Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes

United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Nineteenth Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, December 9, 1946, 4 p.m.⁵⁸

New York, December 9, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret
USDEL(CFM) (46) (NY) 19th meeting

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation proposed on Saturday⁵⁹ to hold the next session of the C.F.M. in Moscow. I would be happy to obtain agreement on this proposal.

Mr. Byrnes: The United States Delegation accepts with pleasure Mr. Molotov’s invitation. In this connection I would like to ask whether accommodations will be made available for the press since we hope that the press may submit reports on the work of the C.F.M. as it did in Paris and here. I don’t propose that we follow the same procedure as was followed at the Paris Conference but I hope that the same liberal procedure we have observed will be continued.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Government will be happy to see the Ministers in Moscow and everything will be done in spite of the housing difficulties to accommodate the correspondents and to create the most favorable conditions for their work. They will be able to report from Moscow on the proceedings of the Conference as they reported in Paris and New York.

Mr. Byrnes: That is satisfactory.

Mr. Bevin: I agree to Mr. Molotov’s proposal.

M. Couve de Murville: I also accept.

M. Molotov: Are there any suggestions as to the time of the Conference?

Mr. Byrnes: I suggest either March 3 or March 10.

Mr. Bevin: I prefer March 10.

The Ministers agreed to meet in Moscow on March 10.

M. Couve de Murville: The French Delegation has submitted a draft agenda (CFM(46) (NY)63).⁶⁰ It includes the U.S. and Soviet proposals.⁶¹ The only difference is in presentation. The first item, i.e., frontiers, is not like the U.S. proposal. The Saar is not mentioned although we wish to settle this question. The French Delegation raised the question of the Saar in April and June and would normally ask that this question be taken up again. But since we have all agreed that no matters of substance be taken up at the present time the French Delegation agrees that this matter be discussed at the next meeting. In this connection I would like to inform my colleagues that the French Government might find it necessary to take certain measures in the Saar of an administrative and conservatory character. The food situation in the Saar has forced us to send a considerable amount of food products, especially cereal, to the area. French public opinion would not understand it if these products were transferred to other areas of Germany. For this reason the French Government may have to institute controls. Furthermore, monetary controls may have to be placed in force. There is an inflow of German marks into the Saar which amounted to 13 billion francs last month. The French Government might have to take measures to control these matters. However, none of these economic or financial measures will prejudice future decisions of the C.F.M. on frontiers or reparations. They will not affect decisions regarding coal from the Saar. I merely wish to inform you of the preoccupation of the French Government in this respect and warn you of the preservative measures it may have to take.

The French Government also wishes to place on the agenda the Ruhr and Rhineland questions. French draft proposals in this connection have been previously submitted. This matter has been brought to the attention of the C.F.M. over a year ago but no reply has been received to the French proposals. Our proposals have a political and territorial implication. The last question I wish to raise is of a drafting character. The U.S. and Soviet draft agendas mention the future German Government. We deem it more advisable to speak of the political organization of Germany since this terminology is of a wider character and covers the Potsdam Decision to decentralize Germany. That is the reason why we speak of the political German organization rather than the future German Government.

Mr. Byrnes: Before we try to agree about the agenda for the March meeting I suggest that we endeavor to agree on what we will discuss and decide here. What will be done in Moscow will greatly depend upon the determination of this question. I again urge that the C.F.M. agree to my proposal concerning the appointment of the Special Deputies to consider the German question and to report to the C.F.M. two weeks prior to its next meeting. My second proposal was to the effect that the Deputies be instructed to hear the views of the directly interested governments before we make any decisions. The importance of that proposal is demonstrated by the French paper which lists the German frontiers as the first problem for discussion in March. It is perfectly clear what will happen when this procedure is made known. All the interested countries will say that it will be decided in Moscow to establish the German frontiers without giving those countries a chance to express their opinions. There can be only one result. Every representative will ask to be heard on the frontier question before the C.F.M. takes a decision and he will be told that there has been no agreement to discuss this matter prior to the March meeting. He will be told that in March deputies will be appointed to hear the views of the interested governments. The U.S. Government will inform any interested government that it will reach no decision on the German frontiers until that government has been heard.

I have submitted one more question for decision here—what information should we request the Control Council in Germany to furnish us for our next meeting. I agree to add the two items contained in the Soviet memorandum. The next question I would like to decide here concerns the appointment of special deputies for the drafting of the Austrian Treaty. Should we instruct them to examine the U.S. and U.K. draft proposals,⁶² and any other proposals that might be submitted, and to report to us in March, or should we wait until March and ask them to report back to us in July or November? I know it has been urged that we should first inform the deputies what we expected them to do. I disagree. I believe that the C.F.M. should obtain the information first and then should inform the Deputies what to do.

I wish to revert to the Soviet proposal which requests reports from the Control Council on the implementation of the decisions of the Berlin Conference, on the liquidation of Prussia, on the Committee of Coal Experts and on its activities in the past. Paragraphs 1, 5 and 6 list the subjects the Soviet Delegation wishes the Control Council to report on. This leaves points 2, 3 and 4 open for the Moscow Conference. Points 3 and 4 refer to the preparation of peace treaties with Germany and Austria. That work can only be done after the appointment of deputies. Thus only point 2 regarding the central German administration and the question of the German Government is left for the Moscow Conference. I wish to take decisions now so that when we meet in Moscow we can really start our work and make actual decisions and not restrict ourselves to the appointment of deputies.

Mr. Bevin: I support the U.S. proposal for this preliminary inquiry. I will not refer to the Saar now but may return to it later. I am trying to imagine what we could do in Moscow if the preliminary work suggested by Mr. Byrnes were not done. All I can see is a discussion of the preliminary reports of the Control Council and then the consideration of such questions as reparations. I am particularly anxious to give the interested governments opportunity to express their views. There has been a good deal of resentment in the past in this connection and much time was lost because we did not take this step. It is extremely desirable that we know the whole picture. We are all conversant with what happened in the past and the different interpretations that have been placed on the Potsdam Agreement. If we are going to Moscow merely to discuss the past, it would be simpler for the Control Council to circulate to us written reports for our consideration. There would be no need to convene to discuss these reports. The forward looking method, which should be clear to us, would be to obtain the whole picture before we meet. The deputies could obtain this picture and their report, together with the reports from the Control Council on the factual situation, would be extremely helpful to us. The deputies could not make any decisions—that would be up to the C.F.M. But they could study their information and could submit to us a better picture of the Germany we must deal with. This would include a picture of the frontiers. That is why I suggest that the deputies and the Control Council be called upon to investigate the German situation and to report to us. This preparatory work has never been done before. We have the experience of the past and we should be guided by it. The entire world is waiting for all decisions on how we will prevent Germany from undertaking acts of aggression in the future. This preparatory work will give confidence to the world that we are dealing with Germany in the right manner.

With respect to Austria I don’t understand why we cannot proceed at once. We have prepared five treaties and they would be good guides for the Austrian Treaty. Two drafts on Austria have been submitted and others can be tabled. I cannot see why the job cannot be completed by the deputies with the exception of a few unsettled points which we can dispose of in Moscow. We all wish to withdraw our troops from Europe. We could do so upon the completion of the Austrian Treaty and then concentrate on Germany. In such a circumstance the German picture would be much clearer.

It seems to me that the issue is a narrow one—namely, shall we decide to start our work now or wait until after March. Shall our deputies consider the views of the interested countries and the reports of the Control Council at the present time or after March. If we can agree on this point, I would then like to add a few items to the agenda but I believe that we should obtain agreement on the appointment of the deputies.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation is ready to give more detailed study to the appointment of the deputies and will make known its decision on this question at the next meeting of the Council. However, we must ascertain when and where the deputies will meet and also the questions they will discuss. I fear that if we appoint deputies at the present time they may have to repeat much of their work after we have exchanged views in the C.F.M. I fear if they start their work, not before final C.F.M. decisions but before an exchange of views in the C.F.M., they will have to repeat much of their work. But in view of the fact that there are insistent requests for the appointment of the deputies the Soviet Delegation is prepared to consider carefully this question.

It has been said that the deputies should hear interested states on the frontiers before the next meeting of the C.F.M. I am apprehensive that if we undertake to do this there may be press reports that the deputies are considering territorial claims. It will be reported that one country desires a section of Germany and another country desires another section. There will be agitation and a whetting up of appetites. This will produce disquiet in Germany. We shall thus acervate [acerbate?] the situation in Germany. We will not be achieving the results we desire. If the frontier question is discussed by the deputies, there will be disquiet in Germany and not only in Germany itself. I am also disturbed to note that the U.S. and French agendas commence with the German frontiers. I consider that it would be better not to separate this question but to include it in the preparation of the peace treaty with Germany. It is not advisable to concentrate interest on this question and to excite comment. I feel that it would be difficult to consider this question apart from the peace treaty as a whole. On the other hand, the Soviet Delegation attaches great importance to the reports of the Control Council on demilitarization, democratization, etc. Furthermore, the present situation in Germany including the economic issues and reparations are most important questions. The Control Council report should be one of the first questions on our agenda. After considering these reports we will have a clearer picture of Germany and we will be able to see more clearly how we can prevent Germany from becoming again an aggressive state, a threat to Europe and to the whole world. The question of German administration is also very important. I do not think that it is clearly formulated in the U.S. draft which speaks of a central German administration. It is even vaguer in the French draft. I am not familiar with the British attitude in this connection. However, this question will arise when we discuss Germany.

In conclusion I wish to state that if we increase the number of items on our agenda up to 10 we shall be undertaking too great a task. The items should be reduced as much as possible.

Mr. Byrnes: I am glad to learn that the Soviet Delegation will consider the question of appointing deputies. I hope that Mr. Molotov will bear in mind that although the interested governments will make a great deal of noise when it is known that the deputies are to hear their views there can be no doubt that this noise will be greater in March. Our deputies can ascertain the facts on which we will base our conclusions or we can make our conclusions and then ask the deputies to ascertain the facts to support our conclusions. The fact is that the interested governments will know about our exchange of views and our directives to the deputies. If the deputies do not find the right facts, there will be more noise. I hope that Mr. Molotov will agree to permit the deputies to ascertain the facts on which we will base our conclusions.

Mr. Bevin: Mr. Molotov mentioned the U.K. position on the German Government. The subject of the implementation of the Potsdam Decisions has often been discussed at the Control Council. Our policy has always been to support the Potsdam Decisions. We are in favor of a federal Germany with certain services at the center such as foreign policy. Our main worry is how to make ourselves secure. We have no other motive. We want to build up a democratic Germany which will give us security. We have no ideological motive. The objective of the British people is to avoid war in the future. I will go along with my colleagues and study the questions as to how to get security, how to teach Germany the lessons of democracy and how not to have a cesspool of cheap labor in the East. These questions need careful study but I am sure we shall be successful if we approach them in the proper spirit. I see that reparation is on the Soviet agenda. I am willing to discuss reparation but I must warn you that we cannot find one more dollar to pour into Germany. Germany must find its own means of paying reparations. With respect to the reports of the Control Council I want to know how much has been taken out of Germany. I want to know how much everybody has received. I want a factual report. I also want to know how many German prisoners of war and other Germans are abroad and how many Germans Germany will have to absorb. I think we ought to know what is the value of German assets in the ceded territories. A great part of Germany has been transferred to Polish administration. We must have a clear picture of the financial situation. We must know the whole value of the assets taken out of Germany. I would like all these questions to be investigated so that in March we will have all the facts. We should have all the territorial, economic, political and financial facts.

In conclusion I would like to know whether the agreement to appoint deputies includes the appointment of deputies to study the Austrian question.

M. Molotov: I would consider this.

May we discuss the agenda? I propose that the first question on the agenda be the reports of the Control Council.

Mr. Byrnes: I urge that first of all we agree on what we shall ask the Control Council to report. I suggest that our request include the U.S. items, the two Soviet items and any items the U.K. or the French Delegations might like to add.

M. Molotov: I don’t object to the report covering both items 5 and 6 of the Soviet agenda. The Soviet Delegation has suggested that the report should deal with the decisions of the Berlin Conference regarding demilitarization, democratization, etc. We believe that the report should explain what has and has not been done to fulfill the decisions of the Berlin Conference. I thought this had been agreed to. The second item might be item 3 of the U.S. draft. It would be logical to arrange our requests in this order. The first part would deal with the past and the second part with the future.

Mr. Byrnes: I suggested on Saturday that we add to paragraph III of the U.S. proposal paragraph I of the Soviet proposal. Then subsection D of the U.S. proposal would be paragraph V of the Soviet proposal. I believe that in calling on the Control Council for a report we should include every subject we are interested in. In addition to paragraphs I and V of the Soviet proposal there will also be paragraph VI regarding coal.

M. Molotov: I do not object to this order but I think it would be preferable to start with the past, that is the report as mentioned in paragraph I of the Soviet proposal. We might then include A and B of paragraph III of the U.S. proposal and then conclude with paragraphs V and VI of the Soviet proposal. I think it would be better to switch paragraphs A and B of the U.S. proposal because it would be more correct chronologically to discuss the central agency first and then the composition of the provisional government.

Mr. Byrnes: I have no objection to this re-arrangement. Paragraph III of the U.S. proposal merely calls on the Control Council to prepare these reports and to be ready to file them two weeks before we meet. This paragraph does not govern the order in which we will discuss these subjects in March. If we can agree on the subjects we desire to discuss, if we can appoint our deputies, we can name representatives now to arrange the order of the agenda. The important thing is to appoint our deputies and to ask the Control Council for the information.

M. Couve de Murville: I must confess that I am lost. Before clearing up the order of the agenda there are certain matters of substance which we should clarify. We are asking for a report on the past and present. We are not asking for decisions. But if we ask the Control Council for a report on the provisional government of Germany this implies that a decision has been taken to create such a government. This is an entirely new question. We propose a report on the economic unity of Germany and on the central agencies together with the political organization of Germany under quadripartite control. We need information on these items.

Mr. Bevin: Does paragraph 3 of Section III of the U.S. proposal deal with the past?

Mr. Byrnes: Paragraph B deals with the establishment of central agencies and other problems connected with the economic and political future of Germany under quadripartite government. It deals with those agencies which would have to be created in the future while the Allied forces are in occupation of Germany. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Couve de Murville and believe it would be preferable to say “the provisional organization of Germany under quadripartite government” rather than “the political future of Germany”. We know that we shall have to have a political organization in Germany for some time to come but how shall we obtain the best organization. Our representatives there on the spot are qualified and they are the best men to make recommendations for improving the political organization. They can inform us of the best means of organizing Germany in the future.

M. Couve de Murville: Would Mr. Byrnes’ statement mean that in paragraph A of Section III of the U.S. proposal the words “a provisional German Government” would be replaced by “a provisional political organization of Germany under quadripartite government”.

M. Molotov: There is some uncertainty in our discussion. We must formulate an agenda that would not prejudice the solution of these questions. If we accept the French language, we exclude the possibility of discussing the question of a central German administration.

M. Couve de Murville: We exclude this possibility only in connection with the report from the Control Council. Does Mr. Molotov believe that this formula would preclude the C.F.M. from discussing this matter?

M. Molotov: It is difficult to reply. I am primarily interested in what the C.F.M. will discuss. We cannot bind the C.F.M. by decisions which might exclude the possibility of discussing a central German administration. It is not important whether these discussions are based on a report from the Control Council or not. I doubt that the Control Council can report on this subject. If it does, we should not stop them from expressing their views—that is single or several views.

Mr. Byrnes: I agree.

Mr. Bevin: I don’t know what is being proposed. I would like to see a clean draft.

Mr. Byrnes: I merely agreed with the statements made. No proposals have thus far been put forward for acceptance. I believe that we should request our deputies to reconcile our drafts. There are too many papers and we cannot proceed very far. I agreed to what I thought was the proposal, paragraph III, that is to arrange it chronologically. I thought that there was no opposition but Mr. Bevin says he does not understand the proposal. I think it would be best to ask that representatives of each delegation endeavor to come to agreement on this point.

M. Molotov: Do we surrender to the deputies?

Mr. Byrnes: Yes.

Mr. Bevin: We can include in the proposal those subjects we so desire.

Mr. Byrnes: Our representatives would undertake to go ahead on the other proposals.

M. Molotov: Let’s decide one question. Shall we come to agreement on the agenda tonight or shall we refer it to our deputies.

Mr. Byrnes: It would be better to refer the matter to the deputies. We would have time to give them instructions tonight.

M. Molotov: Could we meet tomorrow morning? There is a session of the General Assembly at 4 o’clock tomorrow afternoon.

Mr. Bevin: What will we discuss? As I understand it the deputies’ report is not ready.

Mr. Byrnes: We could meet in the morning if there was any hope that we could make progress on the treaties. There is still the financial question concerning funds for the Free Territory. There is a report on this question. There is also an economic report which could be discussed tomorrow morning.

Mr. Bevin: I suggest that the deputies meet at 10 o’clock and we meet at 11:30. They could clear up this matter before lunch. Could we meet twice on Wednesday to clear up all the outstanding points?

The Ministers agreed to meet at 11:00 a.m. on December 10.

58. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
59. December 7.
60. Ante, p. 1478.
61. The reference here is to CFM(46) (NY)57, December 6, 1946, and CFM(46) (NY)60, December 7, 1946, pp. 1464 and 1476.
62. The reference here is to document CFM(46)119, June 20, 1946, containing United States proposals for a Draft Treaty with Austria, and CFM(46)151, June 26, 1946, the Draft Heads of a Treaty with Austria, proposed by the United Kingdom. Neither of these documents is printed.