Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

711.64/6–646: Telegram

The Minister in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Budapest, June 6, 1946—noon.
[Received June 7—2:15 p.m.]

1072. Respectfully submit following suggestions based on my reports as to attitude Dept might find it desirable to take in talking with Hungarians during forthcoming visit to Washington of Prime Minister and other Ministers who are representatives respectively of majority party and of Communist and Social Democratic Parties all constituting Hungarian Coalition Govt.¹¹

Nagy led public here to expect great results from Moscow visit which were not realized. Popular disappointment led to substantial discomfiture of Communists with prompt effort by Smallholders to recover part of authority lost during preceding months when Communist ascendancy steadily increased despite outcome November election. This time Nagy is likely to be more cautious in arousing popular expectations since he claims merely to be complying with wishes of Hungarian public in establishing contact with American Govt as one of principal Allied powers and he may therefore avoid public reference to specific questions to be raised in Washington. I have deliberately refrained from soliciting any statement as to what Prime Minister and his associates wish to take up in Washington because by asking for such statement we might inspire hope that positive action would be taken by US on subjects to be raised.

Hungarians will doubtless raise such questions as Transylvania, Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, restitution of displaced property especially gold, possibly Eximbank loan and reparations, among others.

In economic questions Dept may wish to adhere to theme that we remain as we have been ready to cooperate with Hungarians and with Allied Powers able to help in undertaking sound rehabilitation plan for Hungary and that we will continue to press for inter-Allied understanding to this end while deprecating long term bilateral agreements not considered appropriate under armistice regime.

In matters of foreign policy other than economic, Dept may wish to express its continued purpose to secure just and durable peace in eastern Europe especially in Danubian basin and hope of receiving information and opinion available from govts affected including Hungary. To insure our getting at least some credit for eventual modification of Transylvania frontier in favor of Hungary which might otherwise go to USSR at forthcoming Paris meeting Dept will doubtless have in mind fact that Rakosi has sought to convince Hungarians we proposed Paris award of all Transylvania to Rumania. Some rectification of frontier, however small, will greatly strengthen Hungarian Govt’s position. I recommend Dept do what it can in this respect which would be likely to strengthen Nagy’s hand in trying to redress internal balance of power.

For benefit particularly of Rakosi who can be regarded as representing Moscow as well as Hungarian Govt in forthcoming talks. American interest should be stressed in seeing healthy political development within Hungary.¹² Conviction of American people should be expressed that majority of lawful voters shall rule through democratic processes as understood in western world. Contention of Communists that Smallholders majority in Hungary is not real majority of democratic elements cannot be admitted as basis for political action so long as sweeping purge of individual voters has not been put into effect or even contemplated.

I think Dept should not go much beyond such general considerations in statement to Hungarian delegates or make commitments which could be misunderstood or misused. I have avoided giving Hungarians reason to expect any concrete assurances of action in behalf of Hungary preferring, as Dept doubtless prefers, to see practical results of our efforts to meet some Hungarian desires at peace conference speak for themselves in due time.

Meanwhile of course we also have desires and claims which Hungarian Govt can show disposition to meet. It would be wise, in my opinion, for Dept to emphasize our disappointment for instance in Hungarian denial of landing rights for American civil aircraft while we have refrained from pressing claims affecting American property and Hungarian obligations with reference thereto.

Schoenfeld

11. Telegram 955, May 23, 1946, from Budapest, reported that Prime Minister Nagy expressed a desire to visit Washington sometime before June 15 when the Council of Foreign Ministers reconvened in Paris (711.64/5–2346). This request was repeated again on May 28 and June 1. Telegram 533, June 3, to Budapest, directed Schoenfeld to inform Nagy that the United States Government would be happy to receive him and his party (711.64/6–146). The members of the party were to be the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, both of the Smallholders Party, Deputy Prime Minister Rákosi who was Secretary General of the Communist Party, and Minister of Justice Istvan Riesz, a member of the presidium of the Social Democratic Party.
12. In telegram 1080, June 7, 1946, from Budapest. Minister Schoenfeld reported that Soviet Minister Pushkin had asked Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi and Deputy Prime Minister Rákosi to point out on all occasions during the trip to Washington that the attitude of the Hungarians must always take into account that Hungary is occupied by the Red Army and is surrounded by Slav states (711.64/6–746).