3. SWNCC 176/22, July 26, “Proposed Negotiations with the USSR over Korea on a Governmental Level”, transmitted with instruction 24, August 6, to Seoul for the Political Adviser (Langdon).
  4. Not printed.