C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes
Memorandum of Conversation2
| Participants: | U.S. |
| Secretary Byrnes | |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| U.S.S.R. | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Mr. Pavlov |
Mr. Molotov said as he felt that our work was progressing to a close there was one point he wished to speak to the Secretary about.
The Secretary said he thought they had decided all questions concerning the treaties but there was still the question of the United Nations funds.
Mr. Molotov replied that he was simply not informed about that matter and, therefore, not in a position to offer much of an opinion [Page 1438] on it. He went on to say that he wished to speak of the problem of obtaining Yugoslav signature to the treaty and inquired whether the Secretary thought it would be possible to do something for them. He said he hoped Mr. Byrnes did not mind his raising the question.
The Secretary said that he was prepared to discuss any question at any time with Mr. Molotov. As to the Yugoslavs, however, he felt that the Yugoslavs had done very well by this treaty and should be deeply indebted to Mr. Molotov for the time, trouble and skill which he had employed in presenting their views. He said he felt that the Yugoslavs were asking for a number of things from Mr. Molotov which they knew were impossible, and that he had known people who were like that. He said he had just received a letter from the Yugoslavs concerning their desire to participate in the work of the Council on Germany.3 He had not yet answered them, but he felt that it would be impossible to make an exception to Yugoslavia or to change the Potsdam decision which had set up the Council in its present form.
As to the Italian Treaty he said that unless the Yugoslavs and Italians should together agree on some solution of their present problems he did not see what could be done. He inquired what Mr. Molotov thought of the prospects of a Yugoslav-Italian agreement.
Mr. Molotov answered that as was known they had not objected to the idea of bilateral negotiations, but had taken a favorable attitude toward them. It had seemed, however, to them that Mr. Byrnes was not in sympathy with this idea and that was why he did not feel that there was much prospect of results.
The Secretary said that he had not intended to discourage the Italians and the Yugoslavs and his reply which he had read to the Council was the only one that he could have made under the circumstances. He felt that it was the business of Yugoslavia and Italy to decide whether they wished to negotiate or not.
Mr. Molotov suggested that they could well leave this matter to the course of events as he had nothing new to add to it at the present time. He remarked that they had reached certain agreements in the Council and he did not intend to cancel them. He said the point was that the Yugoslav leaders, including Marshal Tito and Kardelj, had made public statements to the effect that they could not accept the French Line. He personally felt that they had spoken too much publicly on this point, but nevertheless it made it difficult for them to sign. He stated that the Secretary had been reluctant to accept the $35,000,000 increase in reparations from Italy and he wondered whether it would not be possible to reduce Yugoslav reparations by [Page 1439] $5,000,000, and at the same time make certain rectifications in the French Line, which would provide the Yugoslavs with a justification for a retreat in order to sign the treaty. The Yugoslavs had expressed interest in changes in two regions—either Gorizia or in the region where Yugoslav troops were in occupation. If some changes could be made in favor of Yugoslavia in either of those areas, the Yugoslavs would be in a position to say that the line had been amended and thus accepted. He inquired whether the Secretary thought it would be possible to do something on these points. He inquired what his views were on these suggestions.
The Secretary said he thought that the Yugoslavs had an excellent excuse to sign in the fact that they had with Mr. Molotov’s assistance acquired $25,000,000 more in reparations. He said he did not see how it would be possible for them to change their decision on the French Line unless there was some new reason to explain it. That was why he had asked about the possibility of an agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy as he felt that such agreement might afford a basis for accepting a change. He knew that the idea of a free territory was not pleasing to either side and that if they had been able to agree on some rectification, say in the north and leave Trieste to Italy, that would be a new element which might be acceptable to the Council. On the other hand for the Council by itself to alter a decision adopted four or five months ago and approved by the Conference would be very difficult to explain.
Mr. Molotov said he agreed it would be much better if the Yugoslavs and Italians could reach an agreement.
The Secretary replied that he hoped Mr. Molotov did not think he was unwilling to help Mr. Molotov out. He said he knew how difficult it was to refuse the requests of smaller countries. Just this morning he had had a long interview with Mr. Tsaldaris, who had complained about the decision on the Greco-Bulgarian frontier. He had explained that there was nothing to be done on this point, but the Soviet Government had made their views plain and that he had not even attempted to change those views. He went on to say, however, that Mr. Tsaldaris had made quite an impression on him on another subject and that was the situation along Greece’s northern frontier. Mr. Tsaldaris had said that that morning he had received reports of the murder of twenty-five of his people along this frontier and had affirmed that this was the work of bandits who came across the frontier from other countries. Mr. Tsaldaris had inquired whether the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States could not look into the matter, possibly to send an investigation committee in order to establish the facts and then if the facts were established to use their influence on the neighboring countries to cooperate in the cause of peace [Page 1440] by prohibiting persons to cross over the frontier. The Secretary continued that this approach of Mr. Tsaldaris had made an impression on him as he thought it was preferable to raising the issue at the United Nations. He felt that the situation there was serious and if it continued might well affect the peace of that whole area of the Balkans. He said he had told Tsaldaris that the neighboring countries would, of course, deny that these bandits came from their territory and that some impartial investigation would be necessary.4
Mr. Molotov replied that he knew that the Greeks had already raised this question before the Security Council, but that he was not familiar with the details. He inquired whether he was to understand that Mr. Byrnes thought it was not worthwhile to discuss the question of assuring Yugoslav signature to the treaty.
The Secretary said he was all ready to discuss anything and had been discussing that question, but he was forced to state again that he felt it would be most difficult to depart from their decision unless there was some real reason for doing so. He said he would be delighted to examine any agreement which Italy and Yugoslavia might reach.
Mr. Molotov repeated that if they should reduce Yugoslav reparations from Italy and let them keep the area between the Morgan and French Lines in the south which they were now occupying, Yugoslav signature would be assured. He said if they do not sign the treaty, they will undoubtedly wish to hold on to the area they occupied. He repeated that he thought it would be wise to give them an excuse for abandoning their previous position.
The Secretary said he really did not see how they could do so and stated again that he felt that the additional $25,000,000 would give them a good reason to change their attitude on the grounds that they had received more than they had expected.
Mr. Molotov said he wished to make it clear that the Soviet signature to the French Line was assured and that no matter what Yugoslavia did or did not do the Soviet Government would sign and would not abandon a decision that they had taken.
The Secretary said he had never had any doubt on that subject. He added that he understood the difficulty of Mr. Molotov’s problem [Page 1441] vis-à-vis the Yugoslavs and said although he could not see what could be done he would think over Mr. Molotov’s suggestion.
The Secretary then said he thought they might go on to the German question on Saturday morning since he knew that Mr. Molotov was anxious to get home and that next week the plenary sessions of the United Nations might interfere.
Mr. Molotov said he was entirely agreeable as he did wish to get home. He said he understood there was not much possibility of a substantive discussion on Germany because the French were not ready.
The Secretary replied that such was his understanding and he had in mind the discussion to ascertain the views of the Council concerning a future meeting and to draw up procedures for it.
- The conversation was held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel at 3 p.m.↩
- The reference here is presumably to the communication from Yugoslav Foreign Minister Simić to the Secretary General of the Council of Foreign Ministers, December 4, 1946, p. 1419.↩
At a meeting with the Secretaries of War and the Navy on December 18, 1946. Secretary Byrnes spoke about his conversation with Molotov on the Greek frontier problem. The Minutes of that meeting, not printed, read in part as follows:
↩“Mr. Byrnes said he wanted to emphasize that Greece is our real problem today. Mr. Tsaldaris, who, while not the most competent person is, he believes, sincere in describing the situation in Greece as deteriorating daily. Mr. Tsaldaris is coming down to Washington today. He had asked Mr. Byrnes to take up with Mr. Molotov the problem of activities beyond Greek frontiers and to endeavor to get Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to refrain from stirring up trouble. Mr. Byrnes had taken it up with Mr. Molotov, and gotten nowhere. Mr. Molotov said that Tsaldaris could not control his own country and that he should therefore get out.” (811.002/1–2446)