861.24591/3–1146: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State
most immediate
[Received 11:59 p.m.]
315. I left Shah’s Palace yesterday in time to greet Qavam on his arrival at airport 12:45 a.m. He was given enthusiastic welcome by huge crowd and went at once to Palace where he gave Shah brief report. At 5 p.m. he received me at his home. Following is substance of conversation which lasted 2½ hours and which he asked be kept entirely confidential:
1. Before questioning him about Moscow conversations I gave him copy of our note of March 6 to Soviet Government11 which he had not previously seen and had its substance translated to him. I also thought it desirable and necessary to use discretion you had given me in your telegram 188, March 812 to inform him of intention of my Government, in case Soviet Government continues to retain troops in Iran contrary to wishes of Iran, to parallel action of Iranian Government by placing matter immediately before Security Council. (Shah had not told him of this). As I had previously done with Shah (my telegram 308, March 1012) I hammered at point that it was of most extreme importance that there should be no sign of weakening or haziness with respect to Iran’s determination to act on her own behalf in this connection. I gave him no indication that US Government might act on own initiative if Iran failed to act.
Prime Minister then said that before reciting course of Moscow talks he wished to ask what America and Britain could or would do to assist Iran in case Soviet Government ignored our present protests and proceeded to do as it wished here. I replied it was impossible to give precise answer to such question at this moment; however, I believed he was aware of important pronouncements you had recently [Page 351] made in your address before Overseas Press Club;13 I had stressed to Shah yesterday the seriousness with which my Government regards assurances given by President Roosevelt when he signed Declaration Regarding Iran; and finally the step contemplated by my Government on behalf of Iran at next meeting of SC was of incalculable importance and advantage to Iran in present crisis.
2. Qavam said he had raised three points in Moscow: (a) He had tried obtain Soviet promise to withdraw troops before March 2; (b) He had asked for Soviet moral support in settling Azerbaijan difficulties; (c) He had requested appointment of new Russian Ambassador to Iran (which has been done).
With regard point a, Stalin at first advanced 1921 Irano-Soviet treaty as justification for retaining troops, which Qavam had countered by citing text and accompanying notes to show clearly treaty was inapplicable and by recalling that he himself had been in office at time treaty signed and knew from personal knowledge what was intended. Soviets had then raised “hostile attitude” of Iranian delegation at Paris Conference, to which Qavam replied that head of delegation had been Moshavar-ol-Mamalek (Ali Gholi Kahn Ansari14) who had later negotiated and signed 1921 treaty to which Soviets so often pointed with pride. Russians ultimately fell back on bald and unexplained statement that their “interests” required retention of troops in Iran.
On point b Stalin had said Azerbaijan was internal question for Iran. Why should Iranian Government be so disturbed, since Azerbaijanis were asking only autonomy, not independence? In any case, USSR could do nothing because “Soviet honor was involved”. This statement was not explained.
Qavam answered that constitution did not allow autonomy. If Azerbaijan were autonomous other provinces would follow and central government would lose all control. Iran [apparent omission] Molotov suggested that Iranian Government recognize existing Azerbaijan regime minus Minister of War and Minister Foreign Affairs. Qavam indicated he was willing to compromise on Azerbaijan but could go only so far as provincial councils law allowed and could not possibly accept present arrangement.
3. Both Stalin and Molotov separately had raised question of oil concession to Russia. Molotov had insisted upon discrimination shown in making grant to Britain and refusing anything to USSR. Qavam had refused to discuss question because of Majlis law prohibiting oil negotiations with foreign countries. He had pointed out that present [Page 352] Majlis would never repeal law and only hope of reopening question lay in election of new Majlis which was impossible so long as Russian troops remained in Iran. Molotov then asserted that Bayat, when Prime Minister,15 had offered to form Russo-Iranian company, 51% Russian and 49% Iranian, to develop north Iran oil. USSR had rejected this but was now willing to accept it. Molotov embodied this proposal in a written note to Qavam which also contained suggestion that Iranian Government should recognize existing Azerbaijan regime. When Qavam reiterated his inability to do anything contrary to constitution or law, Molotov withdrew offer to accept asserted Bay at proposal and said Soviet Government would insist on full oil concession.
I gathered this request for oil grant was only affirmative demand made by [Soviets?] during course of conversations.
4. In strictest confidence and without explaining context out of which remark arose, Qavam told me that at one point Stalin and Molotov had burst out with statement that, “We don’t care what US and Britain think and we are not afraid of them.” (He asked me not to report this to my Government and said he had not told Shah.)
I suspect this may have been elicited by some effort on Qavam’s part to advance American and British attitude as reason for his inability to comply with Soviet wishes.
5. In one talk Stalin had stressed necessity for social reforms in Iran saying that if England had made reforms in America she would not have lost us and if she did not make reforms in India she would lose India. Even in England itself reforms were essential. Qavam had replied he wished to make reforms but this would be possible only if Iran were left alone.
6. At end of talks Soviets had proposed text of joint communiqué including statement that “negotiations had been conducted in spirit of friendship and good understanding” and that they “would be continued in Tehran thru new Soviet Ambassador”. Fearing this phraseology was intended to indicate that negotiations had ended in agreement and so prevent further recourse to UNO Qavam crossed out words “good understanding”. Likewise to prevent possible assertion that negotiations were still in progress he had changed final sentence to read that two Governments would make every effort through new Ambassador to consolidate friendly relations.
7. I remarked that rumors had reached Tehran from Moscow to effect he (Qavam) might be confronted with temptations leading [Page 353] toward disloyalty. I myself did not believe these stories and hoped his actions would give them the lie. He threw up his arms in disgust and assured me he had told me the whole truth.
8. I asked whether Russians had tried to have him substitute continued conversations with Soviet Ambassador here for renewed discussions in Security Council to which he replied that they “would have liked” to have him do that.
9. Prime Minister said that throughout he had made every effort to avoid provoking Russians. Nevertheless it appeared some of conversations had taken on very strained note.
10. At end our conversation I asked Qavam what he intended to do next. He said he wanted to send full written account to Ala and asked me to forward it through our pouch. I agreed but pointed out situation was urgent and telegraphic action seemed indicated. He appeared to acquiesce but did not make clear statement as to instructions he would give Ala nor did he say definitely that he would ask further immediate consideration by SC. However, he did say that Iran had not and would not withdraw its petition to SC.
On whole I was relieved by his straightforward account of Moscow talks and felt he was telling truth though he may have suppressed some points. His failure to commit himself clearly regarding action in regard to UNO may be suspicious but may also easily be explained by fact he had just returned from tiring trip with no time to rest before he saw me, that until our interview he had not seen our note of March 6 nor heard of action we proposed to take in SC and needed time to grasp and reflect on significance of these points and finally that he should properly consult his Cabinet before committing himself on question of this nature.
I am seeking another appointment with Prime Minister in a day or two at which time I hope to elicit something more positive.
Because Qavam’s attitude did not seem entirely clear as regards UNO action I arranged audience with Shah this morning. I told His Majesty that I had no grounds for suspecting Prime Minister of weakening but would like him (Shah) to make sure Qavam understood situation and vital importance of Iranian action. I am sure Shah is completely clear on this.
His Majesty expressed grave concern over rumors of possible Soviet Putsch in Tehran to seize capital and gain control of Government. He pointed out that if this should happen Soviets could dictate instructions to Ala, prevent Iranian appeal to UNO and so make parallel Irano-American action impossible. He suggested that in such a case US and Britain could nevertheless act on own initiative on basis their obligations and voice true Iranian sentiments.
[Page 354]Shah made point that Iranian case is now far more simple and clear cut than at time of London UNO discussion since continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran after March 2 is obvious breach of treaty and makes it unnecessary to demonstrate that Soviet authorities are interfering in any other fashion. I agreed and said that in view of this strengthening of Iranian case it would be utter folly for Iran to weaken at this stage.
In connection my interview with Qavam Shah asked if I had urged on him danger to himself as well as to his country of any flirtation with proposals from Soviets to install him in high office in which he would be used, squeezed dry and tossed aside. I said I had not mentioned this but would be prepared to do so at next opportunity.
Sent Department 315; repeated Moscow 89; London 54.
- See Department’s telegram 385, March 5, 7 p.m., to Moscow, p. 340.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 346.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 346.↩
- On February 28; for text of address, see Department of State Bulletin, March 10, 1946, p. 355.↩
- Persian Foreign Minister. The Peace Conference, meeting in 1919, refused to seat the Persian delegation.↩
- Morteza Qoli Bayat was Iranian Prime Minister from November 1944 to April 1945.↩