Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Fifth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 5, 1946, 5 p.m.⁵⁵

Paris, July 5, 1946, 5 p.m.

secret

Report of the Deputies

Mr. Bevin opened the meeting and called upon Mr. Dunn to give the report of the Deputies.

Mr. Dunn stated that the Deputies had held two meetings, one in the morning and one at 3:00 o’clock that afternoon. They had agreed to present the suggested agenda which was now before the Ministers (CFM (46) 191).⁵⁶ They had agreed on the order only of the first three items. The order in which these subjects would be taken was in any case left to the decision of the Ministers themselves.

Mr. Dunn made the following statement:

“The text of an invitation to be sent by the French Government to the other Governments to be represented at the Conference to be held in Paris July 29 was approved by the Deputies and has been submitted to the Ministers as CFM (46) 190.⁵⁷ The text as submitted contains a statement suggested by the Soviet Deputy to the effect that draft rules of procedure and organization will be transmitted simultaneously with the invitation. Whereas the United Kingdom and United States Deputies hope that it may be possible to agree to some procedure they do not agree that it is necessary to withhold the invitation until agreement is reached upon these proposals as they consider it important that the invitation be issued today.

“A discussion ensued with respect to the participation of China. The Soviet Deputy does not consider that China is one of the states on whose behalf the invitations should be sent, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3a of the Berlin decision.⁵⁸ The United States Deputy considers that the Berlin and Moscow decisions provided that the Conference should be convoked by the Council of Foreign Ministers of which China is a member and that it was only for the preparation of the treaties that China does not participate.

“The Soviet Deputy proposed to amend the first paragraph of page 3 to include ‘in accordance with its decision of July 4’ after ‘on behalf of the C.F.M.’ The United States Deputy could not accept this proposal as in his opinion this would pre-judge the question of China’s participation as an inviting power.

“Soviet amendments to the French proposals for draft rules of procedure and organization of the Conference were then discussed by the Deputies. The Soviet proposals envisage the establishment of separate commissions to deal with each treaty consisting of the States members of the Conference which are at war with the enemy concerned, leaving to the General Commission the task of coordinating the work of the individual commissions. Under the Soviet plan the Italian committee would consist of 20 members, the Rumanian of 11, the Bulgarian of 12, the Hungarian of 12 and the Finnish of 9.

“The French proposal on the other hand contemplates the establishment of technical committees which would permit all invited states to take part in the discussions in the Committees and avoid the necessity of review of all questions by all members in the General Commission.

“No agreement having been reached, the Deputies will require further instruction from the Ministers.”

Mr. Dunn said that the Deputies had also prepared a draft text on Italian reparation. This text contained five paragraphs and there was an additional paragraph still under discussion. There had been a subsequent agreement that the word “external” which appeared in brackets in the fifth paragraph should be deleted.

Agenda of the Meeting

Mr. Bevin asked whether his colleagues desired to settle the order of the agenda.

Mr. Byrnes said that, since a decision had been reached on the question of invitations, it might be placed first on the agenda.

Mr. Bevin said that it was his understanding that the Deputies had agreed to propose that items 1 and 2 on the list before them should be taken in that order, but that they had not agreed on the other items.

M. Molotov had no objection to discussing the first two items which concerned the Peace Conference, but he wished to recall that the Council had decided to discuss the German question and to suggest that they proceed to do so after the discussion on the first two items.

Mr. Byrnes had no recollection of any agreement to take up the German question at this meeting. Some days ago there had been the suggestion that they take up the Yugoslav-Italian frontier and Trieste, the colonies, the date of the Peace Conference and then Germany, with the understanding that if at any time any member of the Council wished to take up some question connected with the peace treaties, that should have priority over the German question. He submitted that, in order to let the Deputies get on with their work on the treaties, it would be desirable to take up first the peace treaty questions and then go on with the German question.

M. Molotov stated that a week before four questions had been placed on the agenda: Trieste, the Italian colonies, the Peace Conference and the German question. They had now discussed three of those questions but not the fourth. When that agenda had been agreed, it was for the next meeting. Therefore, he wished to suggest that they take up the German question immediately after the first two items on the list now before them, namely, the question of the invitations, the draft rules of procedure, the organs of the Conference and the draft article on reparation. He suggested that the German question not be taken off the agenda where it was placed a week ago.

Mr. Bevin asked when it was intended that the Council take up the other questions on the list before them.

M. Molotov suggested that they establish the agenda now, placing the German question on the list for discussion at the present meeting, after consideration of the first two items despite the fact that it ought to have been placed first. It was the only one of the four questions mentioned above which had not yet been examined. That was why he proposed placing it on the agenda now as item No. 3.

Mr. Byrnes said that he was sure that the Soviet Representative was referring to proposals which he (Mr. Byrnes) had made the week before. He had asked that the colonies, the Peace Conference and the German question be considered. That order had been changed and the question of reparation had been substituted, even though Germany was ahead of reparation on the list. He had no objection to the proposal of the Soviet Delegation if the latter desired to stop discussing the treaties and discuss the questions of Germany and Austria after consideration of the first two items on the present list.

M. Bidault said that he knew that his colleagues had not forgotten that already in a number of meetings the French Delegation had asked that the German question be placed on the agenda for discussion. He wished now to make a conciliatory proposal which would be acceptable to all delegations. The Council might first take up the first two items on the list now before them, then take up German and Austrian questions. The remaining items, which, except perhaps the question of the Danube, dealt with minor questions, might be sent to the Deputies for decision. Adoption of this solution would ease the work of the Council and also maintain its agreement to discuss Germany. The Deputies had shown that they were able, if given instructions, to arrive at settlements of difficult questions. It might be best to leave the remaining peace treaty questions for their decision.

M. Molotov thought that the German question should be considered apart from the Austrian and other questions. In fixing the agenda for the present meeting, it would be enough to list the two questions relating to the Peace Conference plus the question of Germany.

M. Bidault recalled that the original agenda for the Conference had mentioned successively German questions and Austrian questions. Accordingly, he had no objection to their being taken in that same order.

Mr. Bevin asked whether they could proceed on that basis.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had no objection to adding the question of Germany and asked that the question of Austria also be added. He had to admit, however, that he had not expected that Germany would be discussed that afternoon. It was certain that they would not be able to complete it at that meeting, but if they were fixing an agenda for the next meeting or two, they ought to put the questions in order. In any case, the discussion would take several days. He wished to repeat that he had no objection to discussing Germany at this meeting, but had to admit that he did not have with him a paper which he desired to put in on Germany, not having expected the question to come up. But there was no objection to discussing it on that day or the next, and when the discussion was finished, the Council would go on and discuss Austria.

Mr. Bevin said that in fairness to the Deputies who had to prepare the draft treaties to be sent to the seventeen invited nations, the Council should let them know how it intended to deal with the problem of the treaties. The Deputies had to know whether the Council would let certain items go to the Peace Conference in unagreed form if no agreement could be reached in the next few days. As the Deputies had mentioned this question in their report, it might be referred back to them with a request to look into it.

Mr. Byrnes thought that that was the best way to deal with the question. They could refer to the Deputies the remaining items on the agenda which the latter had prepared for the present meeting and let the Deputies settle them.

M. Molotov thought that these matters could be referred to the Deputies on the understanding that steps would be taken to reach agreement on them.

Mr. Bevin said that the Deputies would report back to the Council whether they could get agreement or not. He supposed that it would not take the Deputies long to go over those points.

Draft Invitation to Seventeen United Nations

Mr. Bevin suggested that his colleagues now consider item No. 1 on the list before them, the question of the draft invitation, and that of the rules of procedure and organs of the Peace Conference. The Chairman of the Deputies had reported that differences had arisen concerning the last paragraph of the draft invitation.

M. Molotov said that it seemed to him that the proposal to make reference to the decision of the Council of July 4 concerning the convocation of the Peace Conference was quite correct and should be kept in the text.

Mr. Bevin asked M. Molotov what was the importance of mentioning July 4. What did it involve?

M. Molotov said that in the first place it corresponded to the facts. This was a decision which had been taken on July 4. In the second place it indicated who had made the decision. It had been made by the four powers represented here.

Mr. Byrnes said that the Council of Foreign Ministers had been established at Potsdam by the three heads of governments. They had provided that its task would be to draw up peace treaties with the view to submitting them to the United Nations. The agreement did provide in a subsequent paragraph that the treaties should be drawn up under certain conditions. This language had been the cause of great differences among the members of the Council. While there were differences of opinion concerning which members of the Council should participate in the drafting of certain treaties, certainly there was no room for difference of opinion on the fact that the Potsdam Agreement provided that the Council of Foreign Ministers should submit the treaties when drafted to the United Nations. The Potsdam decision did not say that the treaties should be submitted by some members of the Council but by the Council, and Potsdam had provided who should comprise the Council and had named the five states. After Potsdam, three of the Foreign Ministers had met in December at Moscow. They had made provision for the calling of a Peace Conference. The agreement stated that when the preparation of the draft treaties had been completed, the Council of Foreign Ministers would convoke a conference for the consideration of peace treaties. It said, not that some members of the Council, but that the Council would convoke the Conference. Before that agreement was announced, it was communicated to France and the French Government joined in the announcement that the Council of Foreign Ministers would convoke a conference for the purpose of considering the treaties. The language of the Moscow agreement, which all wished to uphold, provided that the Peace Conference would consist of the five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers, together with all members of the United Nations which had taken an active part in the war in Europe. Therefore, he wished to submit that the Council should not violate what was intended at Potsdam and was explicitly agreed at Moscow by convoking a conference on invitation of four or three or two members. It must be convoked, as the Moscow agreement said, on the invitation of all five members. Admittedly, this was not a matter of the greatest importance, but he disliked to have the Council take action which was in violation of agreements and which would hurt the feelings of a member of the Council, which had been made a member by the decision of Generalissimo Stalin, President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee at Potsdam.

Mr. Bevin said that he supposed the effect of mentioning the decision of July 4 was that it indicated that they had settled the question when China was not represented.

M. Molotov said that that was right. Mr. Byrnes had referred to the decisions of the Berlin and Moscow conferences. It should be pointed out that the Berlin decision, to which they had all agreed, clearly indicated that it was for the Four Governments to prepare the peace treaties and that the Council composed of four members should solve the problems of the peace treaties. There was no reference to China in this connection. It was quite clear that the Four Governments were charged with the preparation of the treaties and with the convocation of a Peace Conference. On the substance of the question, the four members present knew very well that the peace treaty drafts had already been prepared by them. China had not participated in the discussion of those questions. China had not been informed of their discussions and did not even know whether there were any peace treaties or not. In these circumstances how was it possible to issue invitations to the Peace Conference on behalf of China? It was clear that responsibility for convoking the Peace Conference rested on the Four Powers, and this was in full accord with the decisions made at Berlin and Moscow. It was impossible to issue invitations in the name of China since China did not know what had been done or what had been decided, but naturally China would participate in the Peace Conference and this would satisfy China.

Mr. Bevin wished to ask M. Molotov whether China would, in his view, be at the Conference in two capacities, one as a belligerent and one as a member of the Council. The Moscow decision said that the Conference would be attended by the five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers plus the other United Nations which had taken an active part in the war. In which capacity would China attend?

M. Molotov said that Mr. Bevin had asked a complicated question. He would like to put a simpler question and ask why China was not at the present meeting discussing these peace treaties.

Mr. Byrnes said China was not there because the Soviet Government had objected to it.

M. Molotov said that the United States had agreed to that. It was a joint decision.

Mr. Byrnes asked why France was here. It was because the Soviet Government had withdrawn its objection to France’s participation.

M. Molotov said that the participation of France in the drafting of the Italian treaty had been provided for at Berlin and at Moscow.

Mr. Byrnes said that it was true that France’s participation in drafting the Italian treaty had been decided by agreement of the three heads of governments and that in the preparation of that treaty France was to be regarded as a signatory of the Armistice. On the other treaties France was in the position of China. There was a clear distinction in the Potsdam agreement and the Moscow agreement between those powers which would be engaged in drafting the treaties and those which would be sending the invitations to the Peace Conference. They were two separate things. There had been differences of opinion on the subject of participation in drafting the treaties. The United States and the United Kingdom had contended that France and China should be permitted to participate in the preparation of all the treaties. The Soviet Government had taken a different view. Finally, the United States had given up its position and had accepted the Soviet view that only those powers should participate which had been signatories to the respective armistice agreements. When the United States had surrendered that view, it had entered into another agreement at Moscow. There could be no doubt about what that Moscow agreement said. It said that the Peace Conference would consist of the five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers, together with all members of the United Nations which actively waged war with substantial military force against European enemy states.

Mr. Byrnes said that according to the report of the Deputies, the proposal had been made that the French Government, in the invitation, would say that, acting on behalf of the Council of Foreign Ministers, it had the honor to invite the Government of such and such state. The name of China did not appear in that text. There was certainly no excuse to go out of their way to violate the Moscow agreement which said that the five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers would be members of the Conference. Since it was not necessary to do otherwise, he submitted that the wise thing to do was to adopt the language he had just cited. It did not mention China at all. China would be at the Conference as one of the five members of the Council as provided in the Moscow agreement. China could participate in making recommendations, which was all that the Conference was going to do. Any recommendations made by the Conference would come back to the Council of Foreign Ministers and under the Moscow agreement he admitted that China would not participate in the final drafting of the text which would be done in the Council of Foreign Ministers by the signatories to the armistice agreements.

M. Molotov said that it remained for him to recall that the questions connected with the peace treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland had been assigned to the countries which were signatories to the armistice agreements, plus France in the case of Italy. Of course, they must stick by that decision. On the other hand, there was no doubt that China would participate in the Peace Conference. China had the right to be there and must be there.

Mr. Bevin asked in what capacity China would be there, as a, member of the Council, in accordance with the Moscow Decision.

M. Molotov said that China would be there in accordance with the decisions of the Berlin and Moscow Conferences. There was a big difference between the four Powers which had participated in the drafting of the peace treaties and another power which had not participated. They could not be equally responsible for the preparation of the Peace Conference. That responsibility fell on the four governments in accordance with the Berlin and Moscow Decisions.

Mr. Bevin said that he was only trying to get the thing clear in his own mind. He asked whether in the letter to be sent to the Chinese Government concerning its attendance at the Peace Conference China would be invited to attend as one of the five members of the Council according to the Moscow Decision.

M. Molotov asked whether China was familiar with the different peace treaties as prepared by the Four Powers.

Mr. Bevin said that M. Molotov had not answered his question. When they sent the letter to China, would China be invited in the same way as the sixteen other United Nations or as a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers in accordance with the Moscow Decision?

M. Molotov called Mr. Bevin’s attention to paragraph 3, subparagraph (b) of the Berlin Decision which defined the composition of the Council of Foreign Ministers for these questions. China was not mentioned there in connection with the peace treaties. Consequently the four Governments represented here constituted the Council for this question and they would invite the other countries, including China, to participate in the Conference.

Mr. Bevin said that he understood M. Molotov’s answer to be that China would be invited as one of the other states not members of the Council. He could not reconcile that with the Moscow Decision, which he thought had superseded the Berlin Decision since it had been made at a later date. He only wanted to do the right thing and not offend China. The Moscow Decision said clearly that the Peace Conference would consist of the five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers plus sixteen other states. If China was not invited as a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers, it seemed to him that they would be going back on the Moscow Decision. The question of the preparation of the treaties was a different thing altogether. That was covered in paragraph 1 of the Moscow Decision. When it came to the matter of convocation of the Peace Conference after the drafts had been prepared, the Moscow Agreement said clearly and explicitly that the Conference would consist of the five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers together with all members of the United Nations which actively waged war with substantial military force against European enemy states. If they did not act in conformity with that decision, they would be put in the position of going back on their word.

M. Molotov said that the Moscow Decision also referred to the decision of the Berlin Conference and was not inconsistent with it.

Mr. Byrnes said that everyone remembered what had happened. After the Potsdam Conference, there had been an honest difference of opinion. President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee had believed that France and China should be allowed to participate in all the meetings of the Council. Generalissimo Stalin had had the opposite opinion. There was a genuine difference of opinion among the heads of the three governments. Then the Foreign Ministers had gotten together at Moscow and after much difficulty had agreed on the compromise solution which said that the Peace Conference would consist of the five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers plus the other United Nations who had taken an active part in the war in Europe. Without that decision there would be no Peace Conference. It could not be changed now. It stated clearly that the five members of the Council would attend. It should not be necessary for the Ministers to have any more trouble about that question. The Deputies had worked out a decision according to which the French Government would, acting on behalf of the Council of Foreign Ministers, extend invitations. That language had been agreed to, China was not mentioned, and thus the question was not raised. Of course, the right thing to do would be for the Chairman of this meeting to advise the Foreign Minister of China that the governments which under the Moscow Agreement were charged with the preparation of the draft treaties had completed their work and that the Conference would be called on July 29, and that under the Moscow Agreement the Conference would consist of the five members of the Council plus sixteen other United Nations and that China was thereby being advised of the date. It was not necessary to go hunting trouble; it would overtake you.

Mr. Bevin said that the peace of the world seemed to be held up on a point of procedure nearly every day the Council met. Couldn’t they come to a decision on this point?

M. Molotov said that if they would only adhere to the decisions already adopted, there would be no argument.

Mr. Bevin said the difficulty was that every time they came to a decision, there was trouble about interpreting it. To be honest, M. Molotov had a great legalistic mind, but in this case he was not, in Mr. Bevin’s view, right. He (Mr. Bevin) would be prepared to let this legal point remain unresolved if it could only be done in a way that would not insult China.

M. Bidault said the French Delegation found itself in a comfortable and at the same time a difficult situation. It was comfortable because the question at issue was one of interpretation of the Potsdam and Moscow Agreements, to which France had not been a party. It was difficult because the French Government had to send out the invitations in consequence to those agreements to which France had adhered insofar as they concerned the Peace Conference. Accordingly the French Government was disposed to accept any interpretation of those agreements which could be agreed upon by the signatories. In any case, France would adhere with regret to any decision whereby China would not be one of the inviting powers. It was not a question of great political importance but had a moral importance for China. The French Delegation hoped that it would be possible to draw up a suitable text which would contain the reference to the Council of Foreign Ministers and at the same time would say nothing contrary to the interpretations which had been placed on the Berlin and Moscow Agreements at the present meeting. The Council had found suitable wording which resolved differences over questions much more difficult than this one. Judging from the prolonged discussion which had gone on without his participation, it was his understanding that the main point at issue concerned the role of the five members of the Council insofar as the sending of the invitations to the Peace Conference was concerned. Having the habit of acrobatics, he was willing to suggest the following text as a compromise: “The French Government, acting on behalf of the Council of Foreign Ministers, has, in consequence of the agreements made at Paris on July 4, 1946 between the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R., the honor to invite such and such state, etc.” Thus the name of the Council of Foreign Ministers would be maintained, and the decision would also be mentioned.

Mr. Byrnes said that the Peace Conference was going to be called, not as the result of a decision of July 4, but as a result of the Moscow Agreement, which said that when the preparation of the drafts had been completed, the Council of Foreign Ministers would convoke a Conference for the purpose of considering treaties of peace. He wished to suggest that they take the exact language of the Moscow Agreement. The words from paragraph 2 of that Agreement which he had just quoted could be repeated in the invitation. The French Government would then transmit the invitations. If they used the exact words of the Moscow Agreement, there could be no question by anybody regarding the way in which the treaties had been drawn up since that had been precisely stated in the Agreement itself.

M. Molotov said that the phrase suggested by Mr. Byrnes was already contained in the draft invitation which quoted the whole of the Moscow Decision.

Mr. Byrnes said that that was true. He had only suggested putting it into the last paragraph of the invitation in order to avoid the difficulties which they had encountered at the present meeting. If it were used there, there could be no doubt. This Peace Conference was based on the Moscow Agreement. It had been called for May 1. All the Council was doing now was changing the date. By citing and quoting the Moscow Agreement, they could accomplish what he understood M. Molotov wished to accomplish, namely to indicate how the treaties had been drafted.

M. Molotov said that the draft invitation already contained a reference to the Moscow Decision and, in fact, quoted it in full. But the draft before him had no reference to the decision of July 4. Accordingly, he had suggested that that decision be set forth in the invitation.

Mr. Byrnes said that they should state the fact that the Peace Conference was called in consequence of the Moscow Agreement. That was where the power to convoke it came from. All they had done on July 4 was to change the date. They might state in the invitation that on July 4 the date had been changed from May 1 to July 29. That would be a statement of fact.

Mr. Bevin suggested that it be stated in the invitation that the French Government “in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision referred to above and in accordance with the decision in Paris on July 4 by the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R. …” Would that not meet the situation? The Drafting Committee could work out the language more precisely. In that way they could inform China, China could adhere, and everything would be all right. China would not be a party to all the treaties, but was a party to convoking the Conference. Would not that meet M. Molotov’s objections?

M. Molotov said that this proposal would be a violation of the Berlin Decision and that he could not accept it. He wished to ask his colleagues to read paragraph 3, subparagraph (b) of the Berlin Decision. It was the paragraph upon which they must proceed in taking their decisions concerning the Peace Conference.

Mr. Bevin said that apparently they could not settle this question.

Rules of Procedure for Peace Conference and the Sending of the Invitations

Mr. Bevin said that there was another point in the draft invitation which had been mentioned in the report of the Deputies. The question was whether all the rules of procedure for the Conference should be agreed upon before the Council sent out the invitations or whether they should send out the invitations immediately and allow the Deputies to go ahead and work out the procedure. Agreement on the organization of such a Conference was bound to take a day or two. Since they had announced that the date of the Conference would be July 29, would it not be possible to let the invitations go out and have the Deputies work on the question of procedure? There would be no prejudice to anybody doing that.

M. Molotov said that the fact that the Conference would be held on July 29 was well known. The question at hand now was for the Ministers to complete the examination of the documents now before them in connection with the procedure for the Conference. He suggested that they might be referred to the Deputies for consideration.

Mr. Bevin said that he was advised that by the time all the procedure was worked out, it would be two or three days hence, and all the other governments would be wondering why they had not received invitations.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had a proposal to make which was probably too simple to secure acceptance. Why could they not draft a message which the French Government could send to these other governments to the effect that, acting on behalf of the Council of Foreign Ministers and under authority of the Moscow Agreement, France invited such and such government to attend the Conference in Paris on July 29?

M. Molotov suggested that these various formulas be referred to the Deputies for examination.

Mr. Bevin asked whether the Deputies should report at the next meeting.

M. Molotov said that they should.

Mr. Byrnes thought that it was important that the invitations be sent. Certainly the drafting of an invitation should not be difficult. They ought to be able to agree to the text of an invitation to a Conference which they had agreed to hold. If they could not, he was willing to let the French Goverment, as the host government, send invitations to the other twenty governments, and he would be content to read about it afterward. Could they not let M. Bidault do it? He did not have much to do.

M. Molotov thought that the Ministers needed some help on this matter and should get it from their Deputies.

Mr. Byrnes said that the Deputies had tried and failed.

M. Bidault said that he should like at least to be able to announce to the various governments concerned that they would in due course receive a formal invitation. He hoped that the formal invitation might be; agreed upon at the next meeting.

Mr. Bevin said that the proposal had been made that M. Bidault send an informal notice to the governments that formal invitations would be sent as quickly as possible and that in the meantime they refer the matter to the Deputies in the hope of getting agreement at the next meeting on the text of a formal invitation.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation detected an inconvenience in sending first informal and then formal invitations. That would be confusing. It seemed better to charge the Deputies with study of the question.

M. Bidault said that he was willing to admit that there had been confusion. He was not proposing that two invitations be sent but simply that he be able to tell the governments concerned which had read in the papers about the Conference that they would receive a formal invitation in due course.

Mr. Bevin said that the proposal before the meeting now was that the matter be referred to the Deputies and that the latter report the next day. Would this, then, be the first item on the agenda of the next meeting preceding other items which had been put on the agenda?

M. Molotov said that he proposed that the examination of the German question not be postponed and that at least one delegation be heard on this question. The Soviet Delegation proposed to make a statement.

Mr. Bevin stated that he must say, as the representative of Great Britain, that he felt their failure to send invitations was going to place them all in a state of humiliation before their own people. They decided to send invitations, but agreement on the text was held up by one delegation. The rest of them had to swallow a situation brought about by the refusal of one delegation to reach agreement. That was what he resented. He was anxious for the matter to go to the Deputies and hoped that they could find a formula that would be of some assistance. He hoped also that they could decide whether the invitations could be sent out regardless of whether all the procedure had been decided upon. He hoped that they could also settle the matter of procedure so that the Four Governments could at least maintain their respect in the eyes of the other peoples of the world. When the decision to hold the Peace Conference had been taken, he had thought that of course the invitations would go out as soon as possible.

Mr. Byrnes asked M. Molotov whether, if the latter’s conditions concerning the reference to the decision of the 4th of July were accepted, he would agree that the invitations could be sent out and that the Deputies would then go on with their work on the question of procedure.

M. Molotov said that he would not agree. He suggested that they keep the text as it was wherein it was provided that the proposals concerning the procedure and organization of the Conference would be transmitted on the same day as the invitations. Let the Deputies finish the matter the next day and then the invitations could be sent out.

Mr. Byrnes said that if it went to the Deputies and there was a stalemate, the invitations would be held up. If he agreed to send the invitation using the language the Soviet Delegation wished, would not M. Molotov agree to let the French Government send out the invitations that night?

M. Molotov said that the two questions were connected. The draft invitation said explicitly that the rules of procedure were being transmitted to the Embassy of such and such government that day.

Mr. Bevin suggested that the invitations might say that the draft rules of procedure would be forwarded as soon as possible instead of on that day. The Deputies could work on the procedure and the documents could be sent as soon as completed.

M. Molotov said that the two questions were connected.

Mr. Bevin said that he was unable to get agreement on this matter. What should he do? Should they send it to the Deputies?

M. Bidault said that he could only express the hope that he would be in a position to sign as soon as possible the letters of invitation which it was the duty of the French Government to sign on behalf of the Council.

Mr. Bevin said that he would like to ask somebody else to take the Chair. He felt quite hopeless about getting anywhere.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that they adjourn.

M. Molotov said that he did not understand why they were postponing the examination of the German question. They had been hurried in their consideration of it in April and in May. It had been postponed to discuss it and it had been placed on the agenda. Why did they keep on postponing it? Why could they not meet that evening at 9:00 p.m. to discuss the German question for an hour or half an hour?

Mr. Byrnes said that he had suggested discussing the German question about five or six days before. The Soviet Representative had not wanted to discuss it, because he wanted to discuss these peace treaties. Time and again the Soviet Representative had stated that they should get through with the peace treaties. Now tonight, when it was proposed to invite the governments of the world to a Peace Conference and the other members were willing to take his own proposed language, much as the U.S. Delegation objected to it because it was an insult to China, the Soviet Representative declined even to do that and would not send invitations even in his own words. The United States Delegation had brought from Germany its representative, General Clay, for the purpose of discussing German questions here. He had been kept here four days and finally, because of continued delays brought about by the Soviet Representative, he had been sent back to Germany. No one had any reason to believe that the Soviet Delegation had wanted to discuss the German question at this meeting. The U.S. Delegation had thought, after the agreements reached the previous evening, that the Council would wind up its work on the peace treaties so that the Deputies could get on with the job of drafting. The Deputies had met that morning. They had suggested an agenda. It had been agreed to by the Soviet Delegation. Not one word was said about Germany. There was a list of questions presented at the present meeting. When this list had been seen in the U.S. Delegation, it had prepared to discuss those questions. If they were now going to discuss Germany, he would send for his experts whose presence was necessary and be ready to dicuss it on Saturday or Sunday or Monday, but he was not going to discuss Germany just because it suited one member of the Council at the present moment to bring it up and insist on it.

M. Molotov said that there had been a misunderstanding. He was not insisting on discussing the German question that night without waiting for the experts Mr. Brynes needed. If General Clay was needed, they could wait a day. There was no question about that. When it was explained to him why the U.S. Delegation was not ready to discuss the German question immediately, he understood that explanation. He would not object to waiting another day. In regard to the references to the attitude of the Soviet Delegation, he did not think it was necessary for him to reply to them because they were absolutely unfair and groundless.

Mr. Bevin said that, according to the agenda for that meeting, they should first take a decision on the document before them. As an adherer to agendas, he took the view that it had to be settled before they took up anything else.

M. Molotov said they should abide by the established order and not suggest any new regulations. They had been discussing a question. They had not completed discussion of it. Let them decide how it should be further discussed, and then go on to the next question.

He understood that Mr. Byrnes was willing to discuss the German question the next day. He therefore suggested that they instruct the Deputies to work on the question of procedure and on the text of the invitations, and when the report of the Deputies was presented in the meeting the next day, they could proceed with their discussion of the German question.

Mr. Bevin said if it was understood that the Deputies would report the next day and that the question would then be decided before they went on to the German question, he was willing to agree in order to clear the agenda.

M. Molotov said that that interpretation was absolutely incorrect. Why should they put off the German question? They had been hurried in their consideration of this question in April, May, June and July, and they kept on postponing it. What had happened?

Mr. Bevin said that he would tell M. Molotov what had happened. Whenever anyone else had sought to change an agreed agenda, M. Molotov had always said they must stick to the agenda. That had been the record of the last few weeks. Now that he (Mr. Bevin) had got an agreed agenda for this meeting, he was going to stick to it. Items 1 and 2 would have to be settled. If they were going to hold to the agenda in one case, let them hold to it in another case. He wished to make it absolutely clear. There was no objection on his part to discussing Germany, no desire to delay the discusion of Germany. He was ready at any time to do so if the agenda had been fixed. But they were now discussing a report of the Deputies in which there were matters of vital interest to Great Britain. He had not suggested that they be discussed before the German question. He had tried to be conciliatory and had agreed to discuss Germany before those other questions, but here on the agenda the first item was the absolutely vital question of the sending of the invitations, and it looked as if it were going to be held up a long time and probably used for bargaining purposes, a course which he did not like.

M. Molotov said that he wanted only to point out that there were certain inaccuracies in Mr. Bevin’s statement when he had quoted the opinion of others. He did not intend to enter into the details of that question. He wished only to suggest that they discuss tomorrow the report of the Deputies on the questions which the Ministers had been discussing at this meeting. He wished also to suggest that the Council not postpone the discussion of the German question.

Mr. Bevin said that he was afraid that he could not discuss the German question while this other item remained unsettled. He was willing to have it go to the Deputies and hear their report and take a decision tomorow and then go right on from there with the German question.

Mr. Byrnes said that he only wished to repeat that since April he had been willing at any time to discuss the German question. He had said so again at this session, but there was no question in the minds of the Foreign Ministers at the present moment concerning the relative urgency of the matters before them. They had sent out to the world the night before notice that the Peace Conference would be held on July 29. There was no doubt of the urgency of acting on the basis of that decision. It had been contended by one delegation that there would hardly be sufficient time to prepare for a conference on that date. Were they now going to delay the preparation and sending out of the draft treaties and not give the other governments sufficient time to read them? He did not think that the Council of Foreign Ministers should place itself in the position of having agreed to hold the Peace Conference and to fixing the date and then find itself unable to agree on the language of the invitations to be sent by the French Government, and go on to their other work leaving that question unfinished. He (Mr. Byrnes) had stayed until 12:30 on the previous night to reach agreement on reparations, to please the Soviet Representative. He wondered if the Soviet Representative would agree to stay now until midnight to agree on this question of the invitations. Then they could go on with the German question tomorrow.

M. Molotov said that he had no objection and that they should go on considering the question.

Mr. Byrnes said they had agreed to M. Molotov’s language for the invitation. Why could they not agree to send it out? He had suggested language. M. Bidault had suggested language. Mr. Bevin had done the same. M. Molotov had objected to all those proposals and put forward one of his own. Then when the U.S. Delegation had agreed to the Soviet language, M. Molotov would then not even agree when the other delegations had said they agreed with him.

M. Molotov said that Mr. Byrnes’ statement was an inaccurate presentation of the matter. There were two questions which they were called upon to settle. Since they had reached agreement on one, why could they not reach agreement on the other? If Mr. Byrnes was prepared to go on with the work, he (M. Molotov) was also agreeable.

Mr. Byrnes said that he was agreeable. There were two entirely different questions. One was that of the invitation to attend the Conference. The other, according to the report of the Deputies, was the question of the suggestions on procedure to be presented to the Conference. There was no reason why the invitations could not be sent. Then the Deputies could work on the question of procedure. The Ministers could then look at the Deputies’ recommendations, and if they were accepted, they could be forwarded at an early date as suggestions to the invited governments. But it was necessary to send the invitations at once so that those governments could make their plans for the future.

Mr. Byrnes continued that the fact of the matter was that the Council of Foreign Ministers had not asked the Deputies to prepare rules of procedure. They had been asked only to draft the invitation. The U.S. Delegation had confidently expected that the invitations would be sent out that day. But now it appeared that they had to be held up because of some rules of procedure to govern what other people should do at the Peace Conference on July 29. This was not a question of substance. Why was it so important for the Council to make proposals regarding the procedure of the Conference. The Conference could take any such proposals and throw them aside. He (Mr. Byrnes) really doubted the wisdom of making such proposals. Would it be right to ask a government to come to a Conference and at the same time send a long letter saying that if that government came, these were the rules which would govern its conduct when it got there? The Conference had a right to make its own rules. If anyone suggested to the Four Powers what their rules should be, they would not like it. These other governments would not like it any more than the Four Powers, and they had the same rights. The Four Powers would be assuming to themselves a great deal of power without any authority to do so. It might even occur to some of those other governments which were coming to the Conference to say so and to say openly that they would make their own rules.

M. Molotov recalled the fact that as far back as the latter part of March the Deputies had started to discuss the question of the procedure of the Conference with the consent of the Foreign Ministers. Also the Ministers had agreed to place this question as item No. 1 on the agenda for the day. It was perfectly obvious that they should discuss procedure since the Council bore responsibility for the preparation of the Conference. They had to make suggestions on that subject.

Mr. Bevin said that the suggestion had been made that they settle the first point before them by agreeing to eliminate the last paragraph of the draft invitation. Alternatively, they might agree to substitute for it the following sentence: “Proposals for the organization of the Conference and for its rules of procedure will be forwarded later.” Could they agree on that and then let the Deputies go on and work out the procedure for submission to the Ministers for approval before the end of the present session?

Mr. Byrnes had no objection to following that course or to discussing the rules of procedure at the meeting of the Council. His point was that he did not want the invitations held pending the conclusion of that discussion.

M. Molotov suggested that the Deputies be instructed to consider the question of procedure and that after that the matter of sending the invitations could be discussed, as was envisaged by the agenda.

Mr. Bevin said that the Deputies might consider the question before the meeting of the Ministers tomorrow. The Ministers would then decide it before going on to other questions. It would be the first item on their agenda.

M. Molotov said that he had proposed only that they instruct the Deputies to discuss the first item on the agenda and to make a report to the Council.

Mr. Bevin asked whether M. Molotov would agree that it should be decided by the Council before they went on to discuss Germany.

M. Molotov said that Mr. Bevin was suggesting a new procedure which was not correct. He suggested that the Ministers confine themselves to the agenda.

Mr. Bevin said that they had agreed the night before with M. Molotov to take up the question of reparation and settle it that night. Now he wanted the U.K. to be given the same consideration on the question of the invitations.

M. Molotov said that he also was anxious that the question be solved the next day, but he had to recall the fact that Mr. Bevin had just said that the question of procedure would take two or three days to settle. They must do their best to settle it the next day.

Mr. Bevin said that he could not agree to the agenda until he had the report of the Deputies. He was willing that the matter should go to the Deputies and then they could take account of the situation after looking at the Deputies’ report.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that they decide the next day’s agenda when they met.

Mr. Bevin asked whether the Deputies would study the question of the invitations and the draft rules of procedure meantime.

It was agreed that the Deputies should study it and report the next day.

Reparation From Italy

Mr. Bevin said that the second item on the agenda was the report of the Deputies which presented a text based on the agreement reached the night before by the Council on the subject of reparation.⁵⁹ He understood that the word “external” which appeared in brackets in paragraph 5 was now to be considered as deleted by agreement.

Mr. Byrnes said that he was told that the paper before them was not complete and had not been finally agreed upon.

Mr. Bevin said that there was an additional paragraph to be added. He believed that it was agreed except for that paragraph.

Mr. Byrnes said that he would like to see the completed document.

Mr. Bevin asked whether the Deputies could supply the completed document at the next meeting. Then the Ministers could see just what the items were. He understood that there would be no alteration of the five points presented in the document before them.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation accepted these five items and agreed to the exclusion of the word “external”.

Mr. Byrnes said that he objected to considering the document until they had the completed text before them. He would be glad to consider it then.

Mr. Bevin said that this had been a most unfortunate day for him.

The meeting adjourned at 8:45 p.m.

55. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.

56. The agenda set forth in C.F.M.(46) 191, July 5, 1946, not printed, was as follows:

    1. Peace Conference: Draft Invitation and Rules of Procedure.

    2. Revised Draft of Reparation.

    3. In the order for the Ministers to determine:

    • Compensation for United Nations Property.
    • Settlement of disputes (Arbitration and Conciliation).
    • Interpretation.
    • United Nations Property: Special clauses relating to Insurance
    • United Nations Property—Roumanian Treaty: Special clauses relating to Oil, Shipping, etc.
    • Danube
    • General Economic Relations

      (a) State enterprises exception

      (b) Civil Aviation

    • Roumanian Treaty: General Economic Provisions (Soviet reservation on neighbouring countries).

57. C.F.M.(46) 190 is not printed. As subsequently amended by the Council, this document was circulated as C.F.M.(46) 190 (revised), July 8, 1946, p. 834.
58. The reference here is to the Report of the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, August 2, 1945, Fart II, paragraph 3, subparagraph ii, Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1500.
59. The document setting forth the text agreed to by the Deputies on reparations to the Soviet Union, which was before the Council at this point, was subsequently regarded as not having been formally promulgated as a Council document. The text relative to reparations for the Soviet Union was included in document C.F.M. (46) 207, July 9, 1946, p. 854.