Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes

United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Seventeenth Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, December 6, 1946, 4 p.m..¹⁵

New York, December 6, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret
USDEL(CFM) (46) (NY)17th Meeting

Deputies’ Report¹⁶

Mr. Dunn: Statute for the Free Territory of Trieste. Article 31A of the Statute for the Free Territory of Trieste, Freedom of Transit, was accepted by the Deputies and is referred to the Ministers for approval.¹⁷ Article 31B—Railways—The U.S. and U.K. Delegations can accept the first phrase of this article, whereas the U.S.S.R. feels that the second part, in brackets, should be retained.¹⁸ The French Delegation proposes a redraft of the bracketed phrases. Article 31C—Civil Aviation.¹⁹ The phrase in brackets “and to land for non-commercial purposes” which is the phrase used in Article 71 of the Italian Treaty is proposed by the French, U.K. and U.S. Delegations. The Soviet Delegation considers it unnecessary.

Financing of the Salary of the Governor of Trieste

A draft letter to the Secretary General suggesting that funds be provided for the salary and expenses of the Governor of the Free Territory is submitted for the Ministers’ consideration.²⁰

Special Facilities in the Free Port of Trieste

A new text for an article to be embodied in the Instrument for the Free Port of Trieste was discussed by the Deputies this morning and two alternate proposals are submitted.²¹ The first, proposed by the French, U.K. and U.S. Delegations, reproduces the Conference recommendations under 11B and modifies the original French proposal for this article. The Soviets proposed that their text be substituted for this proposal.

Procedure for Final Signature

Two phases in the preparation of the treaties for signature are envisaged. The first involves the mechanical preparation of the texts of the five treaties in all the necessary languages which will require that a competent group remain in New York for final drafting and checking. The Deputies agreed that the time required for this purpose would be not less than one month. It is assumed that the Ministers will designate their representatives on this group. The second phase includes the submission of the printed and approved text to all signatories for their consideration prior to final signature. It is believed this should not require more than three weeks. The Deputies agreed to recommend that the treaties could be signed between February 1st and 15th either at the place where the Ministers are meeting or in Paris. In connection with the final version, the French representative asks that in addition to the authentic language versions of the Balkan and Finnish treaties an official French translation be authorized as being one of the languages of the Council of Foreign Ministers. In as much as the preparation of the final treaties involves the approval of the Security Council to the Permanent Statute for the Free Territory of Trieste, the Provisional Instrument and the Statute of the Free Port of Trieste it is recommended that authorization be given to transmit these documents to the Security Council as soon as possible. This will enable the Security Council to take action before final signature and eliminate the necessity of possible alterations at a later date. The Ministers might likewise wish to consider naming a small committee which on an informal basis could be called upon by the Security Council if explanation of the text should be desired.

Danubian Conference

The Deputies agreed upon the wording of the proposal to call the Danubian Conference and the order in which these states participating in the conference should be listed.²²

Article 31A of Statute for Free Territory of Trieste (Freedom of Transit); Draft Letter to UN on Salary of Governor of the Free Territory; Text on the Danubian Conference

M. Couve de Murville: We can first approve the points that the Deputies agreed on, that is, Article 31A of the Permanent Statute, the draft letter to UN on the salary of the Governor, and the new text on the Danube.

(Agreed)

Article 31B of Statute (Railways)

We can now turn to points which are not agreed, 31B and 31 C of the Permanent Statute for Trieste.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation accepts the French wording of 31B.

Mr. Byrnes: The United States Delegation would prefer it if in the fourth line the words “jointly or severally” were struck out and if the following language down to “railway” in the sixth line were accepted and a period put there, with the rest deleted.

Mr. Bevin: Yes, it would be better to let them negotiate it. They can negotiate a railroad agreement. It would be better not to go into the details.

M. Couve de Murville: Then the United Kingdom Delegation also requests that we stop before the brackets?

M. Molotov: Perhaps it would be possible to accept the first amendment suggested by Mr. Byrnes, but not the second.

Mr. Bevin: You mean wipe out the words in brackets and maintain “jointly and severally”?

M. Molotov: No, the contrary.

Mr. Byrnes: My objection to the last part is that it provides for joint operation of the terminal. I would have to buy three tickets, one from the Yugoslavs, one from the Italians, and one from the Free Territory.

M. Couve de Murville: The object of this is to avoid three tickets. The difference between the original Soviet text and the French draft is that the former provided for obligatory joint operation of the railroad and the latter left the door open.

Mr. Byrnes: What confuses the situation is that the language provides for the operating by the authorities of Italy, Yugoslavia, and the Free Territory of the railway terminal. If it was by agreement of the three Powers, that would be all right. We should strike out the words, “authorities of the Free Territory, Yugoslavia and Italy”, and “and also for the operation of the railroad and terminal facilities on that part of the line, to all”.

M. Couve de Murville: “Authority” is not an appropriate word. It will be the railroad services who will operate the common railroad station, not the Governments. We have no objections to Mr. Byrnes’ amendment.

Mr. Bevin: How would it read?

M. Couve de Murville: Then it would read, “Without prejudice to its proprietary rights over the railways within its boundaries and its control of the railway administration, the Free Territory may negotiate with Yugoslavia and Italy [jointly or severally]²³ agreements for the purpose of insuring the efficient and economical operation of its railways. Such agreements would determine where responsibility lies for the operation of the railways under the direction of Yugoslavia and Italy, respectively, and also for the operation of the railway terminal and facilities on that part of the line which is common to all. In the latter case, such operation may be effected by a special commission comprised of representatives of the Free Territory, Yugoslavia and Italy and under the chairmanship of the representative of the Free Territory.”

(Agreed)

M. Couve de Murville: “Jointly or severally” comes out. I think Mr. Molotov has accepted it.

M. Molotov: I agree.

Article 31C of Statute for Free Territory of Trieste (Civil Aviation)

M. Couve de Murville: There are several words in brackets in 31C, “and to land for non-commercial purposes”. I think the Soviet Delegation has objections.

M. Molotov: If the words in brackets are kept, it will go against the general character of this article which deals with “commercial planes”.

Mr. Byrnes: These words in brackets are in every treaty. I think there must be some misunderstanding to cause objections for their inclusion in the Statute for the Free Territory. Under this clause a private plane could land but not transact business.

M. Molotov: It was a mistake in the other treaties. We did not propose to let non-commercial planes land. In all the treaties it refers only to “commercial planes”.

Mr. Byrnes: It does not mean to land for military purposes. A plane could land to refuel and get repairs or if a passenger was ill. They could land, provided it was not for commercial purposes.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation has never had in mind anything but commercial planes in any of the treaties. We could not agree to anything else.

Mr. Byrnes: There is no disagreement. It simply means that a noncommercial plane could land only for these purposes.

M. Molotov: The fact is that there are commercial and noncommercial planes, i.e., military planes. We had in mind only non-military planes. We couldn’t accept military planes on any account.

Mr. Byrnes: There is no disagreement. The words that govern are the words “civil aircraft”: “Civil aircraft registered in the territory of any one of the United Nations which grants the same rights to civil aircraft registered in the Free Territory shall be granted the right to fly over the Free Territory without landing and to use for traffic purposes such airports as may be designated by the competent authorities of the Free Territory, and civil aircraft can land for non-commercial purposes.” We can make it plain by changing the language in the brackets, “and such civil aircraft can land for non-commercial purposes”.

M. Molotov: Wherever we refer to civil aviation, civil aircraft, I should like to put in, in order to avoid misunderstanding, in brackets the word “commercial”.

Mr. Bevin: We are all thinking the same thing. I think the words Mr. Molotov suggests would knock out private planes, civilian aircraft but privately owned.

M. Molotov: The fact is we agree as regards commercial aviation. As to other planes, let those who are anxious to provide for them negotiate with the respective countries. It is not a matter for the peace treaty.

Mr. Byrnes: I have no objection to it. If Mr. Molotov were flying a plane and wanted to land there, I would not object. But if he objects and wants it specified that it is commercial, I’ll agree.

M. Molotov: I shall agree if the same right is granted to my colleagues. Let us have the Deputies arrange the wording.

M. Couve de Murville: And with the guiding principle that these provisions apply to civil commercial aircraft.

Special Facilities in the Free Port of Trieste

M. Couve de Murville: The next item, “Special Facilities in the Free Port”. There are two texts, the French–U.K.–U.S.A. text and the Soviet text.

M. Molotov: Could we accept the French wording proposed at the Conference? It raised no misgivings. The Delegation who objected was the Soviet, and it withdraws its objections.

Mr. Bevin: That is the first paragraph?

M. Couve de Murville: There are two different things in this proposal of the three Delegations. There is first the first paragraph, which takes up provisions contained in the recommendation of the Conference concerning the Free Territory. I think in paragraph b dealing with economic provisions, this paragraph reads, “that the establishment of free zones under the exclusive jurisdiction of any country is incompatible with the juridical Statute of the Free Port”, and then there is a second point dealing with special privileges to be accorded to Yugoslavia and Italy. The second point comprises of two paragraphs, and it takes up the proposal which was made in Paris by the French Delegation. Mr. Molotov has focused the discussion on this second point. He suggested to take out the wording originally proposed by the French Delegation in Paris and which slightly differs both from the wording of the proposal of the U.S., U.K. and French Delegation and of the Soviet proposal. I consider that the suggestion of Mr. Molotov was to accept paragraph 2 of the U.K. and U.S. and French Delegations’ proposal with the addition after the word “may” of the words “at the request of the Yugoslav or Italian Government”.

M. Molotov: Not quite. We tried to make some changes in the text of the French proposal which was embodied in the provisions for the Port of Trieste, the French text that was proposed in Paris. This wording will be found in paragraph 3, but I am prepared not to insist on our language but accept the French language as contained in the provisions for the Free Port. This text reads as follows: With the object of satisfying special needs of shipping of Yugoslavia and Italy in the Adriatic, the Director of the Free Port at the request of the Governments of Yugoslavia and Italy and in case of a positive advice from the International Commission shall be entitled to grant any commercial vessels flying the flag of any one of the two Governments the exclusive right to use berths in certain parts of the area. If we could accept the language proposed by the French Delegation in Paris, paragraph 3 would be made up as follows: the first part of it would be that which has been agreed by all of us, excluding the word “two”; and the concluding part would be also that which has been agreed by all of the Delegations; and in between them would be the text which has just been read out, the text of the French language proposed in Paris. Altogether this article will consist of three paragraphs.

Mr. Bevin: The preamble would go in. What about the words, “establishment of free zones under the exclusive jurisdiction of any country”? Does that remain in?

M. Molotov: No, delete that.

Mr. Byrnes: That is the only thing the Conference did recommend.

M. Molotov: If you are insistent on this recommendation, I will agree that there will be four paragraphs.

Mr. Bevin: And this paragraph beginning with the words, “The conditions under which reservations are made”, does that go out? Is there any objection to that?

M. Molotov: This will then be the fifth paragraph. Why so few?

Mr. Bevin: Because we want to make it clear. Then perhaps we should keep only one, the first paragraph.

M. Couve de Murville: Mr. Molotov proposes to delete this paragraph, so we will agree to include the four paragraphs.

M. Molotov: One paragraph will not be enough? A single paragraph? Then we shall remove all questions in dispute.

M. Couve de Murville: I think we are agreed as to the four paragraphs for the time being.

M. Molotov: I have just been advised in regard to paragraph 1 that there are different views on the subject of the frontiers of the four zones as of 1939. We have in mind the two zones as to which there is no disagreement, but another two zones are included, and that is the subject of disagreement.

M. Couve de Murville: Up to now our Committee considered that the Free Port consisted of two zones only, but it appears that an Italian law passed in 1925 has set up two more free zones in the Port, one a timber zone and one an oil zone. Should these two zones be added to our former concept of the Free Port which included only the two former zones?

Mr. Bevin: Why not leave the “two” out and have only the words, “installation of free zones” and let them settle locally what the free zones are. It would then read: “shall include the territory and installation of the free zones of the Port of Trieste within the limitations of the 1939 boundary”. I suppose everybody in Trieste knows what the free zones are.

M. Molotov: No, there are differences of opinion.

Mr. Bevin: Here, yes. But there may not be locally.

M. Molotov: We ought to eliminate this misunderstanding.

Mr. Bevin: I have adopted the words that the Soviet Delegation proposed in Paris.

M. Molotov: The words as well as the map?

Mr. Bevin: It should be a question of agreeing on the map.

M. Molotov: We must have a more accurate definition. Various maps may be presented.

Mr. Bevin: I am told that in 1939 there were four zones. I assume nobody wants to cut the port down in order to handicap it. We want it to be prosperous.

M. Molotov: Let us agree not to cut down and not to extend.

Mr. Bevin: Very well. On the basis of 1939.

M. Molotov: We will have to reconcile our views.

Mr. Bevin: Then it is a question of what existed in 1939.

M. Couve de Murville: Do we refer this to the Committee, or do we retain the text as it stands now with the two free zones.

Mr. Bevin: Leave out “two” and adopt that text, and then at the next meeting of the Ministers we could decide how many zones.

M. Molotov: I have no objections.

Mr. Bevin: Leave the text as it is and go on to determine the map.

M. Couve de Murville: Do we ask the Trieste Committee to reconsider this question and determine what should be indicated in the map?

Mr. Byrnes: Are we to strike out “map annex” and leave it?

M. Couve de Murville: I understand that we reserve this question and will take it up again tomorrow after the Trieste Committee has reached agreement as to the zones.

Mr. Byrnes: The map that was presented to us has four zones. Therefore if we leave the words “map annex”, all right, if we are going to attach this map. If we are not, I am entirely willing to scratch the map and leave it to the people on the ground to determine how many there are. Or, if we are going to determine it, then I would stick by the map.

M. Molotov: I have a map with two zones, and I don’t know which is better.

Mr. Bevin: I suggest that we adopt this article, take out the words, “map annex” and take out the word “two”, and leave that until we have an agreed map.

M. Molotov: I think that your first proposal was more convenient because it might appear possible to reach agreement and not to raise any more disputes.

M. Couve de Murville. Are there any objections to referring this question to the Trieste Committee so that they might reach agreement?

(Agreed)

Procedure for Final Signature of the Treaties

M. Couve de Murville: The next item is the final drafting of the treaties. The Deputies think that one month will be sufficient, and that the work should be done in New York after the Ministers have finished.

M. Molotov: No objection.

Mr. Byrnes: I would like to emphasize “sooner if possible”.

M. Couve de Murville: Once the final texts are agreed, they would be sent to all the signatory countries. The next stage is the signing itself, and it is suggested that this should take place between February 1 and February 15 either at the place where the Council of Ministers will be in session or in Paris. Is it possible to decide on this before knowing the date when the Council of Ministers will meet for its next session?

M. Byrnes: I don’t think we could.

M. Couve de Murville: If that date were too late, we would have to provide for signature of the treaties earlier.

Mr. Byrnes: I think we will have to leave this question until we decide when the Council will meet.

M. Couve de Murville: The next question was raised by the French Delegation this morning as to whether in the case of the Balkan and Finnish Treaties an official French translation should exist side by side with the official text and the translation into the languages of the ex-enemy countries.

(Agreed)

Reference to the Security Council of Drafts of Permanent Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste, the Provisional Instrument, and the Statute of the Free Port

M. Couve de Murville: The next item is to refer to the Security Council right away the draft of the Permanent Statute of the Free Territory, the Provisional Instrument, and the Statute of the Free Port.

(Agreed)

Shall we ask the Deputies to prepare a letter to send the text to the Security Council. That completes the Deputies’ report.

Mr. Byrnes: How about the appointment of that committee which on an informal basis can be called upon by the Security Council? I suggest that whoever is made representative of the Council in charge of drafting after the adjournment of this Council should serve as the Committee.

(Agreed)

Mr. Bevin: When shall we take up the Italian Navy?

M. Couve de Murville: I would suggest taking up first the fourth report of the Economic Committee and then going on to the Naval report.

Danubian Conference

Mr. Byrnes: How about the wording on the Danube? Is that agreed to? (Agreed)

Fourth Report of the Economic Committee²⁴

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation has no objections as regards this report of the Economic Experts, and we remove our brackets in paragraph 3.

M. Couve de Murville: May we approve the whole of this report to which there are no objections? There are only two points which have to be settled because the Economic Committee hadn’t enough time to deal with them.

(Agreed)

Report of the Naval Committee²⁵

M. Couve de Murville: We shall pass on to the report of the Naval Committee, then.

Mr. Bevin: Mr. Chairman, there is one thing set forth in the naval report which has never been before the meeting, and which I think we have to settle in principle before we do any other thing. As I understand it, we have had a claim from the Dutch for 13,000 tons of shipping, compensation for the ships they had sunk in the Mediterranean. They lost 85,000 tons, and as against that the Dutch have claimed 13,000 tons, which covers the ships, a sloop, a tanker, and tugs, and it affects the balance there is to distribute. They appear to have lost six troopships making a total of 85,000. They lost one destroyer, 1628 tons, in addition. The percentage of claims against losses in the Mediterranean is 16 per cent. My Government thinks that this Dutch claim is reasonable.

M. Molotov: If we postpone the settlement of this question, new claimants may appear, and we will find ourselves in a difficult position.

Mr. Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I may say that Brazil made a claim, and I had stated to the representatives of Brazil that the United States would consider a recommendation that out of the ships allotted to the United States provision be made for one ship to Brazil, and I do not ask to disturb this allotment as it now stands.

M. Couve de Murville: It seems really difficult at this late stage to consider new claims, all the more so since if we take into consideration the Dutch or Brazilian claims other countries might lodge claims also, countries who have incurred losses at the hands of the Italian Navy.

Mr. Byrnes: I wonder if, in view of the fact that the Dutch are making a claim, and Brazil, too—if, in the spirit that exists out at the United Nations to limit armament, we could not agree to scrap these ships. Then we would not have any quarrel about the disposition.

M. Molotov: A good idea, but the application of the question is too narrow.

Mr. Bevin: I am willing to sink the lot.

M. Molotov: I cannot yet recover my senses as a result of such rapid decision.

Mr. Bevin: It is not rapid decision; it is preconceived notions. It would save trouble.

M. Molotov: We think we had better proceed with the taking of the decision on the report that was submitted to us by the experts.

Mr. Bevin: I think we ought to clear the Dutch, whether they are going to be in or out.

M. Molotov: No, it is too late to change what has been mapped out and we will have to shuffle it all over again.

Mr. Bevin: New Zealand and Australia have told me that they will not make any claims; they have lost a lot of ships and they will not make any claims.

M. Couve de Murville: What do we decide then concerning this Dutch claim? I take it the three Delegations consider that it is impossible to meet the claim.

Mr. Bevin: What do we say to the Dutch? What is the basis for rejecting their claim?

M. Molotov: On the basis of what we have discussed up till now. Mr. Bevin seems to have at his disposal much material to give that reply.

Mr. Bevin: Mr. Molotov is not relying on justice. He is relying on my ingenuity.

M. Molotov: The proven skill.

M. Couve de Murville: It would be easy enough, I think, to find a basis for an answer in the facts. We have decided that this allocation is made on the basis of loss of warships only and loss suffered with certainty pursuant to action of the Italian Navy. In the case of the Netherlands, only one destroyer of 1600 tons has been sunk by the Italian Navy and even in that case, it is not quite certain whether it was Italian naval action which was the cause of this loss.

Mr. Byrnes: Are we going to send this back to the Committee to rearrange it, or what?

M. Couve de Murville: I think we should reach a decision as to the principle concerning this Dutch request.

Mr. Byrnes: I am not suggesting anything because I think the United Kingdom has a lot to say about these ships as war booty. I am not making any suggestions.

M. Molotov: I second the motion made by M. Couve de Murville and suggest that we either proceed to take a decision or make some other suggestion.

(The Ministers recessed for fifteen minutes.)

M. Couve de Murville: Can we begin now?

Mr. Bevin: Mr. Chairman, we had a talk. The whole of our policy depends on what we said on this schedule, and if a settlement can be effected having regard to all the circumstances, the part the British Navy played with the aid of the American Navy, then the United States and ourselves will take care of Holland.

We are ready to accept Greece, ready to accept Yugoslavia, we can accept France. Great Britain is willing to accept column C (of the schedule presented by the Naval Committee). We are prepared to support the Americans on A and the Soviets on B. That gives Greece 7,533 tons, gives Yugoslavia 5,218 tons, to the United States 48,071 tons, gives to the Soviet Union 51,262 tons, gives to the United Kingdom 47,930 tons, and it gives to France 47,667 tons, almost equal to Britain. And out of the 47,930 that Great Britain and the 48,071 the United States receive, they will look after Holland. We have done that to try to give effect to the spirit and intention of the Teheran decision. Having regard to the fighting we did and the ships we lost in trying to bring the Italian Navy down in the interest of the Allied cause, I think we are acting generously and fairly to all the Allies.

Mr. Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I find upon investigation that the claim of the Netherlands was filed in September. The Committee, however, did not consider the allotment that was presented to it. What the Netherlands asks for is a tanker, 10,000 tons, and the two tankers here have been given to France. I do not want to disturb that and there is no other way that I know of that the problem can be solved other than that which was presented by Mr. Bevin. He has asked me as to whether or not I would undertake to assist in satisfying the requests of the Netherlands. I cannot agree as to the specific request because I am not in possession of information that would enable me to say whether or not there is a possibility of giving to the Netherlands a tanker, which the Netherlands has requested, but I will undertake to share with the United Kingdom the giving to the Netherlands some tonnage instead of the specific request they have submitted. The United States will also endeavor to satisfy the request of Brazil, but I do not want to make any specific commitment as to any specific type of ship, either as to the Netherlands or to Brazil. In other words, we will take care of Brazil, and we will assist the United Kingdom in taking care of the Netherlands. I think that is the only way it can be done because we cannot disturb the allotment which the Naval Committee have worked out over many weeks, I should have said, many months.

M. Molotov: I think that we can take it that we have reached final agreement as regards those ships which are to be allotted to Greece, Yugoslavia and France. It remains for us to settle the question of the three groups, A, B and C. Of course, we most highly appreciate the services of the British and American Navies in the recent war, as well as those of their Armies, but if one is to speak of the recent war which is still fresh in our memories, then no one, I think will underrate the role played by the Soviet Union in the war against Italy. I shall not now compare the services of our countries and I think that we can take it that the services of our three countries have been duly appreciated by all the peoples. The new questions which we heard today relate to Brazil and Holland. As far as I have understood, the solution regarding the claims of these countries has been found. Now, it remains for us to settle the question of the groups A, B and C with regard to those countries which we represent, namely, the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. I would suggest that we approach this problem basing ourselves on the principle of equal treatment of our three countries and that we settle this question by drawing lots. This will not be offensive to any one of us and will, on the contrary, demonstrate that we are anxious for the equal treatment of each one of us.

Mr. Bevin: I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I can’t agree to drawing lots. This must be settled. We have two points, first the settlement of the Italian Navy; secondly, the return of the British and American ships that were sent to Soviet Russia. On the basis of the Teheran Agreement²⁶ my instructions are that I must settle it across the table, and I think we ought to settle it in a good spirit. I think the offer I have made on behalf of the United Kingdom, who had the bitter fight in the Mediterranean against Italy, is sound and fair. I have gone into this very closely. I was a member of the Churchill Cabinet at the time of Teheran. There was one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, and I instructed the representatives in the Naval Committee to carry out in spirit exactly what was agreed. The reason that there are not eight destroyers is because there wasn’t enough to go around to satisfy France, Yugoslavia, Greece and the other countries, and, therefore, it is six, but the principle that we followed is the actual undertaking we gave at Teheran. In addition, we have given additional tonnage and that is an adequate compensation, and it is strictly in conformity, I understand, with what was arrived at in Teheran. In addition to that, the United States and ourselves have undertaken to take care of Brazil and Holland, and I don’t think anything could be fairer. I hope that we will be able to accept this.

M. Molotov: I should like to reply on the subject of Teheran. I was in Teheran and I am a little acquainted with the matter. I am able to recall that at that time it was the question of those ships of the Italian Navy which were to be divided, allocated in anticipation of a future division of the Italian fleet and as a preliminary share to the Soviet Union. It is true that what was allocated to the Soviet Union was allocated during the war prior to the termination of the war, in other words, prior to the division of the Italian Navy. At that time of Teheran there was no question of future division of the Italian Navy.

Mr. Byrnes: I don’t know that these discussions would do any good, but at Teheran the request was made which was first made at Moscow for the allotment of ships by the United States and the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union. Based on that request, we agreed to allocate to the Soviet Government the ships requested for use during hostilities, the question of official title to be discussed at the end of the war. That is Teheran. The understanding was set forth in a statement at the time showing the vessels on loan from the United Kingdom or the United States to the Soviet Government. And looking at that list here in this allotment the Soviet Government is allowed tonnage in excess of it. We ought to discuss the thing in good humor. We must say that war vessels are war booty, and that it would serve no good purpose to discuss the contributions of the several governments to the winning of the war. A man could spend a lot of time on that subject, but the fact is that never before in history that I know of has war booty been divided as it has been divided in the case of naval units. The German naval units have been divided and then, here, when Great Britain has a little more direct interest than we have in the ships because they were fighting the Italian Fleet before the United States or the Soviet Government were in the war, I think that this is a fair solution of the very perplexing problem. I don’t know that it would help the situation, but I know that my Soviet friend will realize in the case of the Rumanian ships they were small and of minor importance, but when the Soviet Government came into possession of Rumanian ships, certainly the United States would never have thought of asking that they be divided. I am glad that you will have them. When war booty like guns, planes, any of the great weapons of war came into possession of the Soviet Government we would never have dreamed of asking for a division of them because they were war booty. Therefore, I think really it is a fine thing that in the case of the German Navy at Potsdam the feeling between the Allies was so splendid that there was an agreement on the part of the Allies to divide the German fleet with the Soviet Government, and the Japanese, and now the Italian.

I tell my colleagues right now what bothers me while we are talking of armament, this distribution of war vessels not only among the Governments here represented, but to the Netherlands and Brazil, is as inconsistent a thing as could possibly be done. We would give to the world more clarity when talking about limitation of armament if instead of having a lot of argument about the division, we would say that of these Italian vessels the best thing to do is to scrap them. As a matter of fact, I would say one more word. As I look at this table, the proposal of Mr. Bevin is to give to the Soviet Union 51,262, and there are 48,071 in Column A and 47,930 in Column C, so he proposed to name C, but I will take C, if he doesn’t want it, and will give him A. But if he wants A, I will take C. I am not going to quarrel with him about it.

Mr. Bevin: I am sticking to C.

Mr. Byrnes: He spoke first, but I agreed that he fought first, and therefore I gave him preference. Mr. Bevin, representing the United Kingdom, claimed C, and said he would give the United States A. He didn’t tell me about it before, but I say he spoke first and didn’t give me a chance to choose, but then he fought first against the Italian Navy, and I recognize that. Is there any doubt about that, that Mr. Bevin did not tell me which column he was going to choose, but when he made his statement just now he said that he preferred C. Had he given me a chance I would have chosen C. He allotted to me A and I say that in as much as he spoke first and fought first, I don’t complain.

M. Couve de Murville: It is a question of courtesy. I understood Mr. Bevin spoke first and took the last class.

Mr. Byrnes: As I understand, France is the only country here that got more than it wanted. But if France is dissatisfied with these tankers, I think it would help settle the problem of the United Kingdom with the Netherlands.

M. Couve de Murville: I didn’t complain.

M. Molotov: I only said that we should apply to the Italian Navy the same principle as we applied in Potsdam to the German Navy. If we are unable to reach agreement on this now, then this question remains in disagreement.

Mr. Byrnes: It is all right. If we can’t agree, I want the scrapping to be kept in mind.

Mr. Bevin: I would like to make my position clear. My instructions are to settle this across the table, to know what is going to happen and not to draw lots. We can’t do that in this case. It is quite true I agreed to it in Potsdam, but we feel so keen about this Italian Navy. We lost a lot of tonnage in the Mediterranean during this fight. My instructions are to get it settled if we can. If we can’t, it shall remain where it is.

There is one matter I want to raise, Mr. Chairman, in connection with this before we break up tonight. It is this: I hope that this discussion will not be reported in the press because we have issued the strongest warning to the Italian Government. All of us know what sailors are, God bless them.

Mr. Byrnes: I will go along with the first statement.

Mr. Bevin: There may be very great forebodings about this allocation. I don’t want anything to happen about scuttling or anything of this kind. As I say, we have issued the strongest possible warnings to the Italian Government and to the admirals of the fleet, but I think it would be very unwise to get this public discussion at the present moment.

M. Couve de Murville: I think that we will all agree on this, that it is a very important discussion and that nothing should appear in the press on these matters which have been discussed here. I hope that every one of us will give instruction to his press representative to avoid such publication.

M. Molotov: That is right.

Mr. Byrnes: I agree with the first statement of Mr. Bevin. We know what sailors are, and if they learned we thought it wise to scuttle them they might say, “Well, that is good enough for us, we will scuttle them.”

(The Ministers agreed to meet at 10:30 a.m. on Saturday, December 7, to discuss the German question, and at 4:00 p.m. on Monday, December 9.)

15. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
16. This was the report of the 129th Meeting of the Deputies, December 6, 1946; for the Record of Decisions of that meeting, see supra.
17. The text of article 31A is included as Annex 1 (p. 1443) of the Record of Decisions of the Deputies’ 129th Meeting.
18. For the text of article 31B, see Annex 1, p. 1443.
19. For the text of article 31C, see Annex 1, p. 1444.
20. For the text of the draft letter under reference, see Annex 2, p. 1444.
21. For the text of the new article under reference, see Annex 3, p. 1445.
22. The proposal under reference appears in Annex 5, p. 1446.
23. Brackets appear in the source text.
24. Designated document CFM(46) (NY)42, December 3, 1946, not printed, this Report contained the proposed text for Annex XIII on property and debt provisions relating to the Free Territory of Trieste of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy, and a recommended new paragraph 6A on obligations with respect to property in ceded territory or the Free Territory of Trieste of United Nations nationals in article 68 of the Draft Treaty. As ultimately included in the Treaty of Peace with Italy, Annex XIII became Annex X, and article 68, paragraph 6A, became article 78, paragraph 7.

25. CFM (46)250, August 5, 1946, was the 13th Report of the Work of the Naval Committee, not printed. It stated that in response to the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers at its meeting of April 27, 1946, the Naval Committee had prepared an agreed table showing the recommended distribution of excess Italian naval units between the U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A., France, Greece, and Yugoslavia. The table which accompanied the Report was marked off into six columns labelled Greece, Yugoslavia, France, A, B, and C. The Report explained that the Committee had been unable to agree upon which of the three lettered columns (A, B, and C) should be allotted to the U.S.S.R., U.K., and the U.S.A. and the matter was therefore being submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers for decision. According to the table accompanying the Report, the agreed distribution of surplus Italian ships was as follows:

    Greece: the cruiser Savoia and the water carrier Aterno, for a total tonnage of 7,533.

    Yugoslavia: the destroyer escorts Aliseo, Indomito, and Ariete, seven minesweepers, 2 landing craft, the water carrier Isarco, and four large tugs, for a total tonnage of 5,218.

    France: the cruisers Regolo, Pompeo, and Scipione (each of 3,606 tons), the sloop Eritrea (2,172 tons), the destroyers Legionario, Mitragliere, and Velite (each of 1,627 tons) and Oriani (1,728 tons), together with 6 motor torpedo boats, 3 vedettes, 5 landing craft, two tankers, 5 water carriers, 12 tugs, and one transport, for a total tonnage of 47,667.

    Column A: the battleship Italia (41,356 tons), 9 motor torpedo boats, 3 landing craft, 1 tanker, two water carriers, 9 tugs, for a total tonnage of 48,071.

    Column B: the battleship Cesare (23,622 tons), the cruiser Aosta (7,283 tons), the destroyers Artigliere and Fuciliere (1,623 tons each) and Riboty (1,383 tons), the destroyer escorts Ardimentoso and Animoso (1,060 tons each) and Fortunale (1,040 tons), 11 motor torpedo boats, 3 vedettes, 3 landing craft, 1 tanker, 4 water carriers, 12 tugs, 1 training ship, and 1 transport, for a total tonnage of 51,262.

    Column C: the battleship Vittorio Veneto (42,100 tons), 9 motor torpedo boats, 3 landing craft, two water carriers, 9 tugs, 1 depot ship, 1 auxiliary minelayer, one transport, for a total tonnage of 47,930.

    (CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 2061, CFM Documents)

26. On December 1, 1943, during the wartime Tehran Conference of Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom assented to a Soviet request for the transfer to the Soviet Union of part of the Italian Navy and the merchant fleet which was at the disposal of the United States and British forces as a result of the surrender of Italy. Discussions on this request had begun during the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in October 1943. For documentation on this matter, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 112, 120, 126–129, 133, 597, 852, 862, 873, and 875–878.