740.00119 Control (Japan)/l–746
Memorandum by the State–War–Navy
Coordinating Committee to the Secretary
of State
top secret
SWN–3708
Washington
, 7 January 1946.
Subject: Reform of the Japanese Governmental System.
| References: |
a. SWNCC 228.28
|
|
b. SWNCC 228/1.29
|
At its 32nd meeting the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee, after
amending, approved SWNCC 228 in light
of the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in reference b.
Copies number 60 and 65 of the revised approved paper (SWNCC 228) and SWNCC 228/1 are forwarded for information.
Copies of these papers have been forwarded to the Secretary of War,
Secretary of the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their
information.
It is requested that the Department of State transmit the enclosed copies
number 60 of SWNCC 228 and SWNCC 228/1 to the American
Representative on the Far Eastern Commission30 for his guidance in negotiations with the other
members of the Commission on the formulation of an Allied policy on the
reform of the Japanese Government.
It is further requested that the Department of State advise the American
Representative that no parts of these papers are to be released to the
press at present.31
For the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee:
H. Freeman Matthews
Acting Chairman
[Annex 1]
Report by the State–War–Navy Coordinating
Subcommittee for the Far East
top secret
SWNCC
228
Reform of the Japanese
Governmental System
32
the problem
1. To determine the constitutional reforms which the occupation
authorities should insist be carried out in Japan.
facts bearing on the
problem
2. See Appendix “A”.
discussion
3. See Appendix “B”.33
conclusions
4. It is concluded that:
-
a.
- The Supreme Commander should indicate to the Japanese
authorities that the Japanese governmental system should be
reformed to accomplish the following general objectives:
- (1)
- A government responsible to an electorate based
upon wide representative suffrage;
- (2)
- An executive branch of government deriving its
authority from and responsible to the electorate or
to a fully representative legislative body;
- (3)
- A legislative body, fully representative of the
electorate, with full power to reduce, increase or
reject any items in the budget or to suggest new
items;
- (4)
- No budget shall become effective without the
express approval of the legislative body;
- (5)
- Guarantee of fundamental civil rights to Japanese
subjects and to all persons within Japanese
jurisdiction:
- (6)
- The popular election or local appointment of as
many of the prefectural officials as
practicable;
- (7)
- The drafting and adoption of constitutional
amendments or of a constitution in a manner which
will express the free will of the Japanese
people.
-
b.
- Though the ultimate form of government in Japan is to be
established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese
people, the retention of the Emperor institution in its
present form is not considered consistent with the foregoing
general objectives.
-
c.
- If the Japanese people decide that the Emperor Institution
is not to be retained, constitutional safeguards against the
institution will obviously not be required but the Supreme
Commander should indicate to the Japanese that the
constitution should be amended to conform to the objectives
listed in a above and to include
specific provisions:
- (1)
- That any other bodies shall possess only a
temporary veto power over legislative measures,
including constitutional amendments approved by the
representative legislative body, and that such body
shall have sole authority over financial
measures;
- (2)
- That the Ministers of State or the members of a
Cabinet should in all cases be civilians;
- (3)
- That the legislative body may meet at will.
-
d.
- The Japanese should be encouraged to abolish the Emperor
Institution or to reform it along more democratic lines. If
the Japanese decide to retain the Institution of the
Emperor, however, the Supreme Commander should also indicate
to the Japanese authorities that the following safeguards in
addition to those enumerated in a and
c above would be necessary:
- (1)
- That the Ministers of State, chosen with the
advice and consent of the representative legislative
body, shall form a Cabinet collectively responsible
to the legislative body;
- (2)
- That when a Cabinet loses the confidence of the
representative legislative body, it must either
resign or appeal to the electorate;
- (3)
- The Emperor shall act in all important matters
only on the advice of the Cabinet;
- (4)
- The Emperor shall be deprived of all military
authority such as that provided in Articles XI, XII,
XIII, and XIV of Chapter I of the
Constitution;
- (5)
- The Cabinet shall advise and assist the
Emperor;
- (6)
- The entire income of the Imperial Household shall
be turned into the public treasury and the expenses
of the Imperial Household shall be appropriated by
the legislature in the annual budget.
5. Only as a last resort should the Supreme Commander order the
Japanese Government to effect the above listed reforms, as the
knowledge that they had been imposed by the Allies would materially
reduce the possibility of their acceptance and support by the
Japanese people for the future.
6. The effectiveness of governmental reforms in preventing the
resurgence of military control in Japan will depend in a large
measure upon the acceptance by the Japanese people of the entire
program. In the implementation of allied policy on the reform of the
Japanese Government, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
must take into account the problems of sequence and timing, as well
as measures which might be adopted to prepare the Japanese people
[Page 101] to accept the changes,
in order to insure that the reforms are lasting in strengthening
representative government in Japan.
7. This paper should not be released for publication. The eventual
release of a statement of allied policy on the reform of the
Japanese Government should be coordinated with the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers in order not to impede the accomplishment of
such reforms in Japan itself.
recommendations
8. It is recommended that:
-
a.
- Upon approval by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee
of the Conclusions in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 above:
- (1)
- The report, as amended, be forwarded to the State,
War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff for information; and
- (2)
- The report, as amended, be forwarded to the
American Representative on the Far Eastern
Commission for his guidance in negotiations with
other members of the Commission on the formulation
of an Allied policy on the reform of the Japanese
Government.
-
b.
- No part of this report be released to the press at
present
top
secret
Appendix “A”
Facts Bearing on the
Problem
- 1.
- The Potsdam Declaration provides that:
“… The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to
the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies
among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of
religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the
fundamental human rights shall be established.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn
from Japan as soon as these objectives [as set forth in
the Potsdam Declaration]34 have been accomplished and there has
been established in accordance with the freely expressed
will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and
responsible government.”
- 2.
- The Allied note of August 11 to the Japanese Government35
stated that:
“The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in
accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established
by the freely expressed will of the Japanese
people.”
- 3.
- One of the ultimate objectives of the United States in regard
to Japan is stated in SWNCC
150/4/A, “United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to
Japan”,36 to
be:
“To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful
and responsible government which will respect the rights
of other states and will support the objectives of the
United States as reflected in the ideals and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States
desires that this government should conform as closely
as may be to principles of democratic self-government
but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to
impose upon Japan any form of government not supported
by the freely expressed will of the people.”
[Annex 2]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
SM–4499
SWNCC 228/1
Washington
, 18 December 1945.
Memorandum for the State–War–Navy
Coordinating Committee
Subject: Reform of the Japanese Governmental
System.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered a report by the
State–War–Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East (SWNCC 22837), on the subject of reform of the Japanese
governmental system, in which it is recommended that certain
policies for reform be indicated, or as a last resort, be imposed by
the Allies upon the Japanese authorities.
They assume that in formulating these policies, due consideration was
given to the statement in the Three Power Proclamation issued from
Berlin to the Japanese people on 26 July 1945, to the effect that
there is to be established in Japan “in accordance with the freely
expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and
responsible government.”
From the long-range military point of view, the major concern of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the government of Japan is that
no nationalistic or military clique or combination should again be
able to dominate that country and lead it into a war of aggression.
The effectiveness of governmental reforms in preventing the
resurgence of military control in Japan will depend in a large
measure upon the acceptance by the Japanese people of the entire
program. The principal short-term military interest is in the
possibility that the implementation of the proposed reforms may
foment unrest in Japan to such a degree as to require increases in
occupational forces [Page 103] or
lengthening of the tenure of occupation by such forces. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff consider it appropriate to point out that the
effectiveness of the United States Army and Navy has already been
reduced incident to demobilization, and that continuance of
demobilization under current plans will, in the course of the next
twelve months, further reduce the fighting strength of the United
States armed forces to a point where it will be difficult to deal
with any serious unrest in Japan.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff further consider that, as a matter of
planning in connection with the successful attainment of these ends,
additional studies should be made by the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers on the details of the sequence and timing of the
proposed reforms, together with measures which should be adopted to
prepare the Japanese people to accept the changes in order to
minimize unrest and disorder and to insure that the reforms are
lasting in strengthening representative government in Japan.
Subject to the foregoing remarks, the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive
no objection from the military point of view to the objectives set
forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 thereof.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
A. J. McFarland
Brigadier General, USA Secretary
