Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes

United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Ninth Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, November 4, 1946, 4 p.m.¹⁶

New York, November 4, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret
USDEL(CFM) (46) (NY) 9th Meeting

Secretary Byrnes: The meeting will come to order. Before we concluded yesterday, the Soviet Representative said with reference to one of the sections (No. 11) concerning the free port and economic questions that he might have other amendments to propose. Are you ready to propose them now?¹⁷

Mr. Molotov: I would like to return to the amendments of yesterday.

Secretary Byrnes: We return then to the several amendments which were presented by the Soviet Delegation. I have in my hand a paper which was prepared by the Secretariat and I shall follow that paper if agreeable to the other members of the Council. Is it desired that we take them up in the order in which they are presented, or should we have a general discussion as to the amendments?

Mr. Bevin. I feel, Mr. Chairman, that this entire question depends on point 8. Many of these amendments will be affected by what is done with Article 8.

Secretary Byrnes: It may be that it would be wise, then, to consider that paragraph if the representative of the United Kingdom desires. Unless there is objection, we shall proceed to do that.

Mr. Molotov: No objection.

Discussion of the Soviet Amendment to Article 8 of the Statute

Secretary Byrnes: Are there any comments as to the amendments to Article 8?

Mr. Bevin: I am at a loss to understand the change in the wording. What does it really mean? Just who is in charge of the police or the forces which will keep order? If the governor has no control, no anything, how is he to maintain public order? The same principle arises in Article 9. It was said yesterday that if there were riots, if there were difficulties, the governor could step in but if this document is accepted as proposed by Mr. Molotov, he will have no force to deal with; he is merely a figurehead and he cannot guarantee, on behalf of the Security Council, to carry out the functions which the Security Council imposes upon him if he has no say at all either in the organization of the police force or in its direction. I do not for one moment suggest that he has to accept responsibility for every detail of the administration but it is a question of who is in charge of the police force. Otherwise, it seems to me, that somebody underneath him in charge of the force could, in fact, develop a police state which would nullify the democratic character of the entire regime. Therefore, I cannot help feeling that if you give the governor the duties to supervise the maintenance of the fundamental principles of public order and security and he has nothing to do it with, all the control is under the elective authority. I cannot see how he can discharge his duties to the Security Council and guarantee the civic and human rights that he is supposed to do. All I want cleared up is the responsibility for the international area of the Security Council in the final analysis, and it is their representative who will be charged with these duties. If I can be told how he can carry out his duties under these words, I could be interested.

Mr. Molotov: The proposals made yesterday by the Soviet Delegation are not considered by it as entirely satisfactory in the case under consideration. The Soviet Delegation considers these proposals as the limit of compromise which it will be advisable to accept for the sake of reaching unanimity. As a matter of fact, we adopted the decision which is embodied in Article 16 of the draft treaty to the effect that the legislative and executive authority in Trieste should be based on democratic principles. This is the starting point. If we proceed from this decision, the governor who is to be appointed by the Security Council should not have all the powers in all events under normal conditions when the statute approved by the Security Council is observed. In this case, the authority should be vested in the democratic elected body of Trieste, but the governor should only supervise the observance of the statute established by the Security Council. It is another matter when an emergency arises, when there is the threat of violation of the statute, or a threat to the integrity and independence of Trieste.

As to cases when such a situation arises, that is, when the situation allows of no delay, the governor, under paragraph 9 of our proposal is entitled to act at his own discretion subject to his making an immediate report to the Security Council. This is our idea of the relation between the executive authority and the governor. From this we draw relevant conclusions as to the police, though the language in this case has not been yet exactly defined and is in need of definition.

We feel that under regular conditions the police in Trieste should be subordinated to the executive authority elected on democratic principles. This is the usual procedure. If, however, an emergency arises when the governor will not be able to dispense without his interference, then it must be provided that he should assume the control of police and that he should issue orders to the police. That means that in a regular case under regular conditions the bodies of executive authority elected on democratic principles continue to act as they act in every democratic country.

However, in an emergency the governor shall assume the control of police and will act under his own responsibility. Such a provision would create sufficient possibilities, for the governor would be in harmony with the interest of the population and would guarantee to the Security Council that nothing would happen in Trieste without the knowledge of its representatives. Such is our idea.

It remains for me to add that if the police is to be placed not under the executive authority but under the governor, nothing will remain of our decision that the executive authority shall be organized on democratic principles. We cannot accept this. We hold that the governor who is to supervise the observance of the statute should enjoy the confidence of the people and should not interfere in current affairs but should assume his full powers only in the last resort, in the extreme case, as indicated in paragraph 9 of our proposal.

M. Couve de Murville: Mr. Chairman, there is one question I would like to ask the Soviet Delegation. The draft provides that when exceptional urgent circumstances arise the governor may assume direct control. Now I do not see how the governor can assume direct control in exceptional urgent circumstances if in normal times he has no authority whatever over the police or in general over the organs who must care for the maintenance of public order in Trieste.

Mr. Molotov: I quite understand that this is a fully justified question and I think that this question is in need of further elaboration. But if provided we reach agreement that executive authority in Trieste is to be made the real executive authority which will carry out really executive functions and that they will not be carried out in daily affairs by the governor, if we have reached agreement on this, then I think it will be possible for us to work out a formula providing a procedure under which the governor will assume the control of police for a definite period of time in an emergency.

Secretary Byrnes: The United States believes that the unusual conditions existing in this territory require special treatment. Here we have two people who are suspicious of each other. There is bad feeling between them. The condition is such that we finally concluded that the only way to reconcile it was to establish this free territory and to put it under the control of the Security Council. The Security Council assumes the obligation of maintaining its integrity, independence, and in maintaining order there.

The point that Mr. Molotov makes would ordinarily be a precedent, that we want to make certain that we maintain democratic lines in government, but there is a vast difference between a governor appointed by some outside power, some outside state to have control in a territory or colony, and to have charge of police powers, and the governor who is appointed not by a single state but appointed by an organization to which Yugoslavia belongs and which we hope Italy will belong, the United Nations.

The governor is only the agent of the organization, the United Nations, and we select him because we believe it unwise to have in Trieste either an Italian or a Slav, because of the feeling between them. We want an independent individual acting as agent for the Security Council.

We provide in Article 16 that the legislative and executive authority shall be established along democratic principles, and at the end of the next paragraph we say “Rights of citizens shall be respected in respect to human rights, fundamental freedom including religion, language, press, schools and access to public services.”¹⁸

Now when those rights are included in the statute, and the Security Council of the United Nations organization insures that they will be observed, then the prestige of the United Nations organization is at stake. It must see that they are observed.

I have heard representatives of Yugoslavia say two or three times that in former years Italian officials did not permit Slavs in Trieste to enjoy the fundamental freedoms. They have complained to us about the schools and denial of the right to speak their language. Now if this free territory for which the Security Council is responsible has an Italian as Minister of the Interior or Chief of Police and they should do those things about which Yugoslavia has complained to us time and again, what position would the United Nations and the Security Council be in if it had a governor with an empty hand, unable to insure and to fulfill promises made in this document that we have agreed to?

The representative of the Security Council selected as governor would be selected solely because he would have no interest either in the Yugoslavs or in the Italians. He would be interested only in seeing that the prestige of the United Nations Organization is maintained.

I see this danger: If the Council has control of the police and, just for illustration, it is controlled by the Italian citizens of the free territory, and they are denying to the people some of these rights, the governor goes to them, as Mr. Molotov has suggested. The Council says, “You have nothing to do with that. I have the police hi charge. I have listened to you but I ignore what you say.” Then what can the governor do? He can do absolutely nothing. He is helpless—as someone said the other day—he would have a free hand, an open hand, but an empty hand.

I have only one word more. Of course the governor will be our representative from the Security Council and will be independent without interest. No Slav, no Italian need be suspicious of him or afraid of him, unless he wants to dominate some other group or deny to them some of the rights guaranteed here. On the other hand, we cannot put the governor in the position of having responsibility without power. Those of us who have had experience in government know that we should not do that.

Mr. Molotov: Mr. Byrnes said that we have item 3 in the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding Article 16 concerning the rights of the population. It is quite true that there is such a paragraph and it seems to us that it is precisely the execution of this paragraph regarding the human rights, the rights of the population, the right of religious freedom, that it is quite advisable to assign to the responsibility of the local authorities as far as current, insignificant current affairs are concerned, because we can reasonably expect that if there is executive authority elected in a democratic way, this authority will be capable of guaranteeing these rights. The existence of the two racial elements in a free territory does not create an insurmountable obstacle.

On the contrary, if general democratic methods are applied, we can reasonably expect that local authorities will be able to deal with the insignificant current affairs, but if these insignificant current affairs are to be referred to the governor, who is to be a foreign citizen as we all agree and who is to represent the Security Council there, for decision, he will be called upon to settle all sorts of quarrels, bickerings, and misunderstandings and conflicts, and if we do so, we shall run the risk that all these bickerings, these quarrels and insignificant questions will draw the governor into the necessity to deal with secondary questions. And in view of the fact that the governor is an executive of the Security Council, this will also draw into this business the Security Council itself.

It is precisely because the governor is to represent in this particular case an international organization that it will be undesirable to involve the governor in the necessity to deal with day-to-day insignificant affairs relating to the city and territory of Trieste, because this inevitably will involve both the governor and the Security Council in dealing with second-rate questions.

On the other hand, where serious matters are at stake, it is necessary to provide for the Security Council and the governor to take the decisions. It is necessary that whenever it is a question of insignificant issues which do not go beyond the statute that they should be dealt with by local authorities, but whenever there is a threat of a violation of the statute or a threat to the independence and integrity of the free territory, the governor shall have the right to assume there the sole power and the Security Council will support him, and as far as any major issues are concerned everything necessary will be done in the interest of the international organization. The details of all this, of course, can be worked out. Of course, some more work in this respect should be done.

Secretary Byrnes: I would not for a moment think of having the governor act as the chief of police and be charged with the duty of looking after what my good friend has referred to as questions of secondary importance, but in this Article 16 that we have already agreed to we have provided that the statute should include the things that I have recited.

Therefore, when he is responsible for them we all agree he must be given the power somewhere to see that they are enforced. He must see that they are enforced, by the local government, but if you do not give him the power to demand that the local government enforce them, you just put him in an impossible position.

We are in a position of having to protect the minority here. Both of these peoples distrust each other. No matter which one is in the minority they feel that they are being treated unfairly. The local government, the council, having charge of local police, will not treat them unfairly when they know the governor has the power to correct it, but if he has not got the power then the minorities will suffer.

We might, if we could agree on the principle of the thing, agree also upon language that would express that agreement saying that—adding to the language giving to the governor the power to maintain public order and security that he should consult with the council of government and entrust the execution of authority to local officials to the extent that he finds consistent with the discharge of his responsibility.

Mr. Bevin: Are we agreed to that proposal?

Secretary Byrnes: After 8(a), “maintenance of public order and security,” “consulting with the Council of Government in the discharge of his responsibility and entrusting the execution of his authority to local officials, to the extent that he finds it consistent with his responsibilities.”

Mr. Molotov: Under this language the whole local authority is made dependent upon the action of the Governor. He will be able to do anything he likes.

Secretary Byrnes: He would be able to do or rather maintain public order and security and he is our representative, a man who is selected by the Security Council free and independent of the local prejudices and passions.

Mr. Molotov: The result of this language is that the Governor will be made responsible for local affairs including the small and major issues except that he may, if he likes, yield a small portion of his power to local officials.

Secretary Byrnes: It would be only applicable to those things in the statute with which we charge him. We hold him responsible for them. If our representative finds it safe to do what he thinks should be done, then he will do it. If he finds that it’s not safe, then he would not do it, and no one would want him to do it.

Mr. Molotov: Permit me, then, to ask what is then left to local authorities?

Secretary Byrnes: He would leave to local officials under this provision the doing of everything as long as they did those things in accordance with the statute.

Mr. Molotov: Your language does not contain this.

Secretary Byrnes: It says that he shall let the local officials exercise their authority to the fullest extent that he finds possible consistent with the discharge of his own duty. He’s got the responsibility but as the mayor of a city would leave to a chief of police the exercise of police duties unless a situation arises when he is not performing his duties and then he steps in to see that he does or removes him. Now I say first of all, we must admit that we have got to decide who has the primary responsibility. If we were setting up an independent state, the situation would be entirely different. We are not doing that. We are setting up an international free territory and an international organization. The Security Council has the primary responsibility. Its agent must have the power to carry out that responsibility.

Mr. Molotov: But the fact is that the decision we adopted in Article 16 lays down that the Security Council shall be made responsible for the integrity and independence of the territory. But it does not imply in any way that the Security Council will be bound to deal with every current business that may arise any day there. The dealing with daily affairs should be entrusted to executive authority in Trieste since we decided that both legislative and executive authority are to be based on democratic principles. They are called upon to deal with municipal administration, police and other matters. Therefore, it is necessary to combine the duties of the governor who is to be responsible for the integrity and independence of the territory, and the responsibility for the current affairs which is to be vested in the executive authority.

Secretary Byrnes: I do not want to continue to occupy so much time, but I do want to say that we must remember that in addition to what we agreed to in Article 16, we have in the French proposal an agreement by two-thirds of the Conference, after long debate participated in by all of our representatives, and we are after all of that, discussing how we will amend the proposal of the French which was agreed to by the Conference in order to try to meet the views of the Soviet Delegation. We can’t go any further on this particular provision here.

Mr. Molotov: I have no more observations to make.

M. Couve de Murville: Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that the present difficulty which we are faced with is the fact that we are dealing with vague formulas. There is one formula in the proposal which has been adopted by the Conference and another in the proposal suggested by the Soviet Delegation. As long as we do not state more precisely what we have in view in the implementation of those formulas, I think that we shall remain in a very confused state of affairs. This was the reason which prompts me to ask a question of Mr. Molotov, and I will take the liberty—if my colleagues allow—to state the French point of view as to the implementation of the proposal which the French Delegation made to the Conference.

We distinguished two periods, the normal period and the exceptional period. As regards normal times, we have provided for three types of powers of the governor. We waived the first type since the three other delegations were opposed to it. I mentioned that it was the right for the Governor to have the chairmanship of the Government Council which would certainly have given the governor authority and helped him in the discharge of his functions. This wouldn’t have meant at all that the governor should interfere in current affairs which remain within the scope of the council of the local authorities whether elected or appointed.

The two other rights which we suggested for the governor were first the appointment of the chief of police of the Free Territory. We consider that if the governor is to be responsible for the maintenance of public order and security, he should be able to choose the officials of Trieste who will be in charge of the police.

The second right which we are providing for the governor was the right of veto, not only applying to legislative measures but also to administrative ones. And this right was to be completed by the right to make suggestions as regards legislative and administrative matters. Now in exceptional circumstances, the part to be played by the governor undergoes a change. He has a new right, and first of all, he has the right to assume control of the police which is all the easier for him since the chief of the police has been appointed by the governor. Moreover, the governor has a right not merely to make suggestions to the Council of Government as regards administrative measures, but to take them himself. He has the right to take those measures himself to the extent to which there is a threat to the integrity or independence of the Free Territory as well as to the extent that there is a threat to the public order or to the human rights.

Secretary Byrnes: Any further comments?

Mr. Bevin: I’d like to ask one question. Under the proposals we have before us, who will the police give their allegiance to, the Council or to the Governor? If they were appointive, what kind of agreement would they have as employees? I was wondering what Mr. Molotov’s views were on that?

Mr. Molotov: It has seemed to me that it would be better to provide for the police to swear its oath to the Council of Government as a body of local authority, but in the long run we may accept a procedure as follows: though the police are to be subordinate to the local authority, the director of the police can be appointed by the governor on the presentation of the local executive authority.

Mr. Bevin: Does that mean, pardon me asking this but this is one of the most difficult points we have got to settle and we ought to try and understand it, does that mean if the local Council presented a person the governor thought was unsuitable, he would have the right to refuse him?

Mr. Molotov: In my opinion, yes, it does.

Mr. Bevin: Would the deputy chosen have to be a citizen of the Free Territory or could they go outside like they do for the governor? I don’t mean the Security Council, I am thinking of the initial stages of this setting up of the Free Territory.

Mr. Molotov: What do you mean by “the initial stage of setting up.”

Mr. Bevin: In time, in ten years’ time, they may grow together, the difficulty may not occur, but at present you have got the Italians and Slavs there and in building up the police force and getting public order and getting the thing working, would it be understood that they could appoint some other national in charge of the police?

Mr. Molotov: It seems to us to be sufficient to have the governor from among foreign citizens, but to have the local authorities composed of local citizens.

Mr. Bevin: Perhaps I didn’t make myself clear, I didn’t mean the local authority, I meant the Chief of Police, or perhaps a better term would be the director of public security.

Mr. Molotov: We feel that all these persons must be chosen from among the local inhabitants, because otherwise they will be aliens to the local population, and only the governor could be selected from among foreign citizens.

Mr. Bevin: I am still in the difficulty that if the oath of allegiance is to the local Council, how would it be possible to operate under paragraph 9 where you found yourself in difficulty and the governor stepped in because the statute was in danger or because public order was in danger? What puzzles me is how the governor could take over the police or take over the forces of public security if that situation existed.

Mr. Molotov: But the fact is that we propose that the governor shall have the right to approve the director of police and, consequently, the fact is that we propose that the governor shall have the right to approve the director of the police under submission of the local authority and that will insure to him enough influence both on the matter and as regards the person.

Mr. Bevin: And if the man wasn’t suitable, the governor would have the right to remove him?

Mr. Molotov: That is right. It is always that he may suggest that a new director of police be appointed and that the new nominee be submitted for his approval.

Mr. Bevin: I suppose it wouldn’t be possible to go as far as the oath of allegiance as the Security Council is responsible. The governor has the right as we suggested to appoint the director of public security on the advice of the Council, wouldn’t it be possible for the oath of allegiance to be taken to him and the administration, in normal times, be under the local Council?

Secretary Byrnes: I only make one more suggestion about it, it’s this: I do not think we are going to have a very easy time getting a good man to accept this office of governor that we are talking about so much. I said this morning that if any man hunted the job we must have a psychiatrist to interview him first of all. We will have difficulty persuading a capable man to accept this responsibility and I declare that I do not think it wise to put any man in this position without giving him the power to fulfill the obligations he assumes to the Security Council.

In view of the fact that we do not reach an agreement on that, is there any use for us to discuss the other amendments? My only thought is that it would serve no good purpose and it would be useless for us to go into it, but I am willing to do anything the Council wishes.

Shall we, then, let it go until tomorrow and see if further consideration will bring us any nearer? If we do, then I suggest that maybe if we meet in one of the committee rooms, in a smaller meeting, there might be a smaller distance in the room and we might come nearer to getting together. I think that before we decide we just can’t agree, it would be good for us to have one meeting of that kind. What is your pleasure? Do you think it would serve any purpose to do it? Otherwise, we will not.

Mr. Bevin: I am ready to do anything, as long as I get home sometime.

Mr. Molotov: I have no objection.

Secretary Byrnes: Shall we meet at 4 o’clock tomorrow afternoon? We can meet tomorrow morning if you want to. When you say you want to get home, I am nearer home.

Mr. Bevin: What sort of meeting is it you want, just the four?

Secretary Byrnes: The same way we met in Paris.

Mr. Molotov: No objection.

Mr. Bevin: Can we dispose of any other items outstanding? There are a lot of other items.

Secretary Byrnes: In so far as these are concerned, these things—

Mr. Bevin: I don’t mean them.

Secretary Byrnes: To what point do you refer?

Mr. Bevin: We left over reparations, we left over all sorts of things.

Secretary Byrnes: Well, I feel just the same way about that, if we don’t agree on this statute it isn’t any use to be discussing 50 or 60 amendments, we are just wasting time. I don’t want to have a lot of argument with anybody, I am in a good humor today. If we can’t, agree, we just don’t agree, that’s all.

(The meeting adjourned at 6:25 p.m.)

16. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
17. Under consideration throughout this entire meeting was document CFM(46) (NY) 13, November 14, 1946, p. 1156, which set forth the proposed Soviet amendments to the American and the French proposals for article 16 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy having to do with the Statute for the Free Territory of Trieste. The numbered paragraphs of the American and French proposals for article 16 are variously and inconsistently referred to in the minutes of this meeting as “sections”, “points”, “articles”, and “items”.
18. The quotation is from paragraph 6, subparagraph 3, of document C.F.M. (46) 186, July 3, 1946, on the Free State of Trieste, p. 752, which was amended and approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers at its 33rd Meeting in Paris, July 3, 1946. This agreement was set forth under article 16 in the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy which was referred to the Peace Conference by the Council of Foreign Ministers; see vol. iv, p. 9.