C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes

Memorandum of Conversation56

secret
Participants: U.S.
Secretary Byrnes
Mr. Bohlen
U.S.S.R.
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

Subjects:

1.
Moscow as meeting place of next session of CFM.
2.
Trusteeship.
3.
Greece.
4.
Appointment of Deputies to hear views of other countries on Germany.

The Secretary said that before they got on to the subject of trusteeship, he wished to tell Mr. Molotov that so far as the United States is concerned he was prepared to accept the invitation to Moscow for the next meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. But there was one point that was troubling him on that score. Last December at their conference there the newspaper correspondents had not been able to obtain or send out any accurate information and as a result, the results of the conference had not been fully understood by public opinion in the United States. He said he hoped this time that Mr. Molotov could assure him that the newspaper correspondents would be given the same facilities that they have had in Paris and in New York for covering the conference.

Mr. Molotov said the only limitation as to newspaper correspondents would be the question of accommodations and that everything else would be done. He said the Soviet Government, subject to the limitation of space, would admit any correspondents the Secretary desired.

The Secretary thanked Mr. Molotov and suggested as to a date that the first or second Monday in March might be an appropriate date for the opening. He said either March 3 or March 10 would be agreeable to him.

[Page 1480]

[Here follows a discussion of the question of trusteeship, printed in Volume I.]

Greece

Mr. Molotov then suggested that they should have a discussion about Greece, which the Secretary had brought up at their last private meeting.57

The Secretary remarked that although Mr. Tsaldaris had appeared to him to be in bad physical shape, it had been the Greek Ambassador who had died.

Mr. Molotov said that in addition to being in bad physical health, he felt that Mr. Tsaldaris was not an adequate Prime Minister and satisfied only a small minority in Greece.

The Secretary remarked that internal politics of some countries was so confused it was difficult to tell the extent or lack of support any political figure enjoyed. He said he only knew one thing: there was a terrible situation in northern Greece which he had had confirmed in reports from independent sources. He thought the only method of improving the situation would be first of all to ascertain the facts. He said he was sure that all wished to see peace restored in this area and to bring to an end the daily incidents which were causing the death of 25 to 50 people each day. In a situation such as this where there were charges and countercharges, the only correct method was to send an impartial commission on the spot in order to ascertain the facts and then on the basis of the facts consider what could be done.

Mr. Molotov said that he was afraid that such a commission would merely aggravate the situation and focus attention on these difficulties, which, in his opinion, would not be conducive to restoration of tranquility. He said more concrete measures should be undertaken and not actions which would stir up more noise. He felt that the difficulty was that the Greek Government did not have sufficient authority.

The Secretary replied that he had come to the conclusion that Tsaldaris had made a real effort to broaden the basis of his government and had even offered to relinquish the Prime Ministership to Sophoulis but the latter had refused. He said this information had led him to believe that Mr. Tsaldaris had been sincere in his effort. He repeated that they should try to do something to improve the situation and he still felt the first step would be to ascertain the truth. He inquired if Mr. Molotov had any specific suggestions.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had no concrete suggestions but that he thought that Tsaldaris not only did not enjoy widespread support but was not even well thought of by some of his closest followers. It was necessary to find some practical measures to improve the situation, and not to take steps which would stir up passions, which were always [Page 1481] dangerous in the Balkans. He felt the main trouble was that Tsaldaris was not a competent or adequate Prime Minister.

The Secretary said that he felt that Tsaldaris had made a sincere effort to improve his government and he felt that they should devise some method in order to improve the situation, and repeated that he felt an impartial commission was the first step.

Mr. Molotov again stated that he felt a commission would not be helpful but would increase disturbances.

Special Deputies to Hear Views on Germany

The Secretary then said he wished to bring up another subject and that was what was Mr. Molotov’s particular objection to the appointment of special deputies in order to hear the views of other countries before the Council met on Germany.

Mr. Molotov said that he felt that if they appointed Deputies before the Ministers had reached any agreement, the Deputies work would be in large measure useless and would have to be repeated by the Ministers at a later date. He felt that the Ministers should at least agree on one or two points and then the Deputies would know the approach of their governments to the questions at issue and would have a real prospect of fruitful work. He said the Ministers themselves must prepare these matters and the Deputies could not do so.

The Secretary said he could not see that point of view and he felt that to deny other interested governments the right to make their views known would cause much hard feeling on the grounds that they were being confronted with fait accomplis. He said, for example, that they had had communications from the Netherlands and Poland concerning the frontier of Germany and that if the Deputies could hear the views of other countries they would then be in the position to inform the Ministers when they meet again. He emphasized again that the Deputies would have no power of decision but merely of reporting what they had heard to the Ministers.

  1. The conversation was held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel at 3 p.m.
  2. The reference here is to the conversation of December 6, 1946; see the memorandum, p. 1437.