Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

864.00/6–1146

The Minister in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

No. 1574
secret

Budapest, June 11, 1946.
[Received July 2.]

Sir: In reference to my telegrams nos. 975 of May 24¹³ and 1062 of June 5¹⁴ and interim reports on the political crisis created by the demands of the Smallholders Party for fuller participation in provincial administration and police affairs in addition to the holding of elections in provincial districts, I have the honor to submit as of possible interest to the Department a report by Mr. Imre Deri of the Legation, in which are described the steps by means of which the opposing parties of the coalition were brought to a compromise solution.

June 5, 1946

“After a day full of excitement and dramatic turns, the political crisis ended in a compromise. The demands of the Smallholders Party have not been met fully by the leftist parties and the tangible results achieved by the majority party are in no proportion to the hue and cry raised by the Smallholders only yesterday. Yet the party justly claims a victory. This is the first time the party has dared to revolt against the leftist dictatorship and wring concessions from them. If Mr. Pushkin had allowed the crisis to take its natural course, and if Tildy and Nagy had had more nerve and backbone to hold out longer for more concessions, they would have gotten them. Out of the maze of conferences and negotiations which took place between yesterday evening and this afternoon only those stand out which show direct or indirect interference of the Russians. Yesterday afternoon, just before the meeting of the Smallholder deputies began, Mr. Gregoriev¹⁵ called up Secretary Balogh; the Prime Minister had already left his office and could not be reached by Gregoriev. Mr. Gregoriev told Father Balogh that Mr. Pushkin would like to see Nagy Ferenc. Balogh gave this message to Nagy at the Smallholders’ meeting, and the Prime Minister, on his way to Tildy, asked him to notify Mr. Pushkin that the Prime Minister would visit him in the evening.

“Mr. Pushkin explained to Nagy Ferenc that the Government couldn’t afford the luxury of a grave crisis at this time when Hungary was having to fight for a satisfactory peace treaty. He strongly advised Nagy against forcing a showdown with the leftist parties. He said that a compromise could be effected and that dissolution of the coalition would not be tolerated by the Soviets. Under the present circumstance, Mr. Pushkin said, the coalition must be upheld even at the cost of sacrifices. The dissolution of the coalition would necessarily result in the Soviets taking a hand in the political crisis. What Soviet action was envisioned Mr. Pushkin did not say. Nagy Ferenc replied that he and his majority party had already made sacrifices for the sake of upholding the coalition, and he could go no further. No compromise could be effected at the price of a further sacrifice on the part of the Smallholders Party. If such a sacrifice would be demanded, he would tender his resignation. He told Mr. Pushkin that he would no longer take the responsibility for the domestic political situation and was determined to hand in his resignation. The conversation which lasted two hours had no positive result, but Mr. Pushkin seeing that Nagy Ferenc was taking a determined stand, did not push the matter further. However, it is evident that Mr. Pushkin had a conversation with Mr. Rakosi either on the same night or early next morning in which he advised the Communist leader to make concessions.

“Secretary Balogh himself took a hand in effecting a compromise. He visited the Communist Party headquarters yesterday night and, in the absence of Rakosi, conferred with Revai¹⁶ explaining to him that if the Communists should insist on refusing the majority party demands they will have to take the responsibility for whatever might follow. A very long conference took place between Rakosi and Szakasits¹⁷ on the one hand and President Tildy on the other hand this morning. It was apparent Rakosi had already received instructions from Pushkin to make concessions, which was passed on to Nagy who was in continuous telephone communication with the President. Neither Rakosi nor Szakasits saw Nagy after their return from Tildy at Leanyfalu. They held a short conference with the leftist ministers, after which the extraordinary Council of Ministers began. The meeting of the Council of Ministers was a short and formal affair. The issues of the crisis were not even mentioned, which indicates that the Russians had effectively used their influence on Nagy and had given directives to the Communists. The crisis was over by 3 P.M.

“The Smallholders, however, had to swallow the bitter pill of compromise. After yesterday’s enthusiastic meeting they had to be informed of the conditions of the armistice. Neither Nagy nor Secretary Balogh took the trouble of personally informing the deputies of the compromise. They left the job to Kovacs Bela, the General Secretary of the Party.

“The meeting was an anti-climax to yesterday’s spirited enthusiasm. Mr. Kovacs told the deputies that an agreement had been reached between the party and the leftists. He read the conditions of the agreement, which were the following:

• “1. Elections in the rural communities and the provincial municipalities will be held at the earliest moment. No date had been fixed, for the bill for the elections will have to be drafted and passed by the Assembly.
• “2. 100 important positions in the police will be given to members of the Smallholders Party.
• “3. Positions of such Communists and Socialists who will be dropped because of the B list¹⁸ will be given to Smallholders.
• “4. Should any of the provincial mayors or elected sheriffs be removed through disciplinary proceedings, these positions will be given to Smallholders.
• “5. The political police in the provinces will be abolished.

“Mr. Kovacs told the deputies that the compromise solution had to be accepted by the Prime Minister inasmuch as the Russians insisted on the compromise and brought very strong pressure to bear. He appealed to the patriotism of the deputies, and said that they must not take the risk of complete chaos and thus incurring the enmity of the Russians.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Respectfully yours,

H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld

13. Not printed, but see footnote 7, p. 300.
14. Not printed; in it Minister Schoenfeld reported having been informed by Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi that the Government crisis had been ended as a result of indirect Soviet pressure (864.00/6–546).
15. Counselor of the Soviet Legation in Hungary.
16. Jozsef Revai, Deputy Secretary General of the Communist Party.
17. Arpad Szakasits, Secretary General of the Social Democratic Party.
18. In the spring of 1946, at the initiative of Prime Minister Nagy, the Hungarian political parties agreed, for the sake of Government economy, to reduce the number of civil servants to 90 percent of the 1938 level. Special committees were established in Government departments to draw up lists of civil servants to be retained (A List) and those to be released from Government service (B List).