Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Forty-Second Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 12, 1946, 5 p.m.⁴⁶

Paris, July 12, 1946, 5 p.m.

secret

Report of the Deputies

Mr. Bevin: The meeting is opened. We will have a report of the Deputies by M. Couve de Murville.

M. Couve de Murville: The Deputies met these last few days in order to draw up a list of questions in connection with the five peace treaties which are still outstanding because there has been no agreement on them between the Delegations. The document is CFM(46) 227.⁴⁷ In this discussion we will find in order the various peace treaties with the various countries and will list the questions outstanding, together with the governments which are referred to. I would like to point out a small change to be made in your document which you have, namely, part 6, which is on page 8, ought to go at the end of part 1 of the peace treaty with Italy, that is to say on page 3. A few drafting amendments have also been made which do not appear yet in this document, and the Secretariat will circulate a redraft. On the other hand, I would like to draw the attention of the Ministers to a number of points:

1. The first point is this: As regards the Port of Trieste, it has been provided that a technical commission be set up in order to determine the conditions for the international port of Trieste. The Deputies agreed to submit to the Ministers the idea that this commission might be a subcommission of the commission appointed to define the statute of the Free Territory of Trieste.

2. Another point I would like to point out is in connection with the Italo-Yugoslav frontier and the frontier of the Free Territory of Trieste for which there is no text so far. The United States Delegation has made various proposals, six altogether, on these questions and in connection with questions such as frontier settlements for local trade, water, and electricity supply. But the Deputies have had no time to examine these proposals yet.

3. In connection with the work of the Naval Committee in drafting the treaty with Italy, there has been no agreement as to ships to be allocated to Greece and Yugoslavia. Therefore, the work of the Naval Committee has been stopped, at least in regard to ships to go to other countries concerned.

4. In connection with the provision of the Rumanian treaty, the provision regarding Rumanian assets in United Nations, there is Article 26 proposed by the Soviet Delegation which is to be found in the draft treaty and was approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers whereby the Allied and Associated Powers could use Rumanian assets in their territory to meet payments against Rumania, including debts. But yesterday the Soviet Delegation submitted an amendment to Article 26 limiting this clause to place the amount which has been approved by the Ambassadors of the three powers concerned in Bucharest and in conformity with the clause regarding settlement of the different phases of the articles of the treaty.

5. The fifth point deals with the clause relating to the scope of application of certain economic clauses of the treaty. There has been no agreement on this point. There are three proposals—one by the Soviet Delegation to extend certain economic clauses to all the United Nations which have broken diplomatic relations with the enemy countries concerned; then we have the proposal by the U.S. and U.K. delegations suggesting that the clause should be extended to all the states having broken their diplomatic relations, plus France; and finally, the French proposal that the provision should apply to all the United Nations which were at war with Germany.

6. Finally, there was a statement by the U.S. Deputy with which the United Kingdom Deputy associated himself. The American and British Delegations accepted the proposal which I have just submitted to you, with the following reservation, namely, that in the cases where an article or question had not been settled by common agreement, the various draft treaties should mention the various positions adopted and the wording proposed by each Delegation.

Mr. Bevin: You have heard the report of the Deputies. The first point is on the Statute of Trieste and on the constitution of the free port. In the first case, the Statute of Trieste, the Committee has been appointed; it hasn’t met yet. I urge it to meet now and get on with its work.

(All Delegations agreed.)

Mr. Bevin: The suggestion is that the Commission on the free port should be a subcommittee of that Statute Commission.

(All Delegations agreed.)

Mr. Bevin: The next point is the question of the claim for ships by Greece and Yugoslavia and the division of the rest of the Italian navy. As I understand it, the Naval Committee can’t get on until this problem of ships claimed by Greece and Yugoslavia is settled, and the Naval Committee cannot get on with their work until the point of dispute is settled.⁴⁸ It is up to the Council now.

Mr. Byrnes: As I understand it, no provision as to this matter goes into the treaty, and I think it would be well to go over the treaty provisions first, but I am entirely willing, if it is desired, to discuss first the proposal that was submitted by me originally with reference to the first clause that ships should be awarded to Greece as war trophy insofar as the view of the United States is that the Savoia should be given to Greece and the three destroyer escorts to Yugoslavia.

M. Molotov: The wish of the Soviet Delegation is that the naval ships to be allotted to Greece and Yugoslavia should be more or less equal.

Mr. Bevin: It is the view of the U.K. Delegation that the losses were about two to one. Greece lost two to Yugoslavia’s one. It doesn’t seem right that the division should be equal.

M. Molotov: I can add that the Greeks themselves wrote in their document of March last that they would be satisfied if two small ships would be allotted to them⁴⁹ The document said that Greece is willing to accept, instead of the cruiser demanded, two ships of a smaller type.

Mr. Byrnes: That document was superseded by a subsequent document, CFM–44, in which Greece asked for a cruiser and a number of other ships, and therefore if it is going to be based on what they asked for, we will have to add to the cruiser that we suggested to give them.⁵⁰

M. Molotov: I have just cited this document CFM–44.

Mr. Byrnes: I don’t know about the number of the document. Under this claim of the Greeks of 8 July,⁵¹ they asked for one cruiser, six destroyers, eight escort destroyers, six submarines, four mine layers, six mine-sweepers. It was evident that they had read the claims of Yugoslavia and as their losses were two to one against Yugoslavia, their requests increased. Mr. Chairman, the opinion of the American Representative on the Committee was that regardless of the requests from Greece and from Yugoslavia, which could not be complied with, that naval losses should be considered and the losses of Greece were approximately twice as great as the losses of Yugoslavia. The proposal of the American Representative on the Committee is that instead of giving Greece two to one, it should be divided in the ratio of three to two, that is to give Greece 7,500 tons, and approximately 5,000 tons to Yugoslavia. I recall to the Council that when I made the proposal about dividing these war trophies, Mr. Bevin had presented his statement of the sinking of the cruiser of Greece two or three months before the war started. In view of that sinking of the cruiser even before the war started, I thought it should be proper that we should give a cruiser as a war trophy.

M. Molotov: I can only inform you that there is a document from the French experts estimating the ships losses suffered by Greece at 10,104 tons and those suffered by Yugoslavia at 10,125 tons.

Mr. Bevin: The actual losses suffered were 43,000 tons for Greece and 24,000 tons for Yugoslavia. The French calculation writes off ships before they begin to decide what the losses were.

M. Molotov: The French estimate takes the ships, the service of which was less than 30 years.

Mr. Bevin: Some flagships were over 30 years.

M. Bidault: I am going to give an explanation of the French figures estimated by the French Delegation. It is not, I suppose, essential to dwell at length on this matter. However, it is perfectly right that the French experts have given 10,104 tons for Greek losses and 10,125 tons for the Yugoslav losses, and this is the reason. I admit the fact that those figures are more or less equivalent and that we have eliminated, to the detriment of Greece, a number of unfinished ships and ships which were older than 30 years, which appear to us to be more museum ships than fighting ships. This is the reason why. At the same time that the French Delegation submitted that, it had drawn up statistics which, of course, appeared to it as being judicious. It proposed that, as an example, as a token, the loss of an old cruiser, Greek cruiser, should be compensated for by a destroyer of a value more or less equal, or perhaps greater value.

Mr. Byrnes: The battleship Pennsylvania was 30 years old in 1933 before the war. The Pennsylvania could hardly be considered as a museum piece. If we can’t agree on it, I suggest we go on with matters that must be included in the treaty.

Mr. Bevin: I would like to say that the Warspite, which was used in the Battle of Matapan, played a very big part in capturing this navy and was just 30 years old.

M. Bidault: I also recall that the Corvette [Courbet] which has been of some service to the Anglo-American landing on the shores of Normandy was 32 years old.

Mr. Bevin: I want to thank everyone for knocking the French statistics out.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation prefers not to leave this question uncompleted and suggests that we adopt the proposal made by Mr. Byrnes, and if the American and British Delegations are so insistent that the Savoia be turned over to Greece, let it be so, but I suggest that on the other hand we adopt Mr. Byrnes’ proposal for the transfer of 5,000 tons of war ships to Yugoslavia.

Mr. Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I only want, so there will be no misunderstanding, to say that this proposal of the American Representative on the Committee of Naval Experts was 5,000 tons of naval tonnage. I do not want what the American expert called naval tonnage confused with war vessels. I do not want to send it back to the Committee as a matter that will cause more discussion back there.

Mr. Bevin: The proposal now is that the Savoia goes to Greece and that the Committee be instructed to make up naval tonnage to go to Yugoslavia to total 5,000 tons.

M. Molotov: Naval tonnage?

Mr. Bevin: Just let me be clear. What is your interpretation of “naval tonnage”? You objected to “war vessels”. What is “naval tonnage”?

Mr. Byrnes: War ships plus naval auxiliary minor craft that make up 5,000 tons. Naval men use these technical terms. I am simply repeating what my naval experts advise.

Mr. Bevin: Can we agree to that? Is there any objection? There’s more trouble in giving things away than in capturing them. They can make the adjustment.

M. Molotov: Yugoslavia will be hurt.

Mr. Bevin: I don’t think so.

M. Molotov: Let us reach agreement that the fighting tonnage should be not less than 3,000 out of 5,000 tons.

M. Bidault: Although it is not quite clear to me as I came late to this meeting, I shall agree with your proposal. On the other hand, I note that as a man in his youth I wanted to be a naval officer. I note with pleasure that this is a vocation that is quite common to the Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Bevin: That is agreed then. Is it the desire of the Council that the Naval Committee should continue their work to deal with the division of the rest?

M. Molotov: That follows.

Mr. Bevin: I think we are not going to wait for the report. They can report to us when we come back.

M. Molotov: Perhaps we can agree on one thing, and that is in case of disagreement, lots should be drawn.

Mr. Bevin: No, I can’t agree to that. It is better to wait for the report.

M. Molotov: I would like to make a declaration. The proposal mentioned by me before in addition to document no. 10, which is entitled “The Sphere of the Application of Economic Article.”⁵² The Soviet Delegation associates itself with the Anglo-American proposal and withdraws its proposal.⁵³ The gist of this proposal is to extend to France the same provisions as will be applicable to all countries in respect of all the enemy countries with whom we are to sign peace treaties.

Mr. Bevin: The other point relates to the amendment by the Soviet Delegation to Article 26 of the Rumanian treaty which states that in paragraph 1 of Article 26, after the words “Those fully satisfied under other Articles of this Treaty” include the words, “the amount of the foregoing claims to be determined by the three Ambassadors in Bucharest by mutual agreement.”⁵⁴

Mr. Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I would say—the article 26 I have in my hand was proposed by the Soviet Delegation on June 27.⁵⁵ And the minutes of the June 27 meeting state that we have reached agreement on this point.⁵⁶ (reads from official minutes) We agreed to it—the disposition of it—and I think we should let the agreement stand.

M. Molotov: This holds good as regards debts but we say that the claims in excess of debts are to be determined by the three Ambassadors.

Mr. Byrnes: Mr. Chairman—what this amendment says is that the amount of the foregoing claims is to be determined by the three Ambassadors in Bucharest by mutual agreement.

M. Molotov: Our amendment refers not to the debts but to claims over and above debts. Substantially to no claims which are in the nature of reparations. The words “excluding debts” may be added to the amendment.

Mr. Byrnes: Mr. Chairman—the agreement of the Council is very clear that the final agreement was on the Soviet Delegation’s paper and it provided that the Allied powers having assets should apply such property or proceeds thereof to such purposes that are in the limits of the claims of Rumania and her nationals. It continues, primarily for the payment of Rumanian debts other than the claims fully satisfied under other articles of the present treaty. The words I have read are the Soviet proposal. The minutes show that the Council adopted the word “primarily” would be replaced with the words “including debts.” They now read that all Rumanian property or the proceeds thereof in excess of the amount of such claims should be returned. The proposal is to open up the statement that was agreed to and provide that the amount of the foregoing claims should be determined by the three Ambassadors in Bucharest by mutual agreement. In other words, the United States instead of having the claims determined by the countries the claims would be determined by the three Ambassadors in Bucharest. First, I object to opening up an agreement. Second, if it was opened up it is impractical because the claimant in some country, one of the United Nations would never have a chance to prove its case. Thirdly, if the three Ambassadors did not agree then the claims would never be allowed.

Mr. Bevin: Any other comment?

M. Molotov: First of all, I would like to make it clear that the proposal under consideration is not the proposal made by the Soviet Delegation but by the American Delegation. In the second place, this question was also discussed in connection with Finland, in which case a different procedure was adopted with the Council by all delegations, in particular the British Delegation. Furthermore, we consider that this article should be in the main preserved now. We have only one modification to suggest, namely, that we take our “claims other than debts” and this should be changed “on which claims in our view are justified to be met under this Article.” In principle we do not deny that this is quite possible. But in the view of the fact that my colleagues are opposed to this amendment we are not pressing for it.

Mr. Bevin: There are of course a number of questions reported by M. Couve de Murville which have not been settled. We will pass on to the next.

I agreed with Mr. Byrnes about the peace conference. I agreed with M. Molotov about reparations. Some of these points which are outstanding are vital to my country. I take it that these problems will now have to go to the peace conference; (1) the Danube question, on which I have submitted an alternative draft. There has been no reply; (2) the settlement of disputes; (3) United Nations property in Italy; (4) Compensation; (5) Public provisions relating to insurance; (6) industrial, literary and artistic property; (7) the questions we did not settle in the most favored nation treatment and provisions on civil aviation. There is the British property in the Balkans which has not been returned to us yet. And we want to secure our rights in the treaty. I have received instructions from my government. They expect these questions to be settled before they can sign the treaty. There was a proposal by M. Couve de Murville from the Deputies that the articles on these matters which have not been settled would be included in the documents sent out. Can we agree to that so that the conference will know our respective views that exist between us? Any objections?

M. Molotov: To what?

Mr. Bevin: To the clauses that are not settled and put forward by the different delegations to go in the report.

M. Molotov: No objections.

Mr. Bevin: Now the last point I want to put to the Council is to fix another deadline for the Deputies to finish their work. Having fixed the conference for June 29 (July 29) [sic] we will have to give the governments time to study the proposals. I would suggest next Wednesday.⁵⁷ Some of the countries are very far off and need time to get here so that they will have to be flown off in order for them to have time to study. I thought they could be delivered for central distribution by Wednesday night. Any comment? Any objections?

(No objections)

Mr. Byrnes: What about the report? There is no. 12⁵⁸ documents which have not yet been considered by the Deputies.

Mr. Bevin: There seem to be two points here. The Deputies ought to consider these by Wednesday. I think if there is no agreement they ought to be put in as a United States proposal for the Conference.

Mr. Byrnes: That is entirely satisfactory. I do want to say, however, that there is one other change that I would want to have along with the Italian treaty. I want to have considered by the Conference inclusion in the treaty of the same language having Yugoslavia guarantee rights of Italians in the territory which is ceded to Yugoslavia as is provided that Italy must guarantee. At London the Yugoslav Delegation, as I recall it, stated that if territory were transferred to them, they agreed that there should be full guarantee that there would be no discrimination against people in that territory because of religion, and that its rights of fundamental freedom, freedom of expression, etc., would be guaranteed, and I think it would be good to include that language in the treaty. I would like to prepare a paper and submit it to the Deputies for their consideration.

M. Molotov: It seems to me that we have to reckon with the fact that Yugoslavia is not a defeated country. It has a constitution and laws of its own, and we have no reason to tender any advice to Yugoslavia on the question of its internal life.

Mr. Byrnes: That is true, but of course there is a difference. It is not a question of the Yugoslav Government guaranteeing certain fundamental rights to people who voluntarily become nationals of Yugoslavia, but here the Council by its action is proposing to take territory and cede it to Yugoslavia, transferring people of another nationality without asking them whether they want to go or not, and when they do it is not asking much of Yugoslavia to say that if you want this territory and if you want these people and you want us to cede this territory to you, we must ask that you cooperate enough to guarantee them these fundamental rights. I have no idea that the Government of Yugoslavia would hesitate about doing it, and certainly when we are proposing the cession of territory and the transfer of human beings to another government without any agreement on their part, it would give great comfort to those people who are so transferred to another country and might contribute to the future peace of the territory.

Mr. Bevin: What are your wishes in this matter?

Mr. Byrnes: I would like to know whether we can agree in principle and then let the Deputies work out some language for the document.

M. Molotov: Let the Deputies agree on it.

Mr. Bevin: Could the United States put their draft in and let the Deputies look at it.

Mr. Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, that is my proposal. I have some language, but I think it would be better to let the Deputies agree on the language. If they can’t agree, let it go to the Conference.

M. Molotov: Is that the question of ceded territories in general?

Mr. Byrnes: I would make as a basis of the language the language in the Italian treaty. Yugoslavia could take on measures necessary to secure to all persons in the territory ceded to Yugoslavia by this treaty without discrimination the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms including freedom of expression, religion, political opinion and public meeting. May I suggest this: Suppose we said instead of “Yugoslav” “any state” to which territory is ceded under this treaty.

M. Molotov: This will give rise to an embarrassing situation because the first demand applies to Italy, a defeated country, and it appears now that a similar demand is to be presented to the Allied countries like Yugoslavia and France. What particular reason is there to ask such a demand of an Allied country? In my view it is not necessary. It goes without saying and Allied democratic countries realize this without our demanding it.

Mr. Byrnes: It is thought that to use those words, “any states”, it would also apply to Greece to whom we transferred the Dodecanese. I cannot see why any country would hesitate to agree to guarantee that persons in territory ceded to them shall be assured of these fundamental freedoms.

Mr. Bevin: Would we be covered by the Charter in this [apparent garble] of the Allied Nations, under Article 1?

Mr. Byrnes: If this general language is used, as we all agreed to the Charter, we will simply be promoting the fundamental principle of the Charter. We could do nothing better than to agree to the principle that is stated in the very first chapter of the United Nations.

Mr. Bevin: Does anybody else want to speak? Then it is agreed that the United States put their draft in and the Deputies consider it. If there is no settlement of this, we will send it to the Conference. It should apply to all ceded territories and not to Yugoslavia alone.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation sees no use for such an article in respect to Allied democratic states.

Mr. Bevin: What do we do?

M. Molotov: Although with respect to Greece it would be very useful.

Mr. Bevin: Well, now is there anything else on the report?

Mr. Byrnes: If it is not agreed in principle, I want it noted that the United States Delegation will submit it to the Conference.⁵⁹

Mr. Bevin: Is there anything else? Then we can pass on to Austria. I beg your pardon—Coal.

Coal

Mr. Bevin: M. Bidault asked that the resolution as amended and accepted this morning now be agreed on coal.

(Coal proposal, with amendment, is agreed)⁶⁰

Austria—Displaced Persons

Mr. Bevin: Now we reached the point this morning in which this question of treaty with Austria had become associated with displaced persons.⁶¹ The United Kingdom Delegation regrets that M. Molotov put these two things together. We don’t desire to evade any discussion on displaced persons and, well, I think this method of putting us in this position of bargaining one against the other is not good. We are quite willing to discuss the displaced persons thing but I am anxious that in this session we don’t get into a long argument about priorities and so delay a settlement. I would suggest that we could agree that the Council of Foreign Ministers do all they can to find a solution to this displaced persons business, which is a headache to us all. I recognize that Austria should be relieved of this problem as soon as possible. But I do not think it is a prerequisite to allowing the Deputies to go on with considering the treaty. That is a separate thing as a result of the war and one which we ought to do our best to solve. Could we agree to that point. We could spend the rest of the evening trying to examine this displaced persons business.

M. Molotov: I wish to recall the fact that only two weeks ago a control agreement was adopted for Austria, a new control agreement signed by the Allied Council.⁶² This control agreement was welcomed in Austria and it extended the rights of the Austrian Government and satisfied the Allies. On the other hand, we all know that as far as this question of displaced persons is concerned, there were many who fought against our armies on the side of the enemy. The Austrians are more united in their views than any other nation. Recently the Austrian Parliament adopted a decision and decided to address the Allies to relieve Austria of these persons who constitute danger not only to the interior situation in Austria but also to the neighboring democratic countries, and therefore we cannot alter the issue and it is not possible to postpone its settlement.

Mr. Bevin: I would like to make it clear to M. Molotov that I don’t want to postpone it, but I don’t think one should be made dependent on the other. That is a bad method in this Council.

I want to remind ourselves that we agreed not to go back. That has cost a good deal of our time. We have now agreed that to take up other treaties, it would be some help to us here at this moment. As the United States put this on the agenda first, that is the question of the treaty with Austria; we have only been asked today to put on our agenda displaced persons. We don’t object to taking it today and see what can be done, but take it in its order in the way that it was brought before the Council.

M. Molotov: The fact that on the one hand the question of displaced persons is regarded as an important and urgent one is not clear, whereas on the other hand this question is being postponed. It cannot be postponed. From the realistic standpoint, this question is more urgent to Austria, and it is natural that they expect to obtain a reply to this question in the first place. As to the Allies, for them it is not only this question, but they are also concerned in the question to what extent steps are being taken in order to detach Austria from Germany and what methods have been taken to eliminate the remnants of Hitlerism in Austria. One should bear in mind the fact that with its small population Austria had 600,000 members of the Hitler party, which amounts to 20 percent of her total population, and it is therefore important to find out to what extent the democratic regime in Austria has been strengthened. It appears also necessary that the Control Council should express its opinion on this question. It seems to me that it is necessary to obtain information which will specifically bring conclusion of the peace with Austria in due time and as to the present time measures should be taken which will help to prepare the conclusion of a peace treaty with that country; and therefore, it appears to me that it is inexpedient to put off the settlement of the question.

Mr. Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I think we all recall that the Soviet Government through Generalissimo Stalin said that it did not want a peace of vengeance against satellite countries and we have all promised to regard Austria as a liberated country. I admit that we ought to refer the treaty to the Deputies and then we can grapple with the question that M. Molotov referred to as being of great interest to him in the administration of the military zones in Austria. We can call upon the Control Council to make a report to us as to the progress of de-Nazification so that before the time, long before the time the treaty is ready, we will have that report for our consideration. The problem of displaced persons is about as difficult a problem as we have been confronted with during the last twelve months. In Germany the last time I saw the figures, there were approximately 475,000 in the United States zone. In Austria I am informed that we have something in the neighborhood of 200,000, but about 116,000 or 117,000 of those are German, former Germans in Austria who were not nationalized. The question is what to do with them. The question has been submitted to the United Nations. We have appointed a special committee to study and determine what should be done with these homeless people.⁶³ In the paper⁶⁴ circulated by the Soviet Delegation reference was made to General Anders’⁶⁵ Army who fought against the Allies on the side of the Germans. We don’t know enough about that. My information, not directly but indirectly, is that there are none of these people in our zone.

The United States is troubled by the presence in this group of displaced persons of men who fought not against the United States and the Soviet Republic, but who fought with us in the common cause, who shed their blood just as Soviet, American and British soldiers did in the Allied cause, as displaced persons. We urge them to return to their homes, and if they wish to do so voluntarily, we do everything to facilitate it. When a man says he does not want to return to his home for political reasons, if he is afraid to return to his home, we must consider the position of the United States, which was developed by peoples from all over the world, many of them political refugees. Refugees from Britain, the Dutch and Irish, refugees from Russia and from Italy, from Greece, have made the United States what it is. Therefore, the United States is cooperating with the other representatives in the United Nations trying to find some solution to solve this terrible and difficult problem. We are willing to do our share, more than our share, to help solve it; but we can’t forcibly take men who fought by our side, on our side, in a common cause and force them to do what they say means punishment for them. Therefore, I say that we must continue to try to solve this problem, but it should not hold up the consideration of the treaty with Austria and I hope that we can agree to send to the Deputies our views as to such a treaty. I repeat that we have been and we will continue to help those who are in Austria emigrate from Austria. We would like to find out what to do with them, and anybody who has that solution, we would be glad to sit down and see what could be done to get them out of Austria.

Mr. Bevin: Are there any other observations?

M. Molotov: I wish to amplify my previous statement as follows: Mr. Byrnes said that among the displaced persons in question there were those who fought on the side of the Allies, but among the displaced persons in question there were those, and the fact is well known, there are those running into hundreds of thousands who fought on the side of Hitler, and it is not understood why we fail to settle this question, why we want to put it off. These people constitute a danger to Austria and to neighboring countries and it is against our interests to delay. It would be incorrect from the standpoint of the interest of the Allies and those of democratic Austria, and therefore the Soviet Delegation insists that this question be discussed as a whole and that not its fragments should be discussed. If we are not ready to discuss this question now, let us get ready for its discussion by ascertaining the views of the Allied Council in Austria and by collecting more precise data and then getting a reply to this sore question. It has been only two weeks ago that the Council of our four governments revised the terms of the control agreement in favor of Austria, which makes this all the more necessary.

Mr. Byrnes: I agree with what M. Molotov says that we ought to consider this picture as a whole. I agree to call on the Control Council for a report and that when we return here we set aside a session for the full discussion of it. In the meantime, I think we should communicate with the United Nations Committee to see whether as a result of their study they have any suggestions to make so that we can discuss the matter with the facts and the best advice that we can get. Can’t we reach that agreement and let the treaty go on to the Deputies?

M. Molotov: Why couldn’t we make a decision in principle to the effect that displaced persons should be removed from Austria without delay?

Mr. Byrnes: Who is going to move, and where are you going to move them? That would require careful thought as to where you were going to move them.

M. Molotov: It is not possible to leave them on the neck of Austria.

Mr. Byrnes: Whose neck are we going to put them on? We can all agree that we want to put them, but who can agree as to where you are going to put them? That is what the United Nations is considering to see if they can find places where they will take some of them, countries that will accept them. The United States really doesn’t care how quickly we agree on it. As I say, we have 500,000 and we would like to reduce it quickly.

M. Molotov: If we are not ready for the settlement of this question, let us postpone it.

Mr. Byrnes: I agree to postpone the consideration of the displaced persons until we return and then we can go into that more fully. I submit that it would be the wise thing to do to refer the treaty to the Deputies because the two questions are not related. Why should we delay a treaty with Austria because we can’t agree what to do with the people? Especially if Austria wants them out.

M. Molotov: This is only our first point. This item refers to the necessity to eliminate the remnants, the survivors of Hitlerism in Austria and to secure the final detachment of Austria from Germany. It would be necessary, therefore, to hear the views of the Allied Council in Austria on this question in order to see whether the measures that have been taken are adequate or not.

Mr. Bevin: I would like to ask M. Molotov what he means in those words “final detachment”.

M. Molotov: I have information to the effect that many of the laws which we are to enforce are Hitler German and have not been replaced by Austrian laws. There is also information to the effect that families of Germanistic sentiments are encouraged in Austria, which were nourished by Germany, and there are instances in which they are nourished in the present day Austria.

Mr. Bevin: If there are Hitler laws in Austria today, it would be our fault, wouldn’t it, because the Government of Austria isn’t able to do very much until this recent change.

M. Molotov: It should be necessary to obtain a report from the Allied Council in Austria on this question in order to see what the real state of things is now.

Mr. Bevin: In what sense can we consolidate further the democratic order in Austria?

M. Molotov: Many things are implied by this. As far as we know most of the officials that served in Austria under the Hitler regime retained their positions in the state, for instance in the courts. It would be well to have a report of the Allied Council of the actual political situation in Austria in the light of the elimination of the survivors. I have information to the effect that in the interlude between July 18, 1945 and June 12, 1946 there was brought legal action against 18,356 persons, but sentences were passed only on 570 persons. That means that active Hitler agents in the overwhelming majority of cases are unpunished. I should like to cite one of the decrees adopted by the Allied Council on March 26, 1946, which reads as follows: (reads decree)

Mr. Bevin: Apparently we can’t get agreement on this, can we? I have no objection, speaking for the United Kingdom, to asking the Allied Council to give us a report on anything, displaced persons or anything; but I think if we do, we should agree to item 4 of the Soviet proposal and then we can go on to these troubles next time we meet. I couldn’t accept the language of no. 2, which has a list of persons and figures. Since I didn’t know this case would arise today, I have had no time to get an analysis. I have no objection to no. 1 if all these names were taken and the whole problem of displaced persons was inquired into. Do we agree to that?

M. Molotov: I would prefer to consider the question when the first two items are cleared.

Mr. Bevin: What are the questions of the Council?

Mr. Byrnes: Notwithstanding the consideration of Austria, we can’t get started on drafting of Austria until our Soviet friends are satisfied about the displaced persons situation. I just asked the Soviet Representative——

M. Molotov: It is not so!

Mr. Byrnes: Under this language—under no. 4 of the Soviet proposal, the Council of Foreign Ministers instructs its Deputies to proceed without delay, after the drafting of the treaties with the satellites of Germany have been completed, with the preparation of the treaty with Austria. I would like to think that is the position of the Soviet Delegation and that they would want the Deputies to proceed without delay.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation pushes in the forefront the question raised in paragraph 1 of its proposal. And therefore, the question of displaced persons is not the main question of the Soviet Delegation. Of no less importance is the question referred to in paragraph 3 of the Soviet proposal; that is to say, the question of elimination of the survival of Hitlerism in Austria, and the final detachment of Austria from Germany. If we should accept the proposal of the Soviet Delegation in principle, then we should be able to go back to paragraph 4 of that proposal; that is to say, after the conference and after the completion of the drafting of the peace treaty our Deputies could proceed with the preparation of a peace treaty with Austria. If we are unable to agree now to make a decision, then let us discuss this question the next time we meet.

Mr. Bevin: I want to say on behalf of the United Kingdom Delegation I couldn’t agree to either one in principle because it is assuming that what M. Molotov says is correct without any investigation at all. It pronounces judgment on the Austrian Government without ever giving them a chance to be heard and it causes a grave reflection upon the representatives of the Allied Council that they are not doing their job. I am perfectly willing for the Allied Council to go into it, but to keep my mind open until I get the evidence of what is being said about Austria is true or not true. I cannot come to a judgment on an ex-parte statement.

Mr. Byrnes: In April the United States asked merely that this matter be referred to the Deputies. We were told there was no draft. We have prepared a draft. We have circulated it. Now we ask that it be referred to the Deputies. It is said that we must agree to three paragraphs. If we agree to that we don’t know what will be asked. If the Soviet Delegation recognizes that we cannot agree to that, we are willing to go on to another question. I would like to know if we could agree on the proposal which was previously considered with reference to central agencies in Germany, with the exception of the Saar region. M. Molotov said this morning he would like to study it, and I wonder whether he could tell us at this time whether he could agree to that.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation wants to note that the observation that has just been made does not reflect the precise attitude of the Soviet Delegation. I want to refer to the letter addressed to the American Ambassador in Moscow on April 22⁶⁶ in order to explain the attitude of the Soviet Delegation on this subject. The Soviet Delegation has always held that the discussion of the question of Austria ought to be made contingent upon the necessity to see clearly how the conditions have been fulfilled, which we consider necessary for democratic reconstruction of Austria and the elimination of the survival of Hitlerism in Austria in order to be able to conclude a peace treaty with Austria. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation feels that it is impossible not to insist on its proposals but thinks it necessary to obtain from the Allied Council in Austria a report showing to what extent this has been carried out in order to have a clear picture of the physical situation in Austria. This should also include the question of displaced persons. If this can be done in a short time, so much the better.

Mr. Bevin: Do I understand the proposal of M. Molotov is that we send paragraph 1 to the Control Council and ask for the observations, and also paragraph 2 as to displaced persons and refugees, together with a resume of the discussion this afternoon—and if we agree to that, M. Molotov will agree to paragraph 4.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation does not withdraw its paragraph 4, but in view of the fact that we do not propose to adopt any decisions on paragraphs 1 and 2, the Soviet Delegation suggests that we ask the Allied Council Austria to submit its views on paragraphs 1 and 2 and that then we discuss these questions as well as the questions formulated in paragraphs 3 and 4.

Mr. Byrnes: I would like to ask—I think that disposes of that question, and I would like to ask whether we could reach agreement on central administration, which M. Molotov wished to study.

Central Administration for Germany

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation stated today when this question was raised that it would require some time in order to study. Too short a time has passed in order to have been able to study that big question. The Soviet Delegation expresses its doubt as to whether it will be possible to settle the German problem by parts. When we started discussion of the problem in its entirety, questions were raised regarding the Ruhr; reparations and other questions. In any case, the Soviet Delegation will continue to study this question.

Mr. Byrnes: I think possibly the Soviet Representative possibly misunderstood. All I asked was whether or not we agreed to carry out the Potsdam Agreement as to central agencies. The Soviet Representative was party; the U.S. Representative was party; the British Representative was party. France was not in a position to approve it but I made the proposal to except the Saar. It was not a question of study. It is a question of whether we carry out what we promised to carry out. I just submit that Mr. Bevin, M. Molotov and Mr. Byrnes are bound by it. France was not at Potsdam. They reserve their right; if they can agree to go along, certainly the other three of us could agree to stand by it.

M. Molotov: It is well known that the Berlin decision regarding central organs for the German administration is not bound up with the Saar question. In as much as the proposal regarding the Saar has been made, the Soviet Delegation feels it necessary to study this question and feels that the questions which relate to the German problem are closely connected.

German Assets in Austria

Mr. Bevin: One other matter I have been instructed to raise with my colleagues—that is the question of what is a German asset in Austria. If the treaty had been gotten on with, some satisfactory definition would have been put in the treaty. In view of the German penetration into Austria after the Anschluss, we feel that the matter ought to be investigated and an agreed definition by the four powers fixed. I agree that this is a late hour to decide this matter but I am instructed to propose that we agree to a four power commission to study the matter and advise us on a definition. We are prepared to take pending the formation of a commission no further action to impound German assets in Austria. We are prepared to circulate now the U.K. definition under the instructions of my government. We would like our experts to consider it together with any other proposals of other governments with respect to it.

Mr. Byrnes: The United States is impressed with the importance of this and for a long while have been urging that there should be agreement among the four powers on a definition, and therefore agrees to the proposal of the United Kingdom.

M. Molotov: We have not got this question on our agenda. The Soviet Delegation is not ready to discuss a new question.

Mr. Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I don’t remember anybody agreeing to an agenda with displaced persons on it. It was discussed in connection with the Austrian question and therefore this is an Austrian question.

Mr. Bevin: Well, I understood it was an Austrian question. That is why I didn’t raise any objection to discussion of paragraph 1 or 2 or M. Molotov’s paragraph 4.

M. Molotov: There are very many Austrian questions. We will be unable to finish all the questions.

Mr. Bevin: This has affected the stability of our staff. We are all ready to eat. We merely ask for agreement for an expert committee to study the definition. That should not be very difficult.

M. Molotov: How many minutes are proposed for this meeting, and how many more questions will be proposed?

Mr. Bevin: I have no more.

Participation of Countries Concerned With German Problem

M. Bidault: On behalf of the French Delegation I take note of what has been said today. I don’t think I have taken much time of the Council. Secondly, I should like to inform my colleagues that when we meet again only between ourselves France expects the French Delegation to raise the question of participation of countries directly concerned with the German problem because they are neighboring countries. I refer to Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Denmark, which ought to be associated with our work. I am not going to insist now further on this point. I just thought it necessary to point it out to you in order that you may be able to think a little about it. I intend to raise it again at the first opportunity.

Mr. Byrnes: I want to say that I am in accord with the French Delegation. I think they should be heard. If he makes a proposal, I shall certainly support it.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation feels it necessary that the question be discussed among us, and not in haste.

M. Bidault: I am not asking that this question be discussed now, but simply giving notice that I shall ask that the matter be discussed.

Mr. Bevin: Any other item?

(There were none)

Mr. Bevin: We shall meet at the peace conference.

46. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
47. Not printed. With respect to those articles or items which had not been agreed upon for the various draft peace treaties, the positions and proposed language put forward by each of the Delegations were incorporated in the texts of the draft treaties submitted by the Council of Foreign Ministers to the Paris Peace Conference. Those draft treaties are printed in vol. iv, pp. 1–116.
48. Under consideration at this point was the Tenth Report of the Committee of Naval Experts, C.F.M.(46) 197, July 6, 1946, p. 816.
49. The document under reference here is C.F.M.(D) (46) 44, March 18, 1946; see first paragraph of footnote 64, p. 816.
50. At this point the Secretary of State was undoubtedly referring to document C.F.M.(46) 69, May 11, 1946; regarding that document, see last paragraph of footnote 64, p. 816.
51. This appears to be a garble in the Record; the Secretary was apparently speaking about the document cited in footnote 50 above.
52. The document under reference cannot be further identified.
53. The agreed wording on the article in question is included as item IV of the Record of Decisions of this meeting, infra.
54. For the text of article 26 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Rumania as agreed to at this Council meeting and subsequently referred to the Paris Peace Conference, see vol. iv, p. 73.
55. The Soviet Delegation’s proposal under reference here was C.F.M.(46) 162, June 27, 1946, the text of which is included in the United States Delegation Record of the Council’s 28th Meeting, June 27, 1946, p. 648.
56. The Council’s decision on article 26 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Rumania is set forth as item IV, part 1 of the Record of Decisions of the Council’s 29th Meeting, June 28, 1946, p. 681.
57. July 17.
58. The reference at this point is to item 12 of the Report of the Deputies to the Council, C.F.M.(46) 227, July 12, 1946, not printed; see footnote 47, p. 918.
59. The United States proposal under discussion here was subsequently included as paragraph 4 of article 13 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy referred to the Peace Conference; see vol. iv, p. 8.
60. The document under consideration at this point is C.F.M.(46) 226, July 11, 1946, p. 901.
61. For additional documentation regarding the interest of the United States in the political and economic developments in Austria, including the question of displaced persons in that country, see vol. v, pp. 283 ff.
62. Reference here is to the Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France on the Machinery of Control in Austria, signed June 28, 1946; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 28, 1946, p. 175.
63. The reference here is to the Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons, established in pursuance of a resolution of February 14, 1946, of the United Nations Economic and Social Council. For a brief summary of the work of this committee and the handling of the refugee question in the United Nations, see the editorial note, vol. v, p. 138.
64. The reference here is to C.F.M.(46) 230, July 12, 1946, p. 939.
65. Lt. Gen. Wladyslaw Anders had been Commander of the II Polish Corps in Italy during World War II and Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces (in exile) in 1945; in 1946, he was in exile in the United Kingdom. In 1946, Polish military formations remaining in Italy were being demobilized.
66. The text of Molotov’s letter of April 22, 1946, to Ambassador Smith on the matter of taking up the Austrian treaty at the forthcoming session of the Council of Foreign Ministers is quoted in full in telegram 1340, April 25, 1946, from Moscow, vol. v, p. 336.