Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

861.24591/3–1446: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

top secret
us urgent

Tehran, March 14, 1946—1 p.m.
[Received 3:20 p.m.]

335. Qavam last night gave me his definite promise that within 2 or 3 days he would send instructions to Ala to present Iran’s complaint to Security Council.

At FonOff reception this morning he said he had already ordered instructions to be drafted. Added he would tell Ala to adopt tone of moderation in his presentation in order avoid arousing unnecessary antagonism on part of Soviets.

PriMin outlined five slightly differing procedures he might follow:

1. Arrange to have SC inquire as to results of Irano-Soviet conversations on basis of understanding reached at London session. (This would have advantage from Qavam viewpoint of avoiding overt Iranian action before SC.)

2. Make direct appeal to SC and say nothing to USSR.

3. Appeal to SC and notify Soviet Embassy here that this was being done because Soviet troops continued in occupation of Iran.

4. Appeal to SC and notify Soviet Embassy that appeal would be withdrawn if Soviet troops were evacuated in 15 or 20 days.

5. Appeal to SC and notify Soviet Embassy that this was being done because Iranian constitution forbids presence foreign troops in country unless authorized by Majlis. Point out that Majlis authorization expired when Tripartite Treaty expired March 2 and that PriMin could not acquiesce in violation of constitution. He would tell Soviets this should not be considered unfriendly act since he would be merely fulfilling his legal obligation.

(Qavam told me today he intends to adopt procedure 5.)

He asked my opinion which I gave on personal basis to effect it would be best for Iran to take initiative in making appeal and that I saw no objection to procedure 5. I suggested that if procedure 4 were adopted he should make sure that case was not withdrawn from SC before Soviet troops had physically left country pointing out that Russians bad already violated one promise this regard. He assented.

In course of conversation which I consider highly satisfactory I reemphasized utter importance of action by Iran to speak out for herself in defense of her rights so long as she is free to speak. Qavam agreed. I further stressed simplicity and strength of Iran’s present case and advantage of having advocate of Ala’s high caliber to present it. I also pointed out that in coming Council meeting Iran could act with advance assurance of US support which it had not had at London meeting.

Since we cannot be sure Iranian FonOff will give Ala adequate background information Dept may wish to give him substance of such parts of my two recent conversations with Qavam as it deems appropriate. Furthermore although I am satisfied with Qavam’s assurances it is always possible that Russians will apply great pressure on him when they learn of his decision and try to persuade him to withdraw instructions. Accordingly I suggest Dept urge upon Ala importance of immediate action on his part to get matter before SC as soon as he receives his instructions. Once case is presented formally it will be easier for Qavam to resist pressure.

I opened our talk yesterday by giving PriMin copy of Dept’s press release of March 12¹⁶ on our inquiry of Soviets regarding increase of troops in Iran. He was unimpressed and took line that we should not ask Russians about such matter because they would be sure to lie but rather to tell them that we knew reinforcements were arriving.

He then asked what I would do in his place if Soviet troops should occupy Tehran on ground that lives of Russian nationals were in danger. I asked whether Russians had approached him on that score. He said no. I expressed surprise saying his own FonOff had mentioned a conversation with Soviet Embassy personnel this subject. (Shah also had told me Russians had asserted their officials were in danger here.) Qavam then summoned Homayunjah¹⁷ who was inclined to play down matter but on being pressed by PriMin finally produced full memo of conversation which Qavam read with obvious surprise. Memo gave details confirming Shah’s statement that Soviet Embassy here had expressed fear for safety of its personnel. In light of PriMin’s evident surprise I think his question to me must have been motivated by some remark made to him in Moscow rather than by Soviet approach to FonOff here. (This strengthens my feeling he has not yet told full story of Moscow talks.)

In reply to his question, I told PriMin I felt pretext that lives of nationals in foreign country were endangered had become too obvious a device since Hitler had used it so often. In any case, I considered PriMin could not afford to allow any foreign government to assert that with all Iranian army gendarmerie and police at his command, he was unable to maintain order and protect foreigners in his capital. Such admission on his part would be virtual abdication of sovereignty.

I asked again about Qavam’s written protest filed in Moscow. He at once produced copy which my interpreter read. It was forthright, clear and emphatic, used the word “protest” and asked immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran. He has sent me copy.¹⁸ I pointed out this document would be important in SC discussion of case.

To Dept as 335; repeated Moscow 100, London 59.

Murray

16. Department of State Bulletin, March 24, 1946, p. 483.
17. Mohammad Ali Homayunjah, Under Secretary of State in the Iranian Foreign Office.
18. Translated text transmitted to Department in telegram 337, March 15, 1946, 9 p.m., from Tehran, not printed. The Prime Minister’s note was dated March 3. (861.24591/3–1546)