Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Ninth Meeting, Paris, May 4, 1946, 11 a.m.¹⁸

Paris, May 4, 1946, 11 a.m.

secret

The record of the third meeting was approved.

Italo-Yugoslav Boundary

M. Bidault recalled that at the previous meeting the Council had heard the observations of representatives of Yugoslavia and Italy on the report of the Commission of Experts on the Italo-Yugoslav boundary and on the lines recommended by the experts.¹⁹ It was now the duty of the Council to take up this question in the light of the observations which had been made.

M. Molotov indicated that he wished to expound the view of the Soviet Delegation. Having in mind the report of the experts and the recommendations of the four Commissioners, as well as the views of the Yugoslav and Italian Governments, the Soviet Delegation had come to the conclusion that, in the main, the claims put forward by Yugoslavia were well-founded and just. The Soviet experts had arrived at the same conclusion.

M. Molotov said that the Council was examining the question of Julian March. What was Julian March? To Yugoslavia it was a territory inhabited by the same population as that of Yugoslavia itself. Looking at the basic population of Julian March it became clear that, except for a few coastal towns where there was a considerable number of Italians, the population was Slovene and Croat. The Italians were in a minority in this area. To Italy the Julian March was an accidental by-product of the liquidation of the Hapsburg Empire. It had never belonged to Italy before 1918. It was known that the Julian March was a spring-board for Fascist expansion which, like the German “Drang nach Osten” was carried out at the expense of the Slavic peoples to the East. This territory served Italy as a base for imperialistic expansion and annexation of Slavic territories. It would not be the aim of the new democratic Italy to hold this territory. The new Italy should repudiate the policy of conquest. Should it do so, Italy would be able to establish lasting friendly relations with Yugoslavia; this would be in the interest of both countries.

M. Molotov said that, to avoid unnecessary argument, the data of the Austrian census of 1910 could be used, although it was well known that that census had an obvious shortcoming in that it underestimated the size of the Slovene population. However, even according to that census, the Slovene population in the Julian March was 463,000 and the Italian population was 332,000. Thus the Slovene population considerably exceeded the Italian population. There could be no doubt that the Julian March, bearing in mind its well-known historical past, was just as much Yugoslav territory as the neighboring districts of Yugoslavia.

Trieste

M. Molotov considered that the question of Trieste was worthy of special attention. It was well known that the population of Trieste was mixed, with the Italians in the majority. However, the population of the suburbs and of the surrounding vicinity was Slovene as in the rest of the Julian March. What was the town of Trieste? The data submitted to the Council, the history of Trieste, and above all the geographical position of the city, showed that it was the center of the whole Julian March. It would be impossible to tear Trieste away from the Julian March without inflicting serious damage on this territory and on Trieste itself. For Italy the city of Trieste was only one of many ports. There were bigger ports in Italy. For Italy Trieste was first of all a miltary base, a spring-board for the extension of Italian influence into adjacent territory populated by Croats and Slovenes. This was a situation fraught with danger from the point of view of the interest of safeguarding a durable peace in the future. For Yugoslavia, on the other hand, Trieste was the chief and even the only port of national importance. To sever it from the Julian March would be to deprive Yugoslavia of its only large port and at the same time to place Trieste in a position in which it would lack the basis for further natural development and progress. It was no accident that during the more than 20 years in which Trieste had been Italian, the port had not attained the level of goods traffic reached in 1913. This was because Italy was above all interested in developing other ports such as Venice. There could be no doubt that the transfer of Trieste to Yugoslavia would bring about the most favorable conditions for its development as a port and as a commercial and industrial center for a vast area. It should go without saying that the property interests of Allied nationals should be fully protected in the event of the transfer of Trieste to Yugoslavia. This question called for special attention. Also, it would be appropriate to meet half-way the interests of Italy and of Italians which would be affected by this transfer.

Lines for Italo-Yugoslav Frontier Recommended by Commission

M. Molotov then passed to the examination of the lines recommended by the American, British and French experts on the Commission. These proposals, especially the American and the British, meant the splitting of the Julian March into eastern and western parts, cut off from each other by a state boundary. This would be absolutely unjustified and this would not be accepted. He thought it would not be difficult to become convinced that even the proposals of these experts, although it was not expressly indicated, were based on recognition of the fact that the Julian March represented a single whole, a single area. This recognition seemed to explain the fact that under their proposals two-thirds of the whole Julian March was to be returned to Yugoslavia, but at the same time, the whole coastal area was artificially cut off from the Julian March and handed over to Italy. In some places the boundary would come almost to the sea, within a distance of five to eight kilometers from it. Under the proposals of these experts the whole western littoral on the Adriatic was to be cut off from the Julian March. The Julian March would thereby be deprived of access to the sea along the whole line stretching from north to south. The injustice of such discrimination against Yugoslavia was as obvious as it was unprecedented. These proposals were in conflict with the national unity of the basic population of Julian March. They were in conflict with the economic interests of both the eastern and western parts of the area and not in conformity with geographic factors. The separation of the western part of Julian March from Yugoslavia would mean the cutting off of those areas from sources of rivers, from water supplies, etc., which were situated east of the proposed lines. The towns of the western part of Istria would be cut off from the rural districts of the east, without which those towns could not exist. It would be possible to cut off the whole coastal area of Julian March in this way only if it was desired to punish Yugoslavia and its Slovene and Croat population. Such proposals could not be made with any objective other than that of punishment. The proposals could not be justified. The recommendations of the experts, according to which the new frontier would cut off the entire population of this part of Yugoslavia from the sea, could not be considered as well-founded or just.

Statements to Council by Italian and Yugoslav Representatives

M. Molotov continued that he could not pass over the statement made on the previous day by the Italian Prime Minister. The claims put forth by Senor [Signor] de Gasperi included almost all of the Julian March as well as Fiume, Zara, the Island of Cherso and others. These claims testified to the tenacity of Italy’s expansionist aspirations. The figures cited by Signor de Gasperi regarding the Italians who would remain in Yugoslavia if the various proposals of the experts were carried out were not confirmed by the available data. They could not be used in the defense of the conclusions which de Gasperi drew.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation had arrived at the conclusion that the national claim of Yugoslavia submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers, and so convincingly defended by M. Kardelj, should be accepted. In the view of the Soviet Delegation those claims were well-founded. Their acceptance would provide an opportunity to remove a historic injustice against the Southern Slavs. One could rest assured that if such a decision were taken a good basis could be created for the development of lasting friendly relations between Italy and Yugoslavia since the cause of friction between them would have been removed. Such a settlement of the question of Julian March, and especially that of Trieste, would be in the interest of neighboring countries which are particularly concerned with the port of Trieste. These countries were Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and others. It was well known that the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland had already expressed the view that Trieste should go to Yugoslavia. Such a settlement would contribute to a durable peace because it would remove one of the most dangerous springboards of imperialist aggression directed against the Slavic peoples. It would help to put an end to the plans of conquest which Italian fascism carried out in the Balkans. In the settlement of the question of the Italian-Yugoslav frontier, the Council should bear in mind the fact that the national claims of a glorious ally were being considered, an ally who had waged a heroic struggle for freedom and national existence, who had made heavy sacrifices. In accepting the solution proposed by Yugoslavia the four Governments would be giving an ally his due and would be meeting wholly justified Yugoslav desires.

M. Bidault said that if it would facilitate the discussion he was disposed to give his opinion. He reminded his colleagues of the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers of September 19, 1945, which had been the point of departure for the work of the Commission of Experts. The Council had asked the Deputies to report on a line which would be in the main the ethnic line, leaving the minimum of population under alien rule. Later the Deputies, in setting up the Commission of Experts, had given instructions to the Commission concerning the latter’s report and the recommendations. The Commission was to take into account in carrying out its task not only ethnic considerations but also economic and geographical considerations. These instructions were quite reasonable, although there would be no point in hiding the fact that they brought into the picture a new feature which might come into conflict with the original criterion. From these instructions two conclusions could be drawn: (1) that ethnic, economic and geographical considerations were the only ones which were to be taken as a basis for the report and recommendations; (2) that of these factors the ethnic consideration was to take first place. In the light of these plans the French Delegation considered that, with the aim of rendering justice to each party and of organizing a firm peace in that part of the world, the Council should look at the facts and make its decision squarely on the basis of the facts, always keeping in mind that the smallest possible number of persons should be left under alien rule. In this question, unfortunately, the facts were not always easy to establish. Numerical calculations of the population could be taken as an example. What M. Molotov had said concerning the census of 1910, however, had removed the greatest of difficulties on that score. M. Bidault thought that the census of 1910 could be taken as the basis of the Council’s consideration of the question of population. After all, the Council did not intend to review all the work of the experts, and it seemed that there was agreement on the essential facts.

M. Bidault then set forth certain general propositions of fact which he considered to be agreed. The first was that the interior of Istria was definitely a Slavic area. The second was that the city of Trieste had a preponderant Italian majority, but was surrounded by suburbs with Slovene majorities. The third was that the west coast of Istria was predominantly Italian in a number of cities and in certain villages and that the rural population was mixed, containing Italians, Croats and Slovenes. In this last named area the essential difficulty was to try to draw a frontier through a zone of mixed population. In view of the impossibility of doing that, the French expert and the French Delegation considered that the best thing to do was to find a line which would leave the smallest possible Italian population in Yugoslav territory and the smallest Yugoslav population in Italy. This solution would create compensation on both sides and seemed to be the least bad of possible compromises. There had to be some compromise line between the two extremes represented by the line of the Treaty of Rapallo and the line of the Yugoslav claim, the first of which left a great number of Yugoslavs in Italy and the second a great number of Italians in Yugoslavia. The French line seemed to be the least objectionable compromise. M. Bidault submitted that if the Council really wished to apply its decision of 1945 it would find that the French line was most nearly in conformity with that decision. With reference to the economic side of the question, which was definitely secondary, it would obviously be paradoxical to cut Istria in two, whatever might be the draw-back of leaving Pola in Yugoslav territory. This was evident from a glance at the map.

M. Bidault concluded by saying that in presenting these observations the French Delegation had no interest and no other aim than to carry out objectively the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September, with the purpose of finding a solution which would be just and would represent a contribution to peace.

Mr. Byrnes said that he wished to say first, on the subject of M. Molotov’s reference to the line recommended by the American expert, and apparently also to the British and French lines, that it was not true that these lines had been drawn with the purpose of punishing Yugoslavia, Mr. Byrnes wanted the record to show that the United States Delegation had pointed out that Mr. Molotov’s statement was not true. The American expert had endeavored to carry out the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers. And this had been a very difficult and complex task. The United States credited the representatives of the other three Governments with the same honesty of purpose in trying to carry out the decision of the Council. The fact that the experts had recommended four different lines showed how difficult was the problem confronting the Council. It was understandable that, when people become very earnest on questions concerning them, attitudes could be adopted which were very difficult to reconcile with the facts. The Yugoslav representatives at the previous meeting, for example, had spoken of the territory in question as having been torn away from Yugoslavia, Instead of having land torn away from it, Yugoslavia, under the proposed American line, would gain territory with approximately 350,000 inhabitants which it had not possessed at all before the war. In addition, Yugoslavia would have the port of Fiume. This territory comprised over 2000 square miles.²⁰

Mr. Byrnes felt that the difficulty facing the Council was the same which it had faced in September, namely how to do justice as between these two peoples and how to bring about a peaceful situation between them in the years to come. To do that the United States Delegation had proposed to have the frontier follow what was, in the main, the ethnic line leaving a minimum under alien rule. The Council should keep in mind the obligation not to make territorial changes which do not accord with the wishes of the people in the area affected. The difficulty arose in trying to carry out that promise, especially since the Council had not received much assistance from the report of the experts with regard to the views of the people in the coastal area which, under the American line, would be left to Italy. It was, however, generally agreed that the best help would be found in the 1910 census. The data in that census showed that in the territory left to Italy under the American line there was a total population of 591,992. Of these 354,000 (60 percent) were Italians and 190,000 (34 percent) Yugoslavs. On the Yugoslav side of the same line the total population of 370,976 consisted of 52,098 (14 percent) Italians and 300,211 (81 percent) Yugoslavs. These figures came from the 1910 census. In the report of the Commission it was stated that in 1910 there were in addition 29,000 persons in Trieste who were Italian subjects. This group was not counted under the heading of Italian speaking population. The American expert in further study of the 1910 census, taking into account these Italian subjects, had arrived at the conclusion that, under the American proposal, there would be in the territory left to Italy an Italian population of 461,723, which represents 74 percent of the total population. Mr. Byrnes concluded that, while there was obviously no possible way to draw a line which would leave a population on both sides which was 100 percent or 90 percent homogenous, if a line like the American line were taken as the frontier it would come very near a solution which would reduce to a minimum the population living under alien rule. With reference to Trieste, Mr. Byrnes recalled that all four Ministers had agreed that it would be made an open port. He felt that there would be no trouble in agreeing on the question of administration of that port.

Mr. Byrnes said that he was not impressed by the statement that a frontier in the neighborhood of the American line would constitute a military frontier and would invite military operations on the part of Italy. That statement seemed to be based on the past. If the UNO worked properly, there would be no military aggression by Italy on Yugoslavia. If there were, such aggression, the action by the UNO would be so prompt that the aggressor would regret it. Furthermore, it was proposed to disarm Italy by the terms of the peace treaty and steps ought to be taken to make sure that Italy would stay disarmed.

In conclusion, Mr. Byrnes referred to the city of Gorizia which was in the same position as Trieste. Its population was predominantly Italian and he could think of nothing more likely to cause trouble than to take those two cities with their predominant Italian populations and place them under the Government of Yugoslavia.

Mr. Bevin said that he took it that it was in no one’s mind to go back on the London decision. That had been quite clearly set forth by M. Bidault at this meeting. Mr. Bevin, therefore, associated himself with what M. Bidault had said regarding the terms of reference given to the Commission of Experts. He would also like to associate himself with what Mr. Byrnes had said and to express regret that some of the experts had been accused of having ulterior motives.

Mr. Bevin felt that the Council had to examine the question of how to give effect to the decision made in London. The UK Delegation had not come to a final conclusion concerning which of the three lines—those suggested by the British, American and French experts—should be adopted. But he did feel that the Soviet line went wide of the terms of reference and sought to deal with territory which was purely Italian, some of it having been a part of Italy even before 1914. If the figures at his disposal were correct, the Soviet proposal would transfer 417,000 Italians to Yugoslavia in Venezia Giulia alone. It seemed to him that that would create a situation which was bound to produce one of the most serious causes of war, namely an irredentist movement. He was informed that in the north the Soviet line would place an additional 66,000 Italians in Yugoslavia. Under it there would be no Yugoslavs at all in Italy. Therefore, it seemed to the UK Delegation that the Soviet experts’ recommendation did not offer a fair basis that could be defended as an equitable settlement of the problem. With respect to the other three lines, it seemed to him that the French line had given the greatest weight to purely ethnic consideration, because on analysis of the figures of the Italians left in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslavs in Italy it would come nearer to balancing them on that basis than either of the other lines. The American and British lines appeared to have given greater weight to certain economic factors, and also to the importance of the city of Pola to which M. Bidault had referred. The British expert had explained to him that the British line was affected to some extent by other economic considerations such as the location of the lines of communication. In the case of the British line, there had been an effort to reduce the total of minorities rather than to strive for parity.

Mr. Bevin felt that if there was good will on all sides in this question, those three lines seemed to offer the basis for a settlement. He was willing to consider all the factors on which those lines were based with a view to reaching a decision on which was the best possible way of reaching a settlement on the basis of the decision taken in London. Whatever decision was taken, there would be an economic loss to Italy, particularly in the south. That was a matter which had to be faced. But in trying to deal with the problem of these two peoples which had been set at each other so many times, as the Council itself had heard yesterday in listening to their own representatives, the UK Delegation was particularly anxious to settle the problem on the basis of the London decision as that seemed the only way to end the hostility between the two peoples and prevent a new conflict. He wanted to make it clear that he was not taking a dogmatic stand in supporting the stand taken by the British Commissioner. He thought that the experts had done a very good job and the British Government was grateful for the help received from them. It was quite clear that the Council was now sitting in a judicial capacity. It would have to arrive at a decision based on the best justice which it could give. If, in the end, after examination of the problem, it should appear that the French line conformed most closely to the London decision, or if further convincing arguments should be put forward in support of the American line, he was willing to examine either with an open mind. But he could not see that the Soviet line came anywhere near meeting the decision which had been arrived at in September.

M. Bidault desired, in the name of the Council of Foreign Ministers, to express gratitude for the work done by the experts and for their report.

M. Molotov wanted to say that, in his opinion, the work performed by the experts had been very useful. But the responsibility for solving this problem could not be passed to the experts. To try to do that would be to invite difficulty and confusion between the main problem and the details. While the useful data submitted by the experts was appreciated, the Council could not pass its decision wholly on that data. That would lead it to an absurd conclusion. The task before the Council was to settle the problem raised by Yugoslavia. It was a problem of eliminating the injustice against the Slav people in the Julian March, a question of the greatest importance to Yugoslavia. If the basic decision was taken the details of the problem could then be considered. In that way use could be made of the data submitted by the experts. But the principal question now at hand was whether the Council was going to eliminate the historic injustice against the Southern Slavs. M. Molotov wished to cite a specific example. He mentioned that all Delegations had before them a book of maps submitted by the Italian Government. As was evident from these maps, even the Italian Government itself recognized that the whole of the coastal area north of Trieste, the region of Duino, was Slav territory. Notwithstanding that fact, the British, French and American experts had proposed the inclusion of that area in Italy. Such a proposal was contrary to the available facts and to the maps submitted by the Italian Government. How could that have happened? It had happened because the experts had misunderstood the Council’s decisions taken in London. One of these decisions had been that of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the other had been taken by the Deputies. Proceeding on the basis of an incorrect understanding of these decisions, the experts had undertaken a task which had not been assigned to them. They had undertaken to settle not the details but the main problem, the problem of the disposition of the Julian March. They might have served as good experts in dealing with the details involved in drawing a boundary line, but they did not do that. M. Molotov asked whether the Council had really instructed the experts to split the Julian March into two parts and to examine them separately from each other. The question facing the Council was not one of considering two parts separately, but of considering the whole territory. In spite of that, the experts had come to the conclusion that the Julian March should not be given access to the sea, no matter how narrow the territory separating it from the sea may have been. They decided to cut off the sources of rivers and isolated villages from the principal towns. This showed that the experts were not engaged in the task assigned to them. They had proceeded on the basis of an incorrect understanding of their instructions and had thought that they had been called upon to consider and decide a national problem. They had suggested a settlement which would spell misfortune for the population of the whole area and would adversely affect relations between Yugoslavia and Italy. It was for this reason that M. Molotov had said previously that any settlement such as this could only be proposed with the desire of punishing Yugoslavia. But there was no reason to punish Yugoslavia. Therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the experts was untenable. M. Molotov felt that even the French proposal had the same shortcoming as the American and British proposals. That shortcoming was that Trieste, the head of the Julian March, was cut off from the body, the whole territory.

It seemed to M. Molotov that it was not the experts but the Council which should decide the fundamental question of Trieste and that when it did decide it, it should take into consideration not only the findings of the experts, but the whole history of the problem, and that it should be borne in mind that this was a decision on a fundamental question of very great importance to the national existence of an ally, Yugoslavia. If they should succeed in deciding this principal question, the details could be left to the experts. But the main question must be decided by the Ministers. With this reservation, M. Molotov associated himself with the expression of gratitude to the industrious experts.

Mr. Byrnes wished to say a few words regarding the Italian map mentioned by M. Molotov (Map no. 10 in the Italian atlas, called Venezia Giulia). It was a fact that the map showed that at a point on the coast above Trieste there was a Slovene population. Actually there were 7,974 Slovenes living there. But in the same area there were 35,782 Italians. The experts had been instructed to draw a line which would be, in the main, the ethnic line, but it had also been instructed to consider specific economic and geographic features.

Mr. Byrnes wished also to indicate some features of the territory which would go to Yugoslavia under the American proposal. Yugoslavia would obtain the port of Fiume, the Idria mercury mines, an important area of forest land, some excellent power plants, most of the bauxite in Venezia Giulia, and a lot of good farming land. He wanted to say, with respect to the southern part of the American line, that it would leave the area coal mines in Italy, because three-fourths of the coal produced in Italy came from those mines. For ethnic reasons also it would [be] justifiable to give that southern area to Italy. It was Italian now in population. Mr. Byrnes did not believe that that important coal mine should be given to Yugoslavia since Yugoslavia had all the coal it needed, whereas Italy was very dependent on that coal.

M. Bidault mentioned that the Council had not finished its discussion on the consideration of the Yugoslav-Italian boundary and suggested that it adjourn, to meet again in the afternoon.

The meeting adjourned at 1:50 p.m.

18. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
19. The Report of the Commission on the Italo-Yugoslav Boundary, C.F.M. (46) 5, April 27, 1946, is printed p. 140. The lines recommended by the French, Soviet, British, and American experts on the Commission are set forth in annexes (pp. 149–152) to the Minutes of the 73rd Meeting of the Commission, April 28, 1916, and are indicated on the map facing p. 152.
20. According to Senator Vandenberg’s diary entry for May 4, 1946 (Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, p. 274), the Secretary of State used the figures of 375,000 new population and 1,890 square miles of territory.