740.00119 Control (Korea)/2–2846
Proposed Message to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Drafted in the Department of State59
It is obvious from the information contained in your Tfgcg 301, Feb. 22, 194660 that the Soviet authorities in Korea are applying the same tactics they have applied in Eastern Europe in order to gain control of the various governments through minority groups controlled by the Soviet Government. In view of the tactics being used, it is felt that it would be advisable for you to make clear in a strong public statement the measures we are putting into effect looking toward a free and independent Korea.
It is suggested that such a statement should include the following points:
- (1)
- A statement outlining the freedoms which are in force in our zone, with an expression of hope that these may be applied shortly throughout Korea.
- (2)
- A full statement along the lines of your Tfgcg 294, Feb. 19, together with a statement that you are ready to implement all agreements reached in the conference. It might be advisable to publish the full American agenda and point out that we are importing coal from Japan in order to assist the Korean people in the south because of the fact that the Soviet authorities refuse to release Korean coal.
- (3)
- A statement on U.S. policy regarding Japanese industrial installations to the effect that these will be left in Korea and are being operated at present with the meager supplies of raw materials available in the south in order to assist the Korean people to regain their economic industrial independence.
- (4)
- A statement outlining the plans for the disposition to Korean individuals of Japanese-owned farmland and urban property, outlined in your Tflig 669, Jan. 8, and as approved in War 98713.
By separate telegram text of a proposed press release on U.S. Govt, attitude re financial assistance to Korea is being sent you. You should consider using this statement either by reference or incorporation in any general statement you may make.
While it is realized that at the present time it may be difficult, it is felt that every effort should be made to find leaders in our zone who are neither associated with the Kim Koo group nor the Soviet dominated groups, who will put forth a firm progressive program for Korea. Such a group should be encouraged to elaborate in detail a progressive program which will stress the four freedoms and basic land and fiscal reforms which would appeal to the vast majority of Koreans, with the [Page 646] object of winning over to such a progressive program people who now believe that the communist program offers the best hope for them. We should be prepared to give our full backing to such a group as a counterpart to the Soviet-backed communist groups. Because of their background as exiles, the fact that they are apparently being supported by the Kuomintang, and the State Department’s unsatisfactory experience with Rhee in dealings with him over a period of years, we should not show any favoritism to the Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee groups. If it should prove impossible to find such a group of progressive leaders, it might be necessary to make a strong effort to force the Kim Koo group to adopt and put into effect a progressive program along the lines outlined above. If the Kim Koo group will not adopt such a program, it should be made clear to them that they can receive no further U.S. backing.
In all discussions, both public and private, we should stress as our basic aim the unification of the country, both economically and politically, based upon the four freedoms for the Koreans, with the right for American representatives to consult with any and all leaders in the country as a whole and for these leaders to have the right freely to consult among themselves.