740.00119 Control (Korea)/3–1846

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson)72

secret

My Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to the letter of March 18, 1946, signed by you and the Secretary of the Navy, with an enclosed copy of a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,73 the substance of which is a quoted radio message from General Hodge in Korea to General MacArthur. Although there is no date on the message from General [Page 655] Hodge, I note that the Supreme Commander’s letter carries the date of February 2, 1946.

General Hodge refers to a State Department radio message No. 90 of January 27 which simply transmitted to him a message received by the State Department from our Embassy at Moscow. The Embassy’s message contained certain comment on the Soviet attitude toward the Korean problem, but I must confess that I find little pertinency in General Hodge’s subsequent comments to the message to which he refers.

I assume, although it is not clear from the text, that General Hodge, in referring to his “urgent recommendations beginning in October”, has in mind his comments at that time to the effect that Koreans were not favorably disposed toward a trusteeship of Korea. General Hodge infers that he was not kept informed as to the progress of our thinking here in the Department in regard to a trusteeship. In this connection I should point out that SWNCC Document No. 176/8 of October 13, 1945,74 which clearly indicated that this Government favored a trusteeship of Korea, was sent to General Hodge in October. Furthermore, in December a draft trusteeship agreement drawn up in the State Department was sent to General Hodge.

Whereas the views of General Hodge were given full consideration here, this Government had at various times and on various occasions indicated to the Governments of the Soviet Union, China and the United Kingdom its opinion that a trusteeship for Korea would be advisable. At Moscow in December, agreement was reached by these Governments in regard to Korea and this agreement made provision for a trusteeship.

With regard to General Hodge’s comment that subsequent State Department broadcasts “shy away from the trusteeship idea”, I may say that these broadcasts were made to indicate that we were not irrevocably committed to trusteeship provided another solution satisfactory to the four Governments concerned might be found, but they were in no sense indicative of a modification of our agreement at Moscow. They were in fact predicated on a hope that it might be possible to form a government capable of administering the country without need for an interim trusteeship. In this connection, it is to be borne in mind that the immediate and primary task of the Joint Commission is to form a provisional democratic government and not to discuss the pros and cons of trusteeship. Final decision with regard to trusteeship rests with the Governments of China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Every opportunity is being used to keep General Hodge informed. This Department communicates directly with the Office of the Political [Page 656] Adviser to General Hodge, following informal clearance with the War Department. Material and studies gathered from official sources in Washington are being transmitted to the Office of the Political Adviser for the attention of General Hodge. Pertinent information on Korea obtained by our Embassy at Moscow is being transmitted directly to General Hodge.

During past months the Department has brought home on consultation the two departmental officers who have served as political advisers to General Hodge and these officers have returned to Seoul in a position to give General Hodge first-hand information regarding the Department’s views on Korea. Ambassador Harriman75 also visited Korea recently and consulted with General Hodge. Other officers who have gone out from the Department to assist General Hodge have spent a period of consultation in the Department. It seems evident from the foregoing that every effort is being made to keep General Hodge informed of the Department’s viewpoint on Korea.

Quite apart from the foregoing, I wish to invite your attention to certain statements by General Hodge in the reference memorandum which cause me some concern. General Hodge states that his “best guess now is that north and south will never be really united until the Russians are sure that the whole will be soundly communistic”, and he goes on to say that “based on current trends, I question our ability to stem the propaganda and control political maneuvering of the Soviets”. In view of the fact that the American group on the Joint Commission has, under the direction of General Hodge, just commenced its discussions with the Soviet group, I confess myself somewhat perturbed by the attitude taken by General Hodge. I fully realize that he has a difficult task ahead of him. He will receive full support of this Department in performing that task. But I should feel less concern as to the outcome if General Hodge were not so convinced of failure at the very outset of the discussions.

With regard to the final paragraph in your letter, I should welcome any suggestions you have to make with regard to more effective methods which we might pursue collectively to assure that General Hodge is kept informed with regard to this Government’s attitude towards the Korean problem and also to assure satisfactory progress in the negotiations now underway in Seoul.76

A similar letter is being address to the Secretary of the Navy.

Sincerely yours,

James F. Byrnes
  1. A similar letter was sent to the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal).
  2. Letter of March 18 not printed, but for its enclosure, dated February 2, see p. 628.
  3. Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi, p. 1073.
  4. Mr. Harriman’s appointment as Ambassador to the United Kingdom was confirmed by the Senate on March 27.
  5. In his reply of April 10, Mr. Patterson made no specific suggestions but concluded, “I feel sure that if we continue our efforts to give him [General Hodge] the fully integrated support of the government, the interests of the United States will be well served in Korea.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–1040)