711.75/2–846: Telegram
The Representative in Albania ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State
u.s. urgent
[Received February 10—5:21 p.m.]
95. Concur heartily in recommendation contained Moscow’s 321, February 1 received here only Feb 6. If we acquiesce without vigorous protest against conduct Soviet authorities who within few weeks after recognizing a Balkan state cram their ideology down the throats [Page 7] of the govt recognized and inaugurated through their puppets, a program of fear and reprisal against all opposition including that obviously incapable of overthrowing govt and thus nullify every attribute of a truly democratic state, we may expect Soviet authorities to follow exactly same pattern Rumania and Bulgaria and even Korea once recognition is accorded. I feel certain that what has taken place here within short period of 6 weeks transforming an atmosphere of good will and democratic spirit at election time on Dec 2 to a regime of suspicion and fear is being forced upon Albanian authorities by small group Albanian Communists working hand in glove with Moscow and that majority members Govt are not only not in sympathy but helpless. While some action needs to be taken here, the first and most effective place for approach is Moscow where we can with good grace in view of Yalta commitments and past friendly collaboration with Moscow with respect to Albanian policy, express surprise at sudden transformation which has taken place here involving large influx Soviet nationals and large supply arms and inquire what Soviet intentions are. Time is of essence and this approach should be made at once.
- 2.
- If, when approach is made, Moscow presents an air of surprise and aggrieved innocence as it will, it might be suggested that as Department’s information is so definite that something has gone wrong in Albania, since Soviet Legation has opened, Soviet Minister here be instructed to confer with me and British representative regarding situation so that all three can exchange views and endeavor to see that in accordance with Yalta and Potsdam commitments new government here is pursuing truly democratic course.
- 3.
- With regard to possible action here which, as indicated above, is secondary, there are two aspects: first, action with respect to final recognition and second, action with respect to our Mission. Concerning recognition we are awaiting reply from authorities concerning treaty question with respect to which they have since January 16 had copies of all treaties. As already indicated to Department I feel certain we shall receive no reply here until Yugoslavia is ready to reply and reply here and at Belgrade will be identical. Regardless, however, of what that reply may be, I am of opinion sudden developments indicating so clearly Soviet direction and control raises question of whether, even if authorities accept our position with respect to treaties, we should proceed further without clarification of Soviet intentions and additional assurances here that minorities shall have right to express themselves freely and that our representatives will be accorded courtesies due them.
- 4.
- With respect to our Mission, situation is delicate. Strictly speaking, it has no standing. It was sent here to study conditions and make a report which has been submitted. It has remained with Hoxha’s consent on mutual understanding that it is a transition agency awaiting opening of diplomatic mission which has been delayed over treaty question. I am sure authorities, especially those unfriendly toward us, are fully aware of our vague status and this partially explains why our activities are circumscribed and discourtesy heaped upon us. This discourtesy is worse than I can take time to describe by telegram and is doubly damnable because inspired by Soviet agents. It follows too closely Soviet pattern and is too alien to proverbial Albanian hospitality for any other conclusion. With regard to Dept’s attitude on servant question as stated last paragraph Deptel 16, Jan 30,17 authorities have been so nasty toward this Mission since mid-December it is not a question, as posed by Dept, of whether I am persona grata to them but rather question of whether US can permit its representative to be kicked around and still command respect due him and his position.
- 5.
- Think therefore we must envisage possibility closing Mission on our initiative or being asked by authorities to close, a regrettable development in either case. Consider latter probability unless representations made at Moscow move authorities call halt on activities their henchmen here. If we decide to close, there are two alternatives: First, close entirely leaving property in charge British; or second, withdraw all personnel except Fultz, Stevens and Nicholas who would be left as custodians and transmitting agents for messages to be exchanged between Department and authorities here. However none of persons mentioned wish to remain if situation after representations appears ominous.
- 6.
- Accordingly while raising question at Moscow urgently, Department can be considering representations that might be made here.
- 7.
- This may be last chance to befriend this honest industrious small people who have suffered grievously from 300 years Turkish misrule, years of Yugoslav and Italian intrigue, followed by Italian and German occupation and devastation and now face prospect exploitation under fear and terror by Soviet imperialistic swashbucklers.
- 8.
- In considering this message, following telegrams should be read: 59, January 25; 68 and 69, January 29; 73, January 31; 82 and 83, [Page 9] February 2; 85 and 86, February 4; 87 and 89, February 5, as well as Moscow’s 321, February 1 to Department.18
Repeated Caserta 48, Moscow 11, London 8.
- Not printed, but see footnote 8, p. 3.↩
- Of the messages cited in this paragraph, telegram 59, January 25, 1946, is not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 2; telegram 69, January 29, is not printed, but see footnote 8, p. 3; telegram 73, January 31, is not printed, but see footnote 10, p. 4. Telegram 82, February 2, not printed, reported on the campaign by Albanian authorities to confiscate Italian property and expel Italians from Albania (765.75/2–246); telegram 83, February 2, not printed, reported on the opening of a trial in Scutari involving prominent Roman Catholic clergymen and a trial in Tirana on war crimes charges of two former regents of Albania under the German occupation regime and a former Albanian Prime Minister under the Italian occupation regime (740.00116 EW/2–246); telegrams 86, February 4, and 89, February 5, not printed.↩