740.00119 Control (Japan)/9–1846
The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
No. 607
[Received October 7.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch no. 2, October 8, 1945,91 transmitting a memorandum on the removal of restrictions on political, civil, and religious activities in Japan92 and to subsequent despatches on the general subject of the Japan Communist Party.
As a result of the unprecedented political liberty which was granted, and the release from prison on October 10, 1945 of a number of avowed members of the Communist Party, including Shiga Yoshio and Tokuda Kyuichi, the feeling became widespread in Japan that General Headquarters was giving both direct and indirect support to communistic activities in this country. While it is extremely difficult to furnish tangible evidence that the Japanese people believed that this support was real, numerous press items which appeared in the Japanese press between October 1945 and March 1946 as well as personal interviews with political party leaders indicate that many rumors to this effect were extant and widely believed. In some cases, the attitudes of personnel in various Sections of General Headquarters were attributed by interested Japanese to radical tendencies. These instances were cited as “proof” that SCAP was in fact supporting communistic activities. The relative freedom with which the Japan Communist Party and its sympathizers were able to organize mass meetings and demonstrations in Tokyo and other cities of Japan further served to indicate to the more conservative elements of Japan, a sympathetic attitude on the part of General Headquarters and the United States towards communism here.
It was and still is difficult for Japanese to differentiate between active support of communistic principles and the general rule of democracy which allows political parties of all shades of opinion to organize and to have their say, provided that their activities are not inimical to the Occupation. Further, the circumstance that members of the Japan Communist Party were able to attract relatively large audiences and to receive full press publicity concerning their remarks was somewhat puzzling even to well-informed Japanese. Finally, Japanese communists were quick to sense this bewilderment and took full advantage [Page 316] thereof by means of a whispering campaign calculated to spread rumors to the effect that they had the support of General Headquarters.
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The combination of the above factors furnished ample “proof” to the average Japanese that General Headquarters was entirely in sympathy with the Japan Communist Party, and fears were expressed that the rapid increase in Communist Party membership foreshadowed the gradual communization of Japan. It appears probable that the comparatively large number of votes cast for Communist Party candidates in the election of April 10, 1946 is partly attributable to a belief by many Japanese that General Headquarters desired a good showing to be made by the Japan Communist Party.
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It is felt that the Allied Council for Japan has served a useful purpose in providing a convenient sounding-board for American policy vis-à-vis Japan, the Soviet Union, and other countries in the Far East. It has afforded ample opportunity to make clear to the Japanese people and incidentally to the Soviet Union and other Governments, that the United States does not consider the communization of Japan in our or Japan’s best interests. It is believed that this clarification has lent considerable encouragement to many Japanese political leaders who, though conservative by nature, are nevertheless sincere in their desire and effort to hasten the democratization of Japan by stabilizing political thought to the point where neither the extreme right nor the extreme left can prevail.
Respectfully yours,